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Shaw, Mark Robert (2016) 
Why the Media Matters: A Postfunctionalist Analysis of European Integration and 
National Identity in Public Discourse 
Abstract 
This study contributes to the growing literature on the politicisation of European 
integration in EU member states, and the United Kingdom in particular. Existing studies 
have shown that political identities are closely related to the levels of support held by 
citizens for European integration, and that citizen opposition to the EU is mobilised by 
political parties who activate the tension between identity and jurisdictional reforms. This 
study argues that existing theories of integration do not adequately acknowledge the role 
of the media in national debates about European integration, in light of the media’s role as 
the main source of information on the EU for citizens. It builds upon Liesbet Hooghe and 
Gary Marks’ (2009) postfunctionalist theory of European integration, to examine the 
process by which European integration is politicised in member states, and argues that the 
media should be theorised as a substantive actor in this process. It presents a new model – 
Media Augmented Postfunctionalism – that conceptualises the politicisation process and 
the role of the mass media within it. A discourse analysis of nine UK national daily 
newspapers and of political party discourses is deployed alongside a quantitative analysis 
of media positions to explore the linkages between the press, party discourses, and public 
opinion in the UK between 1997 and 2010.  
The thesis presents evidence to suggest that the structure of newspaper positions on 
European integration is similar to that of parties. It goes on to explore the content and 
character of newspaper discourses, and shows that there is a strong association between 
the position of newspapers on the ‘new politics’ dimension and their discursive 
construction of the EU: those newspapers that have a strongly traditional-authoritarian-
nationalist position are more likely to oppose European integration. It demonstrates that 
while there is a strong and cohesive anti-European discourse in the UK press, there is not a 
corresponding coherent pro-European discourse. This thesis finally shows that newspapers 
play an important role in mediating party discourses and that they substantively (re-)frame 
public debates on European integration, determining their character. These findings 
suggest that the mass media can alter the outcomes of the politicisation and contestation of 
the EU in member states.  
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Introduction 
This thesis develops an account of the politicisation and contestation of European integration 
in the domestic politics of European Union member states. In order to do so, it examines the 
recent ‘postfunctionalist’ theory of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009), 
and shows that European integration theory in general, and the postfunctionalist theory in 
particular, neglects the role of the media in influencing public attitudes towards European 
integration. The thesis develops a theory — termed the Media Augmented Postfunctionalist 
model — of how the mass media behaves in debates on European integration, and how the 
positions of media actors are structured in those debates. The argument presented here is that 
European integration is politicised in mass-mediated public debates, in which media actors 
play a substantive role in setting the agenda on European integration. The experience of the 
United Kingdom during the Labour governments of 1997-2010 is examined through an 
analysis of nine national newspapers and of party discourses. This shows that the agency of 
media actors substantively affects the outcomes of debates on European integration in 
member states, and this is particularly important when considering the structure of media 
actor positions on Europe. It is shown that newspapers play an important role in mediating 
party messages, and that they exercise influence on the content and character of public 
debates on the EU. Specific evidence from the UK reveals a coherent anti-European discourse 
in the press, however there is not a corresponding cohesive pro-European discourse. Finally, 
the findings presented in this thesis suggest that the scope of political parties to steer debates 
on European integration is limited by the structure of media positions on Europe, and point to 
a new direction for postfunctionalist theory.  
 
The reasons why countries choose to integrate in Europe, and the factors that determine the 
course and speed of European integration, have been the subject of a number of middle-range 
theories of European integration (Haas 1958; Schmitter 1969; Moravcsik 1993; Hooghe and 
Marks 2009). Recently, a growing number of studies have sought to understand where key 
decisions are made and what factors influence the creation of European policy in member 
states (Evans 1999; Peterson 2001; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Kriesi 2007). These 
questions are vital in order to understand the reasons for an apparent stall, or even reverse, in 
the progress of European integration, particularly since the global financial crisis of 2008, and 
the Eurozone crisis and recession that followed. Perhaps even more significantly, the United 
Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union brings into sharp relief 
questions about the course and speed of European integration. The decision of the UK 
electorate to leave the EU marks a watershed moment for European integration, and indicates 
a shift in the ‘centre of gravity’ of public debates on the EU (Goodwin and Heath 2016, 331). 
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Far from being assured, the future of European integration has never been in more doubt; 
challenged from within by populist and nationalist forces in member states which seek to halt 
or reverse the progress of integration. The underlying motivation for the topic of this thesis is 
to understand what determines the course of European integration, and what consequences 
arise from the apparent resurgence of nationalism in European democracies and the growing 
politicisation of European integration.  
The theoretical model best placed to explain the recent course of European integration is, this 
thesis argues, the postfunctionalist theory of European integration first proposed by Liesbet 
Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009). Building on the multi-level governance approach (see Bach 
and Flinders 2004), postfunctionalism argues that the course of European integration is 
determined by domestic patterns of conflict in EU member states. These conflicts, which 
engage the tension between national identity and changing governance structures, are held to 
constrain the course of European integration, as national policy makers are forced to take heed 
of Eurosceptical publics, limiting their ability to make policy on European integration. 
Postfunctionalism offers a politicisation model that seeks to explain how European reforms 
are politicised in debates in member states, and which actors are important in this process of 
politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 14). Thus, the first motivating question for this thesis 
is to understand what determines the outcomes of debates in member states.  
The second motivating question is to ask what explains citizen attitudes towards the EU, and 
in particular the recent politicisation of European integration. Postfunctionalist theory builds 
on a growing body of work that concentrates on the increasing importance of identity politics 
for the development and course of European integration. This literature argues that public 
attitudes towards European integration have become of greater importance over the past 20 
years, which coincides with a greater interest from scholars in the sources of citizen attitudes 
towards the EU (see, for example, Anderson and Reichert 1995; McLaren 2002; Risse 2005; 
Boomgarden et al 2011; de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Statham and Trenz 2013; Hurrelmann et al 
2015; de Wilde et al 2016). This has also coincided with a substantial increase in the depth 
and breadth of European integration. The emergence of growing opposition towards the 
integration process, and the deepening of that opposition in member states, has led scholars to 
ask under what circumstances citizens oppose the EU, and what drives this apparent shift in 
attitudes (Usherwood 2003; Usherwood and Startin 2013). While opposition to European 
integration existed in the years before the Maastricht Treaty, it is since the transformation of 
the European Community into the European Union that popular opposition to the European 
project has become salient to the course of integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007); in the 
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years since Maastricht, the data show falling support for the European Union among its 
citizens (European Commission 2014).  
The issue of what drives citizen attitudes on the EU is directly connected to the question of 
what structures debates on the EU. Within the literature, there has been a debate over the 
sources of attitudes towards Europe and the factors that structure these attitudes. Over time, 
this debate has shifted from a focus on utilitarian and economic predictors as the explanatory 
factors for opposition to European integration (often termed Euroscepticism), towards a focus 
on so-called ‘soft factors’, that incorporate culturally driven variables including identity (see, 
for example, McLaren 2002; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; 
McLaren 2006; Fligstein 2008; Fligstein et al. 2012).  Postfunctionalism argues that debates 1
on European integration are structured by a non-economic dimension that runs from a green/
alternative/libertarian (or gal) position to a traditionalism/authority/nationalism (or tan) 
position (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). This association is held to be particularly strong 
for political parties on the tan side of the gal-tan dimension, which are particularly opposed to 
European integration. While this association has been demonstrated for parties, it is less clear 
in the existing literature if the positions of other actors in debates are structured by this 
dimension. This thesis seeks to understand if this is the case.  
This thesis argues that postfunctionalist theory is the best way to address these questions 
about how we understand integration and its course. However, while postfunctionalism takes 
us towards a middle-range theoretical framework that is able to understand recent 
developments in European integration, it is incomplete. Accordingly, this thesis identifies a 
number of weaknesses in the postfunctionalist theory of European integration as it is currently 
constituted, and seeks to address them. The first weakness of postfunctionalism is that it fails 
to give a sufficient account of identity. Indeed, this is a weakness acknowledged by Hooghe 
and Marks themselves (2009, 23). To resolve this issue, this thesis looks to 
postfunctionalism’s focus on the construction of attitudes through party messages and 
discourses to inform a framework for understanding how national identities are formed. It 
proposes to adopt that a model of identity formation that emphasises the ‘discursive 
construction’ of national identity. With this framework in place, the thesis goes on to identity a 
 In this thesis, the term ‘Euroscepticism’ is used to mean ‘opposition to the European Union’ in 1
general terms. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) distinguish between two types of Euroscepticism in 
party systems: ‘soft Euroscepticism’ and ‘hard Euroscepticism’. Soft Euroscepticism is said to be 
defined as a ‘principled’ opposition to the EU, and where parties favour withdrawal from the EU or 
where parties’ policies are tantamount to opposition to the whole project of European integration 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008, 2). Soft Euroscepticism is defined as where there is not principled 
opposition, but where parties express ‘qualified opposition’ to one of more areas of EU policies or 
membership, or where there are claims that the ‘national interest’ is at odds with the EU trajectory 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008, 2).
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more significant weakness in postfunctionalism, namely that postfunctionalism’s focus on 
parties as the main agents in shaping and mobilising public opinion on European integration 
ignores the agency of the mass media. The mass media is argued to play an important role in, 
first, the construction of European integration in general, and second in constructing 
connections between European integration and national identity. The mass media is argued to 
be a key source of public discourses on the EU and the nation, and this holds significance for 
our understanding of the sources of public opposition to the EU. This insight is drawn from 
the literature on identity formation as well as an emerging literature on the role of the media 
in shaping attitudes towards the EU (Trenz 2004; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; 
Vliegenthart et al. 2008; Hawkins 2012; Van Spanje and de Vreese 2014;  Michailidou 2015; 
Van der Pas and Vliegenthart 2015).  
In addressing these issues, this thesis seeks to move forward the postfunctionalist agenda by 
theorising about the operation of the politicisation model that Hooghe and Marks (2009) 
suggest, and by offering an alternative, augmented postfunctionalist model. It offers an 
original contribution in two ways. First, it seeks to develop one of the most incomplete 
aspects of the postfunctionalist model by exploring the formation of identity and the role of 
media actors in mediating party discourses and constructing discourses of identity. In doing 
so, it offers a novel approach to integration theory by combining postfunctionalism with key 
findings from the political communications literature. While this insight is significant, the 
question of where and how the media are consequential for the outcomes of debates on 
European integration is the main focus of the thesis. It is shown that the media play an 
important role in shaping the form and outcomes of debates by mediating the messages of 
political parties. The literature on media effects is used to argue that the mediating role of the 
media in the mass arena is significant for the ability of parties to achieve their strategic 
objectives in relation to the EU, and thus for the operation of the postfunctionalist 
politicisation model. If parties cannot reliably cue public opposition to, or rally support for, 
the EU in public debates, then this calls into question the primacy of parties in existing 
postfunctionalist politicisation model. It proposes a new domestic politicisation model — 
Media Augmented Postfunctionalism (MAP) — that seeks to explain how and why the media 
matter in national debates on European integration. Secondly, it examines empirical data to 
provide evidence of the politicisation and contestation of the EU in the domestic politics of an 
EU member state, the UK, in practice. These data provide some preliminary evidence to 
support the new model of domestic politicisation offered, as well as providing a useful 
contribution to the debate about the contestation of European integration in UK public 
debates.  
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In order to do this, the thesis explores a series of questions focussed around developing an 
understanding of how national debates on European integration are structured, and how and 
when different actors are important in determining the outcomes of those debates. These 
research questions can be summarised as follows: 
1) How are mass media actors positioned in debates about European integration, and do they 
follow a similar pattern to political parties?  
2) How do mass media discourses represent European integration in the UK? Do they 
construct connections between the nation and European integration?  
3) How are the discourses of political parties represented by the media? How do the mass 
media affect the outcomes of debates through their mediation of the discourses of parties? 
The specific case study examined is that of the UK during the New Labour governments of 
1997-2010. As one of the EU countries with the most-consistently Eurosceptic populace, the 
UK provides a useful case-study for the operation of the mechanisms that postfunctionalism 
describes. As Chapter 3 discusses, the 1997-2010 period was chosen as a recent and 
particularly significant period for UK European policy. The incumbent Labour Party sought to 
redefine the UK’s relationship with the EU and ‘sell’ membership to a public that had been 
traditionally quite sceptical of the European Union (Daddow 2011). Historically, the UK has 
also been one of the EU Member States with the lowest levels of support for EU membership, 
and its citizens report among the highest levels of ‘exclusive’ national identity 
(Eurobarometer 2014). The choice of the UK as a case study also offers an opportunity to 
contribute to a research literature that has focused in the ‘troubled’ history of the relationship 
between the UK and European integration, taking a largely ‘domestic politics 
approach’ (Gifford 2004). This research agenda has sought to explain the ‘semi-detached’ 
approach of UK governing elites towards the EU (George 1992; 1998; Gowland and Turner 
2000; Forster 2002). Many of these studies discuss the geo-political role of the British state 
and the outlook of British institutions and the public (Bulmer 1992; Schweiger 2007). Another 
focus has been on the role of parties, and particularly the divisions within them. The divided 
nature of UK parties on Europe, and the adversarial nature of the UK political system have 
been found to have contributed to the lack of policy consensus on the EU, and given 
considerable influence to Eurosceptic factions within the largest parties (Ashford 1992; 
Aspinwall 2000; Usherwood 2003). Recent contributions have detected a permanent 
‘Eurosceptic challenge’ to governing elites, and have led to claims that Euroscepticism has 
become a persistent phenomenon in UK politics (Usherwood and Startin 2013; Gifford 2014).  
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As set out above, the UK case also takes on a greater significance in the light of recent 
developments. As this thesis was being finalised, the events of the 2016 UK referendum on 
EU membership were unfolding. In this referendum, 51.9% of those who voted cast their 
votes to leave the European Union, while 48.1% voted to remain in the European Union. This 
represents a hugely significant moment for the UK, EU, and beyond. While this study does 
not seek to explain specifically how it was the UK came to be the first member state to vote to 
leave the European Union, the research contained within it casts some light on how European 
integration has been constructed in public discourses in the UK, and how the media play an 
important role in framing debates on the EU. The result of the referendum also emphasises the 
importance of identity politics for theories of European integration. In the campaign itself, the 
Leave campaign(s) emphasised the themes of identity and national sovereignty. The slogan 
‘vote leave, take back control’ signalled an important role for nationalist politics in the 
referendum campaign. While the full consequences of the UK’s vote to leave the EU remain 
unknown at the time of writing, the great significance of the referendum for the EU, and for 
theories of European integration, underlines the usefulness of the UK as a case study. While 
this study was designed and undertaken before the referendum took place — the vote to leave 
came in the final stages of writing up this thesis — in seeking to shed light on the process by 
which European integration is politicised, and in providing evidence from the UK in the years 
before the referendum, it adds to the wider body of evidence about the causes of the 
referendum outcome.  
This study makes a contribution to the relatively small literature on the effect of the mass 
media on the UK debate on European integration. Existing studies of UK media discourses do 
not generally address the issue of politicisation with direct reference to theories of European 
integration (Anderson and Weymouth 1999; Diez Medrano 2003), or take a discourse-
theoretical approach that is instructive of the shaping of the wider ‘discursive 
environment’ (Hawkins 2009; 2012), but which do not connect this to debates about the 
formation of citizen attitudes about European integration. This study locates explanations of 
Britain’s domestic conflict over European integration in a wider theory of European 
integration, allowing for the beginnings of an effort to understand the UK case in the context 
of European integration theory.  
Overall, this thesis develops a novel postfunctionalist account of the politicisation of 
European integration in EU member states that has the potential to significantly alter the way 
in which postfunctionalist theory thinks about the outcomes of national debates on the EU. 
This thesis finds evidence that the UK press are positioned on European integration in a 
similar way to parties. The gal - tan dimension appears to structure press positions: tan 
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positions are consistently associated with opposition to European integration in the UK press. 
The ways in which the media matter to the outcomes of debates becomes clear from the 
findings of the discourse analysis presented: the media are able to alter the substantive 
character of debates through their selective reporting of party discourses, their framing and 
reframing of party messages, and the way that they construct their own distinctive discourses 
on European integration. This leads to the conclusion that the structure of mass media 
positions in debates in EU member states may be highly significant for the outcomes of those 
debates, since they act as a constraining force on political parties; limiting parties’ strategic 
room for manoeuvre and contributing to the creation of a ‘constraining dissensus’ on 
European integration.  
Thesis structure 
In order to address the questions set out here, the thesis proceeds as follows. Broadly, Part I of 
the study develops an account of the postfunctionalist theory of European integration and 
identifies to key areas in which this theory currently requires further development. It goes on 
to propose the Media Augmented Postfunctionalist politicisation model, and then sets out the 
methodology used to address the research questions set out above. Part II of the study 
empirically analyses the politicisation of European integration in the ‘mass arena’, studying 
the debates in the UK between 1997-2010. Part II first seeks to understand how the positions 
of the UK press on European integration are structured. It then goes on to analyse the content 
of discourses in the UK press on the EU, and then studies comparatively the discourses of the 
press and and of parties in order to shed light the relationships between these actors.  
Chapter 1 discusses recent developments in European integration theory and the emerging 
importance of identity in explaining the course of European integration. Postfunctionalist 
integration theory is introduced as a relatively recent account of the apparent ‘gridlock’ or 
‘constraining dissensus’ in European integration. The chapter outlines the means by which 
European integration becomes politicised according to postfunctionalists, focussing on the 
role of political entrepreneurs in agenda-setting and discourse construction. It argues that a 
postfunctionalist approach allows for an understanding of how European integration is 
contested in public debates, and how discourses within states can constrain the process of 
European integration. The chapter argues that postfunctionalism does not yet contain a 
developed account of identity, nor of the mechanisms by which public opinion is cued by 
discourses that employ constructions of identity. The chapter then goes on to review some of 
the literature on national identity in relation to European integration. The chapter concludes 
that approaches which conceive of national identity as constructed discursively in everyday 
!7
practice (including in the media) are most compatible with postfunctionalism. The key 
elements of this discursive approach are outlined, and it is argued that the role of the mass 
media in presenting, reproducing, and shaping the messages of political parties on identity is 
important, given the role that the mass media play in the everyday construction of citizens’ 
national identities. It is argued that we must therefore understand how the media construct 
identity in relation to European integration, and how they represent party discourses on 
identity.  
In Chapter 2, the Media Augmented Postfunctionalist (MAP) model is presented. The chapter 
argues that the media must be incorporated as a significant actor in postfunctionalist theory, 
and presents the MAP model, a 5-stage process that addresses key weaknesses in the existing 
literature on postfunctionalism. The MAP model conceptualises the politicisation process 
being decided in a ‘mass-mediated public debate’, in which the media play an important role 
in producing and mediating discourses on European integration. The chapter then goes on to 
review the literature on media effects to substantiate these claims. In particular, the areas of 
framing, representation, and agenda-setting are expanded. Media framing affects are argued to 
be particularly significant – in constructing national identity in relation to Europe, and in 
construction representations of the EU which have an impact upon the formation of public 
opinion.  
Chapter 3 sets out the methodology of Part II of the study. It recaps the hypotheses identified 
in Part I of the thesis, and sets out the methodology to be used to explore them. Norman 
Fairclough’s (1995, 2000) framework for critical discourse analysis, and particularly his 
method for the analysis of media discourse, is outlined as the basis for this methodology. The 
rationale for studying the UK during the New Labour governments of 1997-2010 is then 
discussed in detail, and it is argued that the UK during this period provides an excellent case-
study for this thesis. The two specific methods used are then discussed. The first method seeks 
to estimate the positions of media actors through the use of large-scale survey datasets to 
estimate the positions of their audiences. It then discusses the primary method of the study – 
critical discourse analysis. It develops an account of some of the literature on discourse 
analysis that forms the basis of this approach. Finally, the specific textual analysis methods 
and sources are then discussed.  
Addressing the structure of press positions, Chapter 4 seeks to estimate the positions of UK 
newspapers on their support for European integration, the left-right political dimension, and 
the ‘new politics’ dimension. This is achieved through a statistical analysis of data from the 
British Social Attitudes Survey – using readership of newspapers as a proxy for the 
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newspapers themselves. It is shown that a relationship is observed between support for 
European integration and position on the new politics dimension, similar to that found in 
political parties by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002). It is argued that finding suggests that 
the positions of newspaper readers on European integration are structured in the same way as 
parties, with a closer relationship between their support for the EU and their position on the 
new politics dimension than with the left-right politics dimension. This is significant for our 
understanding of the agency of newspapers in the mass-mediated public debate, and provides 
context for the following two chapters.  
Following from the findings of Chapter 4, Chapter 5 outlines the findings of an analysis of the 
content of newspaper articles from nine national newspapers. Reports are analysed for their 
content, tone, and focus. The discursive strategies are analysed and it is argued that the same 
pattern priming and cueing citizens observed in party discourses can be found in newspapers. 
In particular, this chapter seeks to understand the key frames and narratives of discourses on 
Europe in the press, and the differences between the accounts of European integration found 
in newspapers along the new politics dimension. The differences and similarities between 
these discourses are examined comparatively to understand how newspapers along this 
dimension treat European integration differently in their reporting. It is shown that there is a 
general pattern of alignment between the positions estimated in Chapter 4 and the discursive 
content analysed, although this relationship is stronger for newspapers with positions 
estimated towards the tan-pole of the new politics dimension. This appears to confirm the 
conclusion that the press adopt distinctive positions in debates on Europe, and in the case of 
the Eurosceptic newspapers, adopt discursive strategies that construct clear connections 
between the defence of the nation-state and opposition to European integration. This indicates 
that the press play an important role in the politicisation process, and that their agency may 
prove decisive to parties’ attempts to act strategically in the mass arena.  
Finally, Chapter 6 examines the representation of party discourses in the press, in order to 
attempt to better understand the relationship between party discourses and the media in the 
mass arena. This is undertaken through the analysis of five major speeches by UK party 
leaders, and the subsequent press coverage of them. The framing and re-framing of speeches, 
and the way that party narratives are represented is examined in order to understand what 
effect mediation by newspapers has on party messages. It is shown that substantial re-framing 
of party messages occurs, and that consequently the agency of the media is significant beyond 
their general discursive construction of European integration. It is shown that there some 
evidence to suggest that the political positions of newspapers determined in the previous 
chapters structure this reframing, but the behaviour of the press in this regard is found to be 
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inconsistent. This leads to the conclusion that while the media are a significant class of actors 
in the politicisation of European integration, they cannot simply be substituted for parties in 
postfunctionalism. Rather, the chapter concludes, the media are important gatekeepers to the 
mass-mediated debate. This suggests that structure of press positions in member states is 
important in determining outcomes, since the power of the press (and other media) in 
mediating party messages and constructing their own narratives on European integration is 
considerable. This in turn is likely to influence the outcomes of mass-mediated public debates 
on European integration. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review: European Integration, Postfunctionalism, and Identity 
This chapter begins to construct the theoretical framework of this thesis. It does so by first 
locating the theoretical framework in the postfunctionalist integration theory of Liesbet 
Hooghe and Gary Marks (2005; 2007; 2009). It argues that the postfunctionalist approach to 
regional integration theory offers a useful alternative to earlier neofunctionalist and liberal 
intergovernmentalist approaches, and shows that postfunctionalism can be employed as a 
theoretical means to understand the way in which identity is an important explanatory 
variable in the development of European integration. This chapter argues that by locating this 
study in an emergent school of integration theory, new insights into the character and 
consequences of public debates on European integration can be gained. Understanding the 
reasons why European integration has taken its present course poses questions as to how 
political choices are made which shape the direction, speed, and character of integration. 
Theories of European integration ought, therefore, to seek to understand the underlying 
conflicts, issues, and consequences in the integration process, and pay attention to the 
substantive character of the debate in Europe over integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2).  
The central contention of this chapter is that the complexity of identity formation and 
politicisation is not adequately reflected in postfunctionalist theory, however. In setting out 
their postfunctionalist theory, Hooghe and Marks concede that they present ‘an incomplete 
account of the construction of identity’ (2009, 23). This presents an area in which the 
theoretical framework of postfunctionalism requires further development, since identity plays 
a central role in determining individual citizen orientations towards European integration, 
shaping public opinion and structuring the debate between political parties (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 17). In order to understand how identity is politicised and mobilised by parties 
and other political entrepreneurs, we must build an account of identity which is compatible 
with the framework provided by Hooghe and Marks, but which also clarifies the relationship 
between identity, public opinion, and politicisation, and particularly the role of actors in the 
process of politicisation. 
In order to do this, the chapter then sets out an account of identity formation that builds a 
framework centred around the role of discourse in constructing national identities. A 
discussion of the work of Benedict Anderson establishes national identity as the product of 
everyday discourses, and highlights the importance of the mass media in the construction and 
reproduction of national identities. The ‘discursive construction’ framework proposed by Ruth 
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Wodak and others (Wodak et al. 2009) is then reviewed, and it is argued that this framework 
is one that could provide a basis for a more developed understanding of the politicisation of 
identity. This discussion reveals that the construction of national identity is founded on the 
construction of the differences between the national in-group and foreign ‘out-group’. It is 
shown that national identities arise from discourses in both public and private arenas, and that 
these discourses can be articulated by diverse actors for a range of purposes. This discursive 
construction framework goes on to form the basis of the alternative, Media Augmented 
Postfunctionalist model of politicisation presented and analysed in subsequent chapters.  
The chapter therefore proceeds as follows. First, the key tenets and conclusions of 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are briefly outlined. These two orthodox 
theories of regional integration have been influential in shaping the theory and practice of the 
process of European integration. It is then argued that a key weakness of both theories in 
conceptualising European integration is a failure to accommodate the importance of public 
opinion, and particularly public opinion driven by identity politics. In the next section, it is 
argued that Postfunctionalism offers a theoretical framework which incorporates the influence 
of identity politics and allows for an understanding of contemporary developments in the 
politicisation of European integration without rejecting many of the key conclusions reached 
by neofunctionalists. In this discussion, two of the weaknesses of postfunctionalism emerge. 
These are the account of identity offered, which is shown to be incomplete, and the account of 
the role of actors in the politicisation of European integration, where it is argued that 
insufficient consideration is given to the role of intermediary actors, and the media in 
particular. The chapter then goes on to review the literature on European identity and its 
relationship to national identity, and how postfunctionalism treats this relationship. The 
chapter finally reviews some of the literature on identity formation and argues that the 
‘discursive construction’ model offers a good fit with postfunctionalist theory. This model 
emphasises the importance of diverse actors, and particularly the mass media, in the 
construction of national identities.  
1.1 Neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and the challenge of politicisation 
Neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism constitute the most influential ‘orthodox’ 
positions on European integration, against which newer developments, including 
postfunctionalism and related models of multi-level governance have emerged (Diez and 
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Wiener 2009).  This section briefly sets out the neofunctionalist and liberal 1
integovernmentalist positions before discussing the recent challenge to these theories posed 
by the increasing politicisation of European integration. As these two theories fail to account 
for politicisation, the rise of identity politics, and the causes of these changes, it is shown that 
an alternative model — postfunctionalism — offers a means of explaining the recent course 
of European integration.  
Building on the work of the functionalist theorists, neofunctionalism is defined by its concern 
with the processes responsible for integration, focusing their work on the early years of the 
European Communities. Neofunctionalist theorists, led particularly by Ernst Haas, identified a 
number of political processes which were argued to drive a process of change and alignment 
between the functionality of authority, and the structure of that authority (Haas 1958; 
Lindberg 1963; Schmitter 1969; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Nye 1971). 
Neofunctionalism refined the functionalist view of integration, recognising that the 
discrepancy between collective welfare and the nature of political authorities in nation-states 
was not sufficient as an explanans for the impulse to reform jurisdictional boundaries on a 
transnational basis. Their understanding of integration as a process, rather than a condition, 
led Haas and Lindberg to describe a process both of functional institution-building, but also of 
a dynamic change in the expectations and activities of political actors including parties, 
bureaucracies, and interest groups (Lindberg 1963; Moorhead 2003). Neofunctionalism 
focuses its analysis from institutions to the actors which drive the integration process. 
Particularly, neofunctionalists argue that reform in jurisdictional scope and competency must 
be conceived, initiated, and propelled by transnational interest groups which seek to generate 
economic and other benefits from the creation of supranational authorities. These groups are 
seen as being inherently utilitarian in their approach to the achievement of their goals and 
fulfilment of their interests (Haas 1964). Neofunctionalism emphasises that integration takes 
on a self-sustaining dynamism, following from the activities of political actors who are 
defined by their loyalty toward collective views of how their interests are best served by 
jurisdictional change (Rosamond 2005).  
This self-fulfilling process is conceptualised by the concept of a process of ‘spill-over’, which 
aims to demonstrate how political actors shift to support greater amounts of integration. As 
new supranational institutions become established as centres of authority, they are argued to 
 Both theories find their roots in functionalism, which argues that the choices which form the driving force of 1
European integration are made on the premise that there exists a mismatch between the scale of various human 
problems, and the territorial scale of political authorities charged with dealing with these problems. The 
existence of this mismatch between problems and territorial political authorities creates pressure for 
jurisdictional reforms, since governance arrangements should match the scale of the problems to be solved 
(Mitrany 1966). The ‘collective welfare’ benefits of supranationalism are held to be the impetus for this process 
of supranational institution building (Haas 1958).
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become focal points for the actors driving the integration process, and the alignment between 
these actors and new institutions is argued to provide outcomes consistent with their 
preferences (Haas 1958, 292). This alignment in preferences and outcomes is argued to lead 
to a deepening of support for integration and in greater pressure for integration to occur. Three 
types of spill-over are identified. The first, ‘functional spill-over’, arises due to the nature of 
the functional tasks — institution building among them — undertaken as part of the 
integration process. The interdependency of many problems, particularly issues involving the 
regulation and administration of economic sectors, mean that it is difficult to create new 
institutions or regimes of governance for one area and not those to which it is interconnected. 
Thus, the attempt to integrate functional tasks in one area leads to the creation of new 
problems which are only able to be resolved through further integration of functions (Haas 
1958, 283; Lindberg 1963, 10). Secondly, ‘political spill-over’ is held to occur as elites learn 
to recognise the benefits of new functional institutions. These elites — both governmental and 
non-governmental — are held to develop the perception that their interests are more 
effectively advanced through the development of supranational institutional structures; this in 
turn leads to a shift in their loyalties towards these new institutions, leading to their support 
for further integration (Lindberg 1963, 9). Finally, ‘cultivated spill-over’ emphasises the role 
of the central institutions in functioning as a ‘midwife’ for the integration process; embodying 
and ‘upgrading’ the common interest in order to resolve differences in the negotiation of 
functional arrangements. This is an element of neofunctionalism which implies a voluntary 
element to integration — and is therefore closer to the intergovernmental approach — than 
the otherwise deterministic nature of neofunctionalist theory (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 6). 
Thus, in neofunctionalism, a widening and deepening of integration is seen as an inevitable 
part of an ongoing process. Support for further integration is not seen as a function of 
exogenous events and trends such as deepening economic interdependence, military threat, or 
socialisation - but rather an endogenous result of prior integration (Moravcsik 2005, 352). The 
result of this process is argued to result in the outcome of an emergent political community 
which resembles, in many ways, domestic pluralist polities (Rosamond 2005, 241). 
Neofunctionalism has been criticised on both empirical and theoretical grounds, leading a 
move away from neofunctionalism by some integration theorists - including Ernst Haas 
himself (Keohane and Nye 1975; Haas 1976; Cornett and Caporaso 1992; Wincott 1995, 
598). The most significant alternative to neofunctionalism is liberal intergovernmentalism, 
developed primarily by Andrew Moravcsik (1993). For liberal intergovernmentalists, 
European integration is best explained as the result of inter-state bargaining. The impetus to 
integrate certain economic and political functions is a result of the aggregation of national 
interests by governments, followed by inter-governmental negotiation. One of the most 
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important theoretical reactions to neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism has sought 
to challenge several central elements of neofunctionalist analysis (Moravcsik 2005, 358-359). 
The agency of member-state governments is placed at the core of the intergovernmentalist 
approach, which draws heavily on the realist school of International Relations. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism is distinctive in that it combines both domestic and system-level 
explanations for how governments behave when bargaining at a European level, and in that it 
also offers a developed account of preference formation (Forster 1998, 348). 
Central to the liberal intergovernmentalist’s explanation for European integration is the 
assumption of state rationality. This is accompanied with an assumption that national 
preference formation takes a liberal, rather than realist approach, and adopts an analysis of 
interstate negotiation which is intergovernmentalist in nature. These, Andrew Moravcsik calls 
the ‘three essential elements’ of his approach (Moravcsik 1993, 480). Rather than the 
spillover described by neofunctionalists, Moravcsik and others argue that a three stage-model 
can explain preference formation and jurisdictional change (Moravcsik 1993; 1995; Pollack 
2001). These three stages are ‘foreign economic policy preference formation’, ‘inter-state 
bargaining’, and ‘institutional delegation’. In the first stage, national governments aggregate 
the interests of their constituencies, in addition to their own interests, and articulate these 
preferences on the national level. Moravcsik argues that these national preferences are 
constrained by the microeconomic interests of groups within national polities, although these 
constraints may be ‘supplanted by geo-political and ideological motivations’ in polities where 
‘economic preferences are diffuse, uncertain or weak’ (Moravcsik 1995, 612).  
The second stage of this model suggests that national governments then bring these 
preferences to negotiations of intergovernmental treaties. National governments therefore act 
as a mediating force between organised special interests and the new jurisdictional regimes 
they seek to create, shaping the outcomes of the process. The resulting agreements are, it is 
argued, reflections of the relative power and negotiating success of the constitutive states 
participating in each agreement (Pollack 2001, 225). The view that pressures from producer 
groups have been the amongst the primary forces driving European integration, is preserved 
in liberal intergovernmentalism, therefore. However, intergovernmentalists also acknowledge 
the role of ideological forces - particularly the desire of Germany to reconstruct its unity, 
security, and political autonomy after the Second World War (Moravcsik 2005, 359). A central 
feature of the approach of liberal intergovernmentalists is to challenge the conclusion reached 
by Haas that new institutions would, through administrative momentum created through 
spillover effects, drive a process of ‘gradual’ and ‘incremental’ integration (Haas 1964, 70). 
Rather, integration is seen to have spilled over ‘only intermittently’, and has proceeded ‘in fits 
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and starts through a series of intergovernmental bargains’ (Moravcsik 1993, 476). Liberal 
integovernmentalism has been criticised on the grounds that it constitutes an ‘approach’ to the 
study of European integration, as opposed to an empirically testable theory which set out the 
circumstances in which it might be empirically disproved (Wincott 1995, 598-99). In 
particular, Daniel Wincott has argued that the biases of liberal intergovernmentalism ‘cut it off 
from rich debate over the character of ‘domestic politics’’ (Wincott 1995, 599).  
Thus, in the two theories outlined, we can see differing approaches to the role of actors in the 
integration process. Neofunctionalism places emphasis on the agency of organised interests to 
act as the motivating factor and driving force behind integration, emphasising the role of 
economic interests and the power of spillover effects to sustain and increase momentum in the 
integration process. Liberal intergovernmentalists explicitly reject the conclusion of 
neofunctionalists that the the formal role of states in driving integration is ‘potentially 
illusory’ (Schmitter 2005, 259); instead emphasising the role of state governments in 
aggregating interests and striking ‘grand bargains’ which lead to periodical ‘leaps’ in 
integration as opposed to a steady, progressive process. These theories have been useful in 
providing theoretical interpretations for the steady progress of European integration, however 
they find themselves challenged by growing Euroscepticism and opposition to Europe in the 
public arena (Usherwood and Startin 2013). 
The challenge of politicisation  
Developments over the past several decades in the course of European integration seem to 
have generated facts that ‘escape the theories on offer’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 1). The 
advent of increased levels of Euroscepticism, more competition between political parties over 
Europe, and the outcomes of referendums on European integration have led to a situation 
where ignoring the effects of public opinion, and identity politics, on European integration 
seems untenable. This increased politicisation of European integration, and rising 
Euroscepticism, has challenged both neofunctionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists to 
develop explanations for the scope and intensity of Eurosceptic challenges to European 
integration, which ‘came as a surprise’ to these theories (Hooghe and Marks 2007, 119). In 
particular, domestic political conflicts over Europe are not adequately explained by either 
theory, both of which concentrate on distribution bargaining among interest groups. An 
important area that both traditional theories of European overlook is the agency of national 
publics in shaping elite agendas, and the role played by public opinion and national identity. 
Two particular forms of conflict over European integration can be identified; that which 
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draws on economic arguments to oppose the EU, and that which employs arguments based on 
national identity and the loss of national independence, sovereignty, and distinctiveness 
(Fligstein et al. 2012).  
Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism do not capture the effects and significance of 
public opinion, and particularly Eurosceptic opposition, and the role played by identity 
politics and nationalism in engendering support for, or opposition to, integration (Niemann 
and Schmitter 2009, 52). Evidence drawn from across the European Union during the last 
decade suggests that support for European integration has been at best stable, and more likely, 
in decline (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Fligstein et al. 2012; Usherwood and Startin 2013). 
There is evidence that Eurosceptic opposition to integration has become ‘increasingly 
embedded post-Maastricht both at European and national levels across a range of contexts and 
environments’ (Usherwood and Startin 2013, 4). This has occurred both in political parties, 
which have been argued to be the ‘largest reservoir’ of Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 
2004, 416), and in non-party groups, in governments, and in the media (Usherwood and 
Startin 2013, 4).  Thus, identity politics is seen as being increasingly important to 2
understanding integration (Risse 2010). Evidence suggests that, particularly following the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1991, party competition and the electoral salience of European 
integration has significantly increased. For example, between the 1970s and 1990s, the 
proportion of campaign statements on European issues in several European states more than 
doubled (Koopmans 2004; Kriesi 2007). European integration also became one of the most 
important issues in national party competition across Western European countries, behind 
only taxation and deregulation/privatisation, and in 2003 was the most salient issue in the UK, 
France, Malta, and Cyprus (Benoit and Laver 2006). This is supported by evidence from 
expert surveys conducted between 1984 and 2002, which show that the salience of European 
integration for parties and for internal party dissent has risen in almost all EU countries (Ray 
1999; Steenbergen and Marks 2007) 
One response to this in the literature has been the introduction of social constructivist theory 
into the field of European integration theory, particularly through the study of the 
Habermasian public sphere in and across European countries (Risse 2009; Checkel and 
Katzenstein 2009; Diez Medrano 2009). However, these studies typically treat identity as the 
dependent variable, raising the question of whether identity matters in explaining outcomes in 
European integration (Risse 2009, 156). These comparative approaches are also not guided by 
 Past research into public opinion on European integration concentrated on trade theory to build models which 2
focus on economic costs and benefits, making the assumption that individuals and political parties calculate their 
support for European integration in terms of the economic consequences integration brings (Hooghe and Marks 
2007, 120; see also Carey 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993).
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any theory of regional integration which explain the significance of domestic politics for the 
course of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 1). Postfunctionalism has the potential to 
‘bridge the gap’ between these theoretical standpoints, treating identity as the explanatory 
variable, while acknowledging a role for the construction of identities, and accepting the 
neofunctionalist explanation of the impetus for jurisdictional reform.  
While neofunctionalists have acknowledged the potential role of public opinion, driven by 
national identity considerations, as a factor in engendering opposition to integration, this is 
accompanied by an assumption that loyalty to the nation would be replaced by identification 
to the new institutions (Haas 2001). Neofunctionalism predicts that spillover effects will 
operate in the same manner for public support for integration as for the tendency of elites to 
pursue further integration (Hooghe and Marks 2007, 119). Much in the same way that 
spillover is held to mean that ‘the potentiality for future creative action on the part of 
regionally oriented elites tends to increase’, the success of one element of integration is 
argued to lead to a spillover of public support for integration in other areas (Schmitter 1969, 
162). In this view, the increasing politicisation of European integration is held to increase 
public support for Europe, as the benefits of jurisdictional change move from special interest 
groups to the wider society (Hooghe and Marks 2007). Over time, Schmitter argues, this 
effect was expected to result in ‘a shift in expectations and loyalty toward the new regional 
centre’ (Schmitter 1969, 166). Importantly, neofunctionalism does not allow for identity as a 
driving factor behind support for, or opposition to European integration. Indeed, Schmitter 
explicitly excludes identity as an explanatory variable, arguing that ‘interests, rather than 
common ideals or identity’, are the driving force behind the integration process (Schmitter 
2005, 259). Similarly, Liberal intergovernmentalism ignores public opinion and issues of 
national identity as separate variables. Whilst intergovernmentalists accept that national 
governments serve to aggregate ‘interests’ in their constituencies, these are seen as relating 
primarily to economic and socio-economic interests, particularly commercial liberalisation 
and public goods provision (Moravcsik 1993, 495). Liberal intergovernmentalism thus largely 
ignores identity altogether (Hooghe and Marks 2007).  
1.2  Postfunctionalism: explaining the importance of the politicisation of European 
integration 
Postfunctionalism, proposed by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2004; 2005; 2007; 2009), 
builds upon the multi-level governance approach to develop an understanding of constraints 
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placed upon policy making by the political contestation of European integration.  This 3
conflict, postfunctionalism argues, engages communal identities, which are used to politicise 
European integration in high level debates in EU Member States. This builds on research 
which has found that national identity is a factor which can act as a strong constraint on 
individual preferences on the level of integration in Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2004; 
McLaren 2006). The attachment of people to territorial entities has been shown to be 
important, given the role of the state as the ‘terminal political community’, the highest entity 
to which individuals feel allegiance, in performing governance tasks and representing citizens 
(Carey 2002, 392). Thus, the role of the state in making laws for nations becomes important; 
individuals’ perceptions of the use of government power are dependent on their understanding 
of which governing institutions represent their terminal political community (Carey 2002). 
This leads to the conclusion that individuals who feel association with a shared ‘European 
identity’ are more likely to support the institutions of the EU, since they represent their 
terminal political community, and those individuals recognise the authority of the EU to make 
public policy for their community (McLaren 2002; 2006). Conversely, individuals who do not 
identify with a shared European identity, and instead hold an attachment to their state, nation, 
or a lower level of community are more likely to oppose the authority of the EU to make 
policy within their community since they reject the notion that the EU represents their 
terminal political community (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002). Thus, individuals who do not 
identify with a European identity, and who hold a strong sense of a national identity, are more 
likely to be opposed to European integration. As argued below, this treatment of identity 
leaves many questions unanswered, not least the origin of citizen identities and the means by 
which they are contested in mass debates. However, the key claims of postfunctionalist theory 
must first be explored in order to explain why postfunctionalism offers a compelling (if 
incomplete) theoretical framework on which to base the present study.  
As a development of neofunctionalism, postfunctionalism is founded on the premise that an 
understanding of the course of European integration can only be developed by looking 
beyond the economic preferences of interest groups, and by incorporating identity as the 
explanatory variable (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Postfunctionalism forms the basis of its 
understanding of European integration upon three connected claims. The first of these is that 
public and political party preferences on European integration matter, and are frequently 
different. The second is that these preferences matter when European integration is 
‘politicized in high profile public debate’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The third is that the 
divergence of public and political party preferences has led to a ‘constraining dissensus’ over 
European integration. These three claims will now be examined in greater detail. The 
 For an overview of the multi-level governance approach, see Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996). 3
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emphasis on identity and discourses in public debate makes postfunctionalism a much more 
compelling theoretical framework for the present thesis than competing theories of European 
integration. This is especially the case since, in making identity the explanatory variable, 
postfunctionalism is able to answer the ‘so what?’ question that other approaches fail to 
address (Risse 2009).  
The first central claim of postfunctionalism is that party and public preferences on European 
integration are important factors in determining the course of integration. While the 
importance of functional economic interest groups is acknowledged, postfunctionalism does 
not view these groups as ‘inherently’ decisive for European integration, rather as decisive 
only in ‘certain conditions’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 5). Instead, postfunctionalists claim 
that public and party preferences have become increasingly relevant to the outcomes of 
negotiations on European issues. Whereas the first three decades of European integration 
were driven by the primarily economic demands of organised interest groups, and had limited 
implications for most people, public opinion has become more relevant as the importance of 
European institutions has increased for the general population. This, it is argued, has resulted 
in a shift from an environment of ‘permissive consensus’, in which public opinion was 
quiescent, to one of ‘constraining dissensus’ in which  ‘elites, that is, party leaders in positions 
of authority, must look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 5-6).  
The prediction of neofunctionalists that a process in which European issues would become 
prominent in a European public sphere and drive further support for integration as emergent 
political institutions became increasingly relevant to publics is reversed by postfunctionalists. 
Rather than supporting the integration process, the mass mobilisation of public opinion has, 
instead, threatened it (Schmitter 2009, 211). Thus, the abandonment of an elite-centred view 
of European integration by postfunctionalism leads them to claim that that public opinion on 
European integration has reached a point where it is influential on the course of further 
integration; it is ‘rather well structured, affects national voting, and is connected to the basic 
dimensions that structure contestation in European societies’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 7). 
Public opinion on European integration has diverged from that of elites, with lower levels of 
support for the EU among publics (Spence 1997; Hooghe 2003). This leads to the claim that 
European integration has become a politicised and salient issue across EU Member States, 
and that public opinion is not simply an abstract or theoretical mechanism, but one which 
exerts real influence on the integration process (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Hooghe and Marks 
argue that the issue of European integration has entered what they call the ‘mass arena’, 
having moved away from being debated largely in the ‘interest group arena’, primarily 
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through the efforts of political parties seeking to gain from the politicisation of European 
integration (2009, 9-10). This has led to a decisive change in that the elite has been compelled 
to ‘make room’ for the debate on European integration in the public area and for a 
Eurosceptical public, meaning that ‘in 1985 the public could be ignored; in 2005 this was not 
longer an option’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 9). The politicisation of European integration has 
led to the rise of symbolic or identity politics in the debate on integration (Carey 2002, 
McLaren 2006, Hooghe and Marks 2009, Usherwood and Startin 2013). 
While the arrangements for governance and the jurisdictional architecture of Europe have 
been transformed by the development of the European Union, the central argument of the 
postfunctionalism thesis is that the way that citizens conceive of their identities has not been 
similarly transformed (Hooghe and Marks 2007, 2009). The growth of mobility, and of 
transnational social and cultural interaction within Europe has not precipitated the 
construction of a collective European identity at the same rate at which jurisdictional change 
has occurred (Fligstein 2008; Fligstein et al. 2012). Hooghe and Marks argue that 
Eurobarometer and other survey data do not support evidence of an increase in identification 
toward Europe, and a shift away from exclusive national identities (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 
14). For many Europeans, the factors which promote a sense of European identity — 
interaction across borders, tangible economic benefits, and social benefits delivered by the 
European Union — may not be present in great enough quantity (Fligstein 2012). This creates 
a tension between ‘rapid jurisdictional change and relatively stable identities’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 13).  
This tension is politically significant due to the increased salience of European integration. 
Integration in Europe has increased significantly in depth and in scope, and this has been 
accompanied by measures to increase the mobility of capital, goods, and people, which has 
led to a breakdown of national barriers within the EU (Börzel 2005). Parties are held to play 
key roles, as ‘political entrepreneurs’ in the politicisation of European integration, and the 
‘cueing’ of this tension in order to turn it into a salient political issue. This, it is argued, is 
mobilised by what Hooghe and Marks describe as ‘political entrepreneurs’, who construct 
accounts of the connections between national identity, cultural and economic security, and 
European integration and the enlargement of the EU, since these connections cannot be 
directly induced from the experiences of individuals (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 13). Given 
limited public knowledge and time for individuals to consider their economic interests in 
relation to European integration, it is argued that parties act to cue individuals toward their 
own position (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 10). These cues may, however, come from different 
sources, including ‘the media, intermediary institutions such as trade unions or churches, or 
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from political parties’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 10-11). Political entrepreneurs, particularly 
political parties, must mobilise the tension between static identities and evolving jurisdictional 
arrangements in order to create politicisation. This is crucial, since the nature of European 
integration, the effects of which are hard for individuals to evaluate from direct experience, 
means that public opinion on Europe is particularly susceptible to construction through 
discourses from political entrepreneurs in the public sphere (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Risse 
2010). 
The politicisation of European integration 
The means by which the politicisation of European integration has been incorporated into 
national politics is dealt with by Hooghe and Marks as a party political question; they seek to 
discover how European issues connect (or otherwise) to existing patterns of domestic conflict 
(see Hooghe and Marks 2009, 14-19). Rejecting a left-right model of contestation structures, 
postfunctionalism instead argues for a model of competition based on a non-economic ‘new 
politics’ dimension, rather than economic redistribution, since the level of economic 
distribution practiced by the European Union is currently low at 0.75 per cent of its total 
economic product (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 15). In addition, a left-right conception of 
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in 2005 is not much lower than in 1985. The decisive change is that the elite has had to
make room for a more Eurosceptical public. Figure 4 compares the level of elite and
public support for European integration across the European Union in 1996, the one year
for which we have comparable data. The gap varies from large i Ireland (12 per cent),
Luxembourg (17 per cent) and the Netherlands (18 per cent), on the left of the figure, to
extremely large in Sweden (57 per cent) and Germany (54 per cent), on the right.31 In 1985
the public could be ignored; in 2005 this was no longer an option.
Closed shops of government leaders, interest groups and Commission officials have been
bypassed as European issues have entered party competition. On major issues, governments,
i.e. party leaders in positions of executive authority, try to anticipate the effect of their
decisions on domestic publics. Public opinion on European integration has become a field of
strategic interaction among party el tes in their contest for political power.
PUBLIC OPINION
Not until the 1980s did researchers begin to take EU public opinion seriously.32 The point
of departure was to hypothesize the objective consequences of market integration for
Mismatch 
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function 
and form 
public opinion
interest group 
pressure
party 
strategy
distributional logic 
MASS 
ARENA
INTEREST GROUP 
ARENA
identity logic
(‘gal /tan’)
 1.    2. 3. 4.  5.
distributional logic 
(economic left/right)
1 = reform impetus: mismatch between jurisdictional architecture and functional pressures, which provokes tensions in prevailing interest constellation
2 = issue creation: response (or non-response) by public opinion and interest groups to reform impetus, as framed and cued by political parties
3 = arena rules: formal rules that constrain in which arena a decision about reform (or non-reform) will be taken
4 = arena choice: selection of decision arena, which is mediated by political parties
5 = conflict structure: extent to which an identity logic or distributional logic shape contestation about reform; bias to one or the other logic is affected by arena choice
Fig. 2. A model of domestic politicization
31 Liesbet Hooghe, ‘Europe Divided? Elites vs. Public Opinion on European Integration’, European
Union Politics, 4 (2003), 281–305.
32 In the late 1960s to early 1970s, there was some interest in public opinion, but it was short lived (see
Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment: A Summary
Report’, American Political Science Review, 60 (1966), 354–65; Ronald Inglehart, ‘An End to European
Integration?’, American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 91–105; Donald J. Puchala, ‘The Common
Market and Political Federation in Western European Public Opinion’, International Studies Quarterly,
14 (1970), 32–59). For an overview of the revival of public opinion studies in the 1980s and beyond, see
Cees van der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin, eds, Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National
Politics in the Face of Union (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996).
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Figure 1.1: The Hooghe-Marks Politicisation Model
competition is not thought adequate enough to capture the dynamics of party competition in 
Europe, which is not only concerned with redistribution from the rich to the poor, but also 
across member states from the wealthier north and west of Europe to the poorer south and 
east, alongside the challenge of increasing cultural diversity with the addition of new member 
states to the east and south (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2003).  
Postfunctionalists have suggested, therefore, that political competition over the issue of 
Europe is now defined by identity and distributional issues; left-right conflict over outputs is 
joined by conflict over the boundaries of the political community, which is a ‘rather more 
combustible issue’ (Hooghe and Marks 2004; 2009, 16). Economic left-right political position 
is argued to be less associated with party positions on European integration than non-
economic left-right dimensions which postfunctionalists have found to hold a much stronger 
association. These are defined as, alternatively, a green/alternative/libertarian (abbreviated as 
gal) position, and a traditionalism/authority/nationalism position (abbreviated as tan) 
(Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Marks et al. 2006). These groupings of party positioning 
are claimed to be associated with positions on national identity, particularly on the part of the 
tan dimension. Opposition to integration on this side of the political cleavage is on the 
grounds of nationalistic arguments; integration is held to dilute the sovereignty of the nation 
state, weaken self-determination, and introduce foreign ideas to the in-group (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 17-18). Thus, the same force that drives public opinion on European integration 
is also held to structure the contestation of Europe by political parties. This association is 
particularly strong for parties on the tan side of the dimension due to the strong defence of the 
national community associated with parties located towards the tan pole - they defend the 
nation-state ‘against international regimes and against multiple territorial identities’ (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009, 17). This division can arise within parties, for instance in the internal 
divisions in the UK Conservative Party since the late 1980s, which has been divided between 
those taking a tan nationalist position, and neo-liberals who support European integration 
(Turner 2000; Bale 2012).  
A number of factors influence when parties attempt to politicise an issue. Parties are 
particularly incentivised to seek to politicise an issue when they see an electoral advantage to 
doing so. Parties with potential electoral popularity on an issue are more likely to seek to 
politicise European integration, however this is potential constrained by reputational 
considerations and the ideology of their party, along with the need to ensure party unity 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009, 19). The chance of an issue entering mass politics is held to be 
determined by ‘whether a political party picks it up’, rather than the intrinsic importance of 
the issue (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 18). Parties are able to overcome interest group politics, 
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as mass politics trumps the interest group arena when both are engaged on an issue: the more 
attentive the public is to an issue, the less influential lobbying is likely to be (Lowery 2007; 
Hooghe and Marks 2009, 18-19).  
The process of party-driven politicisation given by Hooghe and Marks is outlined in figure 
1.1. This is a five-stage process whereby the impetus for reform arises from a mismatch 
between the form and function of jurisdictional arrangements. Parties respond to public 
opinion and pressure from interest groups at (2), leading to issue creation. Arena rules (3) - 
such as those which require a referendum on transfers of national powers - influence the 
ability of parties to push debate into the mass arena (4). If issues do enter the mass arena (5), 
then they are decided by a conflict structure which is biased towards identity. Issues which 
remain in the interest group arena are decided on distributional logic (Hooghe and Marks 
2009, 9). The arena is both a dependent and explanatory variable, in this model. However, this 
raises the question of the factors that influence the outcome of contestation issues at stage 5, 
in the mass arena: what factors lead to identity logic constraining policy making? 
Postfunctionalism argues that parties are decisive, that they can frame European integration as 
antithetical to support for the nation and its institutions, and that parties are able to cue 
opposition among individuals with these exclusive identities to opposition of European 
integration through mobilising these sentiments (Hooghe et al. 2007; de Vries and Edwards 
2009).  
In shaping arena choice, parties are able to determine where the contestation of European 
reforms take place. If this contestation occurs in the mass arena, it is argued that gal/tan 
identity logic is more influential than left/right distributional logic (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 
9). Contestation of European integration in the mass arena means that the interest group arena, 
which is a closed shop of government leaders, interest groups, and Commission officials, is 
bypassed. Instead, European integration has become ‘a field of strategic interaction among 
party elites’, one in which parties compete for power and to influence public opinion (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009, 9). Identity is held to be causally important for European integration because 
European integration it has opaque economic implications, much clearer communal 
implications, and is debated in public forums by mass organisations (Hooghe and Marks 
2009, 12). In these debates, identity becomes the decisive issue because it affects public 
opinion on European integration, and is held to be important in this regard in three ways. 
First, in that it holds greater weight in public opinion than for elites or interest groups; second, 
that it must be politically constructed in relation to European integration; and third, that 
individual citizens who identify exclusively with the nation are more likely to oppose 
European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 12). Party debates on European integration 
!24
are thus held to be structured by identity. Party competition in this field pits market and 
cultural liberals against social conservatives and nationalists, and varies across European 
states in the geometry of the parties that embody these values. 
The deficit in postfunctionalist theory 
As Hooghe and Marks acknowledge, their account of politicisation is incomplete, since they 
do not give a full treatment to the construction of national identity (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 
23). The fundamental argument of this chapter is that through the incompleteness of their 
account of identity, postfunctionalists neglect the agency of a significant actor in the process 
of the construction and politicisation of national identities: the mass media. This argument 
arises from two deficits in the account of the construction of identity as given by Hooghe and 
Marks (2009). The first is that while they argue that identities change slowly and are not 
fixed, the processes by which identity comes about, and by which it comes to be defined by 
exclusive constructions of the nation is not explored. This process can be understood as the 
long-term formation of citizen identities, against which representations of European 
integration are constructed. Understanding how citizen identities arise is important to 
developing a clearer understanding as to when and how political entrepreneurs are able to 
politicise European integration through appeals to these identities.  
This leads to the second deficit of postfunctionalism, namely that it does not give sufficient 
treatment to the role of other (non-party) actors in this construction process. The current 
politicisation model is predicated on the ability of parties to effectively cue opposition to 
European integration through public communication, however public communication often 
relies on intermediary actors that connect parties to the public (Statham and Trenz 2013).  As 4
the next sections argue, these two issues must be resolved in order for the explanatory 
mechanism of postfunctionalism to properly accommodate national identity as an independent 
variable. We must understand how national identity arises and is reproduced in order to 
understand how it can be used to frame European integration as a threat to the nation. 
Similarly, we must understand how parties are able to communicate these messages to the 
public, in mass-mediated debates, in order to understand how the Eurosceptical outcomes that 
postfunctionalism predicts come about from the public contestation of European integration. 
The first of these tasks is addressed in the second part of the present chapter, while the second 
is addressed in Chapter 2.  
 This issue is explored in detail in the next chapter. 4
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1.3  Postfunctionalism and identity 
 
The next task of this chapter is to outline an account of national identity that is compatible 
with the theoretical framework provided by postfunctionalism, therefore. In order to do this, 
the question of what national identity is and how it arises must be addressed. Therefore, this 
section outlines the account of identity given in postfunctionalism, in order to situate the 
subsequent discussion of the formation of collective identities in an appropriate theoretical 
field. It goes on to review the literature on the concept of ‘European identity’, which has 
become a locus for research on the interaction between national and European identities.  
The concept of identity is discussed in the postfunctionalist corpus primarily in terms of 
national identities versus European identity (Hooghe et al. 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
According to Hooghe and Marks (2009), political conflict structured around and engaging 
communal identities is the main determinant of policy outcomes toward European integration. 
Individuals who hold an exclusive sense of national identity are less likely to support 
European integration than those who hold a mixed identity, or who identify primarily towards 
Europe or a ‘European identity’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009). What matters is ‘whether a person 
conceives of her national identity as exclusive or inclusive of other territorial identities’, 
because individuals who hold an exclusive sense of identity are liable to be cued to believe 
that European integration is incompatible with ‘love of their country’ (Hooghe and Marks 
2009, 13). This cueing is undertaken by ‘political entrepreneurs’, primarily parties.  
As discussed above, postfunctionalism adopts three generalisations which guide their 
understanding of how identity affects public opinion on Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 
12). These are: first, that ‘identity has a greater weight in public opinion than for elites or 
interest groups’; second, that ‘identity does not speak for itself in relation to most political 
object, but must be politically constructed’; third, that ‘the more exclusively an individual 
identifies with an ingroup, the less that individual is predisposed to support a jurisdiction 
encompassing outgroups’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 12). As Hooghe and Marks note, in order 
to make sense of the relationship between national identity and European integration, we need 
to theorise how ‘national identity can both reinforce and undermine support for European 
integration’ (Hooghe and Marks 2006, 424). For postfunctionalists, the most important aspect 
of political identities is not the specific group or groups with which citizens identify, but 
rather ‘how different group identities relate to each other, and whether and how they are 
mobilized in elite debate’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 12). While the governance of Europe has 
been transformed by supranationalism and the emergence of a new jurisdictional architecture, 
the way that citizens form and conceive their identities has remained constant. As a result, 
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‘Europe is faced with a tension between rapid jurisdictional change and relatively stable 
identities’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 13).  However, the mechanics of this mobilisation in 5
elite debate, and indeed the means by which citizens come to possess a sense of national 
identity, are left unexplored. Perhaps the most crucial of these three generalisations is that 
identity must be politically constructed. Public opinion on European integration is particularly 
susceptible to the construction of identity in relation to it, and this is defined this in terms of 
three processes: priming, or making a consideration salient; framing, or connecting a 
consideration to a political object, and cueing, or installing a bias (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 
13). While the extant literature on postfunctionalism leaves the origins of identity largely 
unexamined, the emphasis on the social construction of identity places it within the modernist 
field of identity theory. 
Current postfunctionalist theory makes several further assumptions which guide its account of 
identity. The first is the idea that humans are innately ‘ethnocentric’, and favour their own 
group over others. This does not necessarily mean that people are inherently hostile to outside 
groups, merely that they define their own identity in relation to those other groups. This draws 
on the work of Social Identity Theory (SIT), which has become key to accounts of the 
interaction between conceptions of national and European identity in the ‘European identity’ 
literature.  Individuals may have multiple identities, identifying with communities at different 6
scales (Côté and Levine 2002). National identity has been the most significant form of group 
or community identification in the modern world, being ‘very widely held and even more 
commonly taken for granted’ (Gellner 1983, 409). Thus, we can understand national identity 
as being one level of group identification, while identification towards Europe in general or 
the European Union in particular is often termed ‘European identity’ (Eder 2009; Risse 2010). 
Social Identity Theory suggests that identities can be a source of tension. Since individuals 
and groups define their identity in relation to the ‘Other’, this can entail an implicit rejection 
of those out-groups. This may be part of a ‘competitive response’ whereby individuals try to 
achieve a ‘distinctive and positive’ image of their own in-group (Nigbur and Cinnirella 2007). 
The extent to which this competition may lead to hostility toward out-groups is debated in the 
literature (see, for example, Triandafyllidou 1998; Brewer 1999; Nigbur and Cinnirella 2007). 
However, some studies have found that derogation of out-groups is more strongly associated 
with those individuals who have been primed with an intergroup comparison orientation, 
supporting the assertion by Hooghe and Marks that the role of priming, framing, and cueing is 
central to the process of conflict along identity logics (see Hopkins and Murdoch 1999; 
Hopkins 2001; Mummendy, Klink, and Brown 2001). 
 For a full exposition of the claims of postfunctionalism, see Chapter 2. 5
 See Eder (2009) for an overview of the dominance of SIT in contemporary scholarship on European identity.6
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Thus, postfunctionalism offers an account of identity that suggests that identities are socially 
constructed. It does not specify the mechanisms which contribute to this construction, nor 
does it explore the potential consequences that a more developed theory of identity might 
have for the wider explanatory potential of the postfunctionalist research agenda. We must 
therefore turn to the wider literature on the formation of national identities, and the possibility 
of a ‘European identity’, to explore this aspect of national identity, and the mechanisms by 
which it comes to be politicised.  
The relationship between national identity and ‘European identity’ 
If tension between national identities and European integration is at the core of the 
postfunctionalist thesis, then the concept of a European identity can be seen as the conceptual 
opposite of closely held national identity (Risse 2010). Understanding the extent to which 
citizens identify with Europe is important, since postfunctionalism expects that it is the 
emergence of a European identity that might relieve the tension between feelings of national 
identity and European integration. This change, postfunctionalists predict, will be at least in 
part generational (Hooghe and Marks 2009). A great deal of attention has been paid to the 
possibility of the emergence of some form of European identity among European citizens 
(Bruter 2005; Robyn 2005; McLaren 2006; Magistro 2007; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; 
Risse 2010; Spiering and Wintle 2011; Fligstein et al. 2012). A variety of research methods 
have been applied to the measurement of this European identity. A number of scholars have 
concentrated on identity in the context of institutions: for instance, the role of the central 
institutions of the EU in the socialisation of actors (Risse 2006; Checkel 2007). However this 
approach ignores the role of political dynamics and the mass identities of citizens, which 
postfunctionalism holds to be highly significant. A more substantial strand of work examines 
the possibility of a European identity through the use of survey and experimental data to 
measure the extent to which citizens identify with Europe and how multiple levels of identity 
- European and national - interact and shape attitudes. The core of the postfunctionalist case 
for the importance of identity is based on this work, and the finding that strongly held national 
identities correspond with low levels of support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks 
2005, 2007).  
Citizens who strongly identify with a national community are more likely to support 
exclusionary norms and are more likely to perceive European integration as a threat - to their 
own identity and to their national communities. There is a significant association between the 
strongly-held identification of individuals with their nation-states and their support for 
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European integration (McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005). This relationship between 
national identity and opposition to European integration is crucial for the wider operation of 
the postfunctionalist model. Feelings of national identity are a ‘strong influence’ on the 
evaluations of individual citizens of European integration, and the effects of this influence are 
‘at least as significant as utilitarian explanations, such as income, education and subjective 
economic competence’ (Carey 2002, 407-8). Evidence suggests that opposition to the EU ‘is 
not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilization… but about fear of, or 
hostility toward, other cultures’ (McLaren 2002, 553). As McLaren notes, while the role 
played by the EU in the cultural affairs of Member States is minimal, ‘many Europeans are 
likely to perceive that the European project as a whole is designed to strip away their national 
cultures and identities’ (McLaren 2006, 74). Opposition to European integration is frequently 
associated with a defence of the nation state against the European Union and its institutions. 
For instance, Christin and Trechsel (2002) find that in Switzerland, the greater attachment to 
the nation held by Swiss citizens, the less likely they are to support Swiss membership of the 
European Union. This effect also works in the opposite direction. Indeed, even relatively 
weakly held identification towards the European Union correspond with higher levels of 
support for, and approval of, European institutions (Citrin and Sides 2004).  
Survey methodology has also been used to identify trends in identification by citizens towards 
Europe. For instance, Bruter (2005, 166) argues that ‘a mass European identity has emerged 
over the past 30 years’ and that this identity ‘continues to grow’, drawing on data from mass 
surveys and experiments to argue that news and symbols have an impact on the way that 
respondents conceive of their identities, and that exposure to positive news about the EU 
creates a greater identification toward Europe. Eurobarometer data to is often used in these 
studies; for instance McLaren (2006) shows that individuals who are concerned about 
‘perceived threats to group level economic resources and symbols’ are less likely to identify 
with Europe than those who feel that national are not threatened by integration. This is 
manifested in opposition to the transfer of health and social welfare policy making to the EU, 
for instance (McLaren 2006, 190). Other methods include the use of a psychological approach 
based on Q methodology. For instance, Robyn (2005) finds that there is a significant amount 
of support across the seven countries studied for the EU, but this does not translate to support 
for a specific European identity - national pride, he argues, exists alongside support for 
European integration, however there is ‘little agreement’ on what a European identity might 
look like (Robyn 2005, 229).  
Correspondingly, a literature has emerged which examines the theoretical basis for the 
development of a common mass European identity, and the interaction between this identity 
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and national identities. This is useful for the purposes of this chapter in that much of this 
literature sheds light on the compatibility of dual European and national identities. The 
creation of a European in-group, it is argued, arises from the everyday interaction of citizens 
across national boundaries (see Fligstein 2008). This conception of European identity echoes 
the processes of the formation of identities within nation-states in many respects (Davidson 
2008). Among those arguing for the importance of a ‘civic’ European identity, Fligstein et al 
(2012, 109) argue that ‘it is the people who are involved in these routine interactions who are 
most likely to come to see themselves as Europeans and be involved in a European national 
project’. They also find that that the conception of European identity that has developed 
among those who think of themselves, in part or in whole, as European is of a civic or 
cosmopolitan nature (Fligstein et al. 2012, 117). Those who consider themselves to be 
European - at least in part - tend to be those who live, work, or travel in other European 
countries, speak other European languages, or belong to European networks or associations. 
Thus, for these people, it is argued, European identity is tied up with the freedoms associated 
with the EU and the single market: those who accept the rules and values of the EU can be 
citizens of the EU, without regard to characteristics such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, 
or culture (Fligstein et al. 2012, 116-117). 
This literature also gives support to the notion that individuals holding inclusive or multiple 
identities is consistent with continuing to hold an attachment to a national community 
(Fligstein 2008; Robyn 2005; Risse 2010). Diez Medrano and Guitierrez (2001) argue that a 
European identity is simply one component of a more complicated nested system of identities 
which include national, regional, and local identities (including those associated with cities or 
even neighbourhoods). Individuals may hold several identities simultaneously, each activated 
in different contexts. Similarly, Risse (2005, 2010) argues that national and European 
identities are not necessarily incompatible, because these identities relate to different 
communities - one can be both European and French without the two identities coming into 
conflict, if those identities are activated under different social conditions. The extent to which 
it is normatively desirable for identification towards the European Union to take on the ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ characteristics of the nation state has also been questioned. Wittlinger (2009, 381) 
argues that it is a mistake to wish to shape the identity structures of Europe in the same way 
as the state-based nationalism of the twentieth century - which produced conflict and 
‘nationalism at its worst’. Instead, ‘a European Union that does not bind its citizens 
emotionally, is evaluated in terms of costs and benefits, and does not mange to mobilise its 
citizens’ could be considered to be ‘a welcome and appropriate response to the twentieth 
century’ (Wittlinger 2009, 381). The significance of this is that we should pay attention to the 
context in which identities are engaged and potentially politicised. Whereas exclusive national 
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identities are the focus of postfunctionalism, individuals with multiple identity attachments 
may be still liable to be cued into opposition to European integration if attachment to the 
nation is perceived to be threatened.  
The role of national history and culture, as important determinants of these contexts, is 
significant, therefore. Discourses of history and culture are argued by a number of studies to 
be particularly influential in the patterns of support for European integration in Member 
States. For instance, national histories shape the way in which debates over Europe are 
conducted (Diez Medrano 2003). An apt comparison here is between the UK (and particularly 
England), and Germany. In regards to the UK, a number of authors have argued that 
opposition to European integration is grounded in the history of British imperialism, with 
Britain’s imperial past exerting a considerable influence on the popular conception of British 
national identity (Young 1999; Diez Medrano 2004; Schweiger 2007). Meanwhile Germany’s 
pro-Europeanism is argued to be product of the legacy of Germany’s role in the Second World 
War and Germany’s Nazi past: the experience of the war has lead to a commitment to 
European integration both from elites and mass publics (Diez Medrano 2003; Wittlinger 
2010). Indeed, Germany has been described as following a ‘European vocation’, one that led 
it to avoid discourses of national interest in favour of the European interest (Paterson 2011).  7
These studies highlight the importance of understanding the context of the politicisation of 
European integration: while a the general model of postfunctionalism can explain the 
common processes of politicisation and contestation across member states, divergent national 
cultures and histories may lead to significant differences in the context of this process in each 
Member State.  
Thus, while the literature is mixed in its conclusions on the emergence of a coherent European 
identity, it does provide insight into the complex relationship between national identity and 
attachment to a European identity. However, it is the political use of exclusive national 
identities that are the constraining factor in postfunctionalism, and it is to these exclusive 
national identities that this chapter now turns. Having laid out the account of identity 
presented by postfunctionalism, the theoretical basis of this account will now be explored, in 
order to expand and clarify the understanding of identity in this thesis.  
 However, in recent years a ‘tipping point’ seems to have been reached where Germany’s traditional 7
Europeanism has declined at the same time that it has been pushed ‘somewhat reluctantly centre stage’ in Europe 
(Paterson 2011, 57).
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1.4  How is national identity constructed? The ‘imagined community’ and the discursive 
construction of national identity  
The wider literature on national identity is extensive: the formation of collective identity in 
general, and national identity in particular, has been of interest to a broad range of 
sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and historians. As Wodak et al. (2009, 18-19) 
note, many of the key concepts of national identity, including nationalism and the idea of the 
‘nation’, are essentially contested. While in Europe, nations have developed since the late 
Middle Ages, the history of the nation is one of unique trajectories and special paths. As a 
result, ‘there is no generally accepted definition of a ‘nation’, nor is is there any general 
consensus on the time from which one can speak of a ‘nation’’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 18). 
National identity has become ‘an all-purpose catchword’, particularly in relation to the causal 
connections between culture, the nation-state, and European political integration (Schlesinger 
1987, 220). In the 1990s, the focus of analyses of nationalism shifted toward a debate between 
those who took a modernist view of nationalism, emphasising the role of nation-state building 
and modern print communication, with those scholars who understood the historical bases of 
national identities as being rooted in ethnic affiliations and cultural cleavages (Smith 1995; 
Anderson 2006; Savage et al. 2010).  More recently, the role of globalisation and the 8
influence of everyday practices of national identity in hybrid conditions has become a locus 
for research (Savage et al. 2010, 598).  It is in the modernist strand of literature that we can 9
locate the work that is most compatible with postfunctionalism. This section reviews this 
work, and concentrates on the idea of the nation as an ‘imagined community’, constructed by 
political actors. Key strands of these perspectives are briefly reviewed, before turning to 
theories of national identity that consider the role of the construction, by elites and other 
actors, of the nation. This leads to the conclusion that postfunctionalism should give 
consideration of the different types of actors - beyond political parties - that construct identity, 
and in particular the media.  
The ‘imagined community’ 
 Earlier perspectives developed ‘Primordialist’ claims to the origin of the nation, which differ from modernist 8
claims in that they assume that the fundamental building-blocks of the nation are pre-existing ethnic groups or 
communities (Smith 1991). The world consists, in this view, of ‘natural’ nations that must be restored or 
reawakened (Pearson 1993). These primordial nations are held to arise from factors including ‘blood ties’, or 
quasi-kinship, race, language, geography, religion, and custom (Geertz 1973; Smith 1998). On these lines, any 
new states are held to be susceptible to discontent arising from primordial attachments - which have ‘an 
ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves’ (Geertz 1973, 259). Thus, for 
primordialists, the nation exists as a deeply held characteristic, arising from one’s birth into a particular religious, 
linguistic, or cultural community (Geertz 1973, 260).  
 Contemporary debates on national identity have largely moved away from those who adopt a primordialist 9
perspective, towards debates between those who conceive of the nation as a product of modernism (Smith 1995).
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While there are many theories of national identity, modernist theories appear to be most 
compatible with postfunctionalism. Of all the modernist theories, that of the ‘imagined 
community’ has been one of the most influential on the work of political scientists 
investigating the relationship between national and European identity (see for instance De 
Cillia et al 1999; Edensor 2002; Fligstein 2008, Risse 2005, 2010; Wodak et al. 2009; 
Fligstein et al. 2012). Originating in the work of Benedict Anderson, this work defines 
national identity in similar terms as earlier modernist thinkers, but with a different solution to 
the concept of elite construction and mass response to national identity (Smith 1998, 131). 
The nation is, according to this theory, ‘an imagined political community’ which is ‘imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson 2006, 6). Anderson’s understanding of 
the nation is thus centred on three concepts - community, limited boundaries, and sovereignty. 
Nations are imagined because of the scale that a national political unit inherently demands: 
‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them’ (Anderson 2006, 5-6). In this, Anderson follows Gellner, 
who argues that ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents 
nations where they do not exist’ (Gellner 1964, 169; Anderson 2006).  
 
Three key elements constitute the ‘imagined’ nation. The first is that the nation is imagined as 
a community. The nation is a ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’: the fraternity of nationhood is 
described as the the force behind the willingness of millions to die for their nation (Anderson 
2006, 7). Second, the nation is defined as limited. That is, even the largest of nations is 
encompassed by finite borders, beyond which other nations exist. For Anderson, nationalists 
do not ‘dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their 
nation’ (Anderson 2006, 7). As discussed above, this idea, as with much of the modernist 
view of nationalism and national identity, draws on social identity theory: in-groups are 
defined against the existence of out-groups; in order for there to be an ‘us’, there must be a 
‘them’. Finally, the nation is imagined as sovereign. Drawing on the changes heralded by the 
Enlightenment and the subsequent erosion of the ‘hierarchical dynastic realm’, Anderson 
argues that nations are imagined as being free - either ‘under God’ or directly. The ‘gauge and 
emblem’ of this status is sovereignty (Anderson 2006, 7-8). If the nation is imagined in this 
way, then we can argue that forces, internal or external, which impinge on any of these three 
elements, might be effectively constructed as a threat to the nation (see below). 
The explanans for the emergence of mass national identities is the development of capitalism 
and the print media, and the convergence of the two - giving a new conception to the role of 
elites in constructing the nation. What Anderson calls ‘the fatal diversity of human language’ 
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created the opportunity for the creation of new imagined communities, establishing the 
foundations for the modern nation-state (2006, 46). This account outlines an everyday and 
mundane cultural process. Instead of staged traditions, public festivities, or national ‘high 
cultures’, national identities emerge out of the spread of local written languages, and the use 
of those languages by elites, via the emergent print-media, to form national communities.  10
The regular ritual of reading the same daily or weekly newspapers, and other print 
publications is a key element of this. The discursive construction of the nation in newspapers, 
which explicitly address the reader as part of a nation in-group, and contrasts this in-group to 
outsiders from other nations, develops in readers a set of shared interests, values, and 
orientations. Anderson thus offers a historical account of the development of the nation rooted 
in the changes in the structure of economic relations and mass communication inherent in the 
emergence of the modern world: in short, ‘print-capitalism’ (Anderson 2006, Ch. 3). The mass 
media is therefore the driving force behind the construction of national identities, raising 
important questions about the agency of the mass media in this process.  
While Anderson fails to consider other forms of media, particularly those which have 
emerged in the twentieth century, namely radio, television, cinema, and the internet, he 
provides us with a framework through which to understand how the nation is produced and 
reproduced through common, mass cultural practices. As he notes, the newspaper reader is 
reassured by the ‘mass ritual’ of the consumption of the same content at the same time by 
many thousands of others of whom he has no knowledge: ‘the imagined world is visibly 
rooted in everyday life’ (Anderson 2006, 35). The imagined community is thus created by the 
mass participation (active or passive) in cultural discourses by citizens. This framework can 
be extended from Anderson’s core concern, newspapers and other printed media, to a wider 
range of sources.  
The discursive construction of national identity  
 
The framework of the imagined political community presents a compelling account of 
national identity formation, and has been seized upon by a number of political scientists and 
discourse analysts. This section builds on the imagined community to a framework for 
understanding the importance of identity construction, particularly based on the approach of 
the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis. This account of national identity, focusses 
particularly on the discourses of the nation found in public and private spheres, and the way in 
 In particular, as the market for Latin books was saturated in the late sixteenth century, the significance of local 10
languages increased, and these consolidated into a smaller number of written languages. New groups of readers 
were formed around these languages, and were mobilised for political and national purposes (Anderson 2006, 
Ch. 3). 
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which political actors contrast the nation. National identities are produced, reproduced, 
transformed, and dismantled through discourses, by means of language or other semiotic 
systems, and thus we must understand these discourses in order to examine the construction 
of the nation (Wodak et al. 2009, 4-5). The discursive construction framework is particularly 
useful in that it is complementary to, and compatible with, the account of identity already 
offered by postfunctionalism. Hooghe and Marks note that ‘public responses to Europe are 
refracted through national institutions and patterns of discourse that reflect historical 
trajectories’ (2009, 14). 
In order to understand this process, we must provide a more detailed account of the 
mechanisms which constitute the construction of national identities. To do this, national 
identity is defined to mean a set of conceptions and perceptual schema, attitudes and 
behavioural conventions, shared by its bearers collectively. Following the theoretical 
expressions of identity already discussed, the arguments of Wodak et al. (2009, 22) summarise 
how constructed national identity, formed in everyday discursive acts, constitutes the shared, 
imagined community of the nation: 
If a nation is an imagined community and at the same time a mental construct, an 
imaginary complex of ideas containing at least the defining elements of collective 
unity and equality, of boundaries and autonomy, then this image is real to the extent 
that one is convinced of it, believes in it and identifies with it emotionally.  
This draws upon Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus - common ideas and conceptions shared 
within a group of persons (De Cillia et al. 1999, 153; Wodak et al. 2009, 4). It also borrows 
conceptually from the social psychology of groups, and SIT, in that the discursive 
construction of nations and identities involves the construction of difference, distinctiveness, 
and uniqueness.  The definition of identity involves defining what one is not, and any in-11
group requires an out-group against which to define itself (De Cillia et al. 1999, 153-4; 
Wodak et al. 2009, Ch. 1). National identity can therefore be defined as an interrelated 
complex of phenomena commonly shared among individuals, which include similar 
emotional dispositions, attitudes, behavioural conventions, and particularly conceptions and 
perceptual assumptions which are internalised through socialisation via a variety of avenues, 
including politics, the media, everyday practices, education, and culture (Wodak et al. 2009, 
4). Thus, individuals might share common conceptions of a common national culture, a 
common history, and a sense of national territory or space, attitudes towards other nations and 
communities. The nation-state, far from being merely a political entity, is rooted in cultural 
 For an overview of the social psychology of citizenship and national identity, see Sindic (2011). 11
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representations, ‘symbolic formations - a ‘system of representation’ - which produced an idea 
of the nation’ (Hall 1993, 355).  
The stories constructed around the nation create common meanings with which citizens can 
identify, and constituting them as ‘subjects’ in Foucault’s sense of ‘subjection’: both of and to 
the nation (Hall 1993, 355-6). The centralised nature of the nation-state is manifested in 
strong cultural institutions which claim to ‘subsume all differences and diversity into their 
imagined community’ (Hall 1993, 355). This cultural representation of the nation is inherently 
hybrid - while the role of the national culture is to present ‘one nation’, this apparent 
continuity masks the ‘ethnic hotch-potch of modern nationality’ (Hall 1993, 356). This 
account of national identity does not assume that there is one, definitive, national identity that 
can be objectively observed, but rather there are different identities which are discursively 
constructed according to context (De Cillia et al. 1999, 154). Identity in this sense is ‘in the 
eye of the beholder’. However, the shared, commonly-held aspects of these identities, and 
their attachment and reference to the political object of the nation-state is what defines them 
as specifically national in character, as opposed to merely small-group or community 
identities. 
Therefore, nationality is rooted in a ‘narrative story’ which constructs the nation as part of the 
wider meaning individuals give to the social world (Geertz 1975; Eder 2009; Wodak et al. 
2009). The concept of collective memory is also important to this idea. The narrative 
construction of national identities draws heavily on an emphasis on common history, and how 
history is remembered. Maurice Halbwachs’ (1992) argument, that collective memory is the 
product of the selective recollection of past events which are significant for members of 
particular communities, is influential here. According to De Cillia et al. (1999, 155), the 
stories of national history told by citizens, which form a key part of the ‘national narrative’, 
rely on a collective memory which maintains a certain historical continuity. For example, 
collective memory has been of particular interest for those scholars analysing the relationship 
between German national identity and European integration. The influence of the collective 
memory of the Second World War and Germany’s Nazi past has had a significant impact on 
contemporary conceptions of German identity and is held to be, in part, responsible for 
Germany’s ‘European vocation’ (Wittlinger 2007; 2010; Paterson 2011).  
Eder (2009, 443) argues that we must analyse the construction of national identities by 
concentrating on the sites where debates over identity take place. These include the market, 
discourses on constitutional patriotism, secular legal culture, and institutions such as the 
Council of Europe (Eder 2009, 443-4). The role of discursive acts in various settings, 
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including in politics, the mass media, sports, education, and everyday practices, and the 
subsequent socialisation of citizens is crucial to the discursive construction of national 
identity. As there is no single national identity, different identities are constructed in different 
contexts: ‘audience, setting, topic and substantive content’ are important (Wodak et al. 2009, 
4). National identities are changeable and often ambivalent, therefore. As De Cillia et al. 
(1999, 154) argue, while discourses of identity may change according to context, there are 
relations of transfer and contradiction between the images of identity presented by elites and 
the media, and the ‘everyday’ discourses which take place in the private or semi-private lives 
of citizens. The discourses of the elite and the media thus interact with those of the citizen in a 
meaningful way. The construction of similarity and difference is a key part of this process. 
Actors use strategies which construct identity by ‘promoting unification, identification, and 
solidarity’ are the most comprehensive strategies employed in the discursive construction of 
national identity (Wodak et al. 2009, 33).  12
Importantly, this understanding of identity as a discursively constructed phenomenon entails 
understanding identity not as a singular discourse, but as multiple, overlapping, and contested 
discourses. Political actors produce and reproduce discourses of the nation that contain ‘a 
complex of common or similar beliefs or opinions’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 28). These discourses 
are constructed by actors including the state, political parties, the media, and in everyday 
social practices, and result in material and social conditions that socialise individuals and 
contribute to a shared sense of ‘national identity’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 30). The discursive 
construction of national identity may be undertaken by actors operating under the guise of 
different ‘macro-strategies’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 33-45). These correspond to a number of 
social functions, including community construction, perpetuation, justification, and 
transformation. Perhaps most relevant for the purposes of this thesis, these discursive 
constructions of national identity may seek to ‘construct and establish a certain national 
identity’ for strategic ends: this might include attempts to promote solidarity and unification, 
or to seek to create differentiation. The emphasis placed on exclusive national identities by 
much of the recent literature on European integration suggests that differentiation and 
perpetuation are particularly relevant. Discourses may seek to ‘maintain and to reproduce a 
threatened national identity’ in order to preserve, support, or protect it (Wodak et al. 2009, 
33). Justification strategies seek to justify or relativise the status quo by emphasising the 
legitimacy of past events and the history of the national ‘in-group’ in order to defend a 
common ‘national-self perception’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 33-4).  
 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of discourse theory. 12
!37
Importantly, the discursive construction framework places emphasis on the role of mass 
media discourses in shaping national identity, echoing Anderson (2006) and Billig (1995). 
The mass media play a role in socialising citizens in shared, collective identities that are 
expressed in media discourses. The media formulate models of identity in the same way as 
political elites; these are subsequently recontexualised in private spaces (‘everyday 
discourse’), and form the basis of national identities (Wodak et al. 2009, 3-5). Discourses in 
the mass media have a reciprocal relationship with elite (political) discourses: a transfer and 
contradiction of ideas and images of identity takes place between the two sets of discourses, 
and, ultimately, with ‘everyday’ constructions of identity (De Cillia et al. 1999, 153). The 
mass media also play an important role in recontexualising and producing derivative forms of 
identity discourses from elites in diverse forms: in news reporting, advertising, and popular 
entertainment, among others (Wodak et al. 2009, 204). Thus, the media are a key focus for the 
analysis of identity discourses in this body of work, since they both reproduce existing 
discourses and act as a site of discourse construction: the media both reflect and shape 
discourses on national identity in a complex and broad set of interactions between actors.  
This builds on Michael Billig’s (1995) banal nationalism thesis. Billig takes the concept of 
elite construction of the nation, and re-frames it in a more complex way that acknowledges 
the role of practices beyond those of the elite in identity construction. The reproduction of the 
nation is banal in its character - that the complex of ‘beliefs, assumptions, habits, 
representations and practices’ that comprise national identity are reproduced in a ‘mundane 
way’ (Billig 1995, 6). In particular, it argues that everyday practice is the most important 
mechanism through which the nation is remembered. It follows, therefore, that we must study 
the everyday in order to understand how how the nation is ‘embedded in routines of life, 
which constantly remind, or ‘flag’ nationhood’ (Billig 1995, 38). Perhaps more important than 
politicians, the media play a crucial role, since they act as a means of transmitting the rhetoric 
of politicians into the homes of citizens, and also because the media are a key site for the 
construction and reconstruction of the nation. Most importantly, ‘the dexis of homeland is 
embedded in the very fabric of the newspapers’, and the effect of this is ‘like the hum of 
distant traffic’, it ‘makes the world of nations familiar, even homely’ (Billig 1995, 94). 
The framework offered by the discursive construction of national identity therefore provides a 
means to understand the significance of public (and private) discourses of identity. Citizens 
conceive of their identity in a way that is shaped by discourses in the public and private 
sphere.  Postfunctionalism holds that the politicisation of European integration occurs when 
these identity considerations are brought to the fore in the public sphere, engaging latent 
identities through the processes of priming, cueing, and framing (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 
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14). Kriesi notes that the basis of the success of political entrepreneurs who seek to use 
identity to politicise European integration lies in the exploitation of ‘anxieties about losing 
one’s identity in a denationalizing world’ (Kriesi 2009, 224). The framework offered by 
Wodak et al. helps to unpack this priming, framing, and cueing of national identities in a the 
wider context of the construction of national identities through discourse: the precise 
operation of mechanisms is discussed in the next chapter. What is clear from the ‘imagined 
communities’ and ‘discursive’ theses is that postfunctionalism fails to acknowledge the role of 
actors other than parties in constructing identities. The mass media appears to be the most 
significant of these. As Billig argues, ’Anderson is surely correct in stressing the importance 
of newspapers in the reproduction of nationality’ (1995, 125). The ‘banal’ construction of 
national identity in everyday life should make the media more important for the purposes of 
explaining the politicisation of European integration. The everyday reporting of the EU in 
relation to the nation becomes more significant in characterising the the relationship between 
national identity and European integration, since the everyday construction of the nation is the 
driving force behind citizens’ sense of their national identity.  
To summarise, the significance of this discursive construction literature for the 
postfunctionalist framework is in the account of the formation of identity that 
postfunctionalism gives, and especially in the role of actors in shaping citizen identities. The 
most important of these actors not currently included in postfunctionalism is the mass media. 
Postfunctionalism currently gives a limited treatment of the role of the media in 1) shaping 
citizen identities through discourses, and 2) interpreting and reproducing the nation in relation 
to European integration. The literature on identity formation discussed here has shown that 
the mass media play an important role in the operation of the mechanisms that lead to the 
formation of citizen attitudes. The postfunctionalist account of identity must theorise how 
identity is constructed and reconstructed by the media if it is to rely on the explanation that 
the relationship between identity and European integration can be constructed by politicians, 
therefore (see also, Statham and Trenz 2013).  
Conclusions  
This chapter has argued that theoretical approaches to European integration which incorporate 
identity as a variable stand a greater chance of providing an effective explanation of the 
integration process - taking into account the increasing politicisation of European integration 
since the Treaty of Maastricht. Postfunctionalism retains many of the the key features and 
findings of neofunctionalism, while incorporating identity as a variable. Postfunctionalists 
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argue that political entrepreneurs are able to take advantage of identity in relation to European 
integration when it becomes politicised as an issue, cueing responses which act as a constraint 
on policy-makers in their negotiations to further integration. However, this account does not 
give a full treatment to identity, in either its construction and origins, or its contestation in 
mass mediated public debates. 
The chapter then went on to argue that an account of identity that acknowledges the role of 
the media in both its formation and contestation is required to strengthen the postfunctionalist 
theory. The postfunctionalist theory rests on the notion that the politicisation of European 
integration is undertaken by the cueing, by political parties, of tension between exclusive 
national identities and changing forms of governance. However, as this chapter has shown, 
identity theory attributes a significant role for a range of actors in the formation of these 
identities, including, crucially, the media. This chapter therefore addressed two key issues in 
the exposition of a more developed postfunctionalist account of identity. The first was the way 
in which identities are formed. It was argued that an account of identity formation centred on 
discourse is consistent with postfunctionalist theory on identity. National identity does not 
exist in isolation of political actors, instead, it is shaped in everyday public discourses. The 
sources of national identity and their reproduction in everyday practice are significant for our 
understanding of how they become politicised. Adopting an account of national identity that 
follows the work of Anderson (2006) and Wodak et al. (2009) appears to allow us to begin to 
understand the significance of mass discourses. These discourses adopt a range of strategies, 
but their foundation is the emphasis of national uniqueness and the construction of ‘the 
greatest possible difference’ between the in-group and foreign nations, particularly those 
foreign nations that are the most similar (Wodak et al. 2009). This theory also tells us that 
there is no single national identity, but rather different discourses of identity that are 
constructed according to need and context, and which may compete with each other. National 
identity is not a static target for political parties to use, but as changing and dynamic.  
Second, it was shown that the media play an important role in the construction of national 
identities, and adopting the concepts of the imagined community, and the discursive 
construction of national identity, it was argued that the postfunctionalist model must 
incorporate a more detailed account of identity that acknowledges the constructive role of the 
media in identity formation. As the product of modernity, national identity is closely tied to 
the means by which it is reproduced. For Anderson (2006), this is primarily through the 
newspaper, for example. In order to capture the dynamics of the politicisation of identity, 
postfunctionalism must acknowledge that one of the main sources of its construction and 
reproduction, the media, is an active intermediary actor in the arena of mass politics. 
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Understanding the mass media’s role in constructing identity, and how this interacts with the 
strategic behaviour of parties, appears to be important for our model of the politicisation 
process. The next chapter seeks to begin to address this issue by examining the literature on 
media effects.  
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Chapter 2 
The Role of the Media in Politicising European Integration 
As shown in the previous chapter, the postfunctionalist framework develops an account of the 
domestic politicisation of European integration that takes identity as its explanatory variable. 
This analysis presents only an incomplete account of the nature of identity, in particular its 
origins and the means by which it forms the basis of the contestation of European reforms in 
the ‘mass arena’. These concerns may be addressed by understanding identity as being 
constructed through everyday, ‘banal’ processes, in particular through public and private 
discourses. The contestation of identity can also be re-understood in this context: as a 
discursive process that is undertaken in the mass arena. This chapter critically re-examines the 
domestic politicisation model proposed by Hooghe and Marks (2009), and proposes a new 
model of domestic politicisation that incorporates the media as an actor. This Media 
Augmented Postfunctionalist (MAP) model takes into account the key issues arising from the 
theoretical discussion of the discursive construction of national identity undertaken in Chapter 
1. It also incorporates the insights of the literature on the role of the media in mediating mass 
public debates, arising from the  political communications theory tradition. This allows this 
new model of domestic politicisation to plot a course between that of the political science 
driven approach of the Hooghe-Marks model, and the communications theory driven 
approaches of models which concentrate on public communications and the public sphere.  
The argument of this chapter is that the agency of the media must be taken into account in the 
postfunctionalist model. As the previous chapter showed, the media play a key role in the 
formation of national identity: they construct discourses of the nation that have far-reaching 
effects and which shape citizen attitudes and affiliations. This chapter will argue that the 
media also play an important role in the politicisation of European integration in the mass 
arena. The postfunctionalist model assigns to parties to most important role in this arena, 
arguing that they cue public opinion through framing European integration in terms of 
identity. However this ignores the role of intermediary actors, and particularly the mass 
media, in mediating the discourses of parties in the mass arena, as well as constructing their 
own discourses on European integration and identity. As Statham and Trenz observe, it is 
‘striking’ that postfunctionalism has little to say about ‘the role of political communication, 
nor the role of mass-mediated public debates’ (2013, 149). Therefore, this chapter argues, it 
important to explore the role played by the media in the mass arena, since the constructive 
effects of their discourses may either cue public opinion in the same way as parties, or have a 
material impact on the efforts of parties to cue public opinion.  
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The chapter proceeds in four parts. The first part presents a revised model of domestic 
politicisation, that incorporates the media as a third actor in the politicisation process 
alongside political parties and citizens. This Media Augmented Postfunctionalist model re-
conceptualises the idea of contestation in the mass arena as a mass-mediated public debate, in 
which the media act as an important actor in cueing and framing discourses which affect 
public opinion. Subsequently, these processes are examined in greater detail: the second 
section briefly discusses the key assumptions made about the media as a political actor in the 
model. The third section briefly discusses the implications of long-term constructions of 
national identity before examining the shorter-term impact of press involvement in issue 
creation, and in particular the role of the press in setting agendas and acting as a gatekeeper. 
Subsequently, the fourth section develops the account of the mass arena as a mass-mediated 
public debate, and argues that research into framing demonstrates that media effects are 
significant on both the importance and content of citizen opinions. As a result of this, it is 
argued that we must develop a greater understanding of the content and interaction between 
party and media discourses and the way that the contestation of Europe is subsequently played 
out in the mass arena. This section outlines the operation of some of the key mechanisms in 
this process: in particular how the press is influential in an agenda setting role, as a mediator 
of party discourse, and as a source of influential and widely reproduce frames that shape the 
discourse around European integration.  
2.1  Media Augmented Postfunctionalism  
The account of the politicisation of European integration presented by postfunctionalist theory 
gives only limited treatment to the processes of the politicisation of identity, and how the 
tension between static identities and European reform is subsequently contested in the mass 
arena. As Chapter 1 showed, in the long-run formation of national identity, the media play a 
central role (Billig 1995; Wodak et al 2009). The argument of this chapter is that the media 
are a significant actor in the process of the politicisation of national identities in the short-
term. The politicisation of European integration that leads to the creation of a ‘constraining 
dissensus’ on European integration requires the involvement of ‘politicisation agents’, or 
actors which drive the politicisation process, to engage the tension between relatively static 
identities and changing governance arrangements (Adam and Maier 2011, 432). As Chapter 1 
showed, the primary politicisation agents in postfunctionalism are parties (Hooghe and Marks 
2005; 2009). However, domestically, the other possible major actor in this process is the 
media (Kriesi 2008; Adam and Maier 2011). To address the role of the media in the 
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politicisation process, this section presents a Media Augmented Postfunctionalist model of 
domestic politicisation.  
While the rationale for the inclusion of the mass media in a new postfunctionalist 
politicisation model is set out in full below, it can be summarised in four points. First, the 
central role of the media in the discursive model of national identity formation suggests that 
the somewhat simplistic assumption in postfunctionalism that individuals are cued by, 
primarily, political parties seems to ignore powerful causal mechanisms which shape national 
identity formation and its subsequent politicisation. The banal nature of identity construction 
elevates the importance of everyday discourses in constructing national identity, in the media 
and elsewhere. Everyday discourses, in newspapers, television, radio, books, and elsewhere 
construct the imagined national community, and rhetorically connect this construction with 
European integration (Schlesinger 1991; Law 2001; Hawkins 2012). Second, the media 
performs a crucial role in cementing the form of national identity, and its relationship to other 
forms of identity: including a European identity (Law 2001, 300). As Edensor (2002, 141) 
notes, ‘the mass media has proved to be the most important way of disseminating 
representations of the nation’. In addition to this, the media is also the arena in which different 
representations of the nation are publicly contested (Stevenson 2001, 5). Third, the experience 
of the mass media is deeply implanted into daily life - ‘embedding their temporal and spatial 
reception into the quotidian, and producing numerous context in which they are 
interpreted’ (Edensor 2002, 141). The mass media are a key source of the socialisation of 
national identity for the citizen, and thus the way that the media construct European 
integration in relation to identity is highly significant (Wodak et al 2009, 4). Fourth, as argued 
below, the agenda setting power of the media is also highly significant. For instance, in their 
widely cited study on Presidential campaign coverage, McCombs and Shaw (1972) found 
evidence that the media influence voters’ perceptions of which issues were most important in 
coverage of election campaigns. The salience of issues can be increased by higher levels of 
media attention, driving them up the political agenda (Zaller 1992; Baumgartner and Jones 
1995).  
As Statham and Trenz (2013; 185) note, political science approaches, such as 
postfunctionalism, tend to focus on institutional political actors — in this case political parties 
— and their strategic interactions, without giving consideration to public debate. On the other 
hand, approaches arising from the communications tradition focus on public discourses, 
without considering how these are shaped by the institutional political context, power 
relationships, and how the media system interacts with the political system (Statham and 
Trenz 2013; see also de Vreese 2007). An approach that combines these perspectives allows 
!44
for an understanding of the ways in which the strategic interaction of actors contributes to 
development of public debates, how these debates, conversely, shape the interactions of 
political actors, and how these processes produce outcomes which weigh upon policy makers.  
The Media Augmented Postfunctionalist model adapts the domestic politicisation model 
presented by Hooghe and Marks (2009, 8-9). In a number of important ways, this model 
extends the Hooghe - Marks model of politicisation to incorporate the media as an actor, and 
which expands the conception of operation of the politicisation process beyond the two 
cleavages of ‘identity logic’ and ‘distributional logic’. Incorporating the arguments made so 
far, this model proposes that we must take into account the factors which influence the 
contestation of European integration along these cleavages, and which influence the course of 
debate in the mass arena. Particularly, we must consider how party strategy is shaped by the 
forces outlined in Chapter 1 which are not considered by Hooghe and Marks. This requires 
the re-conceptualisation of the mass arena as the site of a mass-mediated public debate, in 
which the media is a third actor alongside political parties and citizens.  
Model overview 
Figure 2.1 presents an overview of the MAP domestic politicisation model. The MAP model 
starts, at (1) in the same vein as the Hooghe-Marks model, with a reform impetus arising from 
a mismatch between functional efficiency and the form of current jurisdictions. At (2), there is 
issue creation, whereby political parties respond to public opinion and interest groups. Here, a 
new dimension, the structure of citizen identities, is added. The overall structure of 
identification towards the nation and Europe will influence both party strategy and public 
opinion: as argued above, states with a higher proportion of citizens that identify towards the 
nation are likely to have greater scope for Eurosceptical parties to frame and cue issue 
creation. In stage (3), formal arena rules constrain the overall choice of decision-making 
arena. These may, for instance, mandate a referendum or legislative debate to authorise 
reform.  While party strategy frames this arena choice, it is strongly influenced by media 1
framing of European issues, and the gatekeeping role that the media has in regards to the 
political agenda. Here, parties may fail to push reform into the mass arena if the media are 
sufficiently independent in their agenda-setting, or are inclined to exclude the messages of 
entrepreneurial Eurosceptic parties in favour of incumbent, pro-European parties. In other 
words, the media may constrain parties in their attempts to push contestation into the mass 
 For instance, in the UK, the European Union Act 2011 requires a referendum in the case of the amendment or 1
replacement of existing EU treaties, the transfer of specific powers or competencies to the EU, or other changes 
which alter the relationship between the UK and EU; including modifications to voting rules in the Council 
(Qualified Majority Voting), and membership of the Euro. 
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In the arena in which a particular reform issue is contested (4), outcomes are determined by 
the balance of contestation along either the logics of distribution (the economic left/right 
cleavage), or identity (the gal/tan cleavage). Outcomes are, in part, determined by arena 
choice. The mass arena yields a greater likelihood of a constraining outcome, as decisions 
contested along the lines of identity politics are more likely to produce opposition based 
around national identity (Hooghe and Marks 2006; 2009). Issues which reach the mass arena 
are contested in a mass-mediated public debate primarily along the gal/tan cleavage. This 
contestation is conducted in the media as well as directly through speeches, debates, and other 
forms of political action. Parties engage in this contestation by cueing, priming and framing 
the reform issues in order to engage identity politics: these messages largely reach the public 
via the media. The balance of contestation in that debate between distributional and identity 
logic is dependent on the framing of that issue by political actors including both parties and 
the media. The significance of the media in the mass arena is shown in figure 2.1 in two 
particular respects. These are (a) the representation of European issues by the media - which 
can influence contestation along both the left/right and identity cleavages - and (b) the 
construction of identity in relation to Europe in general and the reform issue in particular, 
which influences primarily the logic of identity. This model leaves unchanged the 
postfunctionalist assumption that if issues are contested only in the interest group arena, then 
distributional logic remains the main cleavage along which reforms are contested.  
In the MAP model, the influence of party strategy is no longer the primary determinant of 
outcomes (5). The media play an important role in both creating the conditions in which party 
attempts at mobilising public opinion via the logic of identity against European reform may 
be successful, and in the contestation process in the mass arena. Following Statham and Trenz 
(2013, 148-9), the mass arena of current postfunctionalist theory is re-imagined as 
encompassing a mass-mediated public debate, in which the strategic role of parties remains 
important, but is filtered through the media, and which engages identity logics through the 
prism of pre-existing media biases, identity constructions, and representations of European 
issues. The media thus emerge as a second actor in this new model: they influence the 
outcomes of the politicisation process at the key stages of both issue creation and issue 
contestation. The addition of this second actor raises questions about the strategic interaction 
between parties and the media. The ways in which parties are able to cue and frame public 
opinion depends on their ability to have this message carried to citizens via the media. These 
questions will now be addressed by unpacking, first, the role of the media at stage (2) of the 
model, and second, at stage (4) of the model. This will draw on chapter 1 and the formation of 
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national identities through ‘banal’ processes of socialisation, and on a discussion about the 
role of the press as a mediating force in public debates on the EU.  
In the issue creation stage, the long- and short-term effects of the media become relevant. In 
the longer-term, the construction of national identity in public discourses influences the extent 
to which citizens in member states hold identities that are exclusively national, mixed, or 
exclusively European. These long-term effects of identity construction have the potential to 
profoundly affect the predictions of postfunctionalism. As Hooghe and Marks (2009: 22-3) 
note, ‘identities change slowly’, and thus as identity constructions change over time, so will 
the way that they constrain attitudes over European integration. This long term construction of 
the nation in relation to European integration, and the natural experiment presented by 
European integration has the potential to profoundly shift the debate on Europe: if citizens 
become less focussed on narrowly-national identities and embrace an allegiance to a wider 
European identity, then the scope for political entrepreneurs to mobilise the tension between 
exclusive nationalism and supranationalism will consequently lessen. While this long-term 
change is important for the future relevance of the postfunctionalist research, the primary 
relevance of this long-term identity construction for this thesis is in inculcating the identity 
structures within each Member State.  In the short term operation of the politicisation model 2
presented here, the identity structure that influences issue creation at stage (2) is taken as 
fixed. As the previous Chapter argued, identity formation is a relatively slow process that 
entails the long-term development of solidarities over time (Wodak et al 2009). 
Thus, the primary focus of this chapter, and this thesis as a whole, is to understand the 
significance of shorter-term effects of identity construction, particularly in the media, rather 
than the long term effects, which can be taken as given for the purposes of the model of 
domestic politicisation discussed here.  The short-term effects of the media in the issue 3
creation stage are primarily centred around the extent to which issues become prominent: in 
order to engage public opinion and push decision making into the mass arena, actors must 
turn European reform into a salient issue before the public. This is achieved by increasing the 
prominence of European integration, however this relies on being able to make such reforms a 
part of the political agenda. The agenda-setting powers of the media are significant here, and 
are thus incorporated into the MAP model.   
 As the previous chapter noted, the construction of national identities is a long-term process. While we assume 2
that actors can 
 The long-term effects of media constructions of identity are potentially highly significant, and a locus for 3
potential future research.
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In stage 4, the contestation stage, European reforms are debated in the mass arena. In the 
MAP model, the question of how contestation in public discourse is undertaken is 
investigated. The current postfunctionalist literature assumes that once an issue reaches the 
public arena, the ways in which attitudes towards European integration are constrained 
depends on party cues: since contestation is along the lines of identity politics, the 
mobilisation of opposition to Europe will employ the framing of discourses in terms of 
national identity. However, as the previous chapter argued, this assumption ignores the role of 
the media in mediating those messages, and producing cues of their own. Thus, the 
contestation stage is re-imagined as a process by which parties must pass their messages 
through the media, who modify those messages, and who produce messages of their own (this 
is termed the mass-mediated public debate). Thus, the MAP model goes further than the 
Hooghe-Marks model in that it begins to consider the mechanisms of contestation in the mass 
arena. It is to this contestation that we now turn: first, the underlying assumptions of the 
model are elaborated in more detail, before the contestation stage is developed with reference 
to the communications studies literature.  
2.2  Underlying assumptions: the nature and role of the media as actors 
In order to unpack the Media Augmented Postfunctionalist politicisation model, it is 
necessary to discuss the nature of the media actors being introduced into the model. The MAP 
model presented here makes a number of assumptions, derived from the existing literature on 
media behaviour, about the role of media actors in the politicisation and contestation process. 
The first of these is that the media are an important actor in the mass arena, and play a role as 
an ‘intermediary actor’. The news media remain the best resource for citizens to access 
information about politics, observe debates, and evaluate the actions of governments: 
especially in foreign affairs, the news media remain the primary source of information for 
citizens (Gavin 2000; Hawkins 2012). In the case of European integration, the media are a 
contributor to public knowledge of, and attitudes towards it (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 
2006; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Boomgaarden et al 2013). As the previous chapter 
argued, the media play a role in constructing connections between political objects and 
identity - connections which postfunctionalist theory argues shape the influence of identity on 
public opinion (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 12). The media act as a mechanism to control 
access to information and messages, and media attention is a prerequisite for parties to reach 
the electorate with their messages: this is particularly important when parties wish to mobilise 
particular issues (Van der Pas and Vliegenthart 2015; 1).  
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Recent research has re-evaluated the linkage role that the media play in the process of 
communication between parties and the public (Thiel 2011, 128). The way in which major 
newspapers frame and instrumentalise the EU ‘shapes the attitudes of opinion makers and 
ordinary citizens alike’ (Thiel 2011, 8). Crucially, the role of the media can be seen as pro-
active, ‘enabling collective actors and social movements to voice their demands and challenge 
executive power’ (Koopmans and Statham 2010, 4). Journalists ‘enter the political debate as 
actors by commentating and opinion-leading’, providing a forum for ‘deliberative exchanges 
between policy makers and civil society, under the watchful gaze of an attentive 
public’ (Koopmans and Statham 2010, 5-6). While parties may be effective at mobilising 
some public opinion directly, this direct connection with mass publics is often restricted to 
elections: it is sporadic and often overshadowed by citizen concern with other issues 
(Schmitter 2009, 212). In contrast, the public frequently receive information from the media 
about national identity, European integration, and public debates on these matters. As the 
primary source of citizen information on European affairs, the media clearly matters in 
shaping and forming public opinion on it (Hawkins 2009; 2012).  
One important facet of the agency of the media is that the media must not be understood as a 
single actor. Rather, we must consider the extent to which the media is a collection of 
independent actors. Instead of a single entity, we must understand the media is a group of 
organisations, competing with each other for attention in a variety of ways (Strömberg 2004; 
Wolfsfeld and Sheafer 2006). The mass media has emerged as an ‘autonomous power centre’, 
in reciprocal competition with other centres of power, but also in competition with other 
media actors (Swanson and Mancini 1996, 11). Moreover, the mass media landscape consists 
of many different forms of media, including newspapers, television, radio, and, increasingly, 
the internet. If we consider the UK case, newspapers, just one part of the media, must be 
understood not just as a sector (or indeed sub-sectors of tabloid, quality, or mid-market 
publications), but as a group of up to ten competing actors.   4
This proliferation of media actors raises questions about the motivations and objectives of 
those actors. A pluralistic view of news production would assume that the particular coverage 
given to issues depends on the type of media organisation, and the perceived interests of their 
audience: what is deemed ‘newsworthy’ depends on the assessment made of the demand for a 
certain types of news from audiences (Temple 2008, 115). Media organisations are 
incentivised to modify their content and develop a distinctive place in the market in order to 
pursue an audience and share of the market (Hamilton 2007). However, the overt political 
agendas of many news organisations seems to belie this purely economic view. To use the UK 
 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the UK newspaper landscape, including the circulations of the national daily 4
newspapers and their political affiliations. 
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as an example, there is a clear divide between the broadcast media and newspapers in the 
extent to which overt political agendas drive the focus and content of news coverage (McNair 
2009). Whereas the broadcast media are subject to restrictions on political content, do not 
carry political advertising, and are bound by a principle of ‘impartiality’, the press are 
characterised by clear political partisanship, and the ‘perennial’ search for a competitive 
advantage over their rivals (McNair 2009, 36; Daddow 2012, 1221). In the UK, this 
competition between newspapers has led to the increased sensationalisation of news on EU-
related topics, as ‘Euroscepticism has become big business’ (Daddow 2012, 1221). This is 
driven by the ideological commitment and commercial priorities of newspaper proprietors, 
who have sought to take advantage of the relatively low levels of knowledge of the EU in the 
UK (Spiering 2004, 138).   
The positions of media actors 
The underlying factors that shape the orientation of media actors towards European 
integration are not well understood. Existing studies of the positions of media outlets on 
European integration tend to focus on sociological theories of media ownership (Price 2010; 
Daddow 2012). One key influence is the priorities of proprietors, especially those of 
newspapers (Arsenault and Castells 2008; Daddow 2012). In particular, the influence of 
Rupert Murdoch has been examined by a number of scholars who use his ownership of 
various television, newspaper, and online news sources as an example of how media 
organisations can pursue political goals on behalf of their owners (Anderson and Weymouth 
1999; Anderson 2004). Arsenault and Castells (2008, 508) argue that Murdoch ‘holds power 
in the global network society’ due to his ability to ‘connect the programming goals of media, 
business and political networks’, a power that gives him and his organisations the ability to 
influence public opinion. This power has been linked directly to his newspapers’ coverage of 
European affairs. As Rowinski (2014, 5-6) argues, Murdoch’s newspapers make their support 
for political parties contingent on those parties’ policies, particularly on Europe, where 
Murdoch has pledged to oppose those political parties that do not pursue relatively 
Eurosceptic policies.  
The most important element of the relationship between the orientations of media outlets, 
their owners, and the extent to which they present news coverage biased towards a 
Eurosceptic portrayal of EU affairs for this study is the effects that the behaviour of media 
outlets have on the politicisation process. For the purposes of this study, a number of 
assumptions will be adopted in order to simplify the analysis of this behaviour. First, it is 
assumed that media organisations have positions on political issues, either explicit or implicit, 
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and that these are expressed discursively. This can be observed most obviously in media 
systems where outlets endorse particular political parties explicitly at election times (and, 
often, continue this support during non-election times).  The measurement of the explicit 5
political positions of media outlets is a relatively undeveloped field: while much effort has 
been made by social science to develop schema for the measurement of the political positions 
of parties, legislatures, individual politicians, and legislatures, there has been little attention 
paid to those of the media (Ho and Quinn 2008, 354). The most clearly available indication of 
the positions of UK media can be derived from their political endorsements. It is assumed 
here that these endorsements represent the general political orientations of UK newspapers, 
although we must be careful to differentiate between endorsements of parties at election 
times, and support for particular policy positions.  
Second, we assume that the positions of media outlets on the fundamental axes of interest 
here - support for European integration, gal-tan, and economic left-right - can be identified on 
these axes, and are relatively stable and consistent. In the case of newspapers, a variety of 
viewpoints may be expressed by columnists and commentators, however the overall editorial 
direction of the publication tends to be well-controlled, and the output of news consistent in 
its direction and stance, especially in the case of partisan media (Levendusky 2013). More 
partisan news organisations tend to carefully construct consistent messages which present the 
news as a ‘package’, carefully designed to help consumers make sense of the world 
(Levendusky 2013, 612). The relationship between these relatively steady editorial 
orientations and positions of newspapers along political axes — left-right and gal-tan in this 
case — is not well understood in the literature. Studies of partisan media organisations have 
shown that favouritism towards one party tends to be associated with the presentation of 
particularly well-defined political positions, either a ‘liberal or conservative vision of the 
news’ (Levendusky 2013, 612; Jamieson and Cappella 2008). If we apply the same 
assumptions made by postfunctionalist theory for political parties, then newspapers with a 
general orientation towards the tan pole of the gal-tan dimension ought, in the same way as 
the other significant actors in this model — individuals and parties — to be more likely to be 
opposed to European integration (see Hooghe and Marks 2004; 2009). This association is 
strongest for tan parties, which have been most effective at connecting European integration 
to their core concerns (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 17). We must expect, if this relationship 
holds, that newspapers that take positions towards the tan end of the gal-tan dimension are the 
most likely to adopt strongly Eurosceptic positions and seek to connect these views to their 
positions on other key tan issues, particularly an emphasis on national identity. A weaker 
association exists between gal parties and support for European integration, especially when 
 Chapter 6 gives a breakdown of UK newspaper endorsements and how they have changed over time. 5
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combined with a left- economic orientation (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 17-18). A second 
interesting influence on positioning to consider is the populist nature of actors: populist 
parties (especially populist tan parties) are more likely to connect Euroscepticism to their gal/
tan policy positions (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008; Börzel and Risse 
2009). Translating this to media actors, we can predict that populist media outlets are more 
likely to adopt Eurosceptic positions, especially when they are orientated towards tan political 
positions. Chapter 4 discusses this further, and it is shown that at least in terms of the 
positions of their readers, newspapers follow a similar pattern to parties: an orientation 
towards the tan pole of the gal/tan dimension is associated with increased levels of opposition 
to European integration. 
To this end, and with these assumptions now in place, the mechanics of the MAP model 
presented here will now be discussed in further detail. In particular, we will now turn to the 
operation of specific mechanisms by which the press exerts influence over the process of the 
politicisation and contestation of European integration. There are three effects which are of 
greatest interest to this study. First, the extent to which the media act as either an ‘agenda-
setter’, or as a ‘gatekeeper’, as part of the politicisation process: in other words, the extent to 
which the media are able to either introduce issues to, or exclude issues from the public and 
political agenda. Second, the positions of media outlets in relation to European integration 
and the extent to which there exists competition between outlets and different positions is 
important since the language and frames adopted by the media carry significance for the ways 
in which the public receive and interpret messages about European integration. Especially 
significant in this regards are the connections made by them mass media between European 
integration and the nation. Third, the influence of the media’s representation of political actors 
and their positions on the contestation of European integration. If the media can alter the 
substantive character of the debate through their representation of parties, politicians, and 
their messages, then we must pay attention to the ways in which this is achieved, and the 
potential impacts on outcomes that this behaviour implies. 
2.3 Agenda setting and gatekeeping 
The extent to which actors can influence what issues reach the public agenda, and how those 
issues are discussed, is significant for stages (3) and (4) of the MAP politicisation model.  6
This section discusses the ability of actors — parties and the media — to influence which 
issues are debated publicly (i.e. acting as gatekeepers), what relative importance they are 
 For the purposes of this discussion, the ‘public agenda’ is defined as the set of issues debated publicly, and 6
contested by actors in the mass arena. 
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given, and how they are debated (i.e. setting the agenda). This is significant because 
politicisation of issues is largely facilitated through communicating with the public through 
the media: attention in the media is associated with increased levels of politicisation, and is a 
route to influencing the public agenda for political parties (Hutter and Grande 2014, 1003). In 
order to explore the role of the media here, it is necessary to discuss two possible functions of 
media agency: agenda setting and gatekeeping. As the existing literature shows, there is more 
evidence to support the existence of a significant gatekeeping role for the media, although 
gatekeeping is closely related to the concept of agenda setting in that it involves the 
determination of the issues to be addressed on the public agenda.  
Agenda setting can work in two directions. Politicians and parties may attempt to influence 
the media agenda via what Walgrave et al (2010) call ‘agenda-feeding’. Here, there is a large 
body of evidence to show that parties, and in particular governments, are effective sources of 
news coverage. Governments, parties, and individual politicians use their journalistic contacts 
to attempt to influence the news agenda, which in turn influences the political agenda within 
legislatures and more broadly (Althaus 2003; Davis 2009). Davis, for instance, argues that in 
the UK, back-bench MPs pursue an ‘agenda-feeding’ strategy in order to increase their 
influence on the agenda within Parliament itself - bypassing their limited direct influence on 
the managerial structures of their own parties by using the media to draw attention to issues 
that they feel particularly strongly about, or which might be particularly advantageous to their 
own position (Davis 2009, 211-212). The most prominent politicians are most able to exert 
this influence, since they fulfil the criteria of newsworthiness (Cook 1989). This relationship 
has also been shown to hold for governments, which have a particularly powerful influence 
on news coverage since they provide the most ‘efficient, reliable, and legitimate means’ for 
registering socially significant events (Althaus 2003, 381). 
Importantly for this study, the ability of politicians to influence the media agenda seems to 
increase during election times. During the ‘short campaign’ period of several weeks before the 
day of an election, the ability of parties to set the agenda seems to substantially increase 
(Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). A number of studies have found that, during campaigns, the 
impact of the media on the agendas of parties is much more limited than during ‘normal’, 
non-election periods (Dalton et al. 1998; Norris et al. 1999; Brandenburg 2002). One 
explanation of this is that the behaviour of both the media and parties changes significantly 
during electoral periods due to the changed context of their interactions (Walgrave and Van 
Aelst 2006, 97). Not only does the makeup of the political agenda change — government and 
legislatures, with their own agendas, fade into the background as political parties take centre 
stage — but parties seek to influence the public agenda in a direct and determined way 
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(Dalton et al. 1998; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). This is achieved through political 
speeches, daily press briefings, staging events, press releases, and the widespread issuing of 
provocative statements: parties become more effective and powerful sources during election 
times (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006, 97-8). During elections, parties also increase their direct 
contact with citizens, with increased advertising, direct canvassing, flyers, public speaking 
tours, and, in the UK, party-political broadcasts. Subsequently, we should expect the ability of 
the media to influence the politicisation process, and act as a constraint on issue creation, to 
be more pronounced during ‘normal’ politics, than during elections. 
Media and political actors are engaged in ‘a battle for issues, frames and access’ (Walgrave et 
al 2010; see also Norris et al 1999; Althaus 2003; Entman 2003; Walgrave and Van Aelst 
2011). Of interest for the present thesis is the finding of several existing studies that, under 
specific circumstances, the media are able to exert considerable influence on the political 
agenda: an agenda setting power that runs in the opposite direction to that of politicians 
(Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010). The extent to which the news media is independent 
from governments in particular has been a source of considerable debate in the political 
communications literature (for an overview of this debate, see Althaus 2003). There is 
evidence that media organisations act with significant independence in regards to parties and 
governments: locating and airing oppositional voices is a fundamental part of news creation, 
and this discourse is ‘often initiated by journalists’ rather than simply passed on by them, 
creating an important venue for dissent from the narratives of governments and parties 
(Althaus 2003, 404). Parties and politicians adopt issues due to the media attention that they 
have received: high profile media coverage is likely to attract attention from political parties, 
who feel that they must address issues raised by the media (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). 
This may or may not be a deliberate attempt to exercise influence on the political agenda - the 
media may make a deliberate decision to give high levels of coverage to certain issues, or 
may react to events (Boydstun et al 2014).   Following from this, it has been shown that the 7
more partisan the media, the more likely it is that journalists and news organisations will 
attempt to exert influence upon the political agenda in a deliberate way (Daddow 2012).   
The extent to which the media are able to influence the political and public agenda, and 
therefore the issue creation process, appears to be contingent upon a number of conditions 
(Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). Importantly, the ability of the media to influence the agendas 
of political parties is conditional upon the interests of those parties: media attention towards a 
particular issue tends to attract attention from political parties that have an interest in pursuing 
the politicisation of that issue (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010, 664). On the other hand, if 
 A useful distinction is drawn within some of the literature between institutional-driven and event-driven news, 7
see Wolfsfeld and Sheafer (2006) and Livingston and Bennett (2003). 
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the media focus on an issue that is not ‘owned’ by a particular political party, then that party is 
unlikely to change its agenda to react to the media attention (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 
2010, 667). Thus, in the context of this model, we might expect that a media that devotes 
attention to European issues will influence the agendas of Eurosceptic parties that would 
benefit from the politicisation process, thus reinforcing the politicisation process as party 
strategy responds to the media attention and seeks to engage in issue creation.  
The contingency of the agenda setting power of the media highlights the importance of news 
actors also behaving as gatekeepers to the mass arena, or, alternatively, in an agenda-
constraining manner (Shoemaker 1991; Walgrave et al 2010, 5). Only a proportion of the 
considerable volume of issue messages generated by political parties actually receive media 
coverage. News media have the power to include or exclude issues, thus constraining the 
political agenda in a negative way (Butler 1998). The real power of the media in the field of 
agenda-setting may lie in its ability to exclude issues from the public agenda, therefore. This 
is a negative power: in ‘denying access and in forcing politicians to react on issues’, the 
media has the ability to deny parties the chance to prime and cue public opinion in order to 
achieve issue creation (Van Praag and Brants 1999: 199). There is also a competitive aspect to 
the gatekeeping function of the media: parties and politicians compete in order to gain the 
attention of, and access to, the media and the subsequent framing of issues (Williams and 
Delli Carpini 2000). If Eurosceptic parties are unable to outmanoeuvre their opponents to gain 
access to the media, or the biases created by ownership and other factors discussed above do 
not favour Eurosceptic parties, then attempts to take advantage of potentially favourable 
public opinion and cue opposition to European reforms may fail. The entrance of issues into 
the mass arena is influenced not just by the formal arena rules which determine the location of 
issue contestation, but by the power of the press to determine the extent to which these issues 
reach the news, and thus enter the realm of the mass-mediated public debate. 
The plurality of media organisations operating in the marketplace suggests that we should 
expect a considerable variation in the influence of gatekeeping depending on the media being 
studied. The extent to which media outlets report on particular topics depends on the 
resources, routines, and editorial priorities of each outlet (Livingston and Bennett 2003, 368). 
What is less clear is whether we should expect the disposition of news outlets towards 
reporting European integration issues to be influenced by their political orientations - either 
attachment to a particular political party, or on the gal-tan or left-right dimensions. Broadly, 
we expect that newspapers will follow the pattern of parties, and therefore we should expect 
newspapers that are towards the tan pole of the gal-tan dimension to be more likely to report 
on European integration, especially when entrepreneurial political parties attempt to force 
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issue creation. We also expect that this coverage will be principally negative or critical in 
nature, in the case of tan-leaning publications, since the political agenda of the media 
organisation will be served by a portrayal of European issues that supports that adopted by tan 
political parties (see frames, below). We expect the reverse to be true for gal-leaning 
publications.  
The implication of this agenda-setting role and gatekeeping function is that the ability of 
political parties to create issues is not as straightforward under the MAP model as in the 
Hooghe-Marks model. There are clear implications for the operation of the model if media 
organisations are able to either introduce an issue onto the political agenda, leading to 
politicians being forced to respond, or to exclude an issue from the agenda. The exclusion of 
issues from public agendas could result in the attempts of parties to either politicise European 
integration, or for pro-European (governing) parties to effectively contest the narratives of 
entrepreneurial parties, to fail to reach the public. While parties may try to cue opposition, this 
process is likely to be unsuccessful if they fail to receive attention in the media, since their 
ability to reach a large-enough section of the public will be impaired. Thus the gatekeeping 
function of the media becomes vital - parties which are unable to generate press coverage for 
their messages are unlikely to succeed in issue creation. The matter of who introduces issues, 
driving the issue creation process, is difficult to measure — political news creation is often a 
shared endeavour between media and politicians — however, as the next section argues, the 
content of reporting, and the way in which party messages are reported, is potentially even 
more important than gatekeeping in influencing the outcome of debates on European 
integration. 
2.4 Contestation and the mass area: mechanisms  
The most important area in which the MAP model of domestic politicisation proposed in this 
chapter differs from the Hooghe-Marks model is in the contestation of European reforms in 
the mass arena. Political entrepreneurs, principally parties, thus must construct connections 
between national identity, cultural and economic insecurity, and EU enlargement (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009).  Politicisation is assumed to almost always lead to the constraint of policy 8
making (Statham and Trenz 2013). However, in the MAP model, the media play an important 
role in mediating these discursive constructions from parties. 
 Although it is acknowledged that political entrepreneurs could conceivably be actors other than political 8
parties, this thought is not examined any further (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 13). 
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While party messages have various avenues to reach the public, including publications, 
speeches, and direct voter contact (e.g. canvassing), the primary force for the generation of 
public opinion is the media. As Zaller notes, what matters for the formation of mass opinion 
‘is the relative balance and overall amount of media attention to contending political 
positions’ (1992, 1). Mass opinion is formed from the connection of information and 
predisposition (Zaller 1992, 6). In this case, the predisposition of citizens towards European 
integration is determined largely by their identity. We must investigate the information that 
they receive, through the media and from parties, in order to understand how identity is 
mobilised and used to contest European integration within national polities. The MAP model 
thus expands the conceptualisation of the mass arena. Rather than simply determining the 
conflict structure of debates on Europe, the MAP model takes the process one step further, 
defining the mass arena as the site of a mass-mediated public debate, in which political parties 
are an important actor, but not the only actor which has influence on public opinion. Once the 
issue at hand has become contested in the mass arena, the modified model proposes that the 
ability of parties to influence the contestation process is constrained by the media: parties 
must rely on the media to communicate their messages to the public, thus being subject to the 
ways in which the media represent their messages. Public opinion is also influenced by the 
ways in which the media represent European issues, independently of party messages. While 
issues that reach the mass arena have, by definition, become politicised, the extent of that 
politicisation, and the constraining effect that it will have on policy-makers, is contingent 
upon the character of the debate. 
Evidence for this argument can be drawn from existing studies of the connection between 
media reporting of European integration and public opinion. Analysing the link between elite 
and mass conceptions of Europe, Díez Medrano (2003, 110) claims that ‘the existence of a 
permanent dialogue between journalists and the rest of the population with respect to 
European integration is reflected in the strong similarity between their images of European 
integration and European institutions’. Testing this idea empirically, Bruter (2005) presents 
experimental data to show that identification with Europe is influenced by messages from the 
media and the use of symbols of EU institutions. Bruter argues that the perceptions of 
participants of the integration process when exposed to good or bad news about Europe has a 
significant impact on, particularly, the civic component of a sense of ‘European 
identity’ (Bruter 2005, 125-7). Being systematically exposed to ‘bad news’ about European 
integration damages citizens perceptions of Europe, and they are less likely to identify with 
Europe as a result (Bruter 2005, 126). This influence gives the media a ‘destructive’ potential, 
since reporting of Europe which consistently frames European integration in terms of bad 
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news — giving preference to negative stories and ‘exaggerat[ing] for effect’ — can alter the 
perceptions of readers or viewers (Daddow 2012).  
The MAP model suggests a number of ways in the mass arena in which the media play a role, 
therefore. The first is in mediating, through reporting, the messages of parties on European 
integration - the priming, cueing, and framing of identity by that postfunctionalism argues is 
vital in constructing connections between identity and European reform is dependent largely 
on the media to transmit these messages to the public. Second, in their reporting of European 
issues, the media construct discourses which influence public opinion, since positive or 
negative framing of Europe has a demonstrable effect on citizen support for the EU (Van 
Spanje and De Vreese 2014). This is particularly significant in the connections that media 
construct between the nation and European integration. Finally, they set the terms of debate 
through their strategic interactions with party discourses. Understanding the ways in which 
the media matter in the mass arena requires us to unpack the ways in which media reports on 
Europe affect the attempts of parties to cue and frame public opinion in debates on European 
integration in the mass arena: these mechanisms are now discussed in detail.  
Framing and re-framing 
Frames are of particular importance in understanding the ways in which the media influence 
public opinion, and mediate the messages of political parties. A significant body of research 
has concentrated on the role of media in framing issues, a research agenda which follows the 
work of Goffman (1974), and the concept of frames has been widely incorporated into 
research into media discourses (Fairclough 1995, 2000; Wodak and Chilton 2005; O’Keeffe 
2006; Wodak et al 2009). Frames can be defined as ‘central organising ideas’ that provide a 
coherent way of organising a set of ‘idea elements’ (Ferree et al 2002, 105).  Frames may be 
thought of as like ‘a picture frame, it puts a border around something, distinguishing it from 
what is around it’ (Gamson 2004, 245), or as as ‘schemata of interpretation’, which allow one 
to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label’ social objects and events (Benford and Snow 2000, 
613). In framing, discourses selectively emphasise and evaluate certain aspects of a 
‘perceived reality’, making them more salient than other aspects (Hanggli and Kreisi 2010, 
142). Juan Diez Medrano (2003) has applied frame analysis to the way European integration 
is framed in in-depth interviews, history textbooks, newspaper reports from 1949-1997, and 
other cultural materials in the UK, Spain, and Germany. He argues that ‘frame analysis 
provides us with a powerful analytical tool to explain attitudes’ as ‘people’s attitudes and 
behaviour’s attitudes and behaviour toward objects or problems depend on how they conceive 
of, frame, or represent them’ (Diez Medrano 2003, 5, 7-8). Thus, frames promote particular 
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definitions, interpretations, moral evaluations, or treatment recommendations for the item 
described (Entman 1993, 51-2). Frames actively construct the meaning of the reality that they 
describe, therefore. In news media, frames serve to organise and structure the presentation of 
issues to the public (Schuck and de Vreese 2006, 6). News frames are, by nature of serving as 
a coherent storyline or organising idea for a story, more than simply an isolated argument or 
position, but a ‘coherent and construction of an issue’ which have a ‘powerful effect’ on 
public opinion, and shaping meaning and understanding in political debate (Pan and Kosicki 
1993; Schuck and de Vreese 2006, 6). 
Following Lecheler and De Vreese (2012: 187), we can identify the two most important 
effects of framing on the formation of public opinion: 1) the importance of beliefs, and 2) the 
content of beliefs.  The selective nature of frames — stressing certain aspects or features of 9
reality over others — is argued to lead to individuals holding the considerations suggested by 
that frame as more important than others, meaning that they are applied when forming an 
opinion (Nelson et al 1997; Schuefele 2000; Lecheler and de Vreese 2012). Framing impacts 
the importance of certain beliefs by altering the ‘weight’ of considerations in the minds of 
individuals, increasing their importance over others (Druckman and Nelson 2003, 731). Thus, 
we might expect that media frames which either privilege or exclude identity considerations 
impact on the ability of parties to effectively communicate their identity-based messages to 
the public, and influence the outcomes of debates. 
The content of beliefs is also affected by framing effects. New beliefs may be added to an 
individual’s belief set, thus generating a persuasive effect as a result of the new content added 
(Lecheler and de Vreese 2012, 187). This content effect is particularly significant in affecting 
the opinions of individuals with more moderate levels of political knowledge, suggesting that 
individuals who are less well informed are more likely to be persuaded by media coverage of 
issues than those with a pre-existing high level of knowledge (Slothuus 2008). The effect of 
frames on individual’s opinions can also be observed in situations where individuals are 
exposed to unfamiliar information, leading to adjustment of their beliefs on the topics in 
question and more detailed cognitions of those topics (Lechler and de Vreese 2012, 188; see 
also Shah et al. 2004). This relationship also holds for low-importance issues, which are 
found to be especially mediated by belief content effects (Lecheler et al 2009). This suggests 
that media framing can have a significant affect on the content on citizen beliefs on European 
integration, even if the relative importance of European integration is held to be low. The 
 A third effect, accessibility, occupies a controversial position in the literature on framing effects. Accessibility 9
is closely related to agenda setting and priming in that it makes considerations in the minds of individuals more 
salient (Chong and Druckman 2007). It can be argued that framing is distinct from accessibility effects - and the 
apparent lack of an accessibility effect of frames sets frames apart from agenda setting and priming (see 
Scheufele 2000). 
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importance of media framing is also highlighted by evidence from voting behaviour that 
suggests that the media play a particularly important role in countries where political parties 
exhibit a greater degree of competition on EU issues. Voters exposed to positive media 
framing of the EU, in terms of the beneficial nature of EU membership for that country, are 
less likely to vote for Eurosceptic parties (Van Spanje and De Vreese 2014: 325).  
As a result, we move from the existing postfunctionalist view whereby it is political parties 
that frame the ways in which citizens discuss European integration, to a view which 
incorporates the insights of political communications research and re-imagines the 
contestation of European integration as a mass-mediated public debate. Contestation takes 
places as part of a public discourse which contains three players: parties, media (in particular, 
journalists), and citizens. The news media plays an active role in framing public policy issues, 
alongside that of parties, in a process of strategic interaction: it is an ‘integral part’ of the 
process of shaping public debate (Pan and Kosicki 1993, 70). The formal arena rules may 
affect outcomes somewhat, here. In a referendum situation, there are more likely to be direct 
contacts between parties and citizens - e.g. through direct campaigning, leaflets and 
pamphlets, television broadcasts/live debates. For reforms that are not contested in this way, 
but are still contested in the mass arena, parties may be less likely to directly contact citizens 
about the reform issue, but instead reach citizens through the media. 
Taking these arguments into account, we can identify a number of features of the media 
discourse which ought to be of importance for the contestation of European integration in the 
mass arena. The first is the prominence and content of reports on European integration: the 
media must provide a visible platform in order for debates on Europe to take place. We must 
therefore pay attention to the form and content of discourses on Europe in the media, since 
this content has the potential to directly influence public opinion (Zaller 1992: 42-44). In 
particular, we must understand which frames are employed in the media discourse, and how 
these frames are deployed in different media outlets.  The content of these discourses must 10
be examined particularly for its use of the logics of identity: how media refer to the 
relationship between identity and European integration, and how they construct the 
significance of the nation, ought to be important if identity is indeed the most important 
variable in shaping the conflict structure.  
 The audience of these outlets is also important. A simple study of media discourses may uncover a plurality of 10
frames across different media outlets, however these outlets reach audiences of greatly differing sizes: outlets 
with large audiences are more likely to exert an influence on public opinion. 
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The content of media frames and the role of national identity  
The content of media frames is important for our understanding of the ways in which 
contestation and politicisation take place in the mass arena. As key elements in the formation 
of citizen’s attitudes towards European integration, frames ‘mediate the effect of micro and 
macro sociological factors’, allowing us to ‘improve our explanations of people’s attitudes’ 
and the variations between them (Diez-Medrano 2003, 6). The frames chosen by media are 
significant precisely because of the fact that they are likely to be the primary means by which 
citizens form their opinion of European integration, a political process with which they are 
unlikely to have any direct day-to-day contact. Two types of frames are particularly important 
for this study: valance frames and identity frames.  
Recent research into valence framing shows that valenced (or positive and negative) frames 
have ‘considerable effects’ on perceptions, judgements, evaluations, and behaviour (Schuck 
and de Vreese 2006, 6-7). Positive or negative frames have been found to affect the judgement 
and evaluation of situations and issues, in part due to the context of risk. Where potential 
outcomes are presented as positive, individuals are more favourable towards a decision or 
change, and where they are presented as negative, they are less favourable (Schuck and de 
Vreese 2006). In the context of European politics, this clear distinction between positive and 
negative is likely to be less distinct. Strongly negative news on the EU has been shown to be 
associated with lower levels of support for European integration (Norris 2000). The concepts 
of ‘threats’ and ‘benefits’ are often highlighted in the literature as an alternative to the more 
simplistic positive and negative frames (McLaren 2002; Schuck and de Vreese 2006; Hawkins 
2012). Schuck and de Vreese (2006) argue that two frames on EU enlargement are important: 
(1) EU enlargement as opportunity for Europe, and (2) EU enlargement as a risk for Europe. 
Importantly, negative framing is shown to exert a stronger effect on support for European 
integration: while opportunity framing is associated with greater support for enlargement, and 
risk framing is associated with opposition to enlargement, this effect is more significant for 
risk (Schuck and de Vreese 2006, 21). The greater emotional and personal involvement of risk 
framing is held to explain this stronger association: people are more affected by negative 
framing due to the stronger emotional response that they experience. This suggests that even a 
balance of opportunity and risk framing in press reports could produce an impact on public 
opinion that was negative in direction (Schuck and de Vreese 2006, 22). The effect of 
negative frames on public opinion may be conditional on the visibility of those frames, 
however. In order to have a short-term impact on public opinion, frames need to be visible 
and evaluative (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006: 430).  
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As a result of this, we must pay attention to negative and positive representations of European 
integration and their consequences. In particular, the concepts of ‘threats’ and ‘benefits’ 
appears to be useful in this regard. The way in which these frames relate to the economic left-
right or gal-tan dimensions is not well understood, although Maier and Rittberger (2008, 249) 
argue that there is a subjective difference between valance frames and the construction of 
identity frames which are focussed on the ‘formation of symbolic boundaries’. Respondents’ 
enlargement attitudes respond differently to socioeconomic and identity-related frames, with 
valance framing being more closely associated with economic issues (Maier and Rittberger 
2008). Valence frames may be present in making positive or negative evaluative claims in 
relation to the outcomes of membership of the EU for the national community, however. This 
supports the postfunctionalist claim that left-right and identity politics exert quite different 
effects on public opinion on the EU. As a result, empirical investigation of the content of 
media frames should carefully consider the differences between the valance and identity 
frames, and how these are related to each other.  
We must also consider how the mass media construct their own connections between identity 
politics and European integration. As the previous chapter showed, the media play a role in 
the long-term formation of national identities; however, they also play an important short-
term role. The concept of the nation is well established in the discourses of media outlets, in 
the same way that it is in the discourse of politicians (Wodak et al 2009, 74-5). The role of the 
media in identity construction includes the daily invocation of the nation and its symbols to 
citizens, reinforcing the narrative of the nation (Billig 1995). In the relatively short-time time 
frame that is the concern of the MAP model, discourses on identity in the mass media are 
important in framing debates on European integration. This claim follows from the 
postfunctionalist literature, which emphasises the construction of connections between static 
identities and changing European governance structures, and this claim is supported by the 
literature on the discursive construction of national identity. Discourses on the nation are 
constructed in forms that differ depending on the purposes (or ‘social macro-functions’) of 
those discourses, and may serve to either reinforce and perpetuate existing identities, or to 
transform or challenge them (Wodak et al 2009; 189).  
Existing research into discourses of national identity in a range of contexts have highlighted a 
number of features that are common to the construction of the nation. One of the most 
important of these is the framing of the nation as the only legitimate form of political 
authority (Hawkins 2009; 2012). The attachment of a group identity to the nation has a strong 
impact on the perceptions and attitudes of citizens (Ellemers et al 2002). Key to this, and 
drawing from social identity theory, is the construction of ‘in-’ and ‘out-groups’ and the 
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language of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Li 2009, 104). These discourses are expected to associate 
different characteristics to these groups - the in-group is defined by its differences from the 
out-group. In particular, we would expect that media discourses will attach positive 
characteristics to the in-group addressed in those discourses, and will apply negative 
characteristics to out-groups, mirroring the way that individuals apply ‘mental labels’ to their 
own group membership (Scheepers et al 2002; Klingeren et al 2013, 693). For the purposes of 
this study, the ways in which these constructions of the nation are developed in relation to the 
concepts of Europe, European identity, and European integration are centrally important. How 
do discourses of national identity in the media construct the nation and its relationship to the 
EU, and is this portrayed as a relationship in which membership of one group is exclusive of 
membership of the other? If national identity is constructed in this exclusive sense, then we 
might expect that more citizens will hold such an exclusively national view of their identity, 
and thus be more susceptible to being cued into opposition of European integration through in 
invocation of the nation. Of particular interest in this context is the concept of sovereignty and 
how it is deployed in the discourse in relation to contested European reforms. Previous studies 
have argued that sovereignty is an important component of identity discourses, as an 
expression of the primacy of the national community as the ‘natural’ form of political 
organisation (Anderson and Weymouth 1999; Hawkins 2012). 
The expectation of the MAP model is that tan-leaning outlets will emphasise discourses of 
identity over economic discourses, and that these discourses will emphasise the boundaries 
between the national in-group and the EU, make connections between the nation and 
European integration, and seek to defend the national community. That is, we expect that 
media outlets follow the pattern that postfunctionalism expects of parties. Thus, the valance 
and identity frames of the media are important for developing our understanding of the 
linkage between political parties and the public. As discussed above in relation to the 
gatekeeping role of the media, the extent to which the framing of the media reflects the 
framing of political parties is also relatively unknown. 
Interaction between politicians and the media - setting the terms of debate?  
We must also consider the interaction between the messages adopted by politicians and those 
adopted by the media. If media outlets reproduce the frames adopted by politicians and 
political parties, then we would observe a pattern of similarity between the ways in which 
these two actors engage in discourse on Europe. A pattern of similar frames — both general 
and issue-specific — adopted by both media and parties would suggest that the messages of 
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parties will be able to reach the intended recipients (the public) with more ease than if the 
pattern of framing of debates on European issues in the media is strongly divergent between 
the media and parties. In other words, if parties and the media use common frames of 
reference, and common language on Europe, and adopt broadly similar language and 
positions, then parties’ messages on Europe will be largely echoed in the media and stand a 
greater chance of exerting the desired on citizen attitudes. On the other hand, where these 
frames are strongly different, we might expect parties messages to be ‘lost’ in the media 
discourse (Maier and Rittberger 2008).  
Media adopt their own frames and biases to the reporting of party discourses, and this has a a 
direct effect on the strategies of parties (Goffman 1974; Scheufele 1999). As well as 
influencing the views of citizens, media effects influence how politicians communicate, as 
well as what politicians communicate - although existing studies suggest that this influence is 
greater on the latter (Van Aelst et al. 2008, 494-5). Reporting may be critical of the way that 
parties discuss Europe, and thus frame their messages in a way that is likely to reduce the 
effects of those messages on the importance and content of citizen beliefs (or indeed reinforce 
the beliefs of citizens in the opposite direction to that intended). Thus, the similarities and 
differences between the frames used by media and parties (both incumbent, pro-European and 
entrepreneurial, Eurosceptic parties) can provide insight into the ways in which media affect 
the ability of parties to successfully cue and frame public opinion to meet their strategic 
objectives. The greater the mediation of party messages — in particular the way that they are 
reported and framed by the media — the greater the importance of understanding the ways in 
which the media construct discourses on Europe, and the content of these discourses. The less 
critical media are of party messages, the closer to the Hooghe-Marks model the dynamics of 
contestation are likely to be - since party messages are more likely to reach the public in the 
way that the parties intend. However, the greater the extent to which media frame party 
messages in the context of their own editorial agenda and biases, then the more likely that the 
influence of the media becomes important as a source of frames and cues on Europe 
independent of party frames. 
Perhaps the most important question in terms of the operation of the postfunctionalist model 
is: are the media able to change the substantive terms of the debate through the changing of 
framing? The substantive character of debates is of central importance to determining whether 
those debates have a constraining effect on policy making (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Where 
the media are able to change the character of debates, by presenting issues in frames that are 
different to those of politicians, then we can expect that the existing model will fail to 
adequately explain the process of politicisation and constraint. Hooghe and Marks (2005; 
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2009) assume that debates in the mass arena will be biased towards identity. However, this is 
only the case if the media report parties’ identity focused discourses in the terms that they are 
presented by parties. On the other hand, if the media are able to determine the frames that are 
dominant in the debate, then this measure of control is taken away from parties, substantially 
constraining the ability of parties to set the terms of the debate, and thus for entrepreneurial 
Eurosceptic parties to strategically frame the debate in terms of national identity.  
If the media set the terms of the debate, not parties, then we might expect that the substantive 
character of the debate in the mass arena will limit the agency of parties in constraining policy 
makers (or, alternatively, in effectively contesting Eurosceptic messages). We expect that the 
media will frame European integration in line with their own positions on the EU. Thus, the 
MAP model assumes that pro-European mass media will reframe Eurosceptic negative 
messages, or will evaluate them negatively, while emphasising pro-European party messages 
and positively evaluating them. Conversely, we expect that Eurosceptical mass media will 
reframe pro-European messages to fit their own agenda, and favour the messages of 
Eurosceptic parties on European integration over those of pro-European parties. This has a 
number of potential consequences for the operation of debates. For example, in a member 
state with a media that tends towards tan-leaning, populist media organisations, parties that 
seek to oppose the discourses of entrepreneurial Eurosceptic parties will find their message 
far harder to deliver, given the likelihood that it will be framed in terms of identity politics 
regardless of the carefully-constructed message that they seek to craft. Conversely, if the 
media are able to shift the terms of the debate in the mass arena from identity politics to more 
conventional left-right politics, by framing politicians’ statements in these terms (even if the 
statements are themselves originally framed in terms of identity), then the expectation that 
entrepreneurial political parties are able to effectively control the terms of debate becomes no 
longer valid. Instead, the linkage between parties and the public — the media — assumes far 
greater importance in determining the outcome.  
The extent to which the media are able to determine the frames which structure debates on 
European integration in the mass arena, determining the substantive character of debates, 
seems to be important in shaping the outcomes of the politicisation process, therefore. Rather 
than the inevitable constraint that public debate in the mass arena seems to suggest, this raises 
the possibility that mass-mediated debates are not necessarily, in themselves, constraining. 
Instead, the content of media coverage is important in determining whether or not identity 
discourses are able to effectively mobilise opposition to European integration. As de Vreese 
and Boomgaarden (2006, 431) observe, while the 1999 Danish election campaign for the 
European Parliament was characterised by positive messages from political parties, the tone 
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of media coverage was somewhat negative. This demonstrates that media framing that is 
independent from that constructed by parties is possible. If the media do not follow the 
framing of parties, and instead fit the messages of parties into pre-existing frames or 
narratives, then this may affect the ways in which messages are received by citizens, 
influencing the outcomes of debates.  
As a result of these considerations, the MAP model may produce different explanatory 
outcomes to the Hooghe-Marks model. The outcomes of mass-mediated debates are 
contingent on the interaction between three actors, here, and thus allows for an added degree 
of complexity in the explantations we can produce for particular outcomes. This model, for 
instance, allows us to consider beyond the case of a Eurosceptic party using identity to cue 
opposition to European integration in a conceptually straightforward mass arena. The strategic 
objectives of the media may conflict with those of parties, producing a much less-
straightforward discourse than might be predicted by the Hooghe-Marks model. Alternatively, 
the MAP model allows us to consider the role of incumbent pro-European parties that seek to 
challenge politicisation and anti-European discourses in the mass arena. The new model 
suggests that these parties may struggle in environments with a Eurosceptic media, where the 
terms of reference in debates have already been established by long-running, entrenched 
patterns of discourse on Europe that privilege the nation as the preferred means of political 
organisation, and ways of discussing the EU which emphasise the costs over benefits of 
membership, and the threat to national sovereignty and distinctiveness over the opportunity of 
forging a broader association around a common European identity. This is a scenario about 
which that the existing postfunctionalist framework has less to say, since the primary impetus 
lies with ‘political entrepreneurs’ and these are inevitably Eurosceptic parties. Conversely, the 
importance of the origin and content media frames in shaping public opinion suggests that 
where the either the content of media frames is positive, or the media are able to shift the 
framing of debates from gal-tan to left-right issues, entrepreneurial parties are less likely to be 
able to produce the desired constraints on policy-makers than the Hooghe-Marks model 
predicts.  
Conclusions 
This chapter presented an alternative Media Augmented Postfunctionalist model of domestic 
politicisation. This model incorporates the role played by the media in two important regards. 
First, in acting as gatekeepers or agenda setters that influence which issues reach the public 
agenda and which are contested in the interest group arena. In some circumstances, it was 
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argued, the media may be able to shape arena choice, which in turn influences the ability of 
parties or other actors to mobilise support or opposition for European jurisdictional reform. 
Second, the media play an important role in the contestation of European reforms in the mass 
arena. This chapter re-conceptualised the mass arena in the postfunctionalist model as a 
‘mass-mediated public debate’ in which parties fight to mobilise public support for their 
positions through cueing and framing Europe - via the medium of the mass print, broadcast, 
and electronic media.  
A discussion of the mechanisms by which the mass media participate in the mass-mediated 
public debate revealed a number of phenomena of potential significance for the MAP model. 
Specifically, these were, first, the gatekeeping function of the mass media: the media were 
argued to play an important role in determining access to the mass arena and, consequently, 
the content of the mass-mediated public debate. Second, the role of framing and re-framing 
was discussed, and it was argued that framing effects have a substantive impact on how the 
messages of parties are received by the public, and cue public option. Third, the construction 
of national identity and identity frames in particular were highlighted, and it was argued that 
the media may play a key role in constructing connections between the identity and European 
integration, especially in light of their role in the long-term construction of national identities. 
Finally, the strategic interaction between parties and the mass media and consequent 
mediation of party messages was argued to be significant, since the extent to which the media 
are able to influence the overall structure of the debate is key to determining the subsequent 
outcomes.  
The significance of these findings for the postfunctionalist research agenda can be seen in the 
potential for divergence from the predictions of the postfunctionalist politicisation model. 
Until now, postfunctionalism has predicted that party strategy is sufficient to prompt the 
creation of a constraining dissensus on European integration. However, the MAP model holds 
that media actors have the potential to affect the outcomes of the contestation of Europe in the 
mass arena through their reporting. This raises the possibility that parties may find their 
messages on Europe ineffective, or alternatively may enhance the ability of insurgent 
entrepreneurial parties to reach the electorate with Eurosceptical messages far more 
effectively than analysis of their strategic interactions may predict.  
These findings suggest a number of avenues for investigation: we must ask a questions of the 
available empirical evidence in order to explore the relationship between parties, media, and 
citizens in the mass arena. This chapter has identified four key areas of interest, each of which 
is associated with an expectation or hypothesis that will be subsequently investigated in Part 
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II of the thesis. The first was how mass media organisations fit into the postfunctionalist 
model as actors in the mass arena. If media follow the same pattern as parties, whereby their 
gal-tan position structures their position on European integration, then this is significant for 
the postfunctionalist research agenda, since it would suggest that media fit into the wider 
model, and confirm the importance of the identity variable. As the discussion above showed, 
we would expect that media actor positions on European integration would be structured in 
the same way as party positions on European integration.  
The second area of interest is in how newspapers frame European issues. A small number of 
studies have examined the framing of Europe in the media in the UK: further evidence is 
required in order to explore the ways in which media approach the reporting of European 
integration in the context of the postfunctionalist framework and the central role of identity in 
mobilising citizen opinion. This leads to questions about the similarities, differences, and 
interactions between media and party discourses on European integration. Of particular 
interest, discussed below, are the means by which parties and media frame issues in the mass 
arena. How do those frames vary between newspapers, and how do they compare with 
parties? Two expectations or hypotheses were associated with this area. First, that newspaper 
discourses will construct connections between national identity and European integration in 
the same way as parties; and second, that newspapers would contest European integration 
through discourses on the nation and seek to cue citizen attitudes - establishing their agency 
as political entrepreneurs in their own right. 
Finally, we must investigate whether the media can change the substantive terms of the debate 
in the mass arena. The character of debates, and the dimension along which it is contested — 
gal-tan or left-right — is crucial for determining outcomes. If the media are able to change 
the way issues of European integration are discussed by shifting the framing of discourses 
from one dimension to another, or by reframing party discourses to match their own agendas, 
then the agency of the media in the mass arena will be crucial for the operation of the 
postfunctionalist model. Therefore, The final hypothesis is that there will be evidence that 
newspapers are able to substantively alter debates through their reporting of party discourses. 
The second part of this thesis develops an account of some of these processes through the 
means of a case study of the UK during the period of Labour government, 1997-2010. It 
deploys the theoretical framework developed in part one to identify evidence from both party 
and media discourses on Europe in order to map the ways in which the mass media behave in 
relation to the contestation of European integration and to establish the extent to which the 
predictions made here about the role of the media are supported by evidence from the UK 
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case. Specifically, it will consider the ways in which the mass media represent the EU in 
reporting, how they respond to party discourses on European integration, and how they frame 
debates on Europe. It is intended that this approach will provide a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of the interaction between parties, media, and citizens in the mass arena. 
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Chapter 3 
Methods and Methodology 
This chapter sets out the methods employed in the empirical, Part II of this thesis, and details 
how debates on European integration in the mass arena, outlined in the previous chapter, will 
be examined. In seeking to understand the role of mass media as actors in this space, the 
empirical part of this thesis must address a number of key research areas that arise from the 
discussion presented in the previous chapters. First, we must understand what positions media 
actors take in the debate, and how these relate to those taken by political parties. Second, we 
must understand the content of media discourses on European integration, how these 
discourses represent European integration and the EU, and how these discourses connect 
European integration and the nation. Third, we must understand how the public discourses of 
political parties interact with and are represented in media discourses; specifically how the 
media act as mediators in debates in the mass arena, and how they reproduce and 
recontextualise the messages of political actors. 
The previous chapter identified a number of hypotheses or expectations that provide the 
specific focus of Part II of the thesis. These hypotheses are based on the review of 
postfunctionalist theory, national identity theory, and the literature around the mediating role 
of the press in public debates presented in Chapters 1 and 2. To recap, these can be 
summarised as follows: 
a) that newspapers positions on European integration are structured in the same way as 
political parties, i.e. by the gal-tan dimension;  
b) that mass media discourses construct connections between national identity (i.e. the gal-
tan dimension) and European integration;  
c) that mass media contest European integration through discourses on the nation and seek 
to cue citizen attitudes;  
d) that there will be evidence that the mass media were able to substantively alter debates 
through their reporting of party discourses. 
These hypotheses are addressed in Part II of the thesis through an examination of evidence 
from the UK during the New Labour governments of 1997-2010. Specifically, Part II analyses 
evidence from nine major national newspapers, as well as from party discourses, in the UK. 
To examine the hypotheses, this thesis adopts two primary research methods. The first a 
quantitative analysis that employs existing, large-scale survey research in order to estimate the 
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positions of media and their audiences. This method addresses the first hypothesis about the 
structure of the mass-mediated public debate and the position of the press within that debate. 
The second method is focussed on addressing the final three hypotheses. The final two 
chapters of this thesis employ critical discourse analysis to develop a detailed understanding 
of content of media discourses on European integration in the UK press and in key speeches 
by UK party leaders, in order to test how the press construct discourses of national identity 
and European integration, and how they mediate party discourses.  
This chapter also describes the selection of sources and the methods used to analyse them. 
The chapter begins by discussing the selection of the UK during the New Labour 
governments of 1997-2010 as the case study to be examined in Part II of the thesis. To address 
the research questions, two categories of primary sources are selected: newspapers, as the 
source of media discourses; and speeches by party leaders, as the source of party discourses. 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis analyse data from nine national UK newspapers and speeches 
by four party leaders. Chapter 4 of the thesis analyses the overall structure of the positions of 
these nine newspapers on European integration and other relevant dimensions. 
The present chapter proceeds as follows, therefore. Section 3.1 outlines the mixed methods 
approach adopted by Part II of the thesis, and discusses some of the theoretical considerations 
inherent in adopting critical discourse analysis. Section 3.2 examines case-study selection, 
discussing the selection of the UK between 1997 and 2010 as the case study for the empirical 
chapters, and outlining some of the existing literature on the UK’s engagement with the 
European Union. Section 3.3 outlines the first method and the methodological reasoning 
behind employing survey data to estimate the newspaper positions. The remainder of the 
chapter then discusses then discusses the second method; section 3.4 outlines the sources for 
the critical discourse analysis and how these sources were selected, while section 3.5 
discusses how the texts were read, coded, and interpreted.  
3.1  A mixed-methods approach 
A mixed-methods approach to examining the hypotheses summarised above is adopted by this 
thesis. Specifically, two primary research methods are used: a quantitative examination of 
evidence about the structure of the mass media (specifically the press) in the UK, and a 
qualitative discourse analysis of the content of mass-mediated debates. This section outlines 
the overall research strategy, and then discusses some of the theoretical considerations of the 
use of discourse analysis.  
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The first method is concerned with understanding the structure of media positions on 
European integration in the UK. This question is addressed using an approach that employs 
existing, large-scale survey research in order to estimate the positions of media and their 
audiences, the results of which are described in Chapter 4. This method analyses the data from 
the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) to measure the positions of newspaper readers on 
European integration, as well as the positions of newspaper readers on the two political 
dimensions in the MAP model: left-right and gal-tan. Using the mean positions of the readers 
of newspapers as a proxy for newspaper positions, it then measures the association between 
these dimensions. This provides a generalisable measure of the structure of actors in mass-
mediated debates that is independent of the content of those debates.  
The second method is focussed on addressing the later three hypotheses: in Chapters 5 and 6, 
critical discourse analysis is deployed in order to develop an understanding of the content of 
media discourses on European integration, and how they interact with the discourses of 
political parties. This addresses the detailed content and character of mass-mediated debates, 
and the roles of actors within these debates. It does this by examining data from nine UK 
national newspapers, drawn from the UK between 1997 and 2010, and from five major 
speeches by the leaders of the Labour and Conservative parties during this period. The articles 
and speeches are examined in detail, individually, to gain an understanding of the context, 
content, and purpose of each text. The method for this is set out in section 3.5, below. 
The two methods selected have been chosen to provide a view of the evidence available on 
the UK case that provides an insight into the overall distribution of mass media (in this case, 
newspaper) positions on European integration — to provide an indication of the structure of 
the mass-mediated public debate — and which offers a detailed account of the content and 
character of those debates and the interactions between parties and newspapers in the mass 
arena. In combining a quantitative analysis of large-scale survey data with a detailed critical 
discourse analysis of specific texts that form part of the mass-mediated public debate, this 
approach seeks to achieve both breadth and depth. The quantitative analysis of newspaper 
reader positions offers an opportunity to construct a reproducible and generalisable measure 
of where newspapers and their readers stand in the overall structure of debates on European 
integration. The qualitative discourses analysis provides an in-depth, detailed account of the 
specific content of these debates, how actors construct European integration, and the 
relationship between different actors and discourses. This data provides specific evidence 
from a particular place and time, the UK between 1997 and 2010, providing a deep insight 
into that case. It also observes patterns of behaviour that are common across newspapers and 
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specific cases that provide a degree of generalisability. This combination of methods also has 
the advantage of a degree of ‘triangulation’, allowing for the findings from one method to 
both inform and confirm the other (see Greener 2011, 195-6). In this case, as the following 
chapters show, the findings from the analysis of newspaper reader positions inform the 
subsequent analysis of the content of discourses, and provide confirmation for some of the 
findings presented in those chapters in regards to the link between newspaper reader positions 
and discourses.  
In designing a method to analyse the content and character of debates on European integration 
in the UK, one important consideration is how discourse analysis relates to other forms of 
enquiry, and how these two methods ‘fit’ together. The choice of discourse analysis was 
informed by the findings of the literature review and theoretical framework presented in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 1 showed that postfunctionalist European integration theory argues 
that the constitutive nature of party discourses on European integration are significant for the 
construction of public opinion, in particular the mechanisms of priming, cueing, and framing. 
Political entrepreneurs mobilise the tension between national identity and European 
integration through constructing discourses which connect these two factors (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 13). Chapter 2 showed that national identity can itself be understood as being 
discursively constructed by social actors in diverse ways in public, media, and private 
discourses. In light of this, discourse theory will now be discussed in the context of the 
methods used in this thesis, in order to clarify how this thesis understands discourse and its 
relationship to the world 
Discourse theory and approaches to discourse analysis 
A wide literature has developed that uses the term ‘discourse’ in a range of ways, including 
spoken and written language (Foucault 1972), as well as other forms of semiotic activity that 
can include visual images and non-verbal forms of communication (Fairclough 1995, 54; 
Wodak et al. 2009). In this thesis, the term ‘discourse’ is used primarily to indicate spoken and 
written language. There is no clear agreement on the precise definition of ‘discourse analysis’ 
or ‘discourse’ (De Cillia et al 1999). Discourse theory itself is divided into many strands, 
traditions, and forms, reflecting different disciplines and ontologies. However, broadly, one 
can argue that ‘the discourse analyst examines the ways in which structures of meaning make 
possible certain forms of conduct’ (Howarth 1995, 115). At the heart of the discourse analysis 
paradigm is the assumption that discourses constitute a form of social practice. Discourse 
theory ‘investigates the way in which social practices articulate and contest the discourses 
which constitute social reality’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 3). All objects are objects of 
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discourse, and the meanings of objects depend upon the socially constructed system of rules 
that signify differences (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). 
This definition leaves open the possibility of understanding all social phenomena as 
discourse. Post-structuralist discourse theory, forming part of the ‘third generation’ of 
discourse theory, takes an expansive view of discourse (Howarth and Torfing 2005). For 
example, Derrida holds that ‘everything became a system where the central signified, the 
original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of 
differences’ (Derrida 1970, 252). The social world is seen as no longer being fixed with 
reference to a determining centre, rather it is understood as a process of the endless 
displacement of ‘limited and provisional centres’ (Howarth and Torfing 2005, 9). Post-
structuralists reject the idea of structure as a closed and centred totality. For instance, Laclau 
and Mouffe argue that there is no distinction between the discursive and non-discursive 
(1985). Even an apparently non-discursive phenomena such as technology is interpreted as 
having been constructed in systems of discursive difference, and Laclau and Mouffe argue 
that discourse is co-extensive with the social (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; see also Howarth and 
Torfig 2009).  
However, this perspective on discourse often appears to ‘fall into the trap’ of suggesting that 
‘social life is nothing but discourse’ (Daddow 2011, 80). Alternative approaches to discourse 
analysis offer an account of discourse which is more consistent with the literature reviewed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, and with the account of the construction of identities provided by Hooghe 
and Marks (2009). Specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) offers a perspective that 
provides the discourse analyst with an account of discourse that is rooted in a critical realist 
approach (Howarth and Torfing 2005, 7). CDA understands discourse as one element of social 
practice, one that has a causal relationship with other aspects of social life, and which runs 
through social practices. Discourse can therefore be understood as the means by which 
communicative practices help to shape the way in which we interpret and experience the 
world; discourse forms cognitive frameworks through which we experience and interpret the 
world, providing structure, meaning, and forming belief systems. Discourse can be 
understood, therefore, as the ‘dimension of society where meaning is structured’, and 
knowledge about particular objects is systematically organised, delimiting what we know and 
do not know about an object (Waever 1996: 5). Discourse, rather than constituting all social 
phenomena, is rather a system of rules of signification that ‘actively mediates between people 
and social reality’ (Cabrera 2005: 22).  
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The most significant proponent of CDA, Norman Fairclough, has established a framework for 
the analysis of media discourses (1995), and political discourses (2000), which provides the 
basis for the analysis of discourse in this thesis. This framework fits closely with the 
assumptions found in the work of the theorists of national identity discussed in Chapter 1 (for 
example, Billig 1995; Wodak et al 2009). Fairclough argues that discourses have ‘causal 
effects’, which can bring about changes in our knowledge, and shape our beliefs, attitudes, 
and identities (2003, 9). Discourses, in this account, can include linguistically mediated 
practices that include speech, writing, images, and gestures, which are used by social actors to 
produce and interpret meaning (Howarth and Torfing 2005). Fairclough argues that texts 
‘contribute to changes in people (beliefs, attitudes, etc.), actions, social relations, and the 
material world’ (2003, 9). Language is always constitutive of social identities, social relations, 
and systems of knowledge and belief (Fairclough 1995, 55). Discursive practices are 
considered to be ideological in nature, in that they contribute to the ‘naturalisation of 
contingently constructed meanings’ (Howarth and Torfing 2005, 7-8). As a result, discourses 
can operate in ways that are both transformative, creatively changing the ways in which we 
think about the world, and which reinforce existing social identities, relations, and belief and 
knowledge systems in a more conventional manner. Discourses reinforce the political and 
social order, and transform it, therefore.  
CDA offers a critical approach precisely because ‘critical discourse practitioners see the 
analysis of political discourse as an essentially critical exercise’ (Fairclough and Fairclough 
2012, 17). Through the analysis of political discourse from a critical perspective, CDA 
provides a means to uncover the reproduction and contestation of political power through 
discourse. Importantly, it also characterises political discourse as being attached to specific 
political actors, including individual politicians and citizens, institutions, and organisations 
(van Dijk 1997; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). These actors are engaged in political 
processes and events, and CDA places emphasis on the context of these events to understand 
discourses. Thus, discourse can be understood as taking place in political contexts that 
provide the means for actors to ‘exert their agency’ and which ‘empower them to act on the 
world in a way that has an impact on matters of common concern’ (Fairclough and Fairclough 
2012, 18-19). These contexts may be strongly institutionalised, such as in parliament or 
government, or less strongly institutionalised settings such as social media. Fairclough gives 
emphasis to the idea of ‘politics as action’, and in particular the background of institutions in 
which human agents operate. CDA is also focussed on the analysis of relevant features of 
discourse: those which are pertinent to the purpose or function of the political processes or 
events being analysed (van Dijk 1997, 38; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 18).  
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In both the practice of politics and government, language is central to the operation of those 
practices. Fairclough argues that: 
Political differences have always been constituted as differences in language, political 
struggles have always been partly struggles over the dominant language, and both the 
theory and practice of political rhetoric go back to ancient times (Fairclough 2000, 3).  
As part of his Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework, Fairclough understands 
government as a form of social practice, in which communication is a central component of 
the policy-making process. In his study of the New Labour governments, Fairclough argues 
that parties must build coherent and distinctive representations of the world — through 
discourses — that constitute their world view. These representations include discourses of ‘the 
economy, of work, of crime, of the family’ and ‘of politics and government as ways of 
changing the world’ (Fairclough 2000, 21). Discourse is understood as running through all the 
elements of government as a social practice, as part of the performative characteristics of that 
social practice: ‘part of the way in which particular people perform in particular positions in 
the practice’ (Fairclough 2000, 145). Government therefore cannot, and does not, happen 
without discourse, which is part of the ‘action, style, and performance’ of government 
(Fairclough 2000). Specifically, Fairclough identifies three key features of the discourse of 
parties: a) how it contributes to the process of governance (if the party is in power, as New 
Labour was in this period) or what action it takes; b) how it represents the social and political 
world, and; c) how it projects a particular identity and connects this to particular values 
(Fairclough 2000, 13-15).  
This forms part of Fairclough’s emphasis on the relevant features of discourse. In the case of 
political speeches, for example, he argues that the focus of analysis should be on ‘the purpose 
of the speech, what it is designed to achieve’, since this may be ‘to convince an audience that 
a certain course of action is right or a certain point of view is right’ (Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2012, 18). Understanding the purposes and argumentative nature of political texts 
is central to Fairclough’s framework, since this is ‘key to being able to evaluate the political 
strategies they are part of’ (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 18). This emphasis on 
understanding the underlying strategies of political actors appears to position CDA as an 
especially useful methodology for the analysis of the politicisation of European integration, 
since the postfunctionalist model stresses the importance of the discursive strategies of actors 
(and in particular, parties) in this process.  
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In applying CDA to media discourses, another set of considerations must be taken into 
account. Fairclough (1995) provides a framework specifically for the analysis of media 
discourse, which highlights some of the distinctive features of media discourse, and the 
relationship between politics and communication in the mass media. The media, according to 
Fairclough, is placed between public and private discourse, transforming the sources of public 
discourse into new forms for domestic consumption (Fairclough 1995, 63). The mediating 
position of the media and ‘socially adjacent’ orders of public and private discourse is key to 
understanding the media’s own patterns of discourse construction, and the internal and 
external relationships between these patterns (Fairclough 1995, 63-4). The media have ‘major 
impact’ on the boundaries between public and private, and between institutions and 
individuals, and the advance in mass media technologies have made hitherto largely 
inaccessible public events (such as parliamentary debates) accessible to the public for private 
consumption (Fairclough 1995, 37). An important part of the media discourse and its external 
relationships is the inherent tension in the public sources of media discourse, and its intended 
private audience. The media discourse is shaped by the often contradictory nature of these two 
poles: the relationship between public and private discourses is played out in the discourse of 
the media, as the boundaries and connections between them are continually redefined and 
redrawn.  
The representation of public discourse in media texts is a key consideration for this analysis. 
Fairclough notes that ‘a very high proportion of media output… consists of the mediation of 
the speech or writing of, mainly, prominent people in various domains of public life’ (1995, 
79). News media weaves together the representations of the discourse of several different 
actors, mediating different voices and formulating representations of actions and thoughts. For 
Fairclough (1995, 5), three key sets of questions about media discourses are important:  
1) how is the world represented (for instance events, objects, or relationships); 
2) what identities are set up for those involved? (for instance reporters, audiences); 
3) what relationships are established between those involved? 
The way in which public communicative events are transformed and recontextualised by the 
mass media is ‘the interesting question’ for this framework (Fairclough 1995, 41). Fairclough 
notes that communicative events are recontextualised differently depending on the ‘goals, 
values, and priorities’ of the media discourses within which they are recontextualised, which 
in turn raises questions of truth, bias, and manipulation (Fairclough 1995, 40-41). Fairclough 
includes these transformations and recontextualisations of discourse under the heading of 
‘representations’. This is a key question for the research questions being studied here. As the 
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previous chapter argued, the ways in which the discourses of parties are mediated or 
represented by the mass media — how these discourses are transformed and recontextualised 
— is centrally important for our understanding of how European integration is politicised.  
Fairclough’s framework closely fits with the postfunctionalist view that policy makers must 
make decisions about policy — in particular European reforms — through a process which is 
discursive, with outcomes decided, critically, by arena choice and the form and content of 
public debates. These debates, conducted in part through the public discourses of parties, are 
key to understanding the way in which policies are formed. Fairclough’s framework allows an 
analysis of these debates in a way that acknowledges the dialectical relationship between 
discourse and structures of power, and which provides the analyst with tools to uncover these 
power relationships (Fairclough 2001, 31). 
3.2  Case Selection: the UK between 1997 and 2010 
The particular case selected for analysis in Part II of the thesis is that of the United Kingdom 
between 1997 and 2010: during the ‘New Labour’ administrations of Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown. In light of the recent UK referendum on membership of the EU, the UK seems to be a 
particularly apt case for the study of the politicisation and contestation of the EU. Indeed, 
membership of the EU is one of the longest-standing and most contentious issues in UK 
politics (Hawkins 2012, 561; Oliver 2015; Goodwin and Heath 2016). This section briefly 
reviews the literature on the case of the UK in Europe, arguing that identity politics play an 
important role - reinforcing the suitability of the UK as a case study. It is shown that many 
studies have argued that the UK’s ‘difficult’ relationship with arises from British history, 
geography, and party politics. The role and nature of elite and public debates on Europe have 
also been interpreted as important to shaping British attitudes towards European integration. 
These studies are evaluated, and it is argued that postfunctionalism has the opportunity to 
locate arguments about the importance of identity to opposition to the EU in the UK. This 
argument is substantiated with polling evidence from the Eurobarometer, which indicates that 
the UK has a significant proportion of citizens who identify strongly towards the nation. This 
makes the UK an ideal case-study for understanding how, within a postfunctionalist 
framework, the contestation of Europe through the cleavage of identity is significant for 
constraining policy makers, since the high levels of exclusive national identity in the UK 
would suggest that policy making is particularly hampered by opposition to the EU.  The 1
 A suspicion that appears to have been borne out by the result of the 2016 EU membership referendum. 1
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relatively high levels of contestation of the EU in the period studied also provide a good test 
of the MAP model presented here.  
History, geography, and identity: British ‘exceptionalism’ ,’awkwardness’, or ‘semi-
detachment’ 
The argument that the UK represents a particularly distinctive or exceptional case in terms of 
its relationship with European integration has been made in much of the literature Britain and 
Europe. One of the ways that this argument has been advanced is through analyses of British 
policy and policy-making on European integration. A common theme in this literature is the 
idea that British policy makers have had a difficult or ‘awkward’ relationship with their 
European counterparts, that Britain is somehow ‘semi-detached’ from Europe, or ‘on the edge’ 
of Europe (George 1992; Chrisholm 1995; George 1998; Young 1999; Geddes 2004; Wall 
2008). Much of this literature follows the notion, articulated by Roy Jenkins ten years after 
the UK first joined, that British policy towards and engagement with the EU and its 
predecessors has been characterised by ‘the half-hearted involvement of one of its most 
powerful members’ (Jenkins 1983, 150). Explanations for the this ‘awkwardness thesis’ 
concentrate on a number of key arguments. These include: British history, and the legacy of 
empire and of the First and Second World Wars; Britain’s geographical position at the edge of 
the European continent; Britain’s unitary parliamentary state and an emphasis on the concept 
indivisible sovereignty in the Westminster system; and, the terms in which the UK joined the 
European project. Further explanations include the role of parties and successive governments 
in managing the UK’s relationship with the EU and its predecessors. 
Historical arguments about the British relationship with Europe largely concentrate on the 
UK’s imperial past and the legacy of this relationship in the attitudes and approaches of both 
elites and citizens. The descent from global power to regional European power is argued to 
heavily influence the self-perception of policymakers and the public in the UK - the long-
standing image of Britain as a major power is held to be responsible for the ‘reluctant’ nature 
of Britain’s engagement with European integration (Gowland and Turner 2014). This ‘empire 
within’ has shaped the British state and left policymakers stuck ‘between Europe and 
America’ - as successive governments have struggled to reconcile the desire to maintain a 
‘special relationship’ with the United States and the pragmatic requirement to engage with 
European politics and the integration process (Gamble 2003, 61). This legacy is argued to be a 
causal factor in the development of contemporary Euroscepticism in the UK. For instance, 
Gifford (2008, 851) argues that Euroscepticism in the UK has developed into a ‘distinctive 
and powerful national movement’ that is part of a British post-imperial crisis. This has made 
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Britain exceptional because it of the extent to which Euroscepticism has entered in to the 
mainstream political debate, becoming a popular issue since the 1970s, and underpinned by 
Britain’s imperial legacy and the lasting impact on attitudes that this legacy creates (Gifford 
2008, 867). 
Some studies in this vein make an explicit connection between contemporary British identity 
and Euroscepticism. Britishness and a strong sense of British self-identity is arguably 
important at the elite level - for UK policymakers to mobilise support for governmental action 
and to give those actions meaning (Gaskarth 2013, 61). Identity has identified as an important 
factor for both elites and the public. For instance, contemporary Conservative Party 
discourses have emphasised the ‘Otherness’ of Europe using particularly articulations of 
‘Anglo-Britishness’ - a discourse complicated by the increasing multi-national direction of the 
UK (Gifford 2010, 336). This highlights the complicated picture of contemporary ‘British’ 
identity, as national sentiment in the constituent countries of the UK has increased.  The 2
English element of this British identity is seen to be the most important source of Eurosceptic 
sentiment in the UK: as a new English nationalism has emerged that defines itself in 
opposition to the EU (although often obscured by defences of ‘Britain’, rather than England) 
(Wellings 2010). These accounts of often emphasise the role of sovereignty, and the nature of 
the UK constitution, as a central element of nationalist discourses on Europe in the UK 
(Forster 2002; Wellings 2010). The uncodified nature of the UK’s constitution, and the notion 
that it has evolved continually over more than 700 years — creating a direct link with the 
national past — is held to be central to nationalistic discourses which have been used to 
oppose European integration (Dewey 2009).  
The historical legacy of the British constitution and the failure of successive governments to 
adequately adapt to membership of the EU are also held to be influential in the course of 
British ‘awkwardness’ towards Europe (George et al 1992; George 1998). George (1998, see 
particularly Ch. 9) argues that domestic political constraints based on attachment to national 
sovereignty (a legacy, it is argued, of imperialism and the experience of the Second World 
War), economic problems on accession, and a failure of the adversarial nature of British 
politics to react to the terms of debate among the original members have contributed to the 
perception of British awkwardness. However, George’s conclusion that domestic political 
constraints seemed to be dissipating by the turn of the 21st Century (George 1998, 275) 
 There is only space for a brief discussion of the complicated nature of British identity here. The English nature 2
of ‘British’ identity has been a focus of a great deal of recent scholarship. For instance, see Fenton (2007) on the 
idea that England is actively resisted as an identity by young people, Abell et al (2007) for a discussion of the 
imagination of Englishness as a ‘void’, Bryant (2008) on the politically fragile nature of Englishness. Opposing 
views on the existence of English nationalism at all can be found in Scruton (2001) and Kumar (2003), while 
McCrone (2006) argues that English nationalism is alive, but hidden. 
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appears to have been confounded by increasing opposition to European integration in the 
years since (Ford and Goodwin 2014). The issue of national sovereignty and the terms of 
British entry to the EC/EU is held, rather, to be an outstanding and unresolved issue: one that 
has led to the perpetuation of a ‘nation state mindset’ (Liddle 2014, 256-7). Wall (2008) 
argues that the issue of sovereignty is central to understanding the perception of the UK’s 
relationship among both elites and the public. The failure of policymakers (with the notable 
exceptions of Geoffrey Howe and Tony Blair) to address the issue of sovereignty has meant 
that ‘many in Britain would see concessions on matters of EC competence, not as sensible 
measures for a specific purpose, but as the first steps on as slippery slope’ (Wall 2008, 206).  
The literature on the effect of British participation in European integration on UK political 
parties is  also instructive in its emphasis on the divisive nature of Europe for both Labour and 
the Conservatives. The changing nature of the support for European integration among UK 
parties reflects the changes described by Hooghe and Marks (2009) across Europe: opposition 
to UK membership was concentrated in the Labour Party in the 1970s and 1980s, before 
becoming associated with nationalist sentiments within the Conservative Party from the 1980s 
onwards. This has had an effect of, over time, creating divisions in both the Labour and 
Conservative parties (Turner 2000; Bale 2011, 2015). The scholarship on the dynamics of 
European policy within the two largest UK parties has been accompanied with a recent 
interest in the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which is committed to UK 
withdrawal from the EU. The electoral success of UKIP during the 1997-2010 period, and 
afterwards, has led to a focus on UKIP as the electoral articulation of Euroscepticism (Ford 
and Goodwin 2014). The rise of UK as a potentially ‘entrepreneurial’ party highlights the 
cross-cutting nature of the contestation of European integration in the UK. As Goodwin and 
Ford argue, evidence suggests that UKIP have been successful in linking Eurosceptic 
sentiment to opposition to immigration and dissatisfaction with the established political class, 
thus mobilising citizens across more issues that simply ‘hard-Euroscepticism’ on what they 
call the ‘radical right’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014, see especially Ch. 7).  
Elite and popular discourses 
The increasing visibility of UKIP as an example of a UK party as a ‘political entrepreneur’ 
highlights the importance of understanding the discourses employed to mobilise Eurosceptic 
sentiment. A number of studies have investigated the role of the media in the discourses on 
Europe in the UK. The issue of Europe has become increasingly visible in the UK media since 
the Treaty of Maastricht (Gamble 2003). In the present study, newspapers are chosen as the 
media to be examined. A number of reasons underlie this choice. First, newspapers are 
!82
especially relevant in the UK case due to the presence of far less perceptible bias in UK 
television when compared to UK newspapers (Carey and Burton 2004, 625). Partisan 
broadcasts in the UK are limited to party election broadcasts transmitted by all major 
channels, while legislation prevents the same partisanship found in newspapers on television 
news broadcasts (Carey and Burton 2004). Carey and Burton (2004) find that ‘Britain’s highly 
biased and partisan press’ does have influence on the attitudes of readers towards Europe, but 
that this influence is contingent on partisan preferences (p. 638). Where readers receive mixed 
messages, they are less likely to be influenced by the press (Carey and Burton 2004).  
The role of the media is also important given ‘enduring low levels of support for European 
integration’ in the UK (Hawkins 2012, 562). The influence of the media, especially the right-
wing press, is argued to be significant given the latter’s clear articulation of anti-EU or 
Eurosceptic opinion (Hawkins 2012). Existing studies have largely focussed on the visibility 
of the EU in the media, taking a quantitative approach. For instance, Firmstone (2004) studies 
the frequency of editorials on the EU in four newspapers to assess their agenda-setting role. 
Statham and Gray (2005) have compared reporting in two British newspapers with that in two 
French newspapers, finding that British coverage of the EU is largely internalised within the 
nation. These studies are largely concerned with finding evidence of ‘Europeanisation’ of 
media discourses, however. A relatively small number of studies have conducted qualitative 
studies of the substantive content of newspaper reporting. Diez Medrano (2003) argues that 
the framing of Europe in the British press is primarily as the ‘other’, and that media 
discourses are associated with both elite and mass attitudes towards the EU; however 
Medrano’s study is only based on data from The Economist and The New Statesman, which 
are not mainstream daily newspapers. More recently, Oliver Daddow (2012) has argued in 
explicit postfunctionalist terms that the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by an attempt by 
the Murdoch-owned newspapers to create an environment of ‘destructive dissent’ after the 
‘permissive consensus’ on Europe of the 1970s. Daddow’s argument is not supported by clear 
empirical evidence to support his claim that ‘the rise of the Murdoch empire’ is ‘perhaps the 
essential explanation’ for this change, however (Daddow 2012, 1235). Anderson and 
Weymouth (1999), studying press discourses leading up the 1997 general election and 1998 
UK Presidency of the EU, find that the tabloid press in particular are guilty of ‘insulting the 
public’ through the use of misleading and, at times, xenophobic characterisations of Europe. 
This is compounded by a preponderance of self-identifying Eurosceptic newspapers in the UK 
media market, which they argue presents to the public a skewed image of Europe which is 
inadequate in its informational accuracy and its stereotyping of peoples (Anderson and 
Weymouth 1999, 184-5).  
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The most comprehensive qualitative study of British press coverage of the EU to date is by 
Benjamin Hawkins (2012). Hawkins draws data from five UK newspapers, qualitatively 
analysing their coverage of the Treaty of Lisbon. Hawkins finds that the EU is discursively 
constructed as a ‘foreign power’, and also as a ‘forum for inter-state bargaining’ (Hawkins 
2012, 573). The UK is constructed as part of ‘a nationalist meta-narrative’ (Hawkins 2012, 
574). Importantly, Hawkins argues that the media acts to cue citizens responses and attitudes 
towards European integration and the EU (Hawkins 2012, 570-573). The press can therefore 
be seen as acting in the role of ‘political entrepreneur’; fulfilling the same function that 
postfunctionalists argue political parties also play. Hawkins does not, in his analysis consider 
the presentation or content of government policy, and considers how public opinion and 
media debate influence this a key area for further research (Hawkins 2012, 574). None of 
these existing studies of the press locate their arguments in any theory of European integration 
that explains the significance of their findings, however. Anderson and Weymouth (1999) are 
interested in the ‘misleading’ nature of press coverage and the extent to which newspapers 
meet their responsibilities to readers. Hawkins (2012), meanwhile, presents a argument based 
on a discourse-theoretical approach, acknowledging the importance of media discourses for 
shaping the policy making environment, but without an explicit link to the overall course of 
integration.  
The UK elite discourse is also an area of enquiry that is relevant to the case that the UK is a 
particularly significant one for the study of domestic contestation of Europe. Elite discourses 
in the UK appear to be characterised by an inability to ‘move beyond the narrow modes of 
complaint, lecture and demand’, according to the existing literature (Young 1999, 472). Liddle 
(2014) finds that UK elite discourse on Europe has concentrated on the concept of 
‘unfairness’ - particular entrenched during the Thatcher period. The pro-European elite 
discourse, on the other hand, is argued to be dominated by the language of ‘standing up for 
British economic and political interests (Liddle 2014, 255). These findings are especially 
relevant in the context of the New Labour administrations of 1997-2010. As Daddow argues, 
New Labour set about to pursue a more positive relationship with the EU, and to increase 
support for the EU amongst the British public through a discursive ‘re-construction’ of the 
British relationship with Europe; a new ‘logic of history’ (Daddow 2011). Blair and Brown, 
tried to build a narrative of the British people ‘making sense of their past’; which they viewed 
as a history that was essentially entwined with European history, and which made the British 
inseparable from their European neighbours. This vision is also seen as one where what Blair 
and Brown saw as British ‘exceptionalism’ and attachment to the primacy of the nation state 
was replaced with a recognition of the place of the nation in the international system. Daddow 
concludes that Blair and Brown’s ‘logic of history’ failed to appeal to the British public, who 
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rejected their rhetorical construction of Europe and Britain's place within it (p. 238). 
Daddow’s study therefore conceives of New Labour as a political elite facing the constraint of 
public opinion on Europe which was, at best, ambivalent. While Daddow acknowledges the 
role of the press in presenting what he calls the ‘orthodox’ view of British identity and history, 
he does not investigate how New Labour’s discursive constructions of Europe were 
interpreted and presented by the press to the public. He also does not attempt to understand 
how public opinion and media debate influenced government policy. The connection between 
these seem important in the context of Hooghe and Marks’ argument that elites have been 
forced to ‘look over their shoulders’ when making European policy. The role of the media as 
‘political entrepreneurs’ fulfilling the politicising and cueing role warrants further 
investigation in order to understand how political elites are constrained in policy making on 
Europe, and how in the case of New Labour, their attempt to cue support for Europe was 
unsuccessful. 
Evidence to support the idea that national identity is one of the most important factors 
affecting the UK relationship with European integration can be found in survey data. An 
examination of recent Eurobarometer data on identification with Europe is instructive in 
understanding why the UK is an interesting case, particularly in relation to identity. The 
results of Eurobarometer 81, conducted in June 2014, suggest that the proportion of people in 
all EU Member States who saw themselves as ‘European only’ remained very low: 2% of 
respondents. A further 6% of people saw themselves as European first, with some other 
nationality second. Nevertheless, 51% of respondents viewed themselves as having a 
particular national identity first, with a secondary European identity. The Eurobarometer 
results suggest that 59% of people living in the 28 EU member states possess some sense of 
European identity. A slightly higher proportion of people - 65% - felt that they were a ‘citizen 
of the EU’, in this Eurobarometer wave. This suggests that conceptions of citizenship do not 
necessarily overlap with possessing a European identity: one can feel that one is a European 
citizen without defining oneself as European. There was a positive association in the data 
between educational achievement and a sense of European identity: those who had studied to 
the age of 20 or beyond where more likely to identify as European in some sense (either 
‘national and European’, ‘European and national’, or ‘European only’) than those who left 
school aged 15 or younger - 69% compared to 42% (European Commission 2014, 12). 
The data also show substantial variations between Member States. Spain and Germany were 
the countries with the smallest proportion of people identifying by only their nationality, both 
at 27% and significantly below the EU28 as a whole. Here, the contrast between the UK and 
other EU member states becomes apparent. In only two member states did more than half of 
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the population identify only with their nationality: the UK with 64%, and Cyprus with 52% 
(European Commission 2014, 11). This sets the UK apart from other EU Member States. As 
figure 3.1 shows, the structure of identification in the UK is quite different from other EU 
states. Not only is the proportion of ‘nationality only’ identifying citizens higher, the 
proportion of citizens who hold any kind of identification with Europe is, at 33%, much lower 
than any other EU country. Only 2% reported that they felt European first and British second, 
and 1% identified as European only. While these percentages are not greatly different from 
the EU28 averages for the final two categories — 6% of all EU28 respondents identified as 
European followed by their nationality, and 2% as European only — the percentage of Britons 
identifying only with the nation is both the highest in the EU28, and significantly higher than 
the EU28 mean of 39%. This is significant, because it marks the UK out as an interesting case 
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of Eurobarometer respondents identifying as their nationality only or as either 
‘national and European’, ‘European and national’ , or ‘European only’
to test the importance of identity in conflict over European integration. We would expect that 
opposition to European integration arising from exclusive identification with the nation ought 
to be most clearly identifiable in the UK, as the EU state with the lowest proportion of 
citizens who identify themselves as European. If indeed postfunctionalism is correct, and 
identity is the decisive factor in explaining constraints on policy makers in regional 
integration, then the UK should exhibit the widespread politicisation of Europe, conflict 
structured by identity in public discourses, and evidence of attempts by entrepreneurial 
political actors to engender this politicisation in order to further their own agendas.  
The British example presents an interesting test-case for postfunctionalist explanations of the 
constraining nature of identity on European integration. Much of the literature, outlined 
above, on the UK’s relationship with Europe agrees that the British have been reluctant 
Europeans, characterised by awkwardness and half-hearted commitment to the European 
project. Some studies associate this trend with nationalistic sentiments, others attribute it to a 
failure of parties and governments. While we have some empirical evidence of the elite 
discourses on Europe in the UK over time, the evidence available of the content and qualities 
of mass-mediated debates is much less comprehensive, and crucially, does not locate itself 
within a theoretical framework that answers what Risse (2009) calls the ‘so what?’ question.  3
While a number of studies identify discourses on Europe in the UK that link nationalism and 
European integration, a deeper understanding of these debates, and how they are contested, 
will allow us to understand the process by which postfunctionalists argue decision making is 
constrained. As a case of a member state with distinctive and particularly exclusively national 
patterns of self-reported citizen identification, the UK appears to represent an important 
location to test the theoretical framework that postfunctionalism provides.  
3.3  Method 1: Measuring the positions of media actors 
Chapter 4 sets out to address the first hypothesis, concerning the positions of newspapers on 
European integration, by measuring the positions of newspapers by proxy of the positions of 
their readers. A number of factors led to the decision to approach this hypothesis in this 
manner. As Ho and Quinn (2008, 335) observe, media organisations do not indicate their 
positions in ways that are as readily discernible as individuals; they do not cast votes in 
directly observable ways, while endorsements provide ‘only sparse information about 
underlying political preferences’. Tone, emphasis, and coverage are all more difficult to 
 In other words, one which connects the content of media discourses with a theory of how these discourses 3
affect the outcome of policy making on the EU. 
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measure than directly expressed preferences, and may diverge from the explicit positions of 
media outlets (Ho and Quinn 2008. 335). While later chapters examine in detail the content of 
newspaper and elite discourses, the task of Chapter 4 is to develop a more generalisable 
measurement of newspaper positions. This is necessary because the study of discourses does 
not provide an easily comparable way to measure newspaper positions, and it also does not 
allow for an easy measurement of Hooghe and Marks’ proxy for identity - the ‘new politics’ 
or gal-tan dimension. A further problem is the generalisability of such measurement beyond 
the present study. As section 3.1 argued, discourse analysis is, inevitably, subjective in its 
judgements, relying on the analyst to interpret the data. This method does not allow for an. 
easily generalisable comparison between newspapers in the UK, and those of another EU 
member state, for example. Thus, in order to develop an understanding of the overall structure 
of the political positions of British newspapers on European integration, an independent 
measure of newspaper positions is required.  
One way to achieve this is through an expert survey method (Benoit and Laver 2006). The 
Chapel Hill Survey, used to measure the position of political parties on European integration, 
is one key example of this (Hooghe et al. 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2009). However, the 
historical nature of the data, and the constraints of this thesis mean that such a method is 
impractical. While expert surveys offer the advantage of the provision of a systematic 
underlying structure for cross-country analysis (Benoit and Laver 2006, 3), this is less 
relevant in the study of one country. A problem also arises in the case of this study, since the 
temporal distance from the start of the time period examined is already almost two decades. It 
would be problematic to expect even an expert to give estimates of the new politics and 
European integration positions of newspapers in 1997 from the vantage point of 2016; there 
are likely to be very few experts who would be able to provide an accurate assessment of the 
positions of newspapers 19 years hence. Although the intention here is to compare the results 
of analysis of data on UK newspapers with Hooghe and Marks’ model of parties, there are a 
number of reasons for adopting a different approach. Rather than measure directly the 
editorial positions of newspapers, the mean positions of readers for each newspaper are 
calculated instead.  
There are a number of reasons for the adoption of this approach. In particular, the use of data 
from readers also allows us to capture the reader side of the newspaper-reader relationship in 
a way that alternatives do not. By understanding the elements of the positions of readers, as 
well as the differing compositions of reader attitudes for each newspaper, we can understand 
the audience to which newspapers are writing. Since the postfunctionalist model aims to 
understand the relationship between nationalist discourses and Euroscepticism amongst 
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voters, this is especially relevant. As Benoit and Laver (2006, 63) argue, mass survey research 
presents problems when asking respondents to estimate the positioning of political actors, 
however they are more useful in telling us how citizen perceive positions, and how they are 
positioned themselves. By concentrating on citizen’s underlying values and their explicit 
views on European integration, we can understand how the readership of each newspaper is 
composed, their position on European integration, and on other relevant dimensions.   4
Data 
 
Contemporary survey evidence covering the attitudes of the readers of the newspapers studied 
here is readily available from the British Social Attitudes Survey, allowing the development of 
measures to estimate the positions of newspaper readers on a number of relevant dimensions. 
The aim of the analysis is to create measures of newspaper reader positions along the three 
dimensions measured by Hooghe and Marks (2005); support for European integration, 
(economic) left-right position, and ‘new politics’ (gal-tan) position. Data to measure all three 
dimensions are available from the British Social Attitudes survey, which also asks respondents 
to identify which newspaper they read regularly. Chapter 4 analyses responses to the BSA 
survey from the years in which the survey asked respondents about their newspaper reading 
habits and the required attitudinal questions. These were the years 1997-2006 and 2008. The 
data set assembled had a sample size (N= 16726), of which 53.1% were regular readers of 
newspapers (N= 7658). Three measures of position are thus constructed from the mean 
responses of readers of each of the nine newspapers analysed in the empirical part of this 
thesis. This allows for a comparison of the left-right and gal-tan positions of the readers of 
each newspaper, and of the support of newspaper readers for European integration.  5
3.4  Method 2: Deploying discourse analysis to study media and elite discourses  
Chapters 5 and 6 present a critical discourse analysis of the content of discourses in the mass 
arena, studying both mass media and elite discourses in order to address the final three 
hypotheses outlined above. Having set out the theoretical considerations inherent in 
employing discourse analysis to study media and elite discourses, this section sets out the 
ways in which this method is deployed in practice. CDA is deployed to analyse two classes of 
data: press reports drawn from nine major UK newspapers from two election periods — the 
 Chapter 4 discusses in more detail the relationship between newspapers and their readers. 4
 Chapter 4 gives a full account of how these attitudinal scales were constructed from the BSA data. 5
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2001 and 2005 UK general elections — as well as five major speeches by UK party leaders 
and the subsequent press reporting of them.  
The mass arena, as understood in this thesis, represents the diverse range of locations where 
public debates on European integration occur. These locations include the print media 
(including newspapers, books, and magazines), broadcast media (including radio and 
television), and the internet, with its associated outlets including social media. The 
considerable diversity of sources available, greatly increased by the advent of the internet and 
the growing availability of instantaneous communications, presents a large body of discourse 
available. As indicated above, the press has been chosen as the mass media actor to be 
investigated in this thesis. In addition to the considerations set out above in relation to the 
literature on the UK case, a number of additional factors influenced the choice of newspapers 
as the mass media actor to be examined in this thesis. First, this choice follows the majority of 
the existing literature on media discourses on European integration in the UK, and studies of 
media representation of the EU in particular (for example, Anderson and Weymouth 1999; 
Hawkins 2009, 2012). As the previous chapter indicated, newspapers are an important site of 
contestation. This is particularly the case in the UK, where broadcast media are more 
restricted in their partiality. Newspapers are important sites of production and reproduction of 
discourses, and act as intermediaries between the public and private realms. In the UK, 
newspapers are considered to be agenda setters, exerting considerable influence on the overall 
news cycle (Anderson and Weymouth 1999). Additionally, as Chapter 1 noted, newspapers 
are an important site of the construction of national identities. Newspapers also offer distinct 
practical advantages in conducting a discourse analysis, which requires that discourses be 
closely analysed in textual form: in presenting a large body of text, they are ideal objects of 
analysis for the discourse analyst.  
As Chapter 2 argued, these mediated debates also feature attempts by policymakers to directly 
intervene, in a variety of ways, to set the agenda, or influence the content or framing of 
debates. One way to understand the complex dialectic between the public discourses of parties 
and the media discourse is to study the speeches given by politicians as examples of direct 
interventions into debates. Speeches represent an attempt by parties to construct particular 
representations of European integration, at a particular time, and offer a good fit with the 
postfunctionalist framework, in that they are often a means by which parties attempt to 
directly contest or politicise EU integration. In this case, speeches by party leaders were 
selected. This decision was taken for a number of reasons: leaders were considered most 
likely to attract press attention through their speeches, while the statements of leaders were 
also considered to be most likely to be a clear statement of party policy. While parties consist 
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of a diverse range of individuals fulfilling different functions, and even constructing a range 
of discourses, it was considered most likely that party leaders would give the ‘definitive’ 
statements of official party policy.  
Sample selection  
The aim of this study is to examine the politicisation and contestation of European integration 
in the UK, and in particular the use of discursive strategies relating to national identity by the 
media and by political parties. As noted above, the Labour governments between 1997 and 
2010 offer a particularly interesting and useful case study in this regard. New Labour, and 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in particular, sought to ‘sell the idea of a European future’ to 
the British people, embarking on a ‘propaganda offensive’ in order to ‘convert a hesitant, 
broadly Eurosceptical public’ into a people happy to support British membership of the 
European Union (Daddow 2011, 1). Within this general time-frame, the choice of specific 
cases was driven by the desire to test the case of a period of high contestation of European 
integration. As Chapter 2 noted, the postfunctionalist model is particularly suited to periods 
where specific reforms are to be contested. While there are a number of possibilities during 
the 1997-2010 period, including British presidencies of the EU in 1998 and 2005, the 
Constitutional Treaty (later Treaty of Lisbon), the negotiations on the UK budget rebate, or 
the 2004 accession of ten countries to the EU from Central and Eastern Europe. The last three 
of these events in particular received considerable attention in the UK press. However, of 
these examples, only the formulation of the Constitutional Treaty / Lisbon Treaty fulfils the 
requirement of the contestation of specific reforms in the UK. The case of the Treaty 
negotiations has been studied by Hawkins (2009; 2012), who, as noted above, provides the 
only significant recent study of media representations of Britain and the EU.  
Elections were chosen as two of the primary case studies due to the nature of elections as 
periods of high general political contestation - an increased focus is given to politics in the 
news and this provides useful data. Elections are also periods which test the idea that the 
media can influence mass-mediated debates. As Chapter 2 argued, the media are likely to 
have less influence on debates during election time, since parties ramp up their attempts to 
influence the agenda, and increase their direct contact with the public (Walgrave and Van 
Aelst 2006). Thus, if the media are able to exert influence on public debates on European 
integration during election periods, we would expect them to be able to influence the agenda 
during ‘normal’ politics too. The cases selected for the analysis featured in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis were the 2001 UK General Election and the 2005 UK General Election. The 2001 UK 
General Election featured high levels of contestation about proposed British membership of 
!91
the single currency, and the opposition Conservative Party stood for election with a manifesto 
that opposed British membership of the Euro, while promising to participate in no further 
European integration (Conservative Party 2001). The governing Labour Party promised in its 
manifesto to hold a referendum on Euro membership, and to campaign for joining, if 
economic conditions were right (Labour Party 2001). This pledge was also symbolically 
important to Tony Blair, who viewed Euro membership as a key part of his ‘project’ to 
convince the British public of the merits of the European Union (Daddow 2012; Rawnsley 
2010). In contrast, the 2005 UK General Election offered less contestation about the EU 
specifically, while seeing high levels of contestation on (the often related issue) of 
immigration and asylum. This election therefore offers a contrast with the 2001 case, enabling 
an investigation of the differences between a period of very high contestation of European 
integration, and a period of relatively high contestation, whilst holding the background 
condition of a general election period, and the discursive patterns that this produces, 
constant.  6
In the case of the speeches studied, these are drawn from points throughout the period, 
offering ‘snapshots’ of reporting from 2001, 2004, 2006, and 2009. This allows for a view 
into discourses on European integration, in particular around the speeches, at different times 
and in different contexts. This is a desirable side-effect of the choice to select speeches for 
analysis according to their status as the ‘best attempts’ by party leaders to articulate a 
discourse on European integration, since these speeches come at times of both high and low 
contestation of Europe, are delivered to different types of audiences, and for different 
purposes (see below). 
Selection of newspaper articles 
In order to examine a representative sample of articles from the British press in the time 
periods selected, articles were drawn from nine of the daily national newspapers then in 
circulation. These were The Daily Express, The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Daily 
Telegraph, The Financial Times, The Guardian, The Independent, The Sun, and The Times.  A 7
tenth daily national newspaper, The Daily Star, carries only limited political coverage, and a 
pilot of the method found very little useful data in this publication. Topologies often divide 
the British press into publication types; typically ‘tabloid’ or ‘mass-market’ newspapers (The 
Daily Mirror, The Sun), middle-market newspapers (The Daily Express, The Daily Mail), and 
 A detailed discussion of the context of these two elections can be found in Chapter 5. 6
 The Independent ceased publication of its print edition in 2016, continuing as an online-only 7
publication. 
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‘quality’ or ‘broadsheet’ newspapers (The Daily Telegraph, The Financial Times, The 
Guardian, The Independent, The Sun, The Times). The decision to take a wide sample of 
newspapers aimed to reflect the diversity of newspapers, their political positions, and 
readerships. While other studies take a smaller sample of newspapers that is claimed to be 
representative of the wider UK press (for example Hawkins 2009; 2012), the decision to study 
the most well-read and influential publications in order to gain a comprehensive sense of the 
state of newspaper discourses on European integration. The focus here is on national 
newspapers, and where they publish separate editions for Scotland or other parts of the UK, 
on their London editions. The decision to exclude regional and Scottish, Welsh, and Northern-
Irish newspapers stemmed from a desire to study discourses aimed at a UK-wide audience. 
While this relatively ‘wide’ sample of newspapers necessitates a drawing articles from a more 
limited timeframe in order to keep the total sample size manageable, the decision to study 
nine newspapers allows for a more thorough comparison between publications, and gives a 
fuller sense of the ‘big picture’ of the UK press.  
Figure 3.2: Circulation of 9 major national daily newspapers in the UK, 1997-2010. 
While the total circulation figures of the newspapers declined in the 1997-2010 period, 
newspaper circulations remained relatively stable through for most of the publications up to 
2005, with the Financial Times and Daily Mirror showing modest growth in this period. After 
2005 circulation figures show a significant decline, although the total 2010 circulation of 8.77 
million for these nine publications remains substantial. The structure of the UK press is 
significantly skewed towards publications that are editorially right-leaning (see figure 3.2). 
Typically, while the Guardian, Independent, and Mirror are considered to be left-leaning, the 
remainder are considered to be positioned to the right-of-centre (Anderson and Weymouth 
Newspaper 1997 Circulation 2001 Circulation 2005 Circulation 2010 Circulation
Daily Express 1,241,336 979,042 949,238 674,640
Daily Mail 2,344,183 2,479,768 2,409,121 2,120,347
Daily Mirror 2,442,078 2,149,422 1,748,327 1,218,425
Daily Telegraph 1,129,777 1,022,263 920,745 691,128
Financial Times 326,516 478,161 422,519 390,315
Guardian 428,010 410,152 376,816 302,285
Independent 288,182 223,645 257,100 185,815
Sun 3,877,097 3,636,561 3,382,509 3,006,565
Times 821,000 734,220 660,713 185,815
Total 12,898,179 12,113,234 11,127,088 8,775,335
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1999; Hawkins 2009). Additionally, while the Mirror is positioned as a left-of-centre tabloid 
newspapers, there is no equivalent publication in the mid-market. The ‘quality’ section of the 
market is also dominated by right-leaning publications, with the combined circulations of the 
Guardian and Independent being less than that of the Telegraph alone, for instance.  
The articles for each time period were collected from the Nexis UK database. The following 
search query was used: ‘EU OR Euro* OR Europe!’, in order to collect the widest possible 
range of articles. The use of wildcards ensured that terms such as ‘European Union’ or 
‘European Commission’ were included in the search. In the case of the articles analysed 
alongside leader speeches, an additional search was run using the name of the speech-giver, to 
ensure that no relevant articles were missed. These search terms produced a large number of 
irrelevant articles, which, for instance, mentioned a quantity of money in euros. Articles were 
read manually to ensure that all relevant articles produced by the searches were collected. 
Articles that referred to European integration, the European Union, European institutions, 
treaties, or politics were retained, along with articles that referred to Europe as a geographic, 
political, or cultural entity. Searches did not include the sports, classifieds, or supplements 
sections, in order to restrict the sample to news, editorial, and opinion articles.  
In the case of the two general elections studied, articles were drawn from the final 14 days 
leading up to the day of the election. This covers the concluding period of the ‘short 
campaign’, and allows for an in-depth study of a representative cross-section of articles. In 
this instance, a focussed, deep sample was judged to be preferable to selecting fewer articles 
over a longer period, or reducing the number of newspapers studied. This allows for a greater 
depth of understanding of the variations in reporting of the same events, and also allows for 
the analysis of all articles mentioning the EU, European integration, Europe in general during 
the sample period. In the case of the speeches studied, these articles were also drawn from 14 
day samples. This includes two days before the delivery of the speeches, in order to catch any 
reporting of the lead-up to speeches, and then the subsequent reporting and analysis of 
speeches over the following days. This period was chosen in order to capture any ‘pre-
coverage’ of the speech, in which the speech was reported before delivery, often as a result of 
parties’ publicity efforts and the release of the full text of the speech (commonly on the day of 
delivery), or excerpts of the speech in advance. The twelve day period after the delivery of the 
speech allows for the capture of the key reporting of the speech and subsequent analysis, 
opinion, and editorial items (which may, for instance in regular columns, be published at fixed 
intervals).  
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A total of 1587 articles were included in the sample as a result of this process. This represents 
a considerable body of text from each publication. As figure 3.3 shows, the number of articles 
from each newspapers differs significantly, indicating the varying levels of coverage given to 
UK membership of the EU, and European integration in general. The articles varied, as might 
be expected, in length, as well as the extent to which they discussed the topic of interest.  
Figure 3.3: Articles sampled, by newspaper. 
Selection of speeches 
To complement the analysis of newspaper articles, five key speeches made by leaders of the 
Labour and Conservative Parties were analysed, alongside the newspaper articles reporting 
them over the subsequent two weeks (see above). Speeches are understood, in the 
postfunctionalist context, as attempts by political parties to influence arena choice and to 
participate in mass-mediated public debates: in the context of the analysis in the present 
thesis, speeches are understood as tools used by parties to attempt to cue citizen opinion and 
to guide or influence the outcome of policy-making (either in government or opposition).  
In selecting speeches, the aim was to ensure that speeches were selected from the notable 
‘best attempts’ of leaders to articulate their positions on European integration, in order to 
select from cases where leaders attempted to use their speeches to set or alter the political 
Newspaper 2001 
General 
Election
2005 
General 
Election
William 
Hague 
Speech, 
2001
Tony 
Blair 
Speech, 
2001
Michael 
Howard 
Speech, 
2004
Tony 
Blair 
Speech, 
2006
Gordon 
Brown 
Speech, 
2009
Total
Daily 
Express
36 29 3 4 2 0 6 80
Daily Mail 78 58 10 9 2 2 6 165
Daily 
Mirror
71 25 5 5 1 0 1 108
Daily 
Telegraph
113 70 12 11 4 2 6 218
Financial 
Times
171 111 8 10 2 5 4 311
Guardian 136 71 16 12 2 3 10 250
Independent 101 79 8 10 5 4 3 210
Sun 65 23 6 7 1 1 3 106
Times 96 91 9 6 4 3 4 213
Total 867 557 77 74 23 20 43 1587
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agenda. According to Charteris-Black (2014, xvi), political speeches can be broadly defined 
as either ‘policy-making or ‘consensus-building’. Policy-making speeches are those which are 
concerned with the making of political decisions, while consensus-building speeches are those 
which are concerned with establishing shared values. Of this second category, consensus-
building speeches are often associated with very specific events such as the build-up to war or 
the election of a leader (Charteris-Black 2014, ch. 1). In line with the objective to analyse 
speeches that aimed to influence the politicisation process, the speeches were chosen were of 
the policy-making type. Inevitably, this typology is not strictly binary: policy-making 
speeches usually attempt to establish a consensus, while consensus-building speeches usually 
attempt to establish policy frameworks (Charteris-Black 2014). By focussing on the ‘best 
attempts’ of leaders to make ‘policy-making’ speeches, we are able to analyse the features of 
these speeches, and the nature of their reporting in the press in the cases where politicians are 
most likely to be able to play the role that postfunctionalism suggests. If politicians are not 
able to successfully frame European integration and cue public opinion at their ‘best attempts’ 
to do so, then we assume that they are unlikely to be able to do so at other times. Thus, the 
analysis of the subsequent discussion of each speech aims to interpret how successful 
speeches were in affecting the mass-mediated debate, by analysing the ways in which the 
speeches were reported.  
During the 1997-2010 period, the Labour Party was led by Tony Blair (1994-2007), and 
Gordon Brown (2007-2010). The Conservative Party was led by William Hague (1997-2001), 
Iain Duncan Smith (2001-2003), Michael Howard (2003-2005), and David Cameron 
(2005-2016). The extent to which leaders gave major speeches on European policy during 
their time in office as party leader varied. For example, while Tony Blair gave a large number 
of speeches wholly or in part dealing with European policy during his time as prime minister, 
Gordon Brown gave only two major speeches on European policy during his three years as 
prime minister. Of the speeches given by Labour Party leaders (and consequently, as prime 
minister), two speeches were selected by Tony Blair — one given in 2001 in Edinburgh 
during that year’s election campaign, and one given in 2006 at the University of Oxford  — 
and one by Gordon Brown, given in 2009 to the European Parliament. Two speeches were 
selected from those given by leaders of the Conservative Party: one by William Hague to the 
Conservative Party Conference in 2001, and one given by Michael Howard at a European 
Parliament election event in 2004. These choices reflect the desire to select speeches given in 
a range of contexts and at times of both high and low general salience of European integration 
on the political agenda.   8
 Further details about the specific cases selected are contained in Chapter 6. 8
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3.5  Textual analysis method - deploying discourse analysis 
The method for analysing and coding the texts was based upon three key considerations. First, 
was the emphasis placed upon framing by postfunctionalism, which is held to make 
considerations about European integration salient, and cue opposition. Chapter 2 discussed 
some of the literature on framing analysis in more detail. Thus, the frames that texts employ 
were one of the primary objects of analysis. The second consideration was the construction of 
identities, discussed in Chapter 1. As the key explanatory variable in postfunctionalism, the 
construction of identities in the texts, and particularly the links construction between national 
identity and European integration, is central to developing a clearer understanding of the role 
of media discourses. Finally, these considerations were guided by the discourse analysis 
framework provided by Fairclough (1995; 2000; 2003). Taking the considerations noted 
above, and the research areas identified by Chapter 2, into account, the following features of 
Fairclough’s framework for discourse analysis therefore seem to be the most important for the 
present study, and are prioritised in the analysis of the texts: 
1) Framing 
The analysis of framing allows the analyst to understand how the features of the discourse that 
surround the main messages — reporting in the case of the newspaper articles, and the 
primary arguments in the case of speeches — influence the way in which that discourse is 
represented. Framing can manipulate the reader (or listener), through ordering voices and the 
elements of discourses to subject them to social control (Fairclough 1995, 83-4). Chapter 2 set 
out some of the ways in which research into framing effects have demonstrated the 
substantive impact of framing on audiences. Thus, understanding the way in which discourses 
are framed, where they are situated, and how they privilege certain representations over 
others, is a key objective of the analysis.  
2) Narratives 
Narratives, or ‘pre-genres’, constitute a significant proportion of media output (Fairclough 
1995). The central narratives of the texts can be understood the way in which the authors of 
those text to a) recount a ‘story’, series of events or purposeful social activities in a certain 
way; and b) present that story, in the way that is organised and realised in the text (Fairclough 
1995, 91). The act of news reporting, or indeed giving a speech, centrally involves telling a 
story - recounting past events, but also interpreting them and presenting them in such a way to 
encourage the audience to see those events from a particular perspective. Narratives thus form 
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part of the way in which texts represent events and ideas, and include evaluative judgments 
that may have a substantive impact on the readers’ interpretation of those events or ideas 
(Fairclough 2003). Texts may try to fit newly presented ideas or events into a pre-existing 
narrative, interpreting them through the lens of existing ways of thinking.  
3) Representations of objects, events, and identities 
Texts, and particularly media texts, do not simply ‘mirror realities’, but rather they construct 
versions of reality that are contingent upon the position, interests, and objectives of their 
authors (Fairclough 1995, 104). The way that identities, events, and objects are represented in 
the texts studied here is central for understanding the logics and motivations of the choices 
made by authors. Understanding the language of the text is an important part of this study of 
representations. The emphasis here is on the high-level: the motifs and descriptions used in 
individual texts, and across bodies of texts, that imply a common way of understanding or 
representing a particular object, event, or identities. Some specific features that are considered 
include language choice (vocabulary, metaphor), and features such as metonyms and co-
locations: these are identified as important by Fairclough (1995).  
Process 
After selection, sources were imported into nVivo and were then coded manually and with 
assistance from keyword searches. The choice to code the sources largely manually was 
motivated by the desire to become deeply familiar with the body of text, and to ensure that the 
meanings of the texts were interpreted as part of the coding process. A number of codes were 
established initially, based around the research questions. These included those key to the 
research questions; for instance, where the theme of national identity, the nation, or 
Britishness occurred, these were coded under these headings. Texts were coded in regards to 
their themes, frames, narratives, descriptions, and specific language. Codes were also created 
for specific people, events, and places, to aid the comparison between individual texts. Many 
of these codes emerged directly from the text, and the method incorporated a reflexive 
approach that developed around the context of the articles and speeches being analysed. For 
example, the term ‘Eurocrat’ emerged in a number of articles. This was coded as a new code 
and a search conducted using nVivo to find all the specific instances where this term and its 
variations were used. Computerised word counts were also employed to discover the most 
frequently used terms in order to guide the qualitative analysis.  
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Particular attention was paid in the coding to the key issues arising from the research 
questions. The texts were read to assess how they discussed Europe, European integration, or 
the EU; how they constructed connections between the EU and the UK; whether their 
assessment of their topic was positive or negative; and, to what extent European integration 
was their focus. Focussing on the linguistic characteristics, texts were also read with a view to 
understanding how they framed Europe / the EU / European integration, how they 
characterised it, and what specific words and phrases they used in his framing and 
characterisation. These features were coded, and the texts compared within and across the 
codes generated. The ultimate goal of the analysis was to uncover the assumptions and 
structures underpinning the texts, in order to understand their ideological and theoretical 
foundations.  
While the overall pattern of the codes created gave a general sense of the key trends within 
the text, this high-level picture offers only modest advantages over computerised content 
analysis. Given the aim of the use of a discourse analysis methodology was to understand the 
meaning and context of the texts, a subsequent stage of analysis was undertaken to develop a 
more detailed understanding of the sources. The coding provided a guide for detailed re-
reading of key articles, identified through the coding. This processes reviewed the most 
important frames, themes, narratives, and language used; the aim of the detailed re-reading 
was to gain a deeper understanding of the context and specific features of the texts. 
Fairclough’s framework for discourse analysis, particularly in regards to the media, provided 
guidance for this detailed reading (Fairclough 1995). Focus was placed particularly on the 
devices identified in Chapter 2, especially the use of frames. This process was supported by 
the taking of extensive, detailed notes, which provided the basis for the analysis provided in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Texts were cross-compared to identify similarities and differences: 
particularly in the case of articles that were reporting on the same events, speech, or news 
story.  
Reading texts in context 
An important consideration in the analysis of speeches is to take care to read and consider 
texts in the context of their creation and delivery. Each text or discourse act is located in a 
particular context, deployed for particular purposes, and is one part of a wider social practice 
that encompasses physical, sociological, and psychological elements (Epstein 2008; 
Fairclough 2000, 143). In the case of the newspaper articles and speeches analysed in this 
thesis, each text is located within a wider discourse, encompassing deeply-rooted mechanisms 
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of articulating meaning that are anchored in the practices of parties, individuals, media 
organisations, and wider society.  
The analysis must consider, of course, that the texts analysed here are produced as part of 
processes that may involve more than a single actor. Speeches, for example, are not 
necessarily simply the work of a single politician, but rather may involve the contribution of 
(perhaps multiple) speechwriters, advisors, and other members of the party leadership. This 
means that while the words may be spoken by a particular politician, they are, in fact, the 
work of a range of actors in collaboration. For the purposes of this study, that is not a 
problematic feature of speeches, however. Here, we consider speeches as an attempt by 
parties to influence the contestation and politicisation process, through engaging in discourse 
in the mass arena. Speeches may be given to attempt to politicise European integration, to 
influence the outcome of debates, or to respond to the efforts of (Eurosceptic) political 
entrepreneurs. For the analysis presented in the present thesis, what matters is what is said, 
not who wrote the particular text, since parties, not individual politicians, are the primary 
actor of interest in this context.  
Similarly, newspapers are not the not the product of a single individual, but are instead the 
product of a process involving a number of individuals from reporter to editor to proprietor, 
and within an institutional context that can have a profound influence on the content of the 
discourses produced. However, as Fairclough notes, news texts are the result of a series of 
relatively predictable, stable processes that form part of a chain of events that lead from the 
events or ideas being reported to the private domain in which the discourses produced are 
consumed (Fairclough 1995, 37-40). However, it by considering newspapers as an actor, with 
an agenda, that allows for the useful analysis of media texts in the present thesis. As Chapter 2 
argued, media organisations are producers of discourse under a system of professional, 
institutional control. Much like political parties, they have systems and processes that regulate 
and construct an external discourse. While the role of the mass media differs in that the media 
are an intermediary between the public discourses of parties and the private sphere of those 
who consume media discourses, the factor of interest here is the ways in which this mediation 
occurs, and how the agency of media organisations impacts upon the politicisation process. 
Thus, the main object of analysis — the output of discourses produced by the media — gives 
us an insight into the ‘unseen’ practices of production, undertaken by a diverse range of 
internal actors, by seeking to uncover its underlying assumptions and patterns.  
Particularly when reading newspaper sources, it is important to clarify which voices within 
the texts can be understood as the ‘authoritative voices’ of newspapers. In the same way that 
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party leaders have been chosen as the ‘authoritative voice’ of their parties, it is important to 
consider which discourses within newspapers, which frequently offer a range of discursive 
positions in their various articles and columns, are privileged over others. The decision was 
taken to consider, firstly, editorial and leader-column items as offering the most direct 
expression of the editorial ‘agenda’ of newspapers. Here, the position of the newspaper on 
particular issues is often expressed directly. In everyday reporting, the representations offered 
are also considered extremely important, since it is through this reporting that consumers’ 
perceptions of events are formed and shaped. Columnists are considered to be moderately less 
important, since these writers may contribute to a range of publications, but they nevertheless 
add to the diversity of ‘voices’ and constructions of representations of objects within the 
wider discourse of each newspaper. This can serve to expose readers to different constructions 
to those prevailing within a particular publication, adding an additional layer of complexity to 
an already densely layered and complex set of representations and meanings. However, in 
offering judgements about the general political positions or constructions of objects or events, 
articles by columnists are attributed less weight than editorials and everyday  news reporting.  
Summary  
This chapter has set out the methods and methodology employed by Part II of the thesis to 
examine the hypotheses set out in Part I. Two complementary methods are employed: a 
quantitative analysis of the positions of newspaper readers, and a qualitative analysis of 
newspaper reports and party leader speeches. The first method addresses the first hypothesis 
by examining the overall structure of the mass-mediated debate and the positions of 
newspapers within it: in doing so, it seeks to explore the relationship between the positions of 
newspapers on European integration and their positions on axes of both distributional politics 
(left-right), and new politics (gal-tan). The second method explores the remaining three 
hypotheses by deploying critical discourse analysis to examine in detail the content of 
newspaper and party discourses. The chapter discussed the methodological implications of 
deploying discourse analysis, and then set out the sources to be examined. Finally, it discussed 
the detailed method to be employed in the analysis of texts, and drew out some of the 
implications of this method. 
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Part II 
Chapter 4 
The Structure of Newspaper and Reader Positions 
In order to understand the structure of press contestation of European integration in the mass 
arena, it is necessary to understand, first, where the readers of newspapers stand on European 
integration, and second if contestation and politicisation of Europe in the press is structured in 
a similar way to the same processes among political parties. In other words, do newspapers 
divide on the issue of Europe on an economic left-right basis, or is their support for European 
integration more closely associated with the green/alternative/libertarian (gal) – 
traditionalism/authority/nationalism (tan) axis? Directly measuring the ‘positions’ of 
newspapers in a quantitative manner is difficult, and is complicated by the fact that, unlike 
political parties, newspapers do not necessarily hold a single, fixed, position on the issue of 
European integration. As Chapters 5 and 6 go on to show, the discourses presented by the 
press can vary within individual publications. Measuring reader positions accurately is 
possible due to the data provided by large-scale attitudinal polling, however. 
Therefore, this chapter will contribute to the task of more accurately mapping the structure of 
contestation over Europe in the press by, firstly, examining the editorial positions of 
newspapers on European integration, as well as their endorsements of political parties. 
Secondly, the attitudes of readers of individual publications are examined through the study of 
data drawn from the British Social Attitudes survey series. Thirdly, it will show that the 
attitudes of the readers of newspapers towards European integration do seem to, in some 
respects, follow the pattern found by Hooghe and Marks (2006) for political parties: support 
or opposition to European integration is more closely associated with their gal-tan position 
than their left-right position. This argument is supported by evidence of a relationship 
between the positions of newspaper readers and their positions on both a left-right and 
libertarian-authoritarian axis. Developing a comprehensive understanding based on 
quantitative data of the causal relationship between readers, newspapers, Euroscepticism, and 
the gal-tan axis is beyond the scope and resources of this thesis. However, this chapter seeks 
to begin to develop a way to compare the positions of newspapers and their readers in order to 
articulate the first steps towards understanding the wider structure of UK press contestation of 
Europe.  
The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section discusses the overt, editorial 
positions of newspapers on European integration and their endorsements of parties, to 
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give a general sense of the orientations of the publications studied here. The second 
section outlines the quantitative data and method used to measure reader attitudes, and 
discusses the link between readers’ attitudes and newspaper positions. The third section 
discusses trends in Euroscepticism among the readers of the nine national daily 
newspapers, and this is followed by the fourth section, which presents data which suggest 
that the gal-tan dimension structures newspaper readers’ positions on European 
integration to a greater extent than left-right dimension.  
4.1  Where do the newspapers stand on Europe?   
While mapping the political positions of newspapers is not an easy task, one indication of 
their positions on European integration is their editorial support for major policies such as the 
euro. More generally, the political party endorsed by newspapers can also give a sense of the 
political orientation of that publication. It must be noted that, within each publication, there 
are often inconsistencies in the construction and treatment of certain issues, and a diversity of 
opinions expressed via editorials, regular, and guest columnists. In addition, during the period 
studied, the positions of newspapers do shift over time. However, one frequently followed 
editorial position of newspapers, their endorsement of political parties, is easily determined 
and is shown in figure 4.1. Typically, newspapers endorse parties in the run-up to elections in 
clearly-marked editorials. These editorial statements are often seen as indicative of the overall 
political orientation of the publication (Anderson and Weymouth 1999; Wring and Deacon 
2010).  
Figure 4.1  Endorsements of UK newspapers of political parties at general elections, and 
support for UK membership of the Euro, 2001 general election
1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 Supported 
Euro?
Sun CON CON CON CON LAB LAB LAB CON No
Express CON CON CON CON CON LAB CON CON No
Mail CON CON CON CON CON CON CON CON No
Mirror LAB LAB LAB LAB LAB LAB LAB LAB Yes
Telegraph CON CON CON CON CON CON CON CON No
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(Source: Wring and Deacon 2010, 444) 
1. encouraged anti-Conservative tactical voting  
2. endorsed specific Eurosceptic candidates by constituency  
3. newspaper closed due to an industrial dispute  
The 1997-2010 period saw considerable changes in the political party endorsement of UK 
newspapers. As figure 4.1 shows, several newspapers that had supported the Conservative 
Party switched their support to Labour: the Sun endorsed Labour at the 1997 general election, 
while the Express and the Times supported Labour at the 2001 general election. This 
represented a break from the pattern of press endorsements before this period, which had 
traditionally been largely dominated by support for the Conservatives. Indeed, between 1945 
and 1997, only the Mirror consistently supported the Labour Party, while the Conservatives 
were supported at every election by the Express, Mail (with the exception of 1974 where it 
supported both the Liberal Party and the Conservatives), and Telegraph.  
The 2001 and 2005 elections, analysed in Chapter 5, are two out of only three elections since 
1945 where Labour has enjoyed the support of more than half of the UK’s national 
newspapers, by circulation or by number of titles (the other being 1997) (Wring and Deacon 
2010, 443). Thus, for the first time, Labour had a comparable level of support in the media to 
that enjoyed by the Conservative Party during their previous election victories, for example in 
1992. However, the qualitative character of these endorsements was somewhat different in 
this case. Whereas the Conservatives received the ‘enthusiastic’ backing of their supporters in 
the press in 1992, and indeed in 2010, it has been shown that the support offered to Labour in 
the 1997-2005 period was far more moderate. Wring and Deacon (2010, 446) argue that 
‘these endorsements were characteristically weaker, more conditional and devoted to the 
leader rather than his party’. Indeed, the period between 2001 and 2005 saw a considerable 
weakening of support for Labour in the press. While some of the newspapers that had 
supported Labour in 1997 or 2001 switched to support the Conservatives, or the Liberal 
Independent None None LAB None1 LIB LAB / 
LIB
Yes
Times n/a3 CON CON CON None2 LAB LAB CON No
Guardian LAB Allian
ce
LAB LAB LAB LAB LAB / 
LIB
LIB Yes
Financial 
Times
CON n/a3 CON LAB LAB LAB LAB CON Yes
1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 Supported 
Euro?
!104
Democrats, others ‘were increasingly critical or demanded concessions’ that antagonised 
Labour’s traditional supporters in the press, meaning that by the 2005 general election, 
Labour ‘had few allies’ in the press, while the Conservatives had begun to regain some of the 
support they had lost (Bartle 2005, 43).  
Nevertheless, the change in party support of newspapers that switched to endorse did not 
appear to precipitate a change in their orientation towards the EU and European integration to 
follow that of the Labour Party. Whereas only two newspapers supported the Conservatives at 
the 2001 general election, endorsing their manifesto promise to ‘save the Pound’, a majority 
of newspapers were opposed to membership of the euro. Figure 4.1 also gives a summary of 
the position of newspapers towards the euro at the 2001 UK general election, compared to 
their party endorsement. There is no clear pattern here: while none of the Conservative-
endorsing newspapers supported euro membership, the Labour-endorsing newspapers were 
split evenly.  
The considerations outlined here, including the strength of newspaper support for parties and 
their changing editorial endorsements, highlight the difficulty of using information from 
editorials alone to determine newspaper positions. These relatively crude categorisations also 
hide a considerable amount of nuance: political positions are better expressed as lying on 
certain dimensions. While support for Euro membership can be expressed as a binary choice, 
the overall support of a newspaper for European integration is certainly not a binary choice.  It 
is even more difficult to determine the positions of newspapers on the axes of political 
orientation that postfunctionalists argue are significant for decision-making on European 
integration: the economic left-right dimension, and the ‘new politics’ (gal-tan) dimension 
(Hooghe and Marks 2005). While the following chapters explore the discursive construction 
of European integration in these newspapers in depth, this does not provide an easily 
comparable and generalisable measure of newspaper positions. Nor does this thesis set out to 
analyse in detail the left-right or gal-tan positions of newspapers through discourse analysis. 
The task of this chapter is therefore to measure the position of newspapers in a quantitative 
and comparable way, given the difficulty of determining this information from qualitative 
information alone.  
4.2  Measuring positions: readers and newspapers 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the present chapter measures the positions of readers for each of 
the newspapers studied in this thesis, taking this as a proxy for newspaper positions. Rather 
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than measure newspaper editorial positions directly, this approach allows for the capture of 
the reader side of the newspaper-reader relationship in a way that other methods do not. This 
approach raises questions about the nature of the relationship between the positions of 
newspapers, and the positions of their readers. As Chapter 1 showed, studies of national 
identity formation have ascribed an important role to the media (Billig 1995; Anderson 2006; 
Wodak et al 2009). Meanwhile, Chapter 2 showed that the political communications literature 
presents a wide range of evidence to suggest that media have a meaningful effect on their 
audiences, detecting measurable effects in studies of framing and agenda setting (Norris et al 
1999; Althaus 2003; Entman 2003; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2011). The extent to which 
newspapers influence the attitudes of their readers is contested: while some studies find 
evidence that newspaper discourses can influence attitudes significantly, others argue that 
newspapers simply reflect the attitudes and assumptions of their readership (Barker 1999; 
Newton and Brynin 2001; Ladd and Lenz 2009).  
The literature on how and when the media, and newspapers in particular, influence their 
audiences has recently produced evidence to suggest a causal relationship between media 
discourses and public opinion. Much of the early work done on media messages, for many 
years, concluded that the media do not easily influence public opinion and voting behaviour 
(Berelson et al. 1954; McGuire 1986; Finkel 1993). However, more recently, a number of 
studies have overcome methodological barriers to find evidence of associations between 
exposure to news discourses and political opinions at the individual level (Barker 1999; 
Newton and Brynin 2001; Lawson and McCann 2004; Druckman and Parkin 2005). These 
studies, which looked at individual or limited-group effects, were more successful in detecting 
evidence of media influence. These studies overcome the difficulties of looking at overall 
public opinion, which is relatively stable in the short term, by focussing on data that directly 
links individuals with the media that they consume. This approach is more successful in 
capturing the effects of exposure to media than other methods, which may include residency 
in a country with a high level of readership of a particular newspaper, general political 
knowledge, or self-reported campaign attention; such measures introduce unpredictable biases 
(Ladd and Lenz 2009, 395).  
There is evidence to suggest that there is an association between the media citizens consume, 
and the attitudes that they adopt: studies have found that the editorial position of publications 
influence the choice of citizens who chose to consume then (Miller and Krosnick 1996; 
Newton and Brynin 2001; Ladd and Lenz 2009), and that media outlets influence the opinion 
of their audience. Firstly, reader values tend to coincide with the newspapers that they choose 
to read. As Newton and Brynin (2001) find, there is a close association between the party 
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supported by newspapers and the party for which the readers of that newspaper vote. While 
voters are ‘not fools’, and do not believe everything they read in newspapers, they are likely 
to choose a paper which fits their own political inclinations - this association is particularly 
strong among readers of broadsheet newspapers (Newton and Brynin 2001, 282). The British 
case is particularly well suited for the study of associations between individual attitudes and 
media because the UK media environment allows for an accurate measurement of the 
exposure of individuals to media messages, particularly their consumption of newspapers 
(Newton and Brynin 2001; Ladd and Lenz 2009). Daily newspapers in the UK have national 
distribution and attract large readerships, allowing survey respondents to be easily connected 
with the contents of their chosen newspaper.  
Several studies find that newspapers influence the attitudes of their readers. For example, 
Miller (1991) finds that right-wing newspapers are more likely to frame economic news in a 
positive way; reporting data such as employment and GDP figures, corporate profits, and 
other economic stories in a way that is more optimistic than their left-wing counterparts. He 
finds that economic optimism is higher amongst those who read right-wing newspapers, and 
that economic optimism tends to favour the Conservative Party, potentially influencing 
readers of those newspapers. Gavin and Sanders (2003) have found evidence that broadsheet 
and mid-market ‘black-top’ newspapers exert a statistically significant influence on the views 
of their readers. This influence is seen as being less clear among readers of tabloid 
newspapers, and is not repeated across all segments of the population (Gavin and Sanders 
2003, 587). This influence, they argue, may have ‘important cumulative political significance’ 
in the medium- to long-term (Gavin and Sanders 2003, 588). In a wider study of 21 European 
countries, Azrout et al. (2012) find that media coverage affects support for EU enlargement. 
This association is particularly significant in strengthening existing attitudes; for instance 
people with already strong anti-immigration attitudes are found to be most influenced by 
exposure to negative content about immigration (Azrout et al. 2012, 701). Other studies find 
that at the individual level, newspapers do impact the voting intentions of readers. Studying 
the 1992 and 1997 UK general elections, Newton and Brynin (2001, 265) find that those 
voters who are ‘cross-pressured’ by their newspaper are more influenced in their voting 
intentions that those individuals whose politics are reinforced by their newspaper. In a similar 
vein, Gavin and Sanders (2003) have argued that these effects are more significant in the long 
term; voting preferences are more difficult to change than opinions, and the ‘steady drum beat 
of support’ for parties may have more influence than short-term changes in support.  
Jonathan Ladd and Gabriel Lenz (2009) have conducted one of the most significant studies 
into media influence and voting. They take the switch in endorsements by several newspapers 
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at the 1997 UK general election to show evidence that news media ‘exert a powerful influence 
on mass political behaviour’ (Ladd and Lenz 2009, 394). Newspapers are shown to exert a 
good deal of persuasive influence on voting patterns. The effects of news endorsements and 
slant is estimated to have persuaded between 10% and as high as 25% of voters to switch their 
votes to Labour in those newspapers which changed their support from the Conservatives. 
This suggests a much greater magnitude of effects than other studies have found. For instance, 
Curtice (1999), finds that, while ‘the media can do more than set the agenda or frame issues’, 
the aggregate change of some papers persuading their readers to vote Labour was 
counteracted at the 1997 election by a similar process acting in the opposite direction among 
readers of Conservative supporting newspapers (Curtice 1999, 28). Newspapers were 
persuasive, he argues, but the pro-Labour majority in the press in 1997 was not able to avoid 
an overall decline in Labour’s electoral support from pre-election polls. 
Thus there is evidence that there is a significant relationship between newspapers and the 
attitudes of their readers. Readers may choose newspapers that reflect their political opinions, 
but they are also influenced by the content of the newspapers that they read. This influence 
may reinforce their existing opinions, or indeed persuade them to change their vote at national 
elections. Given this relatively close relationship, the use of reader positions as a proxy for 
newspaper positions provides one route towards developing a quantitative, comparable 
measure of newspaper positions on political issues such as European integration. Combined 
with a qualitative analysis of newspaper discourses, to be presented in Chapter 5, this 
provides a means to give an assessment of the relative positions of the newspapers studied 
here.  
Data 
As described in Chapter 3, a dataset was assembled from the British Social Attitudes Survey 
(BSA). Data were drawn from the 1997-2006, and the 2008 BSA datasets. These years 
comprise those in which respondents were asked questions relating to their support for the 
European Union, during the Labour governments of 1997-2010. A combined dataset of all the 
responses from these years allows for a large total sample size (N= 16726). Of these 
respondents, 53.1% were regular readers of any kind of newspaper (N=8888), and 45.8% 
(N=7658) were regular readers of one of the national daily newspapers included in this study, 
having reported that they read one of these newspapers at least 3 times each week.  When 1
considered on an aggregate basis, there were sufficient respondents who reported to read each 
  Of the readers of newspapers other than the 9 major national dailies included in this study, the 1
majority (N=736) read a Scottish, Irish, or Northern Irish newspaper. 
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newspaper (see table 3.1). Table 4.1 breaks down the total number of respondents for each 
year, which varies considerably. This is due to the format of the BSA; in some years, only a 
portion of the total number of respondents were asked questions on either the European 
Union, or on their left-right and libertarian-authoritarian position.  In several years, all 2
respondents were invited to respond to these questions, yielding more numerous cases for 
those years 
The BSA asks respondents to indicate if they read a newspaper more than 3 times each week, 
and which newspaper this is. Thus, it captures regular readers of these newspapers. It seems 
likely that regular readers more closely reflect the positions of their chosen newspaper in their 
own attitudes than those who do not regularly read the same newspaper, or who read one less 
than 3 times per week. While in most years there were sufficient respondents to provide a 
mean position for each newspaper, a number of years produced only a very small number of 
readers of the lowest-circulation newspaper examined, the Financial Times.  3
The BSA also provides data on the general attitudes of citizens towards British policy on the 
EU. Respondents were asked to choose from a series of responses to the question ‘Do you 
  This is referred to as ‘version A’ or ‘version B’; typically, 1/3 of respondents are asked to complete 2
one version, and 2/3 the other, each year. 
  However, all respondents who reported to be readers of the Financial Times are included in the 3
aggregated results.
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Figure 4.3 Total readers by newspaper, all 
Newspaper Frequency Percent
Daily Express 595 7.8
Daily Mail 1810 23.6
Daily Mirror 1952 17.5
The Sun 1952 25.5
Daily Telegraph 751 9.8
Financial Times 57 0.7
The Guardian 403 5.3
The Independent 168 2.2
The Times 583 7.6
Total 7658 100.0
Figure 4.2  Total Readers by year
Year Frequency Percent
1997 513 6.7
1998 391 5.1
1999 371 4.8
2000 911 11.9
2001 423 5.5
2002 1242 16.2
2003 751 9.8
2004 993 13.0
2005 1393 18.2
2006 350 4.6
2008 320 4.2
Total 7658 100.00
think Britain’s long-term policy should be…’ comprising the following items: (1) ‘to leave the 
European Union’, (2) ‘to stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU’s powers’, (3) ‘to leave 
things as they are’, (4) ‘to say in the EU and try to increase the EU’s powers’, or (5) ‘to work 
for the formation of a single European government’. The mean response to this question from 
the readers of each newspaper is used to represent the position of the readers of that 
newspaper on the ‘support for European integration scale’. Thus a 5-point scale of positions 
on European integration is created from the responses to this question. This 5-point scale is 
analogous to the 7-point European policy scale used by Hooghe and Marks (2004, 419). This 
scale is, for the purposes of estimating mean reader positions, taken as a quantitative variable. 
While it is possible to draw some inferences from the responses of the readers of each 
newspaper to this question, explored below, the relative positions of the mean response of the 
readers of each paper is more instructive of the overall structure of the press.   
Since 1987, the BSA has also asked questions which provide a scale of social attitudes on a 
libertarian - authoritarian scale (which is used to represent the new politics dimension), in 
addition to questions which are used to generate an economic left - right scale. These are both 
also formulated on a 5-point scale. Both scales measure underlying dimensions of values: this 
rests on the assumption that there is a ‘latent’ attitudinal dimension that characterises the 
answers respondents give (Park et al. 2009, 238). Scores on the index are therefore a more 
reliable indicator of underlying attitudes than the answers to any single question. Both the 
left-right and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions are measured with a Likert scale. 
Respondents are invited to ‘agree strongly’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’, 
or ‘disagree strongly’ to a number of statements. The score given for their left-right or 
authoritarian-libertarian position comprises a mean of their scores for the questions on the 
scale. The items were as follows: 
Left–right scale  
Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off. 
Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers. 
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth. 
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor. 
Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance. 
Libertarian–authoritarian scale  
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values. 
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People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. 
Schools should teach children to obey authority. 
The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong. 
Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. 
In the 1998 and 1999 surveys, the six-question formula for the libertarian-authoritarian scale 
was reduced to five questions.  This means that the libertarian - authoritarian scale for the 4
years 1998-99 is not directly comparable to that for the remaining years included, however 
both variations demonstrate a similar level of internal consistency (Jowell et al. 1998, 241). 
The estimated position of the readers of each newspaper on the left-right, gal-tan, and 
Eurosceptic scales is derived from the mean of all the scores of all readers of each newspaper 
for these variables. Tests of reliability indicate that the 6-item standard BSA libertarian-
authoritarian scale and 5-item scale demonstrate a similar level of internal consistency.  In the 5
case of these two scales, they can be read as follows: on the left-right scale, a score of 1 
represents the ‘left-most’ pole of the left-right dimension, while a score of 5 indicates the 
‘right-most’ pole of the dimension; on the ‘new politics’ or libertarian-authoritarian scale, 1 
indicates the most libertarian position on the scale (which approximates the gal-pole, for the 
purposes of this research), while 5 indicates the most authoritarian position on the dimension 
(representing the tan-pole).  
4.3  Euroscepticism among newspaper readers 
The results of the quantitative analysis will now be described in detail. First, the positions of 
readers and non-readers of newspapers on European integration are described, and the 
changes over time of these attitudes are discussed. Next, the responses of readers when 
grouped by newspaper read are considered. 
Euroscepticism among the general population and newspaper readers 
  The item ‘the law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong’ was removed in these years.4
  The 1998 scales have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82 for the left-right scale and 0.74 for the libertarian-5
authoritarian scale (Thomson et al. 2001, 30). This is considered ‘respectable’ for the libertarian-authoritarian 
scale and ‘very good’ for the left-right scale (Thomson et al. 2001, 30). The 2008 scales have a Cronbach’s alpha 
of 0.80 for the left-right scale and 0.74 for the libertarian-authoritarian scale (Park et al. 2009, 239), indicating 
that the removal of one item had little impact on the reliability of the libertarian-authoritarian sale. 
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When comparing newspaper readers to non-readers, a number of interesting observations can 
be made. For the 11 years covered in the full dataset, the average position of newspaper 
readers on the support for European integration scale was 2.40. Non-readers were somewhat 
more supportive of European integration, with a mean position of 2.53. For the same period, 
we observe a notable difference in the positions taken by respondents on the 5-point support 
for European integration scale. Newspaper readers were somewhat more likely to wish to 
leave the European Union (19.9% of readers compared to 16.5% of non-readers), or to stay in 
the EU but reduce its powers (42.9% compared to 38.7%). Overall, 58.6% of non-readers 
wished to either leave the EU or reduce its powers, compared to 62.8% of newspaper readers. 
This suggests that newspaper readers were, overall, somewhat less in favour of European 
integration than their non-reader counterparts. Additionally, more non-readers than readers 
were in favour of leaving things as they are: 24.1% compared to 21.0%. Similar proportions 
of readers and non-readers supported increasing the powers of the EU or working towards a 
single European government. This suggests that those respondents that did not read a 
newspaper were moderately less Eurosceptic than those respondents who were regular 
newspaper readers, and were more likely to be in favour of retaining the status quo.  
Figure 4.4 shows the change in these responses over time. It shows that newspaper readers 
were consistently more in favour of either leaving the EU or reducing the powers of the EU 
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Figure 4.4: Support for European Integration, newspaper readers and non-readers
than their non-newspaper reading counterparts, and that, relatively, newspaper readers were 
more Eurosceptic than those who did not read a newspaper regularly. Throughout, a greater 
proportion of newspaper readers supported policy positions that were clearly Eurosceptic, 
with the difference in percentage of reader and non-reader respondents selecting these options 
ranging from 4% (1998) to 16.2% (2006). The overall trend here is of an increase in support 
for either leaving the EU or reducing its powers, and a decline in support for deepening 
European integration. This trend is visible both among those who read a newspaper 3 times a 
week, and those who did not, with evidence of a consistently more-Eurosceptic attitude 
among those who were regular newspaper readers. Support for the status quo ante ranged 
from 15.6% in 2008 to a maximum of 24.6% in both 1998 and 2003.  
Positions the readers of newspapers on the Euroscepticism scale 
When we consider only newspaper readers, it is clear that there are marked differences in the 
distribution of readers’ positions on the support for European integration scale for each 
newspaper. Figure 4.5 shows the relative positions of the mean position of each newspaper on 
the resultant Euroscepticism scale, while Figure 4.6 shows a cross tabulation of the responses 
for the readers of each newspaper. We see strong evidence, when considering the mean 
positions of readers, that the readership of newspapers in UK is largely Eurosceptic. Only two 
newspapers have mean reader scores on the support for European integration scale that are 
greater than 3, these are the Independent and the Guardian. At 3.10 and 3.28 respectively, 
their position could be described only as moderately pro-European integration; even the 
readers of the most pro-EU newspapers are only marginally more favourable to European 
integration than simply supporting the current level of EU powers.  
Four newspapers occupy positions in a cluster towards the Eurosceptic end of the scale. 
Readers of the Daily Mail are the most Eurosceptic of the newspapers included, with a mean 
of 2.15. In close proximity to the Mail are two other high-circulation tabloid newspapers, The 
Express and The Sun, with scores of 2.21 and 2.31 respectively. The Daily Mail and The Sun 
were consistently the two highest circulation newspapers in the UK from 2000 onwards: The 
Daily Mail overtaking the Daily Mirror, which was the third-largest circulation newspaper 
from 2000 onwards.  
Between these two groups lie the readers of a further three publications: The Times, the Daily 
Mirror, and the Financial Times. Of these, the relative position of readers of the FT lies 
furthest towards the pro-European end of the axis, with a mean of 2.79. The FT, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, adopts an outlook that is positive towards European integration, with particular 
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regard to its business focus and concern for the fundamental freedoms (of labour, capital, 
people, and later, services) of the EU. Taken alone, the position of readers of the Daily Mirror 
is perhaps more surprising, given its generally pro-European editorial stance. However, when 
compared to the other mass-market tabloid newspapers here (the Mail, Express, and Sun), the 
readership of the Mirror is clearly more pro-European. This suggests that, again, one can 
reasonably argue that the attitudes of the readership of the Mirror ‘fit’ with the editorial line 
taken by the newspaper. Finally, The Times is located centrally within the distribution of mean 
reader positions along the scale, with a mean of 2.57. The Times has taken what might be 
termed a ‘soft-eurosceptic’ editorial stance, opposing membership of the Euro and advocating 
the reduction of certain EU powers, while being supportive of UK membership (Taggart 
1998; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). The Times is notable for having switched from a position 
of endorsing a number of Eurosceptic candidates at the 1997 general election, to supporting 
Labour in the 2001 and 2005 general elections, with the proviso that it was opposed to euro 
membership and Labour’s support for it.  
When considering the breakdown of responses to the BSA question on European integration 
preferences used to calculate the Euroscepticism scale, a number of observations can be made. 
Particularly striking is the difference in the levels of support between the readers of different 
newspapers for the two ‘extreme’ options, ‘leave the European Union’ at one end, and ‘work 
for the formation of a single European government’ at the other. At two newspapers, more 
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Figure 4.5: Mean reader position on the support for European integration scale
than a quarter of readers advocated leaving the European Union; 25.2% of Daily Mail readers, 
and 26.4% of Sun readers. Indeed, among the readers of the four mass-market tabloid 
newspapers, support for leaving the EU was generally higher than among the readers of 
quality broadsheet newspapers. The average support for leaving the EU among all tabloid 
readers was 23.0%, with readers of the Mirror being less favourable towards leaving, with 
15.6% support.  
Staying in the EU while reducing its powers was option that attracted the greatest number of 
responses. 42.9% of newspaper readers chose this response. In the case of only two 
newspapers did the option to reduce the powers of the EU whilst retaining UK membership 
fail to attract a plurality of support among readers: The Independent and The Guardian. 
Readers of these two newspapers were, overall, more supportive of European integration than 
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Figure 4.6: Cross-tabulation of responses to BSA European policy question by newspaper, 
1997-2008 (excluding 2007) (Source: British Social Attitudes, 1997-2008)
Newspaper 
Read
1 - Leave 
European 
Union
2 - Stay in 
EU and 
reduce EU 
powers
3 - Leave 
things as 
they are
4 - Stay in 
EU and 
increase EU 
powers
5 - Single 
European 
government
Total
Daily 
Express
131 
22.0%
300 
50.4%
96 
16.1%
41 
6.9%
27 
4.5%
955 
100.0%
Daily Mail 457 
25.2%
916 
50.6%
253 
14.0%
115 
6.4%
69 
3.8%
1810 
100.0%
Daily Mirror 209 
15.6%
455 
34.0%
402 
30.0%
162 
12.1%
111 
8.3%
1993 
100.0%
The Sun 515 
26.4%
665 
34.1%
545 
27.9%
133 
6.8%
94 
4.8%
1952 
100.0%
Daily 
Telegraph
138 
18.4%
450 
59.9%
59 
9.2%
53 
7.1%
41 
5.5%
751 
100.0%
Financial 
Times
4 
7.0%
28 
49.1%
8 
14%
11 
19.3%
6 
10.5%
57 
100.0%
The 
Guardian
7 
1.7%
110 
27.3%
98 
24.3%
127 
31.5%
61 
15.1%
403 
100.0%
The 
Independent
9 
5.4%
53 
31.5%
41 
34.4%
45 
26.8%
20 
11.9%
168 
100.0%
The Times 52 
8.9%
311 
53.3%
93 
16.0%
86 
14.8%
41 
7.0%
583 
100.0%
Total 1522 
19.9%
3288 
42.9%
1605 
21.0%
773 
10.1%
470 
6.1%
7658 
100.0%
those of any other newspaper. 15.1% of Guardian readers and 11.9% of Independent readers 
were in favour a single European government, and 31.5% and 26.8% respectively in favour of 
staying the in the EU and increasing its powers. Notably, a significant proportion of readers of 
both the Guardian and Independent were in favour of reducing the powers of the EU: 27.3% 
and 31.5% respectively. However, very few readers of these newspapers advocated complete 
withdrawal – only 1.7% of Guardian readers and 5.4% of Independent readers chose this 
option.  
4.4  Structuring mean reader positions: left-right or gal-tan? 
Following from the evaluation of the mean positions of newspaper readers on a scale of 
Euroscepticism, the structuring factors of these positions will now be considered. The left-
right and gal-tan dimensions will be evaluated as possible structuring dimensions. The left-
right economic dimension is discussed first, and it is shown that there is not strong evidence 
for an association between the left-right dimension and support for European integration. The 
new politics, or gal-tan dimension is then considered, and it is shown that there is a much 
stronger relationship between the new politics axis and support for European integration. 
Firstly, the relationship between the two dimensions is briefly considered. 
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Table 1
Newspaper ecpolicy libauth leftright
Express 2.21 3.89 2.67
Mail 2.15 3.91 2.73
Mirror 2.66 3.80 2.26
Sun 2.31 3.90 2.42
Telegraph 2.22 3.67 3.09
FT 2.79 3.36 3.07
Guardian 3.28 2.75 2.24
Independent 3.10 2.96 2.53
Times 2.57 3.47 2.95
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of the left-right and new politics dimensions  
The gal-tan and left-right dimensions 
Figure 4.7 plots the mean position of the readers of each newspaper on the left-right and gal-
tan dimensions. This chart demonstrates how the two dimensions appear to capture different 
aspects of readers’ attitudes, and how the mean positions of readers’ of the major newspapers 
differ on these dimensions. For instance, the mass-market tabloids (Express, Mail, Mirror, and 
Sun) occupy similar positions on the new politics scale – towards the tan pole in a narrow 
range of 3.80 to 3.91.  
However, on the left-right dimension, they are much more dispersed, occupying a range of 
positions from 2.26 to 2.73. Whereas the mass-market tabloids do not seem to demonstrate an 
association between the new politics and left-right dimensions, we can observe from the chart 
a positive and linear relationship between the two dimensions for the broadsheet newspapers. 
This suggests that readers of the more right-leaning broadsheet newspapers are more likely to 
hold attitudes that are located towards the tan pole, while readers of left-leaning broadsheets 
are more likely to be oriented towards the gal pole.  
The left-right dimension 
As discussed above, the left-right dimension has been shown to structure party positions on 
European integration, but that this association is weaker than with the new politics dimension. 
Controlling for new politics (gal-tan) also reduces the association between the left-right 
dimension and European policy (Hooghe et al 2002). For parties, Hooghe et al. (2002) show 
an ‘inverted U’ shaped curve, whereby support for European integration is strongest for 
‘mainstream’ parties of the centre and weaker for parties on the far left and right. Parties at the 
extreme right and left are likely to oppose European integration, while parties covering the 
‘centre left’, ‘centre’, and ‘centre-right’ are the most likely to support policies oriented 
towards European integration and co-operation.  
Figure 4.8 shows the positions of readers of the newspapers in this study on the left-right and 
support for European integration scales. It is drawn with a linear line of best fit, showing a 
negative gradient and loose fit of the data points around the line (R2=0.17). An ordinary least 
squares regression does not find evidence of association at the 0.05 level of significance (β= 
-0.41, p=0.28). The 95% confidence interval is -1.53 to -0.51.  
!117
We can observe that, when structured on a left-right basis, the broadsheet newspapers in the 
sample generally exhibit higher levels of reader support for European integration than their 
tabloid counterparts, the exception being readers of The Telegraph who exhibit levels of 
support similar to those of their tabloid-reading counterparts. The Mirror is the both the most 
left-leaning tabloid newspaper in terms of its readership and has the highest level of reader 
support for European integration among the tabloids – higher than both The Telegraph and 
The Times. A number of features are notable in the positions of newspaper readers on the left-
right scale. The most obvious is that the positions of readers are overwhelmingly centrist on 
the economic left-right scale, with a distribution toward the left. On first inspection, the 
positions of the readers of each newspaper appear to follow a pattern that reflects existing left-
right classifications of UK newspapers (for instance, Wenzel et al. 2000; Hawkins 2012). The 
two rightmost newspapers are the Financial Times (3.07) and The Telegraph (3.09). The most 
left-wing publication is The Guardian (2.24), and close to this is the Mirror (2.26). The range 
is narrow, indicating a readership that is relatively tightly grouped together in terms of 
positioning on the left-right dimension. Less intuitive is the placing of readers of The Sun 
(2.42), which are to the left of those of The Independent (2.53).   
One possible explanation of this unexpected result lies with the social composition of the 
readership of The Sun compared to its competitors. The Sun has a readership that is 
particularly working class – 64% of its readers are classified in what the National Readership 
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Figure 4.8: Positioning of newspapers on European integration by the left-right 
dimension. Years 1997-2008 (excluding 2007) 
survey labels the ‘C2DE’ social grades, the highest of any national newspaper (NRS 2010). 
The working class are typically on ‘the left’ on issues of redistribution (Evans 2000, 51). The 
questions used to compose the left-right scale may contribute to this result. While one 
question directly taps into issues of redistributive justice (‘government should redistribute 
income from the better-off to those who are less well off’), others may tap into aspects of 
class politics that are not strictly distributional. For instance, the final question, ‘management 
will always try to get the best of employees if it gets the chance’, may elicit more ‘left-
leaning’ answers from respondents who do not occupy managerial occupations, and therefore 
fall in the C2DE social grades which comprise the majority of the Sun readership. The high 
proportion of working class readers of The Sun may therefore contribute to the relative 
position of The Sun being further to the left than, for instance, The Express. While both 
newspapers occupy a similar position in the market – as ‘red top’ or ‘tabloid’ publications 
(Wenzel et al. 2000, 260) – a greater proportion of the readers of The Express are classified in 
the upper ‘ABC1’ social grades (56%) than The Sun (36%). Readers of The Mirror, who 
occupy a position (2.26) somewhat to the left of The Sun, are composed of a similar 
proportion of working class readers (60%). A possible explanation for the somewhat more 
left-leaning position of Mirror readers lies in the long-term political affiliation of the two 
papers. While The Mirror has consistently supported Labour, The Sun switched from 
supporting the Conservatives to Labour in 1997, before reverting to endorsing the 
Conservatives in 2010.  
The results for newspaper reader left-right positions show a less clear pattern that those for 
parties. With a much smaller data set, it is not possible to show if the structure of parties at the 
far right and left of the left-right dimension - demonstrating a sharp fall in support for 
European integration - would be replicated in the case of newspapers. Certainly, we simply do 
not have newspapers that occupy positions at either extreme end of the left-right dimension. 
While extreme parties oppose European integration because they oppose the ideology of the 
EU’s construction - a ‘market liberal project mitigated by some measure of regulated 
capitalism’ (Hooghe et al. 2002, 969), there are no newspapers in this sample which are 
ideologically opposed to the economic centre-right, centre, and centre-left politics which have 
given rise to the EU. Similarly, the results for readers show that there is no major daily UK 
newspaper with a readership whose mean position would suggest they were radically opposed 
to the market liberal consensus. Whereas Hooghe et al. (2002) expect the support of parties 
for European integration to decline as their distance from the centre of the left/right dimension 
increases; we simply do not have observations at the far ends of the left-right dimension in the 
case of newspapers and their readers to test this hypothesis among newspapers. 
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Thus structuring support for European integration via the left-right dimension does not show 
strong evidence of an association between the mean left-right attitudinal positions of the 
readers the major newspapers and their support for European integration. Rather, as the next 
section shows, there is stronger evidence for an association between readers’ mean positions 
on the gal-tan dimension and their support for European integration.  
The ‘new politics’ scale 
Figure 4.9 shows the positions of newspaper readers plotted on the libertarian – authoritarian 
dimension with a linear line of best fit, R2= 0.87. The linearity of this relationship is striking. 
The results of an ordinary least squares regression show evidence of a significant association 
between libertarian-authoritarian position and support for European integration a the 0.05 
level of significance (β= -0.93, p<0.01). The 95% confidence interval is -1.20 to -0.57. Thus, 
there is evidence of a much clearer linear relationship between the mean position of 
newspaper readers on European integration and their mean position on the libertarian - 
authoritarian dimension than their position on the economic left-right dimension. 
We can see that there is a negative relationship between authoritarianism and support for 
European integration. This is consistent with the finding of research into the new politics 
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Figure 4.9 Positioning of newspaper readers on European integration by the new politics 
(gal-tan) dimension, years 1997-2008 (excluding 2007). 
dimension which shows that parties which are oriented toward the tan pole are ‘without 
exception highly Euro-skepitcal’ (Hooghe et al. 2002, 977). It is interesting to note how the 
libertarian-authoritarian scale is similar to the left-right scale in terms of the distribution of 
positions. The range of positions along the libertarian-authoritarian scale is relatively small, at 
1.16 – this is greater than the range of 0.85 for the left-right scale, but nevertheless still 
limited. We do not have, therefore, the same range of positions available to compare these 
results to those for parties, although a number of general comparisons can be attempted.  
When these results are compared to those for the left-right dimension, we notice a 
considerable difference in the positioning of the readers of individual papers. On the 
libertarian-authoritarian scale, The Sun, which was located towards the left of the left-right 
dimension, has one of the most authoritarian reader positions on the libertarian-authoritarian 
scale. Similarly, the Daily Mirror, whose readers are more pro-European than the other 
tabloids, is positioned to the authoritarian side of the dimension here, in contrast to its 
position on the left-right scale. This supports the idea that while the left-right captures issues 
of redistributive justice, on which the C2DE majority of Sun and Mirror readers are likely to 
lean towards the left, the libertarian-authoritarian scale captures issues about which the 
readers of The Sun and Daily Mirror are more likely to hold authoritarian attitudes (Evans 
2000, 52). We notice a particular cluster of three of these newspapers that are very close 
together on both the positions of their readers on European integration and libertarian-
authoritarianism; the Sun, Express, and Daily Mail.  
The readers of the four most strongly Eurosceptic newspapers, the Sun, Express, Daily Mail, 
and the Telegraph have an average score on the 5-point support for European integration scale 
of 2.22. The Telegraph is somewhat further to the libertarian, perhaps reflecting its broadsheet 
status and the demographic of its readers. Noticeably, all the tabloid newspapers in the sample 
score similarly for social authoritarianism, ranging between 3.80 for the Mirror and 3.91 for 
the Daily Mail. This suggests that readers of these newspapers are very similar in their 
underlying values on matters of social attitudes on the libertarian – authoritarian dimension. 
The readers of ‘quality’ or broadsheet newspapers have a much larger range of positions on 
both the European policy and libertarian-authoritarian scales. The most authoritarian and 
Eurosceptic broadsheet, the Daily Telegraph scores 2.22 on the European policy scale and 
3.67 on the libertarian – authoritarian scale. The most libertarian and pro-European 
broadsheet is the Guardian, the readers of which score 3.28 and 2.24 on the same scales, 
respectively.  
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The mean reader positions of two newspapers stand out: the Telegraph and the Daily Mirror. 
In the case of the Telegraph, its readers are somewhat more Eurosceptic than the linear trend 
line would suggest: readers of the Telegraph score more highly for Euroscepticism than their 
mean position on the ‘new politics’ orientation might otherwise predict. However, the 
editorial line of the Telegraph is strongly Eurosceptic, as Chapter 5 shows. Similarly, readers 
the Daily Mirror have a similar mean score on the new politics scale to the readers of the 
other three mass-market tabloids (the Sun, Express, and Daily Mail), while scoring more 
highly for support for European integration than the readers of other tabloid newspapers. The 
Mirror, as Chapters 5 and 6 show, generally frames Europe in a more positive way than the 
other mass-market tabloids, while consistently supporting Labour and endorsing membership 
of the EU throughout the period studied.  
In common with the data for the left-right dimension, we do not have data for either the far-
gal, or far-tan ends of the new politics dimension. Thus, we are unable to test if the finding 
for parties of a fall in support for European integration for parties that score very highly for 
the gal orientation are replicated in the positions of newspapers; there simply is no newspaper 
which has a readership that falls in this category. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest 
that the new politics dimension seems to provide a stronger structuring dimensional axis than 
the left-right dimension. We see a much stronger association between the mean positions of 
the readers of the 9 major national daily newspapers studied here on European integration 
with libertarian-authoritarianism than with the left-right attitudinal dimension.  This seems to 
hold for the readers of all newspapers included, and presents a similar finding to existing 
research into party positions – the new politics dimension is the most significant factor in 
structuring positions on European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004).  
Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a number of data that give an initial picture of the structure of 
newspaper positions on European integration. The hypothesis that newspaper positions are 
structured in a similar way to the positions of parties is supported by this data. The gal-tan 
dimension  appears to structure the mean positions of newspaper readers to a much greater 
extent than the left-right dimension. Whereas we see only a weak relationship between the 
left-right dimension and readers’ mean positions on European integration, there is a much 
stronger association between the gal-tan dimension and support for European integration. 
This supports the idea that the underlying assumption of postfunctionalism, that nationalism 
and national identity are the structuring factors behind contestation of European integration, 
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holds for newspapers as it does for parties. This is potentially significant for the development 
of postfunctionalist models: newspapers are conceptualised in the Media-Augmented 
Postfunctionalist model presented in this thesis as key actors in the mass arena, and the results 
of this chapter show that conflict between them appears to be structured along the same 
dimension as the conflict between parties.  
Through the use of BSA data, the measures of newspaper (reader) positions developed here 
represent a first step towards a generalisable measure of the left-right, gal-tan, and support for 
European integration dimensions. Further research will be required to validate this method 
and advance further the research agenda of postfunctionalism in this area. This could focus on 
attempting to gather data around the causal relationship between newspaper positions and 
reader attitudes – perhaps utilising data from longitudinal studies – such that that carried out 
by Ladd and Lenz (2009). A wider comparative study of the attitudes of readers of 
newspapers across the EU might also provide data to show whether the apparent relationship 
shown in this chapter between gal-tan and support for European integration holds for the 
readership of newspapers across other European countries. Finally, studies undertaking a 
systematic quantitative coding of the positions of newspapers on European integration and the 
left-right and gal-tan dimensions would be welcome in order to more directly measure the 
relationship between these variables for the newspapers themselves, rather than focusing on 
readers. Possibilities for data collection in this area include quantitative content analysis and 
coding, or alternatively an expert survey in the manner of the Chapel Hill dataset (Bakker et al 
2012).  
In the setting of the present thesis, this chapter provides important context for the discussion 
of the content and structure of newspaper discourses that follows, however. If the data here is 
interpreted in the postfunctionalist framework set out in Chapters 1 and 2, this leads to the 
expectation that the tan-leaning newspapers will also contain the most eurosceptic discourses. 
If newspapers do, in fact, behave like parties and cue opposition to European integration 
through the construction of public opinion, then we would expect to see a greater 
concentration of Eurosceptic discourses in those newspapers that had a readership further 
towards the tan pole of the gal-tan dimension. Additionally, we might expect that, as Chapters 
1 and 2 predict, these discourses will contain nationalistic constructions, that connect a 
defence of the nation with opposition to European integration. Conversely, we would expect 
newspapers located towards the pro-European integration and gal poles of the dimensions 
measured here to contain discourses that were more pro-European, and which did not feature 
nationalistic constructions of the relationship between EU member states and supranational 
governance structures. The following chapter will, therefore, investigate this relationship by 
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conducting an analysis of the discourses of the nine newspapers studied here, in order to 
develop a detailed understanding of the content and character of those discourses.
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Chapter 5 
The Construction of the Nation and European Integration in the UK Press 
This chapter addresses the content of newspaper discourses on European integration in the 
UK. Following from the findings of Chapter 4, it seeks to understand how European 
integration is constructed in British newspapers. The particular focus of this is in addressing 
two hypotheses raised by the previous chapters. In Chapter 2, the importance of 
understanding how the media construct identity in relation to European integration was 
highlighted. The media play a central role in the discursive construction of national identity in 
public discourses; therefore, it was argued, media discourses may be significant if they 
construct connections between the nation and European integration, in the same way that 
postfunctionalism claims that parties do. Chapter 2 outlined the Media Augmented 
Postfunctionalism (MAP) model, which incorporates media actors into the postfunctionalist 
framework. This chapter seeks to build on the findings of Chapter 4 to analyse the ways in 
which newspapers behave as political discursive actors in the mass arena.   
Drawing from Chapter 4, this chapter seeks to understand if discourses on European 
integration follow the political positions estimated for newspapers and their readers. The 
previous chapter explored the relationship between the average positions of readers of major 
daily UK national newspapers on three spectra: support for European integration, left-right 
orientation, and libertarian-authoritarian orientation (used in this instance as a proxy for the 
gal-tan dimension). These showed a stronger relationship between the gal-tan position of 
readers and their position on European integration, than between their left-right position and 
support for European integration. This relationship reflects that described by 
postfunctionalism between political parties and their position on the gal-tan spectrum, and 
demonstrates significant differences between the readers of the major UK newspapers on 
these measures. This chapter seeks to test if the discourses of newspapers reflect these reader 
positions estimated from the British Social Attitudes survey. Specifically, the chapter seeks to 
explore two aspects of the MAP model: the relationship between the gal-tan dimension and 
Euroscepticism in newspaper discourses, and secondly the use of discourses of the nation and 
the construction of national identity which link to these dimensions. It therefore seeks to test 
the assumption that newspapers have positions on European integration that are linked to their 
gal-tan orientation, and if the discourses on Europe connect European integration and the gal-
tan dimension (specifically issues surrounding identity), in the same way as parties.  
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To address these questions, this chapter presents an analysis of the content of newspaper 
discourses on Europe and European integration through a discussion of a detailed study of a 
large number of articles taken from nine leading UK national newspapers.  The sample 1
examines articles from two time periods: the 2001 UK general election, the 2005 UK general 
election. These time periods are of particular interest because they cover two contrasting sets 
of circumstances. In the case of 2001, the EU, and membership of the euro in particular, was 
highly contested and a focus of electoral competition at the general election. In 2005, the 
topic of European integration was not highly visible at the general election, and was less 
salient an issue for both voters and parties (Whiteley et al 2005).  
In order to develop a clearer understanding of the ways in which media exert influence upon 
the character and outcomes of debates on European integration, the chapter examines the 
language and frames employed by the newspapers studied using the methodology set out in 
Chapter 2. The discourses of the newspapers are examined, with particular focus on their 
discursive construction of European integration and the nation, and the ways in which they 
draw connections between these dimensions, is examined through close analysis of the text of 
articles. Figure 5.1 shows a breakdown of the articles examined. The chapter first maps 
distinctive differences between the pro- and anti-European discourses present within the texts 
examined. It is argued that the gal-tan orientation of newspapers is associated with their 
discourse on Euroscepticism. Discourses that opposed European integration where associated 
with tan-ish discourses on the nation, and in newspapers that Chapter 4 found to be positioned 
towards the tan pole of the gal-tan dimension. These newspapers engaged in discourses that 
questioned the legitimacy, scope, and operation of the EU. These discourses frequently made 
connections between national identity and the European integration, seeking to discursively 
construct the EU as a ‘threat’ to the British nation and to UK sovereignty. In contrast, 
newspapers that had an orientation that was either towards the gal pole on the gal-tan 
dimension, or were located centrally on the dimension, were less likely to engage in these 
identity-focussed discourses. Nevertheless, some of the language of Euroscepticism so readily 
identified in the tan-leaning publications studied here was also often found in the pro-
European discourses too. The evidence suggests that negative representations of the EU, 
especially when discussing the operation of the EU’s institutions, are common across the 
press in the UK. This confirms the findings of previous studies which have suggested that ‘the 
parameters of the debate about the EU in the UK follow a broadly eurosceptic 
agenda’ (Hawkins 2009, 235), and suggests that the structure of the UK press has the potential 
to alter the outcomes of debates on European integration by limiting the ability of pro-
 Chapter 3 outlines the full methodology of the sample, including the methods of analysis used and 1
the dates of the articles examined. 
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European parties to influence the content of debates and the dimensions along which they are 
contested.  
These claims are developed by first, examining the content of newspaper discourses on 
European integration. It is argued first that, Europe is constructed as the ‘Other’ to the British 
in discourses in the UK press. The next section argues that the imagery of the nation  and 
national identity is used to cue opposition to European integration by several of the 
newspapers examined, both reproducing the discourses of Eurosceptic parties and engaging in 
their own discursive constructions of European integration as antithetical to the nation. The 
argument here is that the nation is privileged as the only legitimate form of governance, and 
the EU is constructed to be a ‘threat’ to this legitimacy. This is achieved through a 
‘sovereignty’ frame that emphasises the loss of national sovereignty to the EU. In section 5.4, 
the next most significant frame, that of ‘democracy’ is discussed, and it is shown that the idea 
that the EU is anti-democratic can be found across the press, with a particular focus on the 
tan-leaning newspapers. Through these discussions, a pattern emerges of a distinctive, 
Eurosceptic discourse that is present in the newspapers closet to the tan pole of the gal-tan 
dimension. Section 5.5 discusses the treatment of economic debates, which section 5.6 
discusses the possibility that some newspapers attempted to depoliticise European integration. 
In the final section, the 2001 and 2005 general elections are compared, and it is argued that 
the discourse in 2005 did not connect European integration with immigration, which is 
surprising in the context of subsequent UK debates on the EU.  
Figure 5.1  Articles analysed by newspaper and year
Newspaper 2001 General 
Election
2005 General 
Election
Totals
Daily Express 36 29 65
Daily Mail 78 58 136
Daily Mirror 71 25 96
Daily Telegraph 113 70 183
Financial Times 171 111 282
Guardian 136 71 207
Independent 101 79 180
Sun 65 23 88
Times 96 91 187
Total 867 557 1424
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5.1  Constructing the nation: ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
The main respect in which we expect the newspaper discourses to be differentiated according 
to their general gal-tan and Euroscepticism orientations is in their treatment of national 
identity. As Chapters 2 and 4 argued, the association between nationalist discourses and 
Euroscepticism ought to hold, at least in a general sense, in press reporting of European 
integration if the same patterns of contestation observed in parties along the gal-tan axis are 
to be found among the press. Indeed, this pattern was clear in the analysis, with some caveats. 
The first notable aspect of the discourse on identity and European integration is the way in 
which Europe is frequently constructed in a number of newspapers that adopted Eurosceptic 
positions, as Britain’s ‘Other’. This pattern of discourse, noted in of previous studies on 
discourses in the UK (Hawkins 2009; 2012; de Wilde et al 2013), has a number of significant 
characteristics, which this section examines. Conversely, we see a discourse on the nation and 
‘otherness’ that is less consistent in the pro-European newspapers: largely avoiding the 
language of ‘us’ and ‘them’, while adopting some of the same motifs as the Eurosceptic 
newspapers.  
At the most basic level, a discourse that positioned Britain as separate from the EU and from 
Europe: politically, geographically, and socially is present in a significant number of the 
articles examined, particularly in newspapers that adopted Eurosceptic positions. These 
discourses construct Europe as the ‘Other’; an external and separate group from which the 
British are excluded. The frequency of this construction — which dominated the tan-leaning 
press coverage of European affairs — gives an indication of the discursive landscape in which 
tan-leaning press discourses seek to appeal to those citizens who hold a strong or exclusive 
form of British national identity. The relationship between the EU and the UK is presented in 
terms of opposition, of exclusion, and of hierarchy. Through the repeated and sustained 
construction of Europe as something separate from the UK, through the terms of apartness 
and otherness, the tan-leaning press is able to perpetuate the notion that Britishness and 
Europe are incompatible.  
The EU is constructed as the ‘other’ to the British in-group through discursive devices which 
separate Britain and the EU at the basic linguistic level. For example, references to ‘the EU’ 
tend to refer to not the European Union as an international organisation of which the UK is a 
part, but rather as a separate entity with which the UK engages in a bilateral relationship, akin 
to another state (see also Hawkins 2009). The term ‘the EU’ frequently refers to the rest of the 
EU, excluding the UK, or simply to the institutions of the EU, from which the UK is often 
constructed as being excluded. Related to this is the use of metonyms to homogenise 
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European institutions or states. The word ‘Europe’ is frequently used as shorthand for the 
European Union, and thus references to, for instance, ‘withdrawal from Europe’ (Times, 7 
June 2001) are not uncommon, conflating Europe as a geographical location and Europe as a 
political entity. Frequently, both the terms ‘EU’ and ‘Europe’ were employed to signify the 
rest of the EU, excluding Britain, with which the UK was seen to have a relationship. 
This construction of ‘Europe’ as a quite distinct entity to the UK contributes to the idea that 
Britain is not European, and is separate in a physical as well as political sense. Indeed, many 
newspapers constructed ‘Europe’ — either the political organisation or the geographical 
continent — as a place to which one might visit from the UK, and not as something to which 
the UK belonged. For instance, the sense that ‘Europe’ is another place, separate from the 
UK, can be seen in the following example: 
‘The rebate was won after the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, claimed the 
UK was paying a disproportionate amount of money to Europe to subsidise its 
agricultural industry.’ (Telegraph, 31 May 2001) 
Similarly, references to ‘our relations with Europe’ (The Times, 5 June 2001), ‘engagement 
with Europe’ (Express, 30 May 2001), ‘Britain’s tax burden… fast converging with Europe’, 
and ‘political and economic links with Europe’ (Telegraph, 29 May 2001), perpetuate this ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ discourse. Similarly, the Telegraph was able to speak about the number of refugees 
‘coming to Britain compared to the number coming to Europe’ (2 May 2005), the Times of 
‘surrendering sovereignty to the EU’ (29 April 2005), and the Daily Mail of ‘a letter from the 
Prime Minister to the EU’ (23 April 2005). This trend can also be observed in articles not 
reporting on politics. For instance references to ‘holidaymakers to Europe’, and references to 
how banking arrangements differ from those in Britain ‘in most European countries’ (Express, 
6 June 2001). 
One particular metonym, ‘Brussels’, is frequently employed to refer to either the European 
Commission in particular, or the European Union in general. In the sample, all the newspapers 
studied used ‘Brussels’ as a metonym, and often in a pejorative manner. Indeed, the term was 
used a total of 597 times, across all newspapers, in the coverage of the 2001 and 2005 general 
elections: this was more often than the term ‘European Commission’ (used 297 times), for 
instance. This indicates the prevalence of this term as a shorthand for the European Union. 
The use of the term ‘Brussels’ acts in a similar way to the use of ‘Europe’ to mean the EU, 
constructing the EU as a coherent and singular actor with which the UK has a relationship in 
the model of bilateral inter-country diplomacy. Similarly, the use of terminology such as 
‘euroland’ has an equivalent effect, separating the UK from states within the euro by 
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suggesting their homogeneity; this particular word being used by the Daily Mail, The Times, 
and The Sun. 
The term ‘Brussels’ is loaded with another layer of significance in these discourses, beyond a 
simply metonymic shorthand for the EU or the European Commission. Rather, Brussels is a 
term used to signify the claimed hierarchical relationship between the UK and EU, which is 
held to hold power and influence over the UK: a distant capital from which the UK is 
increasingly ruled. Frequently, ‘Brussels’ is used to symbolise this hierarchy in discourses 
which focus on sovereignty and the undermining of the nation (more on which below). The 
EU is constructed as an external level of governance, over which the UK has little control. For 
instance, this was referred to in terms of ‘giving the EU greater power over us’ (Sun, 6 June 
2001), or as ‘the EU blueprint, which would hand Brussels powers over Britain’ (Sun, 30 
April 2005), while Britain is shown to be ‘forced to accept’ decisions of ‘EU judges’ (Mail, 28 
April 2005).  This hierarchical relationship between the UK and EU is almost always framed 2
in terms of sovereignty, and the ‘transfer’ of powers from the UK to the EU (or demands for 
the opposite). The sovereignty frame is discussed in detail below. The way that transfers of 
powers are described in this way assumes a dichotomy between the UK and EU, rather than 
envisaging a ‘pooling’ of sovereignty or the participation of the UK in decision-making 
within the EU. This emphasises the separation between the two levels, and enhances the idea 
of the EU as an external ‘other’ to the British in-group.  
This pattern of discourse was particularly prevalent in a number of newspapers: specifically 
the Mail, Express, Sun, Telegraph, and Express. These are also the newspapers which have the 
most tan-leaning readership, suggesting that the expected relationship between readership and 
content holds in this regard. Among these newspapers, ‘Europe’ was constructed with a good 
degree of consistency as a foreign entity, of which the UK was not a full part. This group of 
newspapers share a common discourse in regard to the way that they locate the EU as an 
‘Other’ to the UK, while being distinctive in other aspects of their general positions (for 
instance the Sun endorsed Labour in 2001 and 2005, while the Express did in 2001: the others 
supported the Conservatives throughout), and in aspects of their discourse on the EU, as 
shown below.  
In the other newspapers studied, there is a less consistent pattern in the way that ‘Europe’ is 
presented in relation to Britain. Among the more pro-European newspapers, we see a general 
pattern of discourse that constructs national identity as being compatible with European 
 This article confused - deliberately or otherwise - the European Court of Human Rights with the EU. 2
This distinction rarely made explicit in the Daily Mail. 
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integration, but with some inconsistency: the language of eurosceptic nationalist discourses 
was adopted in some of the articles studied, albeit to a milder degree than in newspapers that 
adopted the most ‘tan-ish’ discourses. The framing of the UK in relation to the EU in the gal-
leaning press followed a pattern that was less clear, but which generally portrayed the 
relationship between the UK and EU in less hierarchical, and less separate terms. As a result, 
we see the more frequent use of terms which construct the UK as part of Europe, 
geographically and politically, and as part of the EU. For instance, the Mirror frequently 
referred to other European countries as ‘the rest of Europe’ (6 June 2001), and wrote of 
citizens of other European states as ‘our fellow Europeans’ (2 June 2001), as did the Guardian 
(for example, 31 May 2001). The Times referred to the ‘other European countries’ (31 May 
2001), as did the Guardian (for example, 31 May 2001), while the FT referred to the UK 
government as a ‘European government’ (6 June 2001).  
These more inclusive uses of the metonyms adopted by the tan-leaning press demonstrate that 
the mode of reference to Europe was not universal across all publications. A number of the 
newspapers studied fell into this category, and all were broadly supportive of the EU, and 
sympathetic to European integration generally. The Guardian, Independent, Mirror and FT all 
present the EU in a less dichotomous manner than the tan-leaning discourses discussed above. 
The FT does not seem to speak to an explicitly national group, unlike the other newspapers 
studied here. Rather, the audience to which its articles are addressed appears to be a much 
more international audience, and one for which the binding, in-group relationship is a group 
of business or professional people, rather than common members of a national group. The FT 
also generally refers to the UK as a European country, frequently using ‘continental Europe’ 
to distinguish the UK geographically from the rest of the continent, but avoiding the use of 
‘Europe’ as excluding the UK. The Times can be located somewhere between these two 
groups, and presents an example of a newspaper that cannot easily be characterised in terms 
of its presentation of Europe. The Times offers a broadly Eurosceptic outlook, but adopts the 
language of ‘us’ and ‘them’ outlined above less frequently than the newspapers located further 
towards the tan-pole, again indicating a relationship between these dimensions. 
Nevertheless, these newspapers demonstrate internal inconsistency in their construction of the 
EU in relation to the UK. The way that the EU, and ‘Europe’ more generally, is framed in tan 
discourses — as being distinctive and separate from the UK — permeates across the press and 
is present in some of the reporting analysed in newspapers that generally took a more pro-
European stance. Thus, we can find examples of, for instance, the Independent and Guardian 
using the language of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in everyday reporting of the EU. To give just two 
examples, the Independent reported on the ‘rising hostility among business people towards 
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Europe’ (6 June 2001) and the Guardian of ‘national engagement in Europe’ (26 May 2001). 
Here the use of ‘Europe’ as a metonym, and the idea that ‘Europe’ is a place or political entity 
separate from the UK, is clearly evident. This suggests that the mode of referring to ‘Europe’ 
— both the continent and the institutions of the EU — found in tan-Eurosceptic discourses, as 
the ‘other’ to the UK, was also expressed in discourses in generally more pro-European 
publications. The ‘othering’ of Europe by nationalist discourses thus also feeds into the way 
that pro-Europeans discuss European integration. 
The construction of the EU at the basic linguistic level suggests a clear trend between 
Eurosceptic discourses and constructions of the EU as separate from the UK, or as an ‘other’ 
to the British in-group. This is particularly the case in what can be termed ‘tan-Eurosceptic’ 
discourses. These discourses seek to create separation between the UK and EU, presenting the 
relationship between the UK and EU as hierarchal. The use of metonyms, particularly 
‘Brussels’, seeks to make the EU appear remote and foreign, rather than an organisation of 
which the UK is a member. The following section expands this analysis to understand how 
these constructions of the EU and the nation extend to discussions of ‘identity’.  
5.2  Constructing the nation: the EU and British identity  
The discursive construction of identity in relation to the EU in the anti-European discourses 
examined follow distinctive patterns of opposition to European integration which privilege 
the nation and the national community as the only legitimate means of governance. The 
nation is constructed as an essential and inevitable form of political organisation, and the 
framing of the EU in this context indicates that the EU is consequently considered to be an 
illegitimate form of governance. The nation, national sovereignty, and national identity are the 
primary concerns of the tan discourses found within the British press. Elsewhere, the 
importance of sovereignty and the centrality of the national community to discourses on 
European integration in the UK has been described in terms of concern about the EU as an 
‘emerging superstate’ (Hawkins 2009; 2012). There are two key elements, or frames, to this 
tan discourse on the nation. The first is the construction of European Union membership in 
relation to Britishness. This discourse concentrates on the claimed incompatibility of 
European integration and ‘European identity’ with British identity and the symbols of the 
British state. The second frame is one of sovereignty, and this is closely associated and inter-
twined, with the first. This frame constructs national sovereignty as the ultimate expression of 
the primacy of the nation-state, and European integration as an existential threat to British 
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sovereignty in light of a claimed ‘surrender’ of this sovereignty to the EU. The sovereignty 
frame is discussed in the next section.  
Tan-Eurosceptic discourses on the nation 
At the core of the Eurosceptic press discourse on the nation is the articulation of the 
importance of the nation, and its defence against external disruption. Common to these 
discourses is the assumption that national identity is the most important political identity that 
citizens can hold. This construction of the nation is articulated, for example, by Simon Heffer 
in the Daily Mail, who argues that ‘patriotism’ is ‘the love and loyalty a person feel for their 
country’ and that ‘the preservation of that country as an independent nation’ is ‘fundamental 
to the concept’ (Heffer, Mail, 26 May 2001). The EU is constructed as separate from, and 
antagonistic to, the British nation. The EU is also constructed as an artificial creation, one that 
contrasts with the organic and natural image of the nation state, which is shown to be rooted 
in tradition and shared values. This logic of nationalism seems to support the claim that the 
nation has been normalised as the only legitimate form of governance (Billig 1995).  
National identity was a frame deployed in Eurosceptic discourses to oppose further 
integration: being used to frame membership of the euro during the 2001 election campaign, 
and the Constitutional Treaty at the 2005 election. For example, the Times argued that people 
were ‘resentful of the EU’s rising costs and fearful of losing their national identity’ (28 April 
2005). This defence of national identity finds strong expression in a number of newspapers. 
For instance, the Daily Mail argues that ‘our national identity is something to which we have 
an absolute right’, as well as ‘an absolute right to express’ (Mail, 21 April 2005). National 
identity is shown to be fundamental to the cohesion of society, and this is, it is argued, seen in 
the importance of ‘nationhood and great institutions that enable us to draw strength from the 
past while facing the challenges of the future’ (6 June 2001).  
During the height of the debate about membership of the euro during the 2001 general 
election, the Telegraph ran an editorial written by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
which aptly summarises the defence of a British identity, made corporeal in the form of the 
nation state:  
The Prime Minister has recently been attempting to "redefine" British patriotism. One 
would have thought that the concept was simple enough. Patriotism is love of one's 
country. Full stop. (Thatcher, Telegraph, 1 June 2001) 
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The consequences of the EU for the nation are considered to be disastrous: undermining 
national identity and eroding the basis of the national community. In an article outlining the 
claimed consequences of a Labour victory at the general election, the Mail argued that the 
result of increased integration would be that ‘[t]he allegiance of the British people would be 
transferred from our own monarch to the President in Brussels’ (Mail, 24 May 2001). In 
associating one of the key symbols of the British state, the monarchy, with the contestation of 
integration, this discourse is able to frame Europe as an existential threat to the British 
national identity. Indeed, the claimed threat to Britain is seen as encompassing many aspects 
of national life: ‘jobs, taxes, public services, laws, policing, defences, traditions and political 
culture…will be profoundly influenced if Britain continues drifting with the federalist 
tide’ (Mail, 30 May 2001).  
The ultimate aim of European integration, according to this discourse, is that the UK would 
cease to be independent and would instead be part of a European ‘superstate’. This is shown 
to be part of a ‘plan’ or ‘plot’ by EU leaders to replace the nation-state as the primary means 
of political governance, and instead ‘establish Europe as a country with its own flag, passport, 
anthem and currency and centre of power’ (Sun, 31 May 2001). As with the monarchy, these 
symbols are positioned as the most important and authentic hallmarks of the nation, and the 
appropriation of them is shown to represent the destruction of a distinctive British identity. 
This view was found, prominently, in the Sun, in an article headlined ‘Death of Our Nation’, 
which claimed that an ‘EU superstate would swallow up Britain’ and that ‘Britain’s cherished 
way of life would DIE under a nightmare vision of the European Union’s future’ (Sun, 29 
May 2001, emphasis in original). Indeed, this particular article is symptomatic of the tan 
discourse on the nation. Presenting a sensationalised account of a speech by Lionel Jospin, the 
Sun constructs the EU as a threatening, almost hostile force: ‘our political control could be 
seized by a superstate’. The article goes on to make claims that suggest that the most 
fundamental functions of the state would be replaced by the EU: ‘Britain’s Treasury would be 
banned from setting low taxes’, ‘a new EU police force would pound the beat’, ‘Brussels 
prosecutors would decide who to charge and take to court’, and ‘British embassies around the 
globe would be closed and replaced by Europe Centres’. This is the tan discourse on the 
nation at its most hyperbolic. Rather than present Jospin’s speech as one of several visions of 
the future of the EU (an approach taken in the Guardian, 29 May 2001), the Sun instead 
extrapolates Jospin’s proposals to suggest that these were unavoidable, ‘a hammer blow to 
Tony Blair’, while at no point suggesting that such changes might require negotiation and 
political consent from member states. Rather, the EU is constructed to be a quasi-hostile 
external threat to British identity and the British nation-state.  
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Invariably, this narrative of an attack on national identity constructs the threat as originating 
externally. However, British pro-Europeans are also constructed as being complicit in the 
process that is claimed will lead to the end of ‘the British way of life’ (Sun, 1 June 2001). 
Labour politicians, and Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in particular, are frequently constructed 
as being complicit in the process of the undermining of British identity by European 
integration. Labour were accused of ‘bombard[ing]’ citizens with ‘pro-euro propaganda’ (Sun, 
26 May 2001), and ignoring the ‘patriotic, conservative instincts of the British people’ (Mail, 
26 May 2001). Membership of the EU was argued to ‘help massage Tony Blair’s ego’ (Mail, 
27 May 2001), rather than offer any substantive benefits to the UK, while Labour’s policies 
are argued to have ‘encouraged the destruction of the United Kingdom’ (Mail, 26 May 2001). 
The ‘national interest’: privileging the nation  
One expression of the idea of the nation that was used by both pro- and anti-European 
discourses was the concept of the ‘national interest’. Much of the tan discourses employ this 
concept to suggest that the role of the government is to defend the ‘national interest’ in 
negotiations with the EU and other Member States. This discourse seems to privilege a 
politics that seeks to achieve ‘victory’ in negotiations over that which promotes compromise 
for mutual gain. The Telegraph argues that euro membership would be damaging on the 
grounds that the UK Government and Bank of England ‘must act in the national interest of 
Britain’, whereas the ECB ‘which will control our currency if we scrap the pound, is legally 
obliged to act against the national interest of Britain if it is in conflict…with the wider interest 
of Europe’ (30 May 2001). Elsewhere in the same issue, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard wrote that 
the Euro would mean ‘an end to Britain’s control over fiscal policy’ because each country 
would not be allowed to ‘run a separate budget policy in its own national interest’ (Evans-
Pritchard, Telegraph, 30 May 2001).  
The tan discourse makes clear that decision making on British involvement in further 
integration should be founded upon a responsibility to defend the ‘national interest’ and the 
nation itself. For Simon Heffer, further integration would ‘turn us into a foreign country’ and 
he argues that ‘the truly patriotic interest — the British national interest — would cease to 
exist’ if the UK were to join the euro (Heffer, Mail, 26 May 2001). In this passage, the 
national interest is clearly intertwined with the other ideas expressed in the tan discourse on 
Britishness and national identity. Acting in the national interest is mutually exclusive, 
according to the implications of this discourse, with co-operating with further integration in 
the EU and offering constructive engagement on the EU level. This sentiment extends to 
domestic measures that might mean that Britain would ‘fall behind’ other EU countries, who 
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are cast as competitors. For example, the Times condemned the government for allowing 
‘environmental protests’ to ‘obscure the legitimate national interest’ when it came to 
expanding airport capacity, meaning that the UK might lose air traffic to other EU countries 
(31 May 2001). The presupposition of these narratives is that the national interest is 
inherently one which does not include participation in further European integration, and also 
that the primary role of government is to defend this interest against the interests of the EU, 
which are shown to be antithetical to those of Britain.  
This term is employed in some pro-European discourses, albeit in a contrasting manner. The 
language of the national interest was employed in several pro-European discourses to frame 
engagement with the EU and participation in European integration as imperative for 
government. For instance, the FT argues that in regards to the euro, the UK needed to ‘clarify 
its position’ and that ‘constructive engagement is the policy that advances the national 
interest’ (1 June 2001). Quoting Tony Blair’s Edinburgh speech, in which he argued that 
‘isolation in Europe is not patriotic but the denial of our national interest’ (analysed in greater 
detail in Chapter 6), the Guardian argues that the UK had ‘more influence in the EU and 
wider world if its attitude was constructive’ (26 May 2001). The Sun ran an editorial by Tony 
Blair that used the language of national interest to make a case for Labour’s policy of a 
referendum on the euro. He argued that when it came to euro membership, ‘the Government, 
like the people, will make a hard-headed practical assessment of the issues. In the national 
interest’ (Blair, Sun, 30 May 2001). Similarly, the Independent agreed with Blair, arguing that 
‘the stronger Britain is in the EU, the stronger it will be with the US, and vice versa’ (25 May 
2001). In the Mirror, Paul Routledge argued that the Conservatives use of the ‘national 
interest’ to justify a policy of ruling out euro membership was ‘flat-earth politics’ and argued 
that the Conservatives ‘hate Europe, and are obsessed with keeping the pound even if it is in 
Britain’s worst interests’ (Routledge, Mirror, 24 May 2001). This passage inverts the logic of 
tan discourses which defend the pound as a symbol of British statehood (and thus, in the 
national interest). 
These examples present an alternative view of the discourse on national interest, and show a 
willingness on the part of the more pro-European publications to challenge the discourses of 
tan actors on their own terms. As the following sections show, the concept of the national 
interest is implicit in many of the pro-European constructions of the UK-EU relationship. 
Arguments that focus on the benefits of the EU in terms of increasing British influence, and 
the economic and social benefits of EU membership draw on similar ideas to the concept of 
the national interest.  
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Pro-European discourses on national identity 
The clearest difference between the anti- and pro-European discourses in the articles analysed 
is that national identity not widely discussed in pro-European discourse. Rather than being 
associated with a clearly gal discourse, which might be expected to articulate a post-national 
or liberal construction of identity, pro-European messages concentrated on frames other than 
identity when making positive arguments for supporting the EU. Thus, discourses which 
engage directly with the concept of national identity in order to make a positive case for EU 
membership are uncommon. Certainly, no newspapers actively constructed a discourse which 
favoured the creation of a European identity, or which envisaged Britain as being a part of 
such a development, in the articles analysed. The nearest example to this type of discourse 
can be found in the Independent, which in an editorial on the day before the 2001 general 
election declared that ‘the Independent's vision is of Britain as a modern European country’ (6 
June 2001). Other pro-European discourses which adopted this gal-ish construction of identity 
were often in reaction to Tony Blair’s Edinburgh Speech, often quoting from his remarks on 
patriotism, or otherwise adopting this language. For instance, the Mirror argued that Blair had 
positioned the Labour Party as ‘the party of true patriots’ (Mirror, 26 May 2001). Labour’s 
policy was constructed as a sign of progress by the Independent: ‘to argue that it is a matter of 
national self confidence for Britain to play a leading part in shaping modern Europe is 
immeasurably more positive than the tone struck in 1997’ (Independent, 5 June 2001).   3
The most frequent use of national identity in pro-European discourses was to challenge or 
contest the tan-ish discourses of the Conservatives, and in some cases, other newspapers. For 
example, the Conservatives were described as ‘too extreme, too inward-looking and too 
obsessed with the EU’, in the Mirror, which constructs the Conservative position as 
considering the EU as ‘a threat to Britain’. This article goes on to express an optimistic 
construction of the EU, describing it as ‘a union of allies who, together, can achieve great 
things’ (Mirror, 7 June 2001). This construction of the EU as a ‘union of allies’ is perhaps 
closer to De Gaulle’s concept of a ‘Europe des patries’. Rather than describe Europe as a 
political and economic union, or in terms of a common European identity or culture, the 
Mirror instead constructs Europe in the terms of the nation-state and of inter-state ‘alliances’. 
The EU is thus akin to organisations such as NATO: a means to achieve collective ends but 
not as a new form of post-national or cosmopolitan political organisation. Instead, the UK is 
shown to have a positive role to play within this alliance, one which is threatened by 
 The next Chapter discusses in more detail the press reaction to and framing of the reporting of 3
speeches, including Blair’s speech in Edinburgh. 
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regressive forms of nationalist politics: ‘[v]oting Tory would mean following his blinkered, 
little-England route which would devastate Britain's role in Europe ‘(Mirror, 27 May 2001).  
The use of the idea of the nation and national identity was also found in cases where 
newspapers actively challenged the discourse of other newspapers. The Guardian condemned 
the Sun’s rhetoric on the EU as ‘playing, as ever, the xenophobic card’, constructing the Sun 
and its tan-ish discourse as not simply nationalistic, but discriminatory and narrow-minded, 
asking rhetorically ‘so what are the Sun’s principles?’ (31 May 2001). By positioning the 
Sun’s discourse as xenophobic, the Guardian implicitly positions itself on the side of a more 
inclusive and pro-European outlook. Indeed, when discussing the possibility of euro 
membership, the Guardian positions the decision in similar terms to tan discourses - as a 
matter of national identity. In a leading article, it argues that the decision to join the euro was 
‘a defining emotional, cultural and constitutional choice for modern Britain’, and that this 
decision was ‘about who we are and what this country is’ (26 May 2001). Rather than a 
simple choice between a defence of the nation and a positive engagement with European 
integration, the Guardian argues that ‘patriotism and internationalism are not enemies’ (26 
May 2001). This is a distinctly gal-ish argument, which frames the decision to participate in 
integration not as one between the defence and the nation and the destruction of national 
identity, but as an imperative of an internationalist philosophy that was not incompatible with 
the nation-state: ‘international engagement is Britain’s only serious option and Europe is 
inescapably the most immediate forum for this engagement’. This did not mean that ‘national 
interests suddenly cease to exist in an internationalist framework’, but entails the rejection of 
a ‘post-imperial fantasy Britain’ in which the nation-state was paramount and the only 
legitimate form of governance (26 May 2001). Engagement with the EU is thus positioned as 
part of a world-view that embraces the rejection of the rigidities of exclusive attachment to 
the nation-state, but without rejecting the nation-state altogether: this is shown to require a 
serious debate which Labour is seen as having ‘flunked on the preparation, at least in the 
public sphere’ (26 May 2001).  
In the Financial Times, there was a noticeable absence of discourses about the nation in 
everyday news reporting.  However, the FT did engage in discourses on the nation in the 4
comment section. A number of comment articles by academics, and one article by Lionel 
Barber (later, editor of the FT), published during the 2001 election campaign, discussed the 
debate on European integration in relation to debates about the nation and national identity. 
For example, a comment article by Timothy Garton Ash (7 June 2001) analysed the identity 
 One characteristic of the FT is that its comment, opinion, and editorial articles are more clearly 4
delineated from news reporting, the overall structure of the division between news and opinion being 
more akin to a US newspaper (such as the Washington Post) than its British counterparts. 
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politics of the Conservative Party during the general election, arguing that the key issue of the 
election was, indeed, national identity: ‘[t[oday the big issue is: who on earth do we think we 
are?’. Garton Ash links the discourse of the Conservatives to ‘English nationalism’, while 
articulating a discourse that constructs British identity as open, inclusive, and flexible: 
‘Britishness is a wonderful thing, precisely because it is so capaciously accommodating of 
multiple identities’. Similarly, Barber argues that the ‘battlelines’ for British membership of 
the euro lay along competing claims to ‘patriotism’, and the idea that British (and perhaps 
specifically English) identity may vanish ‘in a continental mist’ (Barber, Financial Times, 26 
May 2001). 
However, despite these examples, the most significant feature of the use of the nation frame 
by pro-European discourses was that, most often, it simply was not used at all. Rather than 
challenge the nationalist rhetoric of tan discourses, pro-European discourses in almost all 
newspapers instead framed Europe in different terms, for example concentrating on the 
economic benefits of membership, the claimed positive effects for British influence in global 
politics, or framed their tan opponents as ‘obsessed’ with Europe and the EU. The limited gal 
discourse on the place of the nation at these two general elections, save for Tony Blair’s 2001 
speech in Edinburgh, which was reported in all the newspapers covered, also suggests that it 
is in tan discourses where the main focus on the nation and identity lies: perhaps naturally 
given the ‘nationalism’ component of the tan pole.  
Constructions of the nation are particularly central to the Eurosceptic discourse, therefore. 
The tan-Eurosceptic discourse identified in the previous section takes a construction of the 
nation-state that privileges it over other forms of political organisation. Britishness and 
patriotism are associated with this exclusive construction of the nation-state, which seeks to 
defend the national community and lay a claim to a ‘true’ definition of these concepts. The 
EU is constructed as eroding the basis of the national community, and as an emerging 
‘superstate’. The presence of this discourse confirms the hypothesis that newspapers construct 
connections between national identity and European integration. That newspapers are 
constructing these discursive connections in their reporting of the EU demonstrates their 
agency in the politicisation of European integration. This is particularly significant in the 
context of these discourses on identity, given the privileged role that the literature gives the 
press in national identity formation (Billig 1995; Wodak et al 2009).  
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5.3  Framing the nation and the EU: sovereignty and the discourse of ‘threat’  
Directly connected to the national identity frame is one of national sovereignty. The defence 
of national sovereignty is at the heart of many Eurosceptic narratives among political parties 
in the UK: an association that has been well documented in the literature (see for instance: 
Baker and Seawright 1998; Turner 2000; Risse 2009). Indeed, the centrality of sovereignty 
and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK to the political debate on Europe has 
lead to ‘thinking in terms of undivided sovereignty’, which ‘inhibits a constructive approach 
to European questions’ (Bogdanor 2005, 698). This is reflected in the contestation of the EU 
in the UK press: reports about European integration are frequently framed in terms of national 
sovereignty. Indeed, the sovereignty frame was the most numerous frame deployed in all of 
the reports examined.  
The most common use of this frame was in the construction of the EU as a political institution 
that undermines British sovereignty and independence. The EU is shown to be the antithesis 
of the nation state, a form of political organisation that is designed to undermine and 
supersede the nation as the primary political community, and is thus a ‘threat’ to the British 
nation and the prevailing political order. The framing of the EU using the national sovereignty 
frame thus draws clear and negative associations between the issue of nationhood and 
national identity, and the claimed consequences of European integration. Fundamental to the 
framing of European integration in terms of sovereignty is this tan-ish defence of the nation-
state: relatively few reports adopting a gal-ish stance employed sovereignty as a frame (those 
that did are discussed below). This suggests that discourses on sovereignty have become 
dominated by narratives that associate any ‘loss’ of national sovereignty as wholly negative: 
gal discourses rarely contest this issue on the terms set by tan discourses on sovereignty. 
Consequently, the ‘sovereignty frame’ is defined here as a frame that encompasses a defence 
of sovereignty on nationalist terms.  
References to national sovereignty were plentiful in tan discourses in the coverage analysed. 
Under the broad category of a frame centred on sovereignty, we can identify a number of key 
narratives or motifs that occur across frequently across several publications, and a number 
which appear predominantly in only one or two publications. The first of these narratives is 
that British national sovereignty is threatened inherently by the UK’s membership of the EU. 
This narrative follows the same pattern of logic exhibited by the national identity frame. This 
narrative constructs the EU as an external force, menacing one of the core symbols of the 
nation-state, sovereignty. As with the related discourse on Britishness, this fame is frequently 
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manifested in the language of a ‘threat’: the EU is constructed as a threat to UK sovereignty, 
and this is often linked to notions of democracy, identity, and self-determination.  
The nation-state is constructed as diametrically opposed to any supranational authority, and 
thus any transfer of sovereignty from the UK to supranational institutions. Politics at the EU-
level is thus conceptualised as a zero-sum game: in order for the EU to operate, the UK (and 
other Member States) must ‘give up’ sovereignty to an emerging central quasi-state (Hawkins 
2009, 92). The consequence of this logic is that the tan-ish discourses that begin from this 
premise cannot account for the EU as anything other than damaging to British sovereignty. 
Alternative constructions of the consequences of European integration for national 
sovereignty, for instance the idea that sovereignty is ‘shared’ or ‘pooled’ among member 
states, are impossible within this nationalist logic.  An extract from an article by Peter 5
Hitchens in the Daily Mail is worth quoting at length because it demonstrates these features, 
along with the discourse of threat: 
FINALLY, it prepared to take the country into the euro, placing it irreversibly under 
the control of a supranational socialist system which will be able to impose on Britain 
all the taxes, regulations and restrictions that the Westminster Parliament might resist, 
delay or modify, and which will sweep away everything which makes Britain special 
and unique, and which has until now prevented Labour from exercising the almost 
limitless power that it has always longed to have. (Hitchens, Daily Mail, 3 June 2001) 
Examples of this discourse could be found most frequently in the Daily Mail and the Daily 
Telegraph, and also in the Times, and the Sun. While discourses in the Express largely 
eschewed the sovereignty frame in 2001, they did feature some of the motifs of this frame, 
including the use of the term ‘superstate’, and moved closer towards the heavily tan-
influenced framing of the Mail and Telegraph by 2005. In the Telegraph the term 
‘sovereignty’ itself was widely used. For instance, there were references to measures needed 
to prevent the ‘erosion of the sovereignty of member states’ (29 May 2001), claims that 
‘Britain would surrender further political sovereignty if Labour won the election’ (Jones, 
Telegraph, 29 May 2001), and accusations that the Liberal Democrats used ‘the weasel word 
“pooling”’ for ‘sovereignty they wish to cede’ (28 May 2001). In constructing this account of 
the damaging potential of the EU to the UK, the Telegraph seeks to oppose what it calls a 
‘long-standing Government strategy to surrender our fiscal and monetary sovereignty to a 
pack of bureaucrats in Brussels’ (30 April 2005).  
 Indeed, the idea that sovereignty is ‘pooled’ is the preferred conceptualisation of the European 5
Commission.
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The theme that UK sovereignty was ‘threatened’ by membership of the EU can be observed 
frequently. This is typified by the claims that the UK would disappear as a result of increasing 
integration, what the Mail described in an editorial as ‘this country’s absorption into the EU as 
we join the single currency and spell the end of our national independence’ (2 June 2001). The 
implication of this threat is that the EU would seek to equip itself with the ‘trappings of 
statehood’, and ‘cease to be an association of states, and instead become a state in its own 
right’ (Telegraph, 29 May 2001). This is constructed as threatening to the British state, and 
even Orwellian in nature, with the Telegraph describing the Charter of Fundamental Rights as 
‘a written constitution’ that had been rebranded ‘in true Ministry of Love style’ (29 May 
2001). George Pascoe-Watson in the Sun argued that the ‘truth’ was that the euro would mean 
member states ‘transferring their sovereignty’, and this would mean that ‘everything would 
have to be run past EU bureaucrats and the political elite in Brussels’ (Pascoe-Watson, Sun, 29 
May 2001). In this same report, Pascoe-Watson refers to Gordon Brown as ‘Her Majesty’s 
Chancellor of the Exchequer’. The implicit suggestion offered here by the reference to the 
monarchy is that the EU undermines key symbols of British statehood.  
‘Interference’ and ‘imposition’: the construction of a ‘meddling’ EU 
A related motif is one that constructs the EU as interfering in the affairs of the UK, and as 
‘imposing’ measures on the British people and institutions. This motif of a ‘meddling’ EU that 
involves itself deeply in the lives of citizens creates a portrayal of the EU as being an 
unwanted and damaging influence. The idea that the EU ‘interfered’ in internal UK affairs or 
‘imposed’ unwanted  measures is seen clearly int the Daily Mail. This is typified by the claim 
that Britain was run ‘not by Westminster legislation but by decrees issued in Brussels’ (27 
May 2001). In another example, in an article framed by sovereignty, the Mail describes 
‘Brussels’ as ‘interfering in the election’ and quoted Conservative MP Francis Maude 
accusing the European Commission of ‘meddling’ with the election (24 May 2001). This 
example demonstrates the close link between this motif and the democracy frame, which is 
discussed in more detail below. Similarly, we see claims that emphasise the apparently 
powerless nature of the UK government to prevent this meddling: ‘Government lawyers 
pleaded with EU judges’ (28 April 2005). Elsewhere, the tan-ish discourse on an interfering 
EU finds expression in the Express: ‘the Euro Commission has already dabbled in transfer 
fees’ (1 June 2001). In the Telegraph, this was a recurring theme, for instance with articles 
claiming that a directive on employer-employee consultation ‘could be forced through in the 
face of British opposition’ (4 June 2001), and of ‘a systematic programme of meddling in 
British internal politics’ (2 June 2001). These claims occasionally bordered on on the 
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conspiratorial. The Times published an article by Lord Pearson which claimed that UKIP has 
been ‘indirectly funded by the European Commission’ in order to divert votes from 
‘Eurosceptic Conservatives’, and that whatever the the truth of this allegation ‘the cap fits 
horribly well’ (1 June 2001).   6
This discourse of interference tended to be applied to issues close to the symbolism of 
national sovereignty and self-determination — such as currency, law and order, and the armed 
forces — much more consistently than issues which involved, for example, consumer 
protection, or regulating unfair business practices. For instance, the Daily Mail (25 April 
2005) framed an EU directive to improve road safety as a positive development, but in the 
context of ‘the growing risk posed by overseas lorry drivers’ from the EU. This mixed 
message was symptomatic of reporting across the spectrum of the UK press, and can be seen 
particularly in cases where reports focus on decisions that preserved the powers of national 
governments, or rejected proposed further integration. For instance, in the Telegraph, 
spending targets for member states recommended by the European Commission were 
described as ‘interference by Brussels’, while at the same time it was noted that these had 
been ‘deleted from projections’ by Gordon Brown in a ‘significant victory’ (6 June 2001). 
The same article described proposed (and at the same meeting, rejected) energy taxation 
harmonisation as being ‘imposed on all EU energy markets’. Thus, even a rejection of 
proposed EU reforms by national governments is framed in terms of meddling by the EU in 
national affairs, rather than as exercises of national sovereignty. This particular article ends 
with quotations from Eurosceptic commentators, selected to emphasise this framing. This 
strategy was common in tan discourses: where articles reported that proposals to further share 
sovereignty or transfer national competencies to EU institutions had been modified or 
abandoned, articles adopting tan frames tended to reinforce their message by concluding with 
quotations that reinforce the framing of the article, usually in terms of sovereignty or claimed 
‘interference’ in UK matters. In the Guardian, the same meeting was reported as being a 
potential source of ‘more euro scare stories’, and it warned that ‘the Tories will look to create 
embarrassment’, while reporting that Gordon Brown was ‘furious with criticism from the 
European Commission’, and presents a much more reasonable view of the Commission: that 
they ‘agreed to reconsider the issue’ (1 June 2001). These contrasting constructions emphasise 
the importance of these frames in building contesting accounts of the same events.  
 Lord Pearson was, at the time of writing, a Conservative Peer. He was later expelled from the 6
Conservatives and became leader of UKIP from 2009-10. 
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The EU ‘Superstate’ 
The second of the key motifs found in the sovereignty frame is the claim that further 
integration in the EU would lead to the creation of a ‘superstate’, or a federal Europe. This is 
portrayed in tan-ish discourses as wholly negative for the UK. In the logic of the tan 
discourse on sovereignty, the creation of a federal Europe or of a European superstate is the 
desired conclusion of the European ‘project’, and outcome that would mean the the UK would 
‘dissolve…into the socialist superstate of Europe’ (Littlejohn, Sun, 4 June 2001). The use of 
the term superstate and its variants was widespread. For example, the Telegraph warned of 
‘the path to a European superstate’ (1 June 2001) and ‘the superpower ambitions of the 
European Union’ (7 June 2001). The majority of the uses of the superstate motif were found 
in 2001: the clearest express of this motif being an article in the Mail by Paul Eastham 
entitled ‘Superstate Plot’, which reports on a speech by Lionel Jospin. Eastham constructs 
Jospin’s speech as a ‘vision of an “economic government imposing harmonised taxes”, as a 
leading part of ‘the EU plans to build a super-state’, which would ‘deprive Britain of the right 
to control its own society and economy’ (Eastham, Mail, 29 May 2001).  
In the articles studied in 2005, the term is rarely used, a notable exception being by William 
Rees-Mogg, writing in the Times, discussing the Constitutional Treaty, who asks ‘is the 
United Kingdom to remain an independent, democratic, self-governing country, or are we to 
become part of a European superstate?’ (25 April 2005). In this article, Rees-Mogg argues that 
‘the United Kingdom cannot lose its liberty in a fit of mere-absent mindedness’, and that 
joining the Constitutional Treaty would mean ‘the loss of our national independence’ (Times, 
25 April 2005). The use of the superstate motif here follows the same pattern as its use in 
2001: to oppose European integration on the grounds of the defence of national sovereignty. 
The relative absence of the superstate motif in 2005 can perhaps be explained by Rees-Mogg 
himself, who asks ‘why this baffling silence?’ about Europe in 2005. As discussed above, the 
low levels of contestation of European integration during the 2005 general election seem to 
have led to a much lower instance of the use of the superstate motif. Rather than being 
deployed in everyday coverage of European affairs, this motif is deployed in the articles 
studied here only in the context of discourses that contest European integration.  
In many cases, the claimed move towards a federal Europe was constructed as being a result 
of inaction in the UK, as by William Rees-Mogg, above. For instance, the Mail argued that 
‘all over Europe, a serious debate is raging on the shape of a federalist future’ and that Britain 
was ‘drifting with a federalist tide’ (30 May 2001). This sense that the UK was unconsciously 
moving towards an EU superstate, against the wishes of the British people, was found across 
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several newspapers. The Mail described an ‘onward march of the euro by stealth’ (3 June 
2001), the Telegraph (discussing the proposals for an elected president of the European 
Commission) as ‘milestones on the path to a European superstate’ (1 June 2001), the Sun of a 
‘headlong rush into a federal Europe’ (7 June 2001), and the Express cited the ‘failure to stand 
up to Europe’ as the cause of a loss of sovereignty that saw ‘Brussels riding roughshod over 
Westminster’ (4 May 2005).  
Other narratives constructed the systematic undermining of British sovereignty as part of the 
agenda of British politicians. Labour and the Liberal Democrats were accused in several 
newspapers of pursuing policies that would damage UK sovereignty. For instance, the Times 
warned that the Liberal Democrats would favour policies involving ‘surrendering sovereignty 
to the EU’ (29 April 2005). Meanwhile, the Mail constructed Labour as devoting insufficient 
attention to Europe, arguing that, in 2001, Labour’s general election manifesto ‘devotes less 
space to the…consequences for national sovereignty’ of euro membership, ‘than it does to 
New Labour's policy on sport’ (28 May 2001). This narrative is connected by Mail columnist 
Melanie Phillips to a left-wing political agenda more generally: ’the Left decided to attack 
democracy and the nation state in favour of supranational institutions such as the EU and 
'universal' values like judge-made human rights’ (Philips, Daily Mail, 2 May 2005). Often, 
this agenda is shown to be hidden from the public. For example, the Mail described ‘the great 
deception’, and ‘the shabby, insulting behaviour of our own ruling establishment’ (30 May 
2001), and characterised Tony Blair’s statements on Europe during the 2001 campaign as 
‘notable only for its vapidity and its failure to address the hard questions’ over Europe (30 
May 2001). This was closely connected with the democracy frame, discussed in more detail 
below.  
The superstate motif is a simplification of the EU and its complex relationship with member 
states and governance structures. In this sense, the superstate motif is representative of the 
sovereignty frame as a whole. It draws on the construction of the EU as a potentially hostile 
‘Other’, discussed above, to connect directly hostility to out-groups with a defence of the 
nation. By deploying these images of the usurpation of the British state, tan discourses are 
able to mobilise anti-EU sentiment. This frequently occurs through presupposition: the 
primacy of the nation-state is largely presupposed in these discourses, as opposed to being 
made explicit. The fact that a ‘reduction’ in UK sovereignty is assumed to be wholly negative 
suggests the assumption that the audience for these discourses places the same value on 
sovereignty as the writer: allowing them to construct a discourse which, at times, is strongly 
polemical in its denunciation of the EU. This discourse does not acknowledge that the 
involvement of the UK within the power-sharing structures EU might be positive for the UK, 
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or that the mechanisms for policy making and governance within the EU might operate on a 
more complex model than a simple ‘ceding of power’ to an external political organisation.   
The key reform that prompted contestation during the periods examined was the proposed 
British membership of the euro, and associated referendum, promised in Labour’s election 
manifesto. It was in contesting British membership of the euro that the sovereignty frame was 
most frequently deployed. This reflects the tightened levels of contestation within the public 
sphere around the euro at this election, which was chosen as one of the key themes of the 
Conservative election campaign. Indeed, William Hague and the Conservatives engaged in a 
strongly Eurosceptic discourse around the election, which Hague declared was a ‘referendum’ 
on British membership of the euro.  
The most frequent use of the sovereignty frame in discourses around the euro was to construct 
the euro as a source of threat to British nationhood. For instance, claims such as that ‘joining 
the euro would mean that core economic decisions on Britain's future were taken in Frankfurt 
and Brussels’ (Mail, 26 May 2001) can be found in a number of newspapers. The Telegraph 
claimed that entry into the euro would come with ‘attendant costs and loss of autonomy’ (4 
June 2001). For the Sun, the euro was constructed as an economic and political disaster, and 
part of a wider ‘plan’ to draw the UK into a political union that would undermine the British 
state: ’the economics are not right, the politics are not right, and on top of this the European 
vision outlined by the French Premier yesterday represents an utter nightmare’ (29 May 
2001). This theme was also found in the Express, which constructed euro membership as a 
restriction on the freedom of national governments to set policies: ‘as euro-members, the last 
thing the Germans need is for the European Central Bank to raise the areas key interest 
rate’ (29 April 2005).  
Particularly in the tan discourse on the euro, sovereignty was closely associated with the ideas 
of  Britishness and national identity, as well as democracy and freedom of speech (as is shown 
below). Thus, the example of the euro demonstrates that issues may be framed using multiple 
concepts as part of an overlapping and complementary set of discourses. In this case, the ideas 
of Britishness (the defence of a symbol of British identity, the Pound Sterling), sovereignty 
(the defence of the ability of Parliament to control fiscal and monetary policy, as well as 
maintain national ‘distinctiveness’), and, as the next section will show, democracy (the 
construction of euro membership as subverting the ‘true’ democratic wishes of the British 
people) combine to construct a distinctly tan narrative that seeks to mobilise opposition to the 
euro on several levels.  
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Pro- European narratives and sovereignty 
Among pro-European discourses on Europe, sovereignty was a theme that appeared 
frequently, but in a different sense to the use of the idea of sovereignty in tan discourses: these 
counter-discourses focussed largely on opposing the nationalist logic of tan-Eurosceptic 
narratives about the EU. Thus, rather than being a common frame for articles, constructions of 
sovereignty were used to counter the arguments of the tan-leaning press in pro-European 
discourses. In addition, we also see that a large number of references to sovereignty in the 
more pro-European discourses come in the context of quotations of Eurosceptic politicians in 
articles that are not framed in terms of sovereignty.  
Where pro-European discourses did challenge nationalist narratives on national sovereignty, a 
number of themes emerge. The first is a tendency to present a more nuanced construction of 
the relationship between Europe and UK sovereignty. For instance, the Guardian noted that 
‘democracy is a far more important issue than sovereignty’ because it was the case that 
sovereignty was already shared ‘in Nato, in the UN, or in taking on other international 
tasks’ (30 May 2001). Far from taking power from the nation-state, Ian Black argued that ‘in 
every member state the big questions - and their answers - are rooted in national politics’: the 
future of the EU is constructed as a process of negotiation among its members, where 
competing visions of how ‘to construct Europe’ would be the subject of debate and agreement 
(Black, Guardian, 30 May 2001). The Guardian also offered a different view on the course 
that integration would follow, for instance writing that ‘Blair favours Europe of nation states 
in which power is vested in council of ministers representing each of 15 member 
states’ (Guardian, 30 May 2001). In the FT, the retention of sovereignty over fiscal matters by 
member states in the euro is given as an example of ‘bad rules and principles’, arguing that 
‘the eurozone needs further integration simply to survive’, thus reversing the nationalist logic 
found in tan discourses: integration in order to ensure stability is constructed as a necessary 
consequence of monetary union (25 April 2005).  
The idea that sovereignty was not necessarily ‘lost’ as part of EU membership also forms part 
of the pro-European discourse. For example, the Independent wrote that reaching ‘necessary’ 
agreement on the Nice Treaty meant ‘some further sharing of sovereignty’, which would 
‘ensure effective EU decision-making’ (7 June 2001). In an editorial in the Guardian, Liberal 
Democrat MP Chris Huhne exemplifies this discourse, arguing that while there had been ‘a 
large rise in directives and regulations at the end of the 80s after the signing of the Single 
European Act’, these should not be interpreted as part of a discourse on sovereignty, but rather 
as ‘necessary to create a genuine single market’ and to ensue that ‘member states could not 
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use the excuse of separate safety or consumer-protection standards to protect their home 
markets’ (5 June 2001). Furthermore, achieving this aim of free markets is precisely why ‘a 
mere free trade area is not enough’ and the pooling of sovereignty necessary (Huhne, 
Guardian, 5 June 2001).  
This construction of sovereignty rests on rather different assumptions to those underlying the 
tan discourse on sovereignty: rather than being indivisible, sovereignty is instead a resource 
that can be shared or pooled among member states. in order to achieve practical objectives or 
ensure the smooth running of the EU. Indeed, in a leader article evaluating Tony Blair’s 
leadership of the EU, David Clark argued that by using the ‘language of his enemies: “veto”, 
“sovereignty”,”red lines”’, Blair had failed to reach his potential to fulfil his commitment to 
Europe that formed part of ‘the very core of the Blairite project’ (Clark, Guardian, 2 May 
2005). This rejection of the language of sovereignty is common among pro-European 
discourses. Rather than frame European integration in terms of sovereignty, pro-European 
discourses in the press concentrated on frames that avoided discussing sovereignty altogether, 
or engaged in narratives which dismissed sovereignty as an important concern. For example, 
in an editorial discussing the euro and the proposed referendum, the Express directly 
challenged the nationalist construction of sovereignty as central to the debate on UK 
membership, arguing that ‘[w]e are increasingly aware that whether we join is not about a 
threat to our sovereignty but a matter of economic common sense’. Instead, this was reframed 
to be an economic decision, echoing the position taken by Labour:  
The only sensible approach is to consider whether the five economic tests laid down 
by Chancellor Gordon Brown are met and, if so, to act. But only then. (Express, 26 
May 2001)  
More often, pro-European narratives did not attempt to contest Europe on the grounds of 
sovereignty, with this frame occurring far less often in pro-European articles, and in the 
Europe-supporting newspapers, than in tan discourses. There was also not a distinctive gal 
discourse here: whereas the tan-Eurosceptic discourses make clear associations between the 
nation and the threat posed by a loss of sovereignty, we see few defences of increased 
integration on the grounds of a gal-ish argument centred, for instance, on the idea of the EU 
as a community of interests. This supports that the postfunctionalist claim that the tan pole of 
the gal-tan dimension is more strongly associated with Euroscepticism than the gal pole is to 
support for the EU. Sovereignty and the defence of national sovereignty is an issue more 
closely associated with nationalist ideologies, and thus perhaps provides a more fertile ground 
for tan discourses to mobilise opposition to the EU in the UK. The small proportion of 
citizens who report a ‘European’ identity (see Chapter 3), compared to the larger proportion 
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that report an exclusively national identity reinforces this relationship. Pro-Europeans are less 
likely to mobilise support for the EU by constructing a discourse framed by notions of a 
common European identity and shared sovereignty than Eurosceptics are likely to mobilise 
opposition by emphasising national sovereignty.  
One striking feature of the sovereignty frame is that explicit references to national sovereignty 
were far more common in the press coverage of the 2001 general election than that of the 
2005 general election. The sovereignty frame was deployed frequently in tan-ish discourses in 
2001, whereas in 2005 discussions of sovereignty were far less frequent. This was not merely 
a consequence of fewer articles mentioning the EU at the 2005 general election. Rather, the 
coverage of the EU in 2005 was not presented using a sovereignty frame as frequently as in 
2001: this was the case across tan-Eurosceptic discourses. Instead, articles favoured the 
democracy fame, or else an emphasis on economics. This suggests that the lower levels on 
contestation seen in 2005, both among parties and newspapers, filtered into the framing of 
articles. Where European integration was heavily contested in the context of a proposed 
reform (in the case of 2001, membership of the euro), the sovereignty frame was deployed 
more often. In 2005, reporting instead often focussed on EU news not directly related to 
proposed reforms, or on the progress of referenda in other EU member states on the 
Constitutional Treaty. This followed the lessened emphasis on the EU on the part of political 
parties. This suggests that the increased levels of contestation in 2001 may have led 
newspapers to construct the EU in terms of a threat to national sovereignty in order to 
increase the sense of ‘threat’ to the national community. 
Sovereignty appears to be an important frame for both anti- and pro-European discourses, 
therefore. For tan-Eurosceptic discourses, the sovereignty frame forms part of the defence of 
the nation undertaken in the reporting of the EU. This was particularly the case in the Mail, 
Telegraph, Sun, and Express. This frame constructs the EU as a ‘threat’ to UK sovereignty, 
which is itself constructed as a fundamental component of the nation; without sovereignty, the 
nation is shown to be compromised. By constructing the membership of the EU as 
fundamentally incompatible with national sovereignty, this discourse renders the nation-state 
and the EU as antithetical. Pro-European narratives that discussed sovereignty did not contest 
these tan-discourses on the same terms, however. Instead, pro-European narratives around 
sovereignty constructed it as being ‘shared’ or pooled among member states, or focussed on 
the practical benefits of sharing powers. This appears to be an attempt to counter the narrative 
of ‘threat’ constructed by the tan-Eurosceptic discourse, and represents an attempt to conduct 
debates about sovereignty away from the issue of the nation. 
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5.4  Framing the EU: Democracy and the ‘undermining’ of public debate 
A third important dimension of the debate on the EU in the selected articles focussed on the 
implications for democracy of further EU integration. On both sides of the debate, democratic 
values and governance served as an evaluative frame for the legitimacy, scope, and pace of 
integration within the EU. This frame was one of the most numerous, supporting the 
conclusions presented by de Wilde et al (2013, 189-90), who argue that democracy was ‘the 
primary concern driving online evaluations of the EU’: in the print media, democracy was 
similarly a leading concern. The treatment of democracy, much in the same way as the nation 
and sovereignty, differs substantially across the newspapers studied. While the tan-leaning 
press were uniform in their evaluation of the EU as a negative force for democracy, and 
accused it of undermining public debate and subverting the will of the British public and 
politicians, the pro-European press was much more ambivalent in its evaluations. The tan-
Eurosceptic discourse on democracy, which seeks to construct the EU as anti-democratic, 
contains a number of features. The first is the idea that powers pooled or ‘transferred’ to the 
European Union were irrevocably lost through a process over which the UK had little control, 
which is manifested in frequent discussion of the national veto. Secondly, the EU is depicted 
as not democratically accountable to either the British people or to the Westminster 
Parliament, and this is shown to be damaging to the UK Parliament and British national 
independence.  
As shown above, European integration is constructed as an inevitable process, one which is 
being undertaken by an elite without democratic consent. This construction crosses from the 
sovereignty frame to the democracy frame, being a distinctive motif in the portrayal of the EU 
as a body intent on removing national powers from the UK in an anti-democratic process. 
This is seen as being undertaken without consulting the publics of member states. 
Furthermore, the attitudes of the British public, and their counterparts in other EU countries 
are constructed to be different. For instance, the Times argued that European publics were 
more likely to go ahead with further integration even if it did not prove popular: 
‘...too often Europeans seem to consider as inevitable projects which they do not 
really favour. And that is inimical to the spirit of representative government’  (Times, 
3 June 2001) 
The most prominent motif within the democracy frame was the construction of the EU as an 
organisation that was fundamentally antithetical to democracy. The EU is shown to be an anti-
democratic organisation through its lack of accountability to citizens. This is undermines the 
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sovereignty of the UK as a nation, and the British people as citizens. This theme seems to 
reflect the concerns expressed by both scholars and popular commentators about the so-called 
‘democratic deficit’ from which the EU suffers as a political community.  Much is made of 7
the claimed un-democratic nature of the institutions of the EU. This is particularly visible in 
the emphasis placed on the term ‘unelected’, which is used to categorise the various EU 
institutions as well as civil servants. For example, the Mail argues that the Commission was to 
become ‘an unelected executive’ (24 May 2001), and describes ‘demands’ for ‘much greater 
authority’ for the ‘unelected Commission’ (30 May 2001), while economic policy would be 
decided by ‘remote, unelected, unaccountable and not very competent bankers in 
Frankfurt’ (26 May 2001). This discourse can also be seen in the Sun, which complains of 
‘unelected Brussels bureaucrats’, and ‘unelected failures such as EU commissioners Neil 
Kinnock and Chris Patten’ (Sun, 1 June 2001). In the Telegraph too, the notion that the EU 
was un-democratic due to the unelected nature of its bureaucracy can be seen on many 
occasions. For instance, in discussing claims of interference in the UK election, we see ‘the 
unelected Brussels commission, which was meant to be politically neutral’ (24 May 2001), 
while ‘the unelected European Commission’ is accused of ‘churning out some 70 per cent of 
our laws’ (2 May 2005). The recurring leitmotif of this narrative is the idea that ‘unelected 
bureaucrats on the Continent’ (Telegraph, 30 May 2001) wield power over the UK, subverting 
British democracy and freedoms. There is also a recurring theme that EU officials were 
overpaid, for instance we hear of ‘bungling, unelected European officials like Dim Wim on fat 
salaries and huge expense accounts’ (Sun, 2 June 2001). The EU is seen, in tan-leaning 
discourses, as being the primary cause of a democratic decline in the UK, characterised by the 
undermining of Parliament, the ‘transfer’ of powers to supranational institutions, and the 
steady decline in the ability of voters to hold governments to account. Thus, claims that the 
EU is insufficiently democratically accountable co-exist with claims that this has undermined 
the functioning of democracy within the UK itself. 
This discourse found expression in the more pro-European newspapers too, suggesting a 
wider dissatisfaction with the levels of democracy and accountability within the EU. For 
instance, Ian Black writes of ‘[q]uestions about the European parliament, notoriously remote 
from national electorates, mingle with worries about an unelected commission’, and describes 
concerns about levels of democracy ‘not abstract’, but claims that ‘democracy is a far more 
important issue than sovereignty’ (Black, Guardian, 30 May 2001). Meanwhile, the FT also 
reported on the Commission ‘intervening’ in the UK election, but justified this as it 
‘disparaged Conservative claims of a secret Brussels agenda to seize control of British 
 This theme is also highlighted by Hawkins (2009, 87-89), in his survey of coverage of the Lisbon 7
Treaty in the UK. 
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taxes’ (24 May 2001). The rather different framing of this article is one of only a few 
examples where the democracy frame can be found in the context of a pro-European article: 
in this case, the FT concluded by stressing that ‘the final decision’ on tax harmonisation 
would ‘remain with national leaders’ (FT, 24 May 2001).  
Another motif associated with the democracy frame was one of trustworthiness and, in the 
Sun and Daily Mail the idea that the claimed anti-democratic consequences of membership of 
the EU were part of a New Labour ‘plot’ to undermine Britain. This demonstrates clear links 
between the democracy frame and national identity: many evaluations of the EU which cited 
democracy also made links to the nation and national self-determination. The Daily Mail in 
particular expressed this view, representing Tony Blair in particular as evading discussing 
European policy: ‘Questions about the euro and spending were dismissed with a flick of his 
hand’ (Mail, 7 June 2001). This was to be found elsewhere; for instance the Sun declared that 
‘New Labour isn't much interested in democracy, which is why it’s so keen on Europe’ (5 
June 2001). Associated with this frame is a link constructed between the ‘threat’ to 
sovereignty posed by the EU to a sense that the Labour government sought to subvert 
democracy and undermine British sovereignty:  
‘[t]he issue, masquerading under the vague label of 'Europe', is democracy. Over the 
next five years what we regard as the normal democratic process will be threatened as 
never before’ (Mail, 25 May 2001).  
The tan-leaning discourse thus repeats the Conservative Party message that Labour could not 
be trusted on European policy. This is particularly evident in discussion of the potential 
referendum on the euro. Two positions emerge from the coverage when the promised 
referendum on British membership of the euro is discussed. In the tan-leaning discourse, there 
was strong support for the idea of a referendum, however there is significant variation in how 
newspapers construct the referendum and its political and economic implications. The Times, 
for instance, despite its endorsement to Tony Blair and the Labour Party, reiterated its 
opposition to Britain joining the euro at the 2001 general election; ‘we are confident that the 
euro can be defeated in any plebiscite... our voice against it will be vigorous and loud’ (5 June 
2001). The Express argued that the issue of euro membership must not ‘be skirted around any 
longer’ (7 June 2001), whilst endorsing the Labour Party. These newspapers expressed a 
position which was to trust the outcome of any referendum, and to place the euro, and 
European integration more generally as an issue for another time: 
Voters still don't want the euro -but this election has not been about the euro. (The 
Sun, 6 June 2001) 
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Labour cannot, despite the Tories' best efforts, renege on its promise to hold a 
referendum. (Times, 3 June 2001) 
Indeed, the Times explicitly rejected the idea that a referendum could be rigged, arguing that 
any referendum would be conducted ‘fairly’ (7 June 2001). However, we see a division in the 
press between those newspapers which oppose the euro and support a referendum, and those 
which construct a discourse of untrustworthiness and deception around the proposed 
referendum. This discourse closely reflects that of William Hague’s claim that Tony Blair 
would ‘force Britain into the euro’: a refrain picked up by the tan-leaning press and 
reproduced extensively during the election campaign.  
In particular, the Sun and the Daily Mail framed the discourse Labour in regards to the 
referendum in terms of claimed untrustworthiness, expressing the notion that the result would 
somehow be manipulated, and contributing to the overall discursive frame of democracy. The 
Mail repeats this claim in multiple articles, for instance; ‘if Blair wins another big majority, 
the euro referendum will be rigged’ (Daily Mail, 3 June 2001); ‘what is to stop Mr Blair from 
railroading the country into the euro[?]’ (Daily Mail, 2 June 2001). Labour were also accused 
of conspiring with large corporations who were accused of ‘complicity’ in ‘making us accept’ 
the euro (Daily Mail, 3 June 2001). These newspapers construct much of this opposition to 
the euro around the negative connotations of ‘ditching the pound’ and the potential economic 
consequences of membership. The Sun, for example, invited its readers to imagine if their 
savings were in euros: ‘you would have to watch helplessly as they fell in value’ (Sun, 2 June 
2001). 
The discourse of Labour being unresponsive to voter concerns, and obfuscating its own 
position on the euro was not confined to these two newspapers, however. Even moderate tan- 
and gal-leaning discourses expressed reservations about the amount of information provided 
by the Government about their future plans. The implicit, or indeed explicit, suggestion in 
many of these reports is that Labour sought to ‘hide’ its true position from the public, or else 
stifle public debate: 
When Brown and Tony Blair decided in October 1997 to rule out euro entry for this 
parliament, they also agreed to keep their views on the issue as opaque as possible. 
They have succeeded beyond their wildest expectations. (Times, 3 June 2001) 
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Even the Guardian published a leader article by its political commentator, Hugo Young, 
which constructs Blair and Brown as evasive about to euro, and even arrogant towards 
journalists who asked about it, which is worth quoting at length:  
...whenever the euro was mentioned, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown declined to talk 
about it. They shut every questioner up with the impatient assertion that it had 
nothing to do with the election. They began to recoil from the ignorant effrontery of 
interviewers who still dared to look forward a few months... (The Guardian, 6 June 
2001) 
Young goes on to insist that despite the fact that ‘we talk about the EU as a threat to British 
parliamentary sovereignty’, it was really the undemocratic way in which reforms were being 
undertaken by politicians - both Labour and Conservative - that threatened the sovereignty of 
the British people: ‘our leaders, insisting on this electoral silence, have shown that the British 
are well capable of draining that fragile commodity unassisted’ (Young, Guardian, 6 June 
2001).  
The ‘democracy discourse’ thus represents a frame adopted primarily to make Eurosceptic 
arguments, and is a prominent feature of the tan-Eurosceptic discourse. There is a general 
agreement across the UK press in the articles studied that the EU suffered from a democratic 
deficit. Where the tan discourse is particularly differentiated here is that it frequently portrays 
the EU as a ‘threat’ to British democracy and often constructs the actions of EU institutions 
and policy makers as being undemocratic in their nature. This forms part of a wider discourse 
that, in some newspapers, purports to identity a ‘plot’ by the EU and British politicians to 
subvert democracy in order to lead the UK into further European integration. Conversely, the 
pro-European discourse largely avoids this frame. While some newspapers sought to 
challenge the idea that any referendum on UK membership of the single currency might be 
‘rigged’, there was little other pro-European discourse that adopted framing around the idea of 
democracy.  
5.5  Contesting the economics of integration: where left-right meets gal-tan?  
Reporting of business news related to the EU and European integration followed a pattern 
across all of the newspapers studied of containing fewer instances of contestation along the 
gal-tan dimension. Issues including national identity, sovereignty, and were rarely discussed 
in relation to news about individual businesses. However economic and more general 
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business matters that mentioned the EU tended to demonstrate some of the features of the 
general discourse on European integration. While, on the whole, business news was less 
politicised, one particular anti-European discourse concerned the claimed anti-competitive 
effect of EU institutions and regulations on British business. The EU was constructed as a 
source of bureaucracy and interference in business that was seen to ‘hold back’ British firms. 
This discourse appears, on the surface, to be framed around left-right politics. However, as the 
following discussion shows, it frequently connected to the themes already discussed, 
particularly the narratives concerning sovereignty. Conversely, a pro-European discourse that 
emphasised the economic benefits of membership can be detected, and this was located 
primarily in newspapers that were found in the previous chapter to be located towards the gal-
pole of the new politics dimension. This discourse did not connect as clearly with gal-tan 
issues, however, demonstrating a clear difference between the economic discourses of anti- 
and pro-European newspapers.  
Bureaucracy and the ‘threat’ to British business 
In a number of newspapers, in particular the Mail, Telegraph, Sun, and Express, business and 
economic reporting framed the EU as a source of damaging regulation and of ‘holding back’ 
the British economy. Where news related to regulation of business or other EU directives and 
legislation affecting businesses (such as regulations relating to labour and working 
conditions), then the pattern of contestation found in the wider news reporting appears to be 
repeated. This was typically constructed with a frame centred on bureaucracy, and the idea 
that the EU is a source of inefficiency and damage to companies and the wider economy. 
‘Brussels’, or the European Commission, is frequently constructed as bureaucratic, a frame 
that was to be found in all the of the newspapers studied to some degree, but which is 
emphasised particularly in tan-leaning discourses. When describing policy formation, the 
term ‘bureaucrats’ is frequently employed, often alongside ‘unelected’, forming a connection 
between this and the democracy discourse discussed above. The Express, Times and 
Telegraph adopted the metonym ‘eurocrat’ as a shorthand for this, this term appearing in 
articles in both 2001 and 2005, and there were single uses of the same terminology in both the 
Independent and the Guardian, presenting another example of the language of Euroscepticism 
spilling over into the discourses of pro-European newspapers.  
Emphasis is often placed on the allegedly interfering nature of this bureaucracy for business 
in Britain, much in the same vein as the motif associated with the democracy frame, with the 
Sun warning of the effect of ‘watchdogs... meddling’ on the position of London as a business 
centre, for instance (5 June 2001). The UK is constructed as the recipient of a ‘flow’ of 
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regulatory interference and burdensome lawmaking emanating from the European Union. 
This is argued to place restrictions on British businesses and act as a constraint upon 
economic growth. For instance:  
The effects of signing up to the European Social Chapter, the introduction of the 
minimum wage and a raft of European regulations are having a crippling effect on 
companies, particularly small businesses. (Daily Mail, 27 May 2001) 
Emphasis is placed particularly on regulation, which is constructed as unwanted: ’a raft of 
new shopfloor laws would be foisted on to UK businesses’, and this would result in 
‘destroying their competitive edge and wrecking their place as the world's fourth largest 
economy’ (Sun, 29 May 2001). This is shown to be especially problematic given the period of 
relative economic success being enjoyed by the UK economy: ‘he'll have to explain how it is 
patriotic to surrender control of the best economy for 30 years to unelected Brussels 
bureaucrats’ (Sun, 26 May 2001). The UK is constructed as being part of a wider global 
economy that is highly competitive, and where membership of the EU is presented as 
‘holding back’ the UK from achieving its potential:  
We are not just competing against the Continent, but against companies across the 
world. More Brussels legislation might result in a level playing field in Europe, but 
could harm our position in relation to international competitors. We must stop any 
more employment laws. (Daily Mail, 24 April 2005) 
This passage demonstrates the clear link to sovereignty discourses, and exhibits the connected 
nature of the tan-leaning discourses on European integration. Often, membership of the EU is 
presented, in one instance of discourse, with reference to several different frames or motifs at 
once.  The economic consequences of British membership of the EU are shown in the Mail to 
be negative: ‘being in the EU lowers our standard of living’ (25 May 2001). Euro membership 
is also presented with this frame, with the economic consequences of membership constructed 
in tan discourses to be potentially damaging. For instance, the Mail argues that ‘if sterling 
does not fall against the ailing euro and there is little evidence it will on its own the UK could 
suffer serious economic damage’ (30 May 2001). Ultimately, staying out of the EU is 
considered to be vital to continuing British prosperity. In comparing the UK economy to those 
of countries within the Eurozone, the UK’s higher rate of growth is attributed to the effects of 
euro membership. For instance, Alex Brummer claims that ‘the economy, free of the 
constraints of euroland, will continue to outperform its competitors on the 
Continent’ (Brummer, Mail, 4 May 2005).  
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This discourse also places emphasis on the EU as a means for other European countries to 
achieve economic advantages over the UK. The European economy is frequently shown to be 
performing poorly compared to the UK, which is depicted as a model which the rest of the EU 
ought to reproduce. This can be seen in the Sun, which claimed that ‘British firms are beating 
most European rivals in the number of jobs they create’ (31 May 2001), or in the Mail, which 
repeatedly compared the UK economy favourably to its EU counterparts (see for instance 27 
May 2001; 25 April 2005). The UK is framed as being in a zero-sum competition with the 
other Member States of the EU. This leads to claims that the institutions of the EU were being 
used by other EU states to impose damaging regulations on the UK economy, placing 
constraints on the ability of the UK to compete. For instance, the Sun claimed that ‘countries 
like France would be delighted as Brussels applied the break to our freewheeling economy’ 
and claimed that France aimed to ensure the the UK was ‘hauled down to their level to watch 
as foreign investors packed their bags and fled - along with millions of jobs’ (29 May 2001).  
However, there were some exceptions to the bureaucracy discourse, which co-existed with the 
bureaucracy frame in the most tan-leaning newspapers. In particular, both the Mail and the 
Telegraph constructed the EU as a champion of consumer rights. For instance, the Telegraph 
praised the European Commission for fining car manufacturer Volkswagen for price fixing, 
preventing ‘abuses’ from the ‘car giants’ from harming consumers (31 May 2001). Similarly, 
we see the Mail reporting positively on an initiative by Peter Mandelson, then the European 
Trade Commissioner, to investigate textile imports from China, which were ‘flooding Europe’ 
(25 April 2005). 
The claimed bureaucratic nature of European institutions, and particularly the European 
Commission, is a theme more readily associated with the news sections of newspapers rather 
than the business sections, however. While the bureaucracy frame is primarily deployed in the 
main sections of the newspapers, it also appears in the business sections, albeit with a lower 
frequency. This frame combines a number of motifs found elsewhere, touching on 
sovereignty, democracy, and ideas of the nation, and is thus an extension of these ideas into 
the economic sphere. Rather than accept their opponents’ claims that the EU is a source of 
economic prosperity (see below), an important section of the tan discourse constructs the EU 
as a bureaucratic constraint to economic growth and success.  
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Pro-European economic narratives 
Conversely, there is strand of the pro-European discourses that emphasises the functional 
benefits of membership of the EU. These discourses occur most prominently in the Guardian 
and Independent, and also in the Mirror. Other examples of this pro-European economic 
discourse can be found in the Times. Most notably, this frame was the primary frame used in 
reporting of the EU in the Financial Times. The primary focus of this frame was to position 
the EU as vital to the UK’s economic success and stability. The EU is shown to be a source of 
investment, an important focus for trade, and membership of the EU is argued to support a 
significant amount of employment in the British economy.  
In the Mirror, this discourse on the economy is particularly strongly expressed. The Mirror 
constructs the EU as an important source of prosperity, and uses this to oppose the discourses 
that it identifies from the Conservative Party and in other newspapers. For instance, in 
opposing Conservative policy on the EU and euro membership, membership of the euro is 
argued to be vital:‘[t]he future of this country depends on going into the single 
currency’ (Mirror, 30 May 2001), this seems to echo Tony Blair’s claim that the ‘patriotic’ 
course would be to embrace further integration. The same article continues: ‘[s]hutting 
ourselves off from our main trading partners and the world's second biggest currency bloc 
would be suicidal’ (Mirror, 30 May 2001). These claims are repeated in the Mirror in 
discussions of the arguments in favour of participation in the EU. This discourse was 
deployed in order to attempt to persuade readers to vote for the Labour Party, for instance 
claiming that if the Conservatives were to win the 2001 general election, ‘[w]e would be 
forced out of the European Union, which accounts for 60 per cent of our trade and more than 
3 million jobs’ (Mirror, 28 May 2001).  
This discourse was also present elsewhere. For instance, the Independent connects EU 
membership with economic growth, reporting that Bulgaria could expect that ‘future 
membership would bring prosperity’ (26 April 2005). Despite challenges including slowing 
economic growth and the effects of globalisation, the Independent credits ‘the postwar 
European era of peace and prosperity’ as being contingent on a ‘social consensus’ that 
included membership of the EU (28 April 2005). One particular event that was used in several 
newspapers to illustrate the benefits of European economic co-operation was the maiden 
flight of the Airbus A380 aircraft. For example, in a leader column, the Guardian argued that 
the ‘giant A380… is a muscular symbol of what a united Europe can achieve’, and contrasts 
this with what it claims is the ‘shabby’ state of European politics: the  co-operation that led to 
the development of the aircraft, and its claimed success, is shown to be a model ‘for a grand 
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European project’ (28 April 2005). This pattern is repeated elsewhere, the Mirror praises the 
‘European built’ aircraft while listing the components made in the UK (28 April 2005), and 
the Independent quoted Jacques Chirac to call the aircraft ‘a magnificent result for European 
industrial co-operation’ (28 April 2005), and described it as a ‘European success story’ (27 
April 2005).  
A related theme is that the UK is constructed as being champion of the Single Market, free 
markets in general, and as a leader in other economic reforms. The EU-UK ‘relationship’ seen 
as beneficial for both parties in this discourse, in that the UK is seen to offer leadership when 
it comes to the Single Market. For instance, in a Guardian editorial, Chris Huhne, Liberal 
Democrat MP, wrote that ‘the single market is Lady Thatcher's greatest European 
achievement’ (Huhne, Guardian, 5 June 2001), challenging the intervention of the former 
Prime Minister in the debate during the election campaign, in which she argued that Britain 
should ‘never’ join the euro (see Telegraph, 24 May 2001). This theme suggests that, for 
example, the ‘lower level of bureaucracy in Britain’ ought to be exported to the other states of 
the EU, and that ‘a stronger UK voice in Europe’ would ‘help shape business policies 
there’ (Guardian 6 June 2001). There was also a recurrent claim that this change was required 
in order to ensure a ‘level playing field’ across the EU. For instance, the Times claimed that 
‘some European countries reserve major contracts for local firms’, and that the UK should 
ensure that ‘the same open…processes’ that were used in the UK ‘were carried out across 
Europe’ to guarantee fairness (4 May 2005). The EU is often argued to be the way in which to 
achieve this fairness, and thus bring greater opportunities to the UK economy (for example, 
FT, 7 June 2001; 3 May 2005; Mail, 4 May 2005).  
The contestation of the economic benefits of European integration seems to show another 
division between the framing of Eurosceptic discourses and pro-European discourses. Among 
the Eurosceptic discourses, there is a clear link drawn to the gal-tan axis. The economics of 
European integration are not, in these discourses, framed in solely left-right terms, but 
connections are made to the other frames discussed above, particularly sovereignty. This links 
discussions of the economic implications of EU membership to the tan-Eurosceptic narratives 
centred on the defence of the nation. In strategic terms, this makes sense in the politicisation 
model, since it shifts the axes of contestation to include the new politics dimension. In the 
pro-European discourses, there is little evidence of this: the economics of the EU and reforms 
like euro membership are largely discussed in utilitarian terms, emphasising practical 
advantages.  
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5.6  A ‘depoliticisation narrative’?  
Unlike the clear association between Eurosceptic discourses and tan narratives about the 
nation, there was no clear sense of a distinctive gal/pro-European discourse that was coherent 
in the same way as the tan-Eurosceptic discourse. While the tan-Eurosceptic discourse was 
clearly grouped around frames and narratives such as sovereignty and nationalism, pro-
European discourses were inconsistent in their framing, making it difficult to analyse them 
with any conceptual clarity. While pro-European newspapers opposed the narratives of the 
tan-Eurosceptic press, they were less clear in making a clear ‘case’ for EU membership in 
their narratives, and of connecting this discourse to the new politics dimension. This seems to 
reflect the findings of Hawkins (2009; 2012), who argues that there is not a ‘unified pro-EU 
discourse’ in the UK press, which instead demonstrates a variety of competing voices.  
As the above sections have shown, pro-European narratives are particularly concentrated in 
the Guardian, Independent, and Daily Mirror, and also in the Financial Times. However, as 
Hawkins (2009, 195) argues, there is not a single pro-European narrative in the British 
media.  Whereas the anti-European narratives discussed above tend to consolidate around a 8
number of key frames, pro-European voices in the press do not necessarily contest these 
narratives directly. While the nationalist narratives of tan-leaning newspapers are challenged 
by a number of articles on their own terms, the overwhelming trend was for articles to instead 
make pro-European arguments in quite different terms to the anti-European rhetoric found in 
tan-ish discourses. Rather than argue for European integration along the same axes of 
contestation as the tan discourses discussed above, the pro-European voices in the British 
press focussed on benefits of membership of the EU that fell outside of the gal-tan dimension.  
The Conservatives’ EU ‘obsession’ and de-politicisation  
However, one key feature of the pro-European discourse that was common in the pro-
European newspapers studied is an apparent attempt in many articles to depoliticise the anti-
European rhetoric of tan discourses, and the Conservative Party in particular, by charging 
these actors with an ‘obsession’ with Europe. In contrast to the economic frame, this is a 
discourse focussed on portraying concerns about European integration as ‘out of touch’ with 
the public and as the preoccupation of only a small group on the fringe of politics. Particularly 
in 2001, the charge that the Conservatives were ‘obsessed’ about Europe was to be found in 
almost all the newspapers studied — including those newspapers that were generally 
 Hawkins (2009) studies only the Guardian and Mirror, and does not study the FT or Independent, 8
however. 
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supportive of anti-European sentiments — with the noticeable exception of the Daily Mail. 
This was despite this emphasis placed upon the need for public debate on Europe in these 
same newspapers.  
Key to this discourse is the claim that the Conservatives were ‘obsessed’ with Europe and that 
they had failed in their objective to turn the 2001 general election into a ‘referendum’ on the 
euro. This  discourse is contradictory to claims that there was insufficient debate about the EU 
and the consequences of membership (particularly of the euro). This could be found even in 
the Conservative-supporting newspapers. For instance, the Telegraph argued that ‘Mr Hague's 
attempt to turn the election into a referendum on the single European currency was not 
playing well with the voters’ (30 May 2001). Even the Daily Mail, which generally refrained 
from engaging in this discourse, acknowledged that Hague had ‘faced severe criticism from 
critics in his own party… who claim his determination to stop the euro has proved a 
turnoff’ (3 June 2001).  
For the Express, the focus on the euro was constructed as negative, arguing that Hague either 
‘lacks the intelligence to grasp’ that a referendum was planned on the euro, ‘or in his cynicism 
and desperation, he is trying to con the electorate into voting for him on this single issue’ (29 
May 2001). Indeed, the Conservatives were seen as undermining the chance that the UK 
might retain the pound: ‘in one fell swoop, William Hague has helped Tony Blair to scrap the 
pound’, since the debate had ’given Mr Blair a chance to portray them as extremists 
endangering our national interest’ (28 May 2001). Indeed, this was seen as reflecting badly on 
the Conservative party who had ‘once again let Margaret Thatcher set the agenda with her 
outdated and irrational anti-European views’ (25 May 2001). Similarly, the Mirror 
constructed the Conservative focus on Europe as leading to more important issues being left 
un-debated: ‘William Hague ignores the issues that really matter to the British people - health, 
education, pensions, transport, the economy - and goes on and on about the euro’ (Mirror, 29 
May 2001). The Sun agreed with this, arguing that this had led to the Conservatives 
‘pretend[ing] to themselves that the Election is a referendum on the euro’ (30 May 2001).  
This discourse was also found in the pro-European broadsheets. This was particularly clear in 
the Guardian, which described the Conservatives as ‘still gripped and controlled by a euro-
phobic clique which seeks to drive out apostates and unbelievers’ (Guardian, 6 June 2001). 
Under a headline of ‘Voters Fail to Share Hague’s Euro Obsession’, Alan Travis argues that 
the Conservatives were ‘going nowhere on Europe’ (30 May 2001). This is accompanied by 
claims that ‘the party’s obsession with Europe threatens to tear it apart’ (1 June 2001, see also 
4 June 2001; 6 June 2001). In the Independent, the emphasis on the EU was seen to damage 
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the quality of debate around the election: ‘the election debate has been ditched in favour of a 
euro referendum squabble. And on early showing, the quality of argument is none too high’ (3 
June 2001). 
These claims position the debate on the EU and euro membership as the concern of only a 
small number of people. This seems to be an attempt to depoliticise the issue of Europe by 
pushing it off the agenda and refocusing the election on other issues. While it is expected that 
the Labour Party might want to pursue this agenda — and indeed Tony Blair’s claim’s 
regarding Hague’s ‘obsession’ with Europe were widely repeated — what is most surprising 
is that newspapers that generally supported both pro- and anti-European positions repeated 
this discourse. The claim that the Conservatives were obsessed with Europe gained wide 
traction, and this implies that the issue of integration ought to be debated less frequently. 
This could be interpreted as an attempt to shift emphasis away from debates about European 
integration. Strategically, this appears to make sense for pro-European actors under the 
postfunctionalist model, since if reforms are contested on the left-right axis, this contestation 
is less likely to favour entrepreneurial actors who are able to use discourses on identity to cue 
public opinion on European integration. Significantly, postfunctionalism does not directly 
deal with ‘de-politicisation’ or the means by which incumbent pro-European parties or other 
actors might seek to challenge entrepreneurial (Eurosceptic actors), who appear to hold a 
strategic advantage given the preponderance of citizens who hold an exclusive sense of 
national identity (in the UK case in particular).  
5.7  Comparing the 2001 and 2005 general elections 
Finally, the extent to which the general level of contestation of European integration in the 
broader political environment affects media discourses is of interest, since it indicates the 
extent to which newspapers may follow parties in the level of attention paid to European 
integration as an issue. The above discussion has shown patterns of discourse across both 
2001 and 2005. However, discourses on European integration were more prominent in 2001. 
This is reflected in the number of articles mentioning Europe analysed (see figure 5.1). 
Phillipa Sherrington’s (2006: 69) assertion that ‘the 2005 UK general election was defined by 
‘almost deafening political silence on the European issue’ is supported by the discourse 
analysis presented here. The relative quiescence of the major UK parties on the EU at the 
general election was, Sherrington argues, ‘underwritten by a silent pact’ between them 
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(Sherrington 2006, 69). This contrasts with the 2001 general election, whereby a considerable 
proportion of the election coverage discussed Europe. 
In general terms, a number of clear patterns are visible when comparing the pattern of 
newspaper discourses on European integration between the 2001 and 2005 general elections. 
The first is that numerically, there were more articles mentioning Europe and European 
integration during the 2001 general election: 867 in 2001 compared to 557 in 2005. This 
reflects the lower level electoral competition over European policy evident at the 2005 
general election: newspapers seemed to follow the lead of parties in talking about Europe less, 
especially in the context of contestation. This was in contrast to 2001, where coverage of 
European issues was much greater, especially in the context of contestation in the general 
election, and the proposals around a referendum on the euro promised by the Labour 
manifesto.  
As noted above, the change in emphasis was also reflected in the way that newspapers framed 
the EU. While examples of the frames discussed above were found in the coverage from both 
years, as section 5.3 notes, the sovereignty frame was particularly emphasised in the 2001 
general election coverage. This may reflect emphasis from the Conservative Party in 
particular on sovereignty and the issue of euro membership. In contrast, coverage of the 2005 
general election tended to focus more on the ‘democracy’ frame - although the two frames are 
closely related, and often overlapping.  The rather lower priority given to the issue of Europe 
at the 2005 general election was also evident in the newspapers’ editorial endorsements of 
parties in the days before voting. In 2005, the endorsements of all newspapers gave far less 
prominence to parties’ stance on Europe as justification for lending their support. However, 
the editorials of the key eurosceptic tan newspapers still mentioned the European issue in 
their support for Michael Howard’s Conservatives. For instance: 
We also need someone who will stand up to Europe, who will stop Brussels riding 
roughshod over Westminster. Most crucially, we need a Government that is prepared 
to end the utter madness that is European human rights legislation. (Express, 4 May 
2005) 
…they offer the hope of restoring integrity to public life, of renegotiating more 
sensible terms with Europe, of restoring genuine prudence to the economy and re-
energising the public sector. (Daily Mail, 4 May 2005) 
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Although the Sun endorsed Labour once again, its main election endorsement editorial did not 
explicitly mention Europe. However, columnist Richard Littlejohn did express the consistent 
anti-integration line adopted by the newspaper (see Bartle 2005, 46), when he condemned the 
Liberal Democrats as ‘even more of a high-tax, big government, pro-Europe, meddling party 
than Labour’ (Littlejohn, Sun, 5 May 2005).  
Nonetheless, the focus of coverage at the 2005 general election was largely directed at issues 
other than Europe. This reduction in coverage from 2001 seems to reflect the relatively lower 
importance given to Europe by the major political parties. Despite winning third largest 
number of votes in the UK at the 2004 European Parliament election, 16.1% and with 12 
seats, mentions of UKIP in the coverage registered a decline between the 2001 to 2005 
general elections, down from 23 articles in 2001 to only 15 in 2005. This relative absence of 
European integration as a topic of debate at the election was a point of contention for the most 
vociferous anti-European voices in the tan-leaning discourse. For instance, the Daily Mail ran 
an editorial on 3 May under the headline ‘The Head in the Sand Election’, in which Stephen 
Glover constructed Europe as ‘the issue that touches most deeply on the future of this 
country’;  
Take Europe. Is it not important? I'd say so. But apart from Tony Blair's throwaway 
comment that as things stand entry to the euro 'doesn't look very likely', Europe has 
been largely avoided. Next year we are likely to have a vote on the new European 
constitution, unless the French should reject it in a referendum on May 29 and bring 
the whole process to a halt. (Glover, Daily Mail, 3 May 2005)  
This sense that Europe was the missing topic at the election is emphasised in this passage. 
The negotiations and ratification process for the Constitutional Treaty is seen to be 
sufficiently important to warrant more attention. Despite this, most newspaper reports 
discussing the election did not mention the EU or European integration at all, and even fewer 
took these issues as their main focus. That the relatively low levels of contestation over 
Europe seen in between political parties is reflected in the numbers of articles discussing 
Europe, the EU, or European integration during election suggests a close link between the 
prominence of issues in the political arena and the amount of attention they receive in the 
press.  
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2005: Immigration and Europe as the ‘missing issue’  
While it has been shown that the relative lack of attention directed towards European 
integration by political parties at the 2005 election appears to have been reflected in the press, 
one key issue during that election, immigration, is of interest to the present study because of 
the way in which anti-immigration sentiments have frequently been mobilised by anti-
European parties to stiffen their support at elections. The accession of ten new Member States 
to the EU in 2004 resulted in an increase in immigration to the UK, and immigration emerged 
as an important issue at the 2005 election, forming a key part of the Conservative Party’s 
campaign (Whiteley et al. 2005).  
Research suggests a connection between citizen attitudes towards immigration and opposition 
to European integration. Immigration is an issue that is particularly conducive to discursive 
constructions that link problems associated with immigration to the EU because these 
problems are ‘relatively complex’ and largely beyond the control of national governments: the 
free movement of people guaranteed by the Single Market constrains the ability of 
governments to substantially alter immigration policies (van Spanje 2010, 568). At the 
individual level, anti-immigration sentiments are associated with opposition to European 
integration, and have been shown to negatively affect public support for the EU in referenda 
(de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005, 73). In addition, anti-immigration sentiments are among 
the core predictors for support for populist parties, and attitudes opposed to immigration have 
increased, becoming more politically relevant in a number of European countries (de Vreese 
and Boomgaarden 2005; Rydgren 2008).  
In party contestation, using the postfunctionalist analytical framework, it is relatively easy for 
tan parties to adopt hard line policies on immigration, since they are easily able to connect 
immigration to cultural unity, and national pride, reconciling anti-immigration policies with 
the defence of the nation state and its culture against ‘external threats’ (Bale 2008, 463). The 
tan pole encompasses a wider support for the integrity of the nation state, including against 
the ‘other’ represented by migrants and mass migration. The emergence and increasing 
electoral success of parties across the EU, opposed to the free movement of people within the 
European Union and mass immigration into their own nation-states, illustrates this 
connection. Parties including the National Front in France, the Sweden Democrats, and the 
Northern League in Italy, have been effective in influencing policy outputs across Western 
European countries (van Spanje 2010).  
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This pattern of contestation among political parties in Europe does not fit with the evidence 
available the from newspaper reports studied here from the 2005 general election. Much of 
the public debate on immigration at the 2005 general election did not focus on the free 
movement of people across the EU, or indeed the transitional arrangements for the accession 
countries that joined the EU a year earlier. Instead, the focus was largely on non-EU 
migration, specifically what the Mirror describes as ‘the asylum problem’ (23 April 2005). 
The Conservative party campaign focussed, for the most part, on those immigrants in the UK 
illegally. Their ‘Are You Thinking What We’re Thinking’ campaign has been described as a 
‘dog whistle’, particularly on the issue of immigration and asylum, designed to ‘resonate with 
specific groups of anxious voters’ (Wring 2005, 63). This emphasis on illegal immigration 
was reflected in media coverage of the election: in one of the defining moments of the 
election, Jeremy Paxman, host of television current affairs programme Newsnight, asked Tony 
Blair a total of eighteen times if he knew how many illegal immigrants there were in the 
country (Bartle 2005, 52).  
This emphasis on asylum and illegal immigration carries over into the press reports. Overall, 
there were relatively few connections constructed between membership of the EU and 
increased immigration. For example, a Daily Express leader column focussing on claims that 
Tony Blair lied to Parliament over the case for British involvement in the 2003 Iraq War also 
accused Blair of lying about crime figures and immigration ‘the Home Office admits 500,000 
“illegals”’ (27 April 2005). Even in those newspapers that were supportive of reducing 
immigration into the UK, most reports did not draw connections with the enlargement of the 
EU and the free movement of people. Instead, the pattern of press reporting followed the 
party discourses, on this issue. Discourses on immigration focussed on illegal immigration 
and asylum, rather than legal immigration from within the European Union. For instance, the 
Times reported that one way to ‘scale back the number of foreigners working’ in the UK 
would be to follow the example of Ireland and reduce work permits for non-EU residents, 
rather than take measures to change the free movement of people, or to oppose further 
enlargement (23 April 2005).  
While the bulk of newspaper reporting on immigration and European integration concentrated 
on the major parties, some attention was also paid to the smaller, anti-EU parties. Strikingly 
the UK Independence Party was not widely covered, the party being mentioned in only 15 
articles in 2005, compared with 23 in 2001. In the context of the development of UKIP, this is 
surprising: UKIP has been successful in leveraging anti-immigration rhetoric to campaign for 
a British exit from the EU (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 103) However, the circumstances of the 
2005 may provide an explanation for this failure. As Ford and Goodwin have shown, UKIP a 
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particular difficulty in constructing an anti-immigration the 2005 general election due to the 
relatively positioning of the Conservative Party and the far-right British National Party. As the 
Conservative rhetoric on immigration ‘ventured onto radical right territory’ and the BNP 
offered policies that appealed to ‘unapologetic racism’, UKIP were unable to develop a 
distinctive message (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 65). Nevertheless, given their success at the 
2004 European Parliament elections, it is remarkable that their share of press coverage - on all 
issues - fell from the 2001 general election.  
The juxtaposition of the 2001 and 2005 elections suggests that the level of contestation 
between political parties is directly connected to the level of contestation among newspapers. 
Where the parties strongly contested the EU, newspapers followed, whereas during an 
election in which the EU was not prominently contested, the level of debate in the newspapers 
on this issue was much lower. This also seems to affect the ways in which other issues are 
connected to European integration. Whereas membership of the EU became closely 
associated with the debate on immigration by the time of the 2015 general election (Geddes 
and Tonge 2015), the reluctance of parties to discuss European integration in 2005, and 
connect this issue with the EU and free movement, appears to be reflected in newspaper 
framing of this issue.  
Conclusions  
This chapter presented an analysis of the ways in which the major UK daily newspapers 
constructed pro- and anti-European discourses. It set out to explore two areas: the connection 
between gal-tan position and discourses on European integration in the newspapers, and the 
way in which identity discourses featured in reporting on Europe. The expectation was that 
there would be a clear connection between the gal-tan dimension and the position of the 
newspapers on European integration. This has been supported by the evidence: newspapers 
which were found to oppose European integration were those which were located towards the 
tan-pole of the gal-tan dimension. It was also expected that newspapers would construct 
connections between identity and European integration in their discourses. This was shown to 
be the case for newspapers which were generally Eurosceptic, however there was a less 
coherent pro-European discourse and this was not consistently connected with a discourse on 
identity. These conclusions will now be discussed in more detail.  
The most significant finding of this chapter is that there is evidence to show that the gal-tan 
dimension appears to structure debates in the press in a similar fashion to the way that this 
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dimension structures contestation of European integration among political parties. These 
results appear to support the estimated positions of newspapers discussed in Chapter 4. A 
group of tan-Eurosceptic newspapers, including the Mail, Telegraph, Express, and Sun 
presented consistent and powerful anti-European discourses that connected opposition to 
European integration with a defence of the nation. These newspapers were the same 
newspapers that were found to have average reader positions towards both the anti-EU and 
tan poles in Chapter 4. The Times often mirrored these discourses, but was more moderate in 
its opposition to the EU. This also reflects its more moderate relative average reader position 
on the support for European integration and gal-tan axes as shown in the previous chapter. 
Three newspapers, the Guardian, Independent, and FT, were consistently relatively pro-
European, although they did not demonstrate a distinctive gal discourse. They were supported 
by the Mirror, although this newspaper reported European issues in less depth. The focus on 
the 2001 and 2005 general election campaigns has offered a contrast between a period of high 
contestation. Newspapers appear to largely follow parties in the prominence that they give to 
reporting of European integration: where the level of contestation among political parties is 
low, the level of reporting on Europe is lower, and those articles focus less on contesting 
integration. 
The apparent association between the gal-tan dimension and the discourses adopted by the 
newspapers studied is, in a similar pattern to parties, stronger at the tan pole of the dimension. 
The association between newspapers that adopt positions towards the tan pole on the gal-tan 
spectrum and opposition to European integration extends beyond simply the co-existence of 
these two positions, however. Overall, there is evidence that the tan-leaning press seeks to 
engage Europe as an identity issue, acting as a political entrepreneur in the same sense as tan 
political parties, with the aim of politicising European integration. Also clear from the results 
of the discourse analysis is that the tan press reproduce and, in many cases, strengthen, the 
eurosceptic elite political rhetoric engaged in by the Conservative Party in particular, and this 
is examined further in Chapter 6. There is a less clear connection between gal discourses and 
support for the EU. Newspapers that were found to be towards the gal-pole (and whose 
readers had higher levels of support for European integration) in the previous chapter did tend 
to be more pro-European in their discourses, and made fewer connections between nationalist 
discourses and Europe (and featured a lower prevalence of nationalist discourses in general). 
However, there was an absence of a distinctive pro-European discourse, and particularly a gal 
construction of the nation — in most cases — that constructed the nation and membership of 
the EU as compatible. This is significant for the model, and as a general finding: while there 
is a distinctive, consistent, and coherent tan / Eurosceptic discourse in the UK press, there is 
little evidence of a coherent pro-European discourse. Even in those newspapers that support 
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European integration, there was little evidence of a systematic narrative that reconciled 
membership of the EU with the themes, particularly identity, that provided the focus for the 
tan-leaning newspapers. This finding perhaps offers a wider insight into the difficulty faced 
by pro-European actors in mobilising support for the EU in the UK, although it must be 
recalled that Hooghe and Marks find a stronger association between parties at the tan-pole 
and Euroscepticism. 
This finding begs questions about the importance of the overall structure of the press, and 
influence this might have on the outcomes of debates. This is especially relevant when one 
considers not just the number of Eurosceptic newspapers found here, but the influence that 
they have in the mass arena. The high readership of the tan-leaning newspapers, and the 
pervasiveness of their Eurosceptic discourses during the time period studied, seems to have 
contributed to a discursive environment in which Eurosceptic ideas are strongly embedded. 
The effects of this structure are considered in the next chapter, where the representations of 
party discourses in the media are analysed in detail.  
Analysis of the content of the newspaper discourses revealed a number of additional 
conclusions. Perhaps most importantly, the analysis confirmed that newspapers constructed 
discourses that connected the gal-tan dimension with European integration and which 
consequently contested European integration through the lens of identity politics. This is 
evidence to suggest that the discourses of newspapers matter to outcomes in the 
postfunctionalist model. As Chapter 2 argued, if newspaper discourses construct connections 
between the nation and European integration, then they may cue citizen attitudes in the same 
way that Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue party discourses cue citizen attitudes. This finding 
confirms the assertion of the MAP model that newspapers are also able to cue citizen 
opposition (or support) for European integration - with clear implications for the strategies of 
parties in the mass arena.  
A number of key themes that framed the debate on European integration in the UK media 
were identified. Most importantly, it was shown that the frames of identity, sovereignty, and 
democracy were the most prevalent in the reporting, especially in anti-European tan-leaning 
discourses. Much of the opposition to the EU in the UK press centres around a narrative that 
European integration is a threat to the British nation, and this existential danger is constructed 
as being fundamentally incompatible with the nation-state as the primary means of political 
governance. The EU is thus constructed as objectionable on the grounds of the logic of 
nationalism. This defence centres around a number of motifs, including the defence of key 
symbols of British national identity and the British state, as well as through the concept of the 
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‘national interest’. Tan discourses also frame the EU in terms of democracy, touching on 
debates about the claimed ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU while concentrating on the supposed 
anti-democratic practices of the EU and the negative impact that European integration has had 
on ‘British’ freedoms. The clearest articulation of these sentiments can be seen in the Mail, 
Telegraph, and Sun, which develop a discourse on British membership of the EU that, while 
giving acknowledgement to the economic case for membership, is implacably opposed to 
further British involvement in integration. The most striking aspect of the discourses studied 
was the extent to which many newspapers adopted a construction of European integration that 
contested the very legitimacy of the EU as a political system. This suggests a deep opposition 
to the EU within sections of the press in the UK, acting as a source of resistance and 
opposition to the UK’s continued participation in the EU, that exists alongside the milder 
forms of Euroscepticism that dominate the press discourse analysed in this chapter. However 
this discourse is not uniform, or unchallenged. Several newspapers included in the sample 
present a rather different discourse on Europe, one which is closer to that engaged in by the 
pro-European parties. European integration is constructed in these newspapers, and 
particularly in The Guardian, Financial Times, and The Independent, as a generally positive 
development; they emphasise the functional purpose of integration alongside the practical 
benefits of membership of the UK. 
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Chapter 6 
The Representation of Party Discourses in the UK Press 
This chapter is concerned with the mediation of elite discourses and the linkage between the 
press and political parties in the mass arena. The previous chapter examined the 
characteristics and qualities of press discourses on European integration in the context of 
electoral conflict. Building on the general findings of Chapter 5, this chapter examines the 
postfunctionalist claim that political parties — and in particular entrepreneurial parties — 
seek to ‘push’ debates about European integration into the mass arena through discursive 
strategies that seek to prime public opinion. As the previous chapter found, there is evidence 
to suggest that there is a clear link between the gal-tan axis and newspaper discourses on 
European integration: contestation of European integration in the media exhibits evidence of 
being structured by this axis. A particularly strong link was found to exist between 
Eurosceptic discourses and the tan-pole of the gal-tan axis: as with parties in the 
postfunctionalist model, newspapers seemed to construct links between nationalist, anti-
European discourses and an exclusive construction of British national identity. 
Recalling the literature discussed in Chapter 2, the present chapter examines the mediation of 
debates in the mass arena. In particular, this chapter tests the postfunctionalist assumption that 
the process of politicisation and contestation is one in which the agency of parties is 
paramount. The assumption that parties can politicise (or de-politicise) European integration 
in the mass arena through acts of discourse-making implicitly relies upon the media to 
reproduce those discourses in order that they are transmitted to the public. However the extent 
to which media outlets reframe the discourses of elites, modifying the messages of 
mainstream and entrepreneurial parties alike, is significant for the operation of the 
politicisation and contestation process (see, for example, Scheufele 2000; Edy and Meirick 
2007; Entman 2007).  
Postfunctionalism establishes a number of assumptions regarding the politicisation of 
European integration in the mass arena. Most importantly, it is asserted that political 
entrepreneurs must mobilise opposition to the EU by constructing connections between 
‘national identity, cultural and economic insecurity and issues such as EU 
enlargement’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 13). Through engaging in discourses that engage with 
nationalist sentiments and which connect the EU with social insecurities, political 
entrepreneurs influence arena choice, ensuring that European policy is contested in the mass 
arena. The MAP politicisation model presented in Chapter 2 contended that the mediating role 
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of the media in the mass arena is significant. Parties must be able to effectively communicate 
their messages in a mass-mediated public debate, in order to be successful in engaging the 
tension between static identities and evolving supranational governance structures, and they 
rely on the media to do so. Parties must be able to set the agenda on European integration 
issues, and successfully communicate their framing of European integration to public, for the 
postfunctionalist politicisation model to hold.  
The extent to which this agenda setting power is effective is the subject of this chapter: are 
parties able to put Europe on the agenda, and in the terms of their own choosing, as the model 
predicts? We expect that parties will seek to influence the basis and character of debate in 
order to achieve their objectives. In doing so, as Chapter 2 argued, they must change pre-
existing media narratives through their entrepreneurial activity. Parties ‘seeks to politicise an 
issue when they see electoral advantage in doing so’, and as a result we expect that parties 
will attempt to cast the ‘spotlight of politicisation’ on the EU only in situations where this is 
potentially advantageous (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 18-19). Therefore, major speeches are 
opportunities for parties to attempt to exercise their agenda-setting power in order to position 
themselves strategically on Europe. While parties are constrained in their strategic positioning 
by a number of concerns including reputation, ideological considerations, and the potential for 
issues to divide parties (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Meyer 2013), it can be assumed that major 
speeches on Europe represent occasions where parties seek to maximise their strategic 
advantages on European policy. This chapter will argue that parties are only partially 
successful in setting the agenda in this way. As the evidence below will show, the reporting of 
speeches did not always facilitate this: in some cases, newspapers did not report speeches at 
all (even those that were comparatively major speeches, from the perspective the party), or 
reported relatively little of the content of the speech, limiting the ability of the party to set the 
agenda. 
Chapter 2 argued that the way that the media reports speeches on the EU may not necessarily 
reflect the framing used in the speeches. Drawing form the political communications 
literature, it was argued that the mediation of speeches by newspapers and other media outlets 
is expected to alter the message of those speeches, particularly in terms of how they are 
framed. This chapter will show that there is substantial evidence of reframing. The following 
sections show that newspapers do significantly alter the frames used by parties, fitting the 
discourses of parties into pre-existing narratives and to suit their own editorial priorities. In 
addition, we expect from the theory that newspapers inclined towards a tan-ish perspective 
will reframe pro-European discourses in nationalist terms, emphasising the claimed 
consequences of integration for the national in-group. Given the higher salience of the gal-tan 
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dimension for actors at the tan-pole, we expect that this reframing will be particularly visible 
in the case of speeches that do not frame Europe in gal-tan terms: in other words, we expect 
the Eurosceptic, tan-leaning newspapers to frame speeches on European integration in their 
own nationalist terms, even if this does not reflect the positioning of the speech. If 
newspapers are in themselves entrepreneurial actors, then tan-leaning publications would seek 
to frame speeches in terms of gal-tan contestation, since is expected to produce the 
politicisation and subsequent cueing of opposition to the EU that they desire. This chapter 
argues that there is limited evidence to show that this is the case. As the following sections 
show, there is evidence to show that in some circumstances, newspapers do reframe party 
narratives, but not in a way that is always consistent with their own position on European 
integration.  
Sources 
This chapter examines five major speeches on European integration, made my the leaders of 
the Labour and Conservative parties. Each speech is analysed alongside the subsequent 
resultant press coverage in the same nine major daily UK newspapers analysed in the previous 
chapters.  Speeches were chosen to reflect a range of scenarios. In all cases, the speeches were 
given by the leader of the Labour Party or Conservative Party. A number of variables differ 
between the speeches, including whether or not the speech took place during an election 
campaign, the immediate audience, the orientation of the politician towards the EU, and the 
message of the speech. Three of the speeches frame European integration in terms of national 
identity, while two do not. In all cases, speeches were chosen as examples of the ‘best 
attempts’ of leaders to shape the contestation of the EU in their own image. It is assumed that, 
in each case, these speeches represent attempts by the party leader in question to exercise 
agenda-setting power, and, in postfunctionalist terms, influence either the arena choice for the 
contestation of European reforms, or contest European integration in the mass arena. 
Therefore, these case studies test the assumption that parties are able to politicise European 
integration (in the case of Eurosceptic parties), or are able to shape the terms of debate in the 
mass arena according to their own construction of European integration. This also tests the 
contention of this thesis that pro-European political parties, the role of which is not as well 
theorised in post-functionalism, face difficulties in containing the politicisation of European 
integration through their own framing of the issues.  
Five speeches are analysed in detail, and these have been carefully selected as ‘defining 
statements’ made by party leaders on European integration. Two speeches by leaders of the 
Conservative Party, William Hague and Michael Howard, are examined. William Hague’s 
!173
speech to the Conservative Party conference in Harrogate, on 5 March 2001 was made before 
the calling of the 2001 general election, but served to set out his position for the forthcoming 
election. Michael Howard’s speech in Bristol on 7th June 2004 was made three days before 
the European Parliament election of that year. Two speeches by Tony Blair are examined: one 
made in Edinburgh on 25 May 2001, during the 2001 general election campaign, and one 
made in Oxford, on 2 February 2006. Finally, Gordon Brown’s most significant speech on 
Europe as prime minister, to the European Parliament on 24th March 2009 is examined. The 
articles analysed for each speech are summarised in figure 6.1. 
The speeches, and subsequent reporting of them, were analysed in detail using the same 
methodology employed in Chapter 5. Specifically, the analysis describes the framing of 
European integration and the EU in each of the speeches. The primary messages of each 
speech are analysed, and the extent to which the speech frames the EU in terms of national 
identity and the gal-tan dimension is discussed. The subsequent reporting of the speeches in 
the press is then analysed using the same criteria. Particularly, the analysis aims to compare 
the framing and messaging of the reporting with that of the speeches. Where speeches have 
been reframed, key messages altered or omitted, or the reporting focuses on pre-existing or 
alternative narratives, this is discussed in detail.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the speech given by Gordon Brown in 2009 is 
examined. The analysis of this speech shows that speeches may not be reported in detail, even 
Figure 6.1  Newspaper articles analysed by speech
William 
Hague 
Speech, 
2001
Tony Blair 
Speech, 
2001
Michael 
Howard 
Speech, 
2004
Tony Blair 
Speech, 
2006
Gordon 
Brown 
Speech, 
2009
Total
Daily Express 3 4 2 0 6 15
Daily Mail 10 9 2 2 6 29
Daily Mirror 5 5 1 0 1 12
Daily 
Telegraph
12 11 4 2 6 35
Financial 
Times
8 10 2 5 4 29
Guardian 16 12 2 3 10 43
Independent 8 10 5 4 3 30
Sun 6 7 1 1 3 18
Times 9 6 4 3 4 26
Total 77 74 23 20 43 237
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when they are relatively important statements, and also shows that speeches can be fit into 
pre-existing narratives. Second, Tony Blair’s 2006 speech in Oxford is discussed. The analysis 
of the reporting of this speech shows that party leaders - even prime ministers - can fail to 
influence the agenda at all, with several of the largest-circulation newspapers ignoring the 
speech. It also demonstrates some evidence to suggest that tan-leaning newspapers do reframe 
speeches to be about identity issues, as the theory expects. Next, Michael Howard’s 2004 
speech is examined, and it is shown that, even in periods of high general contestation of 
European integration, that speeches can be re-framed to by the media to fit a narrative around 
internal party politics, rather than substantive policy. Following this, speeches by William 
Hague and Tony Blair, both given in 2001, are examined. The analysis of Hague’s speech 
shows evidence that when Eurosceptic entrepreneurial parties attempt to cue opinion through 
discourses that explicitly connect identity and the EU, this message can be substantially 
altered even in tan-leaning newspapers: in this case due to a negative reaction to Hague’s 
rhetoric. Finally, the analysis of Tony Blair’s speech shows that there is some evidence to 
suggest that there are occasions where the media do mirror politicians’ framing, and that 
newspapers do sometimes divide along the gal-tan dimension in the reporting of speeches: 
reporting the speech in terms of identity politics and debates about the nation, but taking 
positions according to their general gal-tan position.  
6.1  Gordon Brown’s speech to the European Parliament, 2009 
The first speech to be examined was given by Gordon Brown to a plenary session of the 
European Parliament on 24 March 2009 (Brown 2009). This speech represents the most 
complete statement of Gordon Brown’s approach to the EU during his time as prime minister, 
and garnered considerable attention in the press in the UK. The context of the speech was a 
diplomatic effort by Brown to gather support for a co-ordinated fiscal and monetary bailout 
package, to be presented at the G20 summit held in London on 2 April 2009. This speech is a 
case of a pro-European politician making a speech that constructs a case for co-operation 
through the institutions of the EU, and for British leadership within the EU. Rather than 
dealing with a specific European reform, Brown’s speech instead is a call for policy action co-
ordinated through the EU. This case provides some evidence to illustrate the nature of the 
operation of the later stages of the postfunctionalist model. The extent to which Brown is able 
to achieve his objective of setting the agenda, in order to gather support for EU-wide policies 
to confront the global recession, is illustrative of the processes by which politicians are able to 
influence mass-mediated public debates on Europe. 
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In the speech, European integration is framed as part of a wider narrative about the global 
financial crisis and recession. Brown proposes that ‘Europe takes the lead in a bold plan to 
ensure that every continent now makes the changes in their banking system’ to respond to the 
global recession then underway. The speech is therefore structured around a narrative 
describing the events of the global financial crisis, and the action that Brown argues needs to 
be taken to address this crisis. Brown frames his speech in this context, and constructs the EU 
as a means to exert global leadership on financial reforms. As with much of Brown’s rhetoric 
on European integration, the speech focusses on the themes of globalisation and 
interconnectedness, in this case in the context of the financial crisis: this theme of 
globalisation as one of the ‘challenges’ or ‘forces for change’ in the modern international 
system is common to both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s speechmaking on Europe 
(Daddow 2011, 247). Brown constructs the image of ‘an international hurricane… sweeping 
the world’, and positions globalisation as crossing national and ‘moral boundaries’. The 
alternative to this is to create a ‘new and principled economic consensus for our times’. This, 
Brown sees as emerging from co-operation between the US and UK, thus positioning the UK 
as a ‘bridge’ between the United States and Europe, a common theme in Blair and Brown’s 
speeches (Daddow 2011, 251). Thus, Brown constructs the nation-state as being vulnerable to 
the forces of globalisation, and of global economic crisis. Co-operation through the EU is 
positioned as a means to solve these problems; the emphasis is on the importance of co-
operation as a means to achieve shared objectives. The focus of the speech is on this 
argument, and Brown frames the EU as a means to solve shared economic problems. This 
positions Brown firmly away from the tan pole of the gal-tan axis.  
In framing Europe, Brown emphasises the benefits of co-operation and supranationalism, 
discussing what he sees as the achievements of the EU. Brown argues that today ‘we enjoy a 
Europe of peace and unity’ and that this ‘will truly rank among the finest achievements of 
human history’. Brown sees the EU as ‘a beacon of hope for the whole world’, and sees the 
key achievements of the EU as being in bringing peace and security to Europe: ‘we are 
stronger together, safer together than ever we are apart’. This framing appears to combine 
some of the idealism of the founders of the EU with a pragmatic argument for the EU. Brown 
centres his account of the purpose of the EU around goals that are primarily economic. 
Indeed, he identifies the EU as ‘the greatest and biggest single market in the world’, and also 
cites its environmental achievements, commitment to giving aid, and consumer and workplace 
rights. This primarily economic construction of Europe echoes the central message of the 
speech, which is to  place the EU at the centre of worldwide economic reforms: ‘we in Europe 
are uniquely placed to lead the world in meeting the wholly new and momentous challenges 
of globalisation ahead’. 
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However, in parts, the speech contains a secondary frame that deals with identity. This is 
comprised of two parts. First, Brown associates the EU with a set of common values. In his 
construction of Europe as embodying a common purse, he expresses the idea that Europe is 
bound together by common values, in particular the idea that ‘freedom must never become a 
free for all’, ‘markets should be free, but never values-free’, and ‘being fair is more important 
than being laissez faire’. This, Brown argues, has led to a coming-together of Europe that 
implies a sense of common identity and purpose: ‘today there is no old Europe, no new 
Europe, no new east or west Europe, there is only one Europe and it is our home, Europe’. 
Thus, Brown constructs a commitment to common values and a sense of common purpose as 
the most distinctive feature of ‘Europe’: ‘the unity that will last is the democratic unity rooted 
in the common values of people… it is these defining values that bind us closely together’. 
Second, he develops this point and relates it to the idea of Britishness. Brown describes 
himself as ‘proud to be British and proud to be European’, constructing the two identities as 
compatible and inclusive. Furthermore, he constructs Britain in 2009 as ‘a country that does 
not see itself as an island adrift from Europe, but as a country at the centre of Europe, not in 
Europe’s slip-stream but in Europe’s mainstream’. This seems to be a rejection of Eurosceptic 
discourses on Britain’s place in the EU, and echoes the discourse of Tony Blair (see below) on 
Britain taking a leadership role in Europe. Indeed, Brown explicitly rejects the notion that he 
is eurosceptic; ‘some critics suggested that I was supporting global action more because I 
supported European action less’, instead he claims to ‘want Europe to be leading on the world 
stage’. This suggests that the speech, at least in part, was intended by Brown as an attempt to 
cast himself as pro-European, and to reject the notion that he was ‘secretly’ sceptical of the 
EU.  
Thus, Brown’s speech offers a positive account of the role of the EU in the context of the 
financial crisis and in the context of increasingly powerful forces of globalisation. This 
construction of Europe is based around shared values, and the idea that there is a common 
European interest. Brown does acknowledge the nation in this, but only in a single instance in 
the speech where he warns against ‘heading for the rocks of isolation’, instead arguing for ‘he 
course of cooperation’, which he says ‘is in all our national interests’. Primarily, Brown 
constructs the financial crisis and globalisation as being bigger than any one nation, and 
instead sees these forces as compelling internationalism and co-operation. The speech does 
not engage in debate on the EU in overtly gal-tan terms, therefore. Instead, the EU is 
constructed as a means of enabling co-operation in, primarily, the economic and security 
spheres.  
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The construction of Brown’s speech in the press 
Reporting of the speech demonstrated a plurality of framing, tone, and depth of coverage. 43 
articles covered the speech over a two week period. This suggests a significant impact in 
terms of the amount of attention paid to Brown’s remarks. In common with the other speeches 
analysed, the amount of coverage varied considerably between the newspapers (see figure 
6.1). The most notable aspect of the reporting of this speech is the framing employed. 
Whereas Brown attempted to frame discussion of British engagement in the EU as a matter of 
solving shared (particularly economic) problems, and to construct the UK as taking a 
leadership role in the EU, the framing of his speech in the press changes this message entirely: 
Brown’s speech is reported in the majority of the daily national newspapers as part of a 
claimed conflict between the prime minister and Bank of England. Other reports constructed 
Brown as having suddenly ‘changed his mind’ on the EU. There is also some evidence of 
reframing of the speech into gal-tan terms, emphasising the importance of identity and the 
nation state.  
The most notable feature of the reporting, that was shared among a number of newspapers, 
was the reframing of Brown’s speech in order to present it as part of a disagreement between 
the government (and Gordon Brown in particular), and the Governor of the Bank of England, 
Mervyn King.  Several of the newspapers constructed the two as being in conflict, claiming 1
that King’s statement to Parliament opposed the fiscal stimulus proposed by Brown in his 
speech. This was particularly visible in the Express, Mail, Telegraph, and Times, and was a 
secondary framing device in the Independent and FT. Meanwhile, the Mirror reported 
Brown’s speech in a single article discussing King’s comments, reflecting that newspaper’s 
relatively limited coverage of the European Union.   
Notably, only three newspapers — the Guardian, FT, and Independent — gave an accurate 
account of the content and framing of the original text. All three reported the speech in a 
positive light. For instance, on the day of Brown’s speech, the Guardian reflected Brown’s 
message that ‘Europe's history showed that erecting national barriers to trade only leads to 
"retreat and fear”’, and presents Brown as offering ‘strong support for Britain’s membership 
of the EU’ (24 March 2009). Similarly, the Independent led one of its reports with the claim 
that the ‘European Union can lead the world out of recession by forging a new partnership 
with the US’, and described Brown’s speech as part of ‘an emerging consensus’ on financial 
reforms and the role of the EU in creating a new financial regulator (25 March 2009). 
Similarly, the FT reported Brown’s speech as acknowledging ‘the value of shaping an 
 King gave evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee on 24 March. 1
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international debate by first agreeing a common EU position’, and quoted Brown on being 
‘proud to be British and proud to be European’ (25 March 2009).  
More common was reporting that reframed Brown’s narrative. Through reframing Brown’s 
speech to focus on domestic politics, several newspapers shifted attention away from the 
content and message of the speech, and towards the apparent difficulties faced in 
implementing an economic stimulus within the UK. For instance, the Telegraph’s front page 
story on the topic framed Brown’s speech primarily with a construction of conflict between 
the prime minister and Bank of England. The article constructs tension between King, who is 
quoted as arguing that ‘Britain cannot afford tax cuts or public spending rises’, and Brown, 
who had ‘called on countries attending the G20 summit to borrow and spend unprecedented 
amounts (Telegraph, 25 March 2009). Similarly, the Mail constructed an account of ‘the Bank 
and No. 10 at war’, framing Brown’s speech in a narrative that characterised King’s 
appearance before Parliament as an ‘extraordinary warning’ that ‘blew a hole in Mr Brown’s 
plans’, and is described as ‘especially embarrassing for the Prime Minister’ (Mail, 25 March 
2009). In the Times, Brown’s speech is similarly framed, being characterised as being at odds 
with King’s comments, which are described as ‘unconstrained’ (25 March 2009), and as ‘a 
broadside that reduced relations between them to their lowest point’ that ‘overshadowed Mr 
Brown’s first Strasbourg speech’ (Webster, Times, 25 March 2009). Indeed, the Times covered 
this division on its front page, presenting King’s comments as an ‘unusual intervention’ that 
‘laid bare tensions’ on the day of Brown’s speech (25 March 2009). This presents Brown and 
King’s apparent disagreement as the main story, and neglects to report many of the key 
elements of Brown’s speech. In one of the more pro-European newspapers, the Independent, 
this frame of conflict between Brown and King is also the main organising motif of the 
reporting. In the Independent, Brown’s speech is framed as being delivered in the context of a 
disagreement between Brown, on the one hand, and Mervyn King and Alistair Darling (then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer) on the other (26 March 2009). The substantive reframing of 
Brown’s speech to fit with a narrative of conflict between the government and Bank of 
England suggests that even an extensively reported speech such as this can fail to influence 
the nature of the mass-mediated debate if pre-existing media narratives prevail over the 
original framing of the speech. 
This finding is reinforced by the other frames identified in the reporting. A second significant 
feature of the reporting was the construction of Brown having delivered a much more pro-
European speech than his ‘usual’ tone, which was represented as a significant change from the 
past. In the Mail, this frame is adopted to present Brown as duplicitous and insincere. In an 
editorial, Brown is constructed as a ‘cynical’ politician, using flattery to go about ‘buttering 
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up MEPs’: this is juxtaposed with the image of Brown as ‘for years, one of the Government's 
great eurosceptics’ (25 March 2009). The article suggests Brown is lying in order to ‘win 
Europe round to his stimulus plans’, contrasting his previous desire to ‘distance himself from 
the EU’s Lisbon Treaty’. In a second article, headlined ‘Day Brown Fell In Love With The 
EU’, this is reinforced with a construction of Brown having ‘delivered the most pro-EU 
speech of his life’, and of having ‘abandoned his traditionally cool, and sometimes 
antagonistic attitude’ towards the EU (Chapman, Mail, 25 March 2009). The Sun’s main 
article on Brown’s speech constructed Brown in a similar fashion, claiming that he had 
‘lavished praise on the EU’ in his ‘most pro-European speech to date’; this is contrasted with 
‘his frequent clashes with Brussels during his ten years as Chancellor’ (25 March 2009). In 
this, the Sun describes Brown as ‘shameless’ and shows Brown to be at odds with the public, 
constructing his speech as having ‘declared yesterday he was PROUD Britain signed the 
hated Lisbon Treaty’ (25 March 2009, emphasis in original). Columnist Kelvin Mackenzie 
offered a more stark expression of this framing, characterising Brown as ‘brown-nosing 
Europe’, asking readers ‘is he smoking something?’, and reinforces the message that Brown 
had performed a U-turn, describing it as ‘wholly at odds with what he has professed for most 
of his life’ (Mackenzie, Sun, 26 March 2009).  
This frame could also be found in some of the more sympathetic accounts of Brown’s speech, 
indicating that the image of Brown ‘changing his mind’ on the EU was not confined to 
Eurosceptic accounts. For example, Brown is described as ‘gushing like a broken fire hydrant’ 
that had ‘drenched the European Parliament in praise’, and as a man who ‘yesterday went all 
misty-eyed about co-operation’ (Guardian, 25 March 2009). This is contrasted with the 
‘grumpy chancellor who hated attended European summits’ and who was ‘embarrassingly 
obstructionist’ (Guardian, 25 March 2009). This creates an image of Brown as calculating: in 
its leader column, the Guardian constructs Brown as using praise for the EU as a pragmatic 
means to achieve his ends: he ‘cannot have become an emotional convert to the European 
cause’, but rather ‘sees Europe as a useful battalion’ in his ‘great army of financial 
reformers’ (25 March 2009). The FT also reflected this frame, describing Brown’s speech as 
representing ‘new willingness to engage fully with Europe’ in contrast with ‘his reluctance to 
attend Brussels meetings’ (24 March 2009). 
Reframing was generally deployed to oppose Brown’s speech. Notably, the reports that 
reframed Brown in this way gave relatively little detail on the content of Brown’s speech. 
Instead of opposing the Brown’s narrative on the grounds of sovereignty or other common tan 
frames, they seek to personally discredit Brown and his policies, and to avoid giving an 
accurate account of Brown’s message altogether. This pattern was broken in two instances, in 
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which newspapers re-framed Brown’s speech in terms of sovereignty and the nation. The 
Express constructs Brown as hypocritical, of making apparently contradictory statements that 
on the one hand speak in ‘nationalist tones about "British jobs for British workers”’, and on 
the other ‘goes off to the European Parliament and ridiculously calls the EU "a beacon of 
hope for the whole world”’ (Express, 26 March 2009). The speech is constructed as an 
endorsement of further European integration, which is contested with an explicitly nationalist 
rhetoric. The EU is constructed as part of a set of institutions ‘the UN, the International 
Monetary Fund, the EU and World Bank’, that ‘have failed us dismally’ (Express, 26 March 
2009). Rather, than acting to ‘reward their failure by strengthening their powers’, the article 
argues that ‘the real answer lies in each government looking after the interest of their own 
people in the own countries’; thus, the EU is shown to stand in the way of the national 
interest. This re-framing and contestation of Brown’s narrative demonstrates that the concepts 
of sovereignty and the nation can be used in tan-ish discourses that set out to contest 
European integration, even when the speeches being reported do not construct Europe in 
terms of sovereignty or nationalism.  
A number of interesting features emerge from the reporting of Brown’s speech, therefore. 
There are clear differences in the extent to which the newspapers report the content of the 
speech in any detail. While the FT, Independent, Guardian, and Times all gave multiple 
quotations that summarised at least a subset of the main points of the speech, the other 
newspapers focused on on limited aspect of Brown’s message. As might be expected, where 
coverage of the speech was positive in tone, this was in the generally pro-European 
newspapers. However all of these pro-European newspapers published at least one article that 
reframed Brown’s speech substantially. Most importantly, there is evidence to suggest that 
speeches may be substantially reframed to fit with pre-determined narratives. All newspapers 
demonstrated a framing that presented Brown’s speech as either overshadowed by the 
appearance of Mervyn King before the Treasury Select Committee, or which constructed the 
speech as a major change of tone on the part of Brown, often suggesting a duplicitous or 
Machiavellian motive. This suggests that, especially where the political salience of European 
integration is relatively low, speeches are likely to be reported in ways which obscure their 
original message and framing to the reader, even in those newspapers which might be 
editorially sympathetic to their original framing. Most significantly, analysis of this speech 
suggests that leaders are unable to straightforwardly ‘prime, cue and frame’ public opinion 
through engaging in public discourses in the mass-mediated public debate. In this case, 
Brown was simply unable to set the agenda through his speech. This suggests that we must 
reconsider the mechanisms in the postfunctionalist model for the contestation of Europe in the 
mass arena.  
!181
6.2  Tony Blair’s speech in Oxford, 2006 
The second speech to be analysed is Tony Blair’s final major speech on Europe as prime 
minister, given in Oxford on 2 February 2006 (Blair 2006). The speech offers a reflective 
account of British involvement in European integration since joining the European 
Community.  This speech looks back on Blair’s time in office to develop a pro-European, but 2
nevertheless qualified case for engagement in Europe. This speech is significant in that it 
represents the final lengthy statement on European policy of Blair’s premiership, and was 
delivered after the conclusion of the UK presidency of the European Council. In several 
respects this speech shares some similarities with Gordon Brown’s speech to the European 
Parliament. It was also delivered at a time of relatively low overall contestation of the EU in 
the UK: being delivered neither during an election campaign, nor during a period of 
contestation of EU reforms (following the referenda in France and the Netherlands on the EU 
Constitutional Treaty). In common with Gordon Brown’s speech, this speech does not engage 
in the debate on European integration with a discourse that is located primarily the gal-tan 
axis, although Blair does include some elements of a discourse on nationalism in his speech. 
As the following discussion will show, Blair frames the EU as requiring reform, but also as an 
opportunity to recast the relationship between the UK and ‘Europe’ in a more positive light. In 
doing so, he frames European integration not as a matter of identity, but of pragmatic 
necessity in the face of the forces of globalisation and terrorism, echoing his framing in many 
of his speeches on the EU as prime minister (Daddow 2011, 104).  
In this speech, Blair frames the EU in two distinctive, yet related, ways. The first is to frame 
the EU as an essential and inevitable creation of the forces of history - one which solves 
collective action problems that nation states alone cannot. This frame revolves around the 
claim that ‘history is on the side of Europe’; the development of the EU is constructed as part 
of an arch of history stretching from the Second World War to the present, and despite ‘the 
setbacks of recent years’, Blair argues that ‘in times to come, Europe will be stronger and 
more integrated’. European integration is held to be central to addressing the contemporary 
challenges faced by nation states. He constructs an argument centred on ‘globalisation, 
enlargement and the new security threats Europe faces’, which he presents as making the case 
for ‘engagement not isolation’. This positions Blair firmly in favour of further integration.  
In framing British involvement in the EU, Blair draws on a construction of the EU as a model 
for international cooperation and success. For instance, he describes the EU as ‘the biggest 
 While Blair made a number of additional speeches on foreign policy that discussed Europe, this was 2
his last speech as prime minister to focus primarily on Europe. 
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political union and largest economic market in the world’, and lists the successes of the EU as 
‘democracy, peace, freedom and prosperity’. However, Blair sees the ‘the awesome nature of 
what the founders’ of the EU did, and the ‘idealism and faith’ of the founding principles of the 
EU as ‘an unsatisfactory basis’ to ‘justify the EU to a different generation living in different 
times’. The EU, in Blair’s construction of it, is needed so that nation states can overcome 
challenges collectively:  
The world is more interdependent than ever.  Policy on trade or climate change or war 
cannot be conducted alone.  Statesmanship is shared or, all too often, futile.  Nations 
are obliged to cooperate.  If the EU didn't exist, we would have to invent it (Blair 
2006).  
Blair thus frames membership of the EU in pragmatic terms, and also deploys the idea of the 
‘national interest’ to justify the UK’s place within the EU. 
The core message of this speech is a case for constructive involvement in the EU and the 
development of the UK as a leader within the EU. Blair frames UK involvement in the EU 
necessary economically and politically, but sees it and the future of the EU itself as 
conditional on the need to reform the institutions and rules of the EU. This is contained within 
his second frame, which constructs the EU as having become distant from citizens and in need 
of change: ‘it needs to reconnect its priorities and pre-occupations with the challenges its 
people face’. In order to achieve the ‘21st century relevance of Europe’, Blair argues that 
‘policy answers’ to these challenges must be combined with ‘institutional change’. Thus, Blair 
engages with arguments surrounding the relevance of the EU, and the extent to which it 
reflects the wants and needs of European publics. Blair offers a pragmatic assessment of the 
EU that particularly emphasises the need for reform. his institutional integration is 
problematic in Blair’s construction: ‘Too often in recent times, more Europe has been used 
not to answer a question but to avoid answering it’. In this, Blair adopts a tone that reflects 
some of the eurosceptic language examined in the previous chapter. Blair constructs an image 
of the EU as too remote from the concerns of citizens: European leaders had ‘locked ourselves 
in a room at the top of the tower and debated things no ordinary citizen could understand’.  
Finally, Blair draws on the same arguments found in his wider corpus of speeches on the EU 
to make a case, based on this framing, for British engagement and leadership in Europe 
(Daddow 2012). He argues that the need to reform the EU offers ‘an historic opportunity to 
cure the sickness that has afflicted Britain’s relationship with the project of European 
integration’. Thus, the speech directly addresses British Eurosceptic discourses and seeks to 
build a positive case for the UK’s participation in future integration. This is articulated in the 
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context of his assessment of the British relationship with the EU, in which Blair claims to 
detect a ‘political, almost cultural difference in approach between Britain and Europe’, 
suggesting that this is a result of deep-seated opposition to European integration in the UK. 
He argues that the rejection of ‘sharing sovereignty, accepting common rules, majority votes 
and so forth’ represents an objection to the EU that is ‘intellectually pure, albeit practically 
outdated’, positioning Eurosceptics as old-fashioned, and his own views as up-to-date. Blair 
constructs the need for institutional reform as an ‘opportunity’ to ‘become part of a new 
consensus about the EU in the 21st century’ and for Britain to take a leadership role in 
achieving this. Blair argues for the need for a ‘critical analysis’ of Europe, which would allow 
‘for Europe to re-shape a different vision of its future; and for Britain to feel comfortable 
within it’. He is careful to frame this in terms of the maintenance of national sovereignty, and 
acting in the national interest, describing his vision as ‘an ever closer union of nation states, 
cooperating, as of sovereign right, where it is in their interest to do so’. This vision is also 
carefully constructed by Blair to be qualified in its commitment to further integration. He 
states that ‘I don't support ever closer union for the sake of it’; but rather he argues that ‘in the 
world in which we live, it will be the only way of advancing our national interest effectively’. 
In arguing for greater integration, Blair adopts the language of the nation and national interest 
in order to justify his support for the EU, but without, as he says, ‘devotion to undiluted 
national sovereignty’. 
Blair therefore makes a pro-European argument that, largely, does not construct its positions 
on the gal-tan dimension. Rather, Blair argues for European integration from a pragmatic 
perspective: the EU is shown to be a means of solving collective action problems. While Blair 
does occasionally cross into the gal-tan dimension with his discourse on the national interest, 
his discussion of British Euroscepticism is more firmly rooted in the language of the New 
Labour project itself, focusing as it does on the idea that Blair’s views were those of the 
future, and those of his opponents were of the past (see Fairclough 2000). The speech can be 
understood in the context of the model as one that seeks to promote European integration 
without engaging on the gal-tan dimension, seeking to contest the issue of EU institutional 
development away from the issue of identity. This is consistent with the expectations of the 
model, which suggests that incumbents prefer to contest European integration away from the 
gal-tan dimension. 
The construction of Blair’s speech in the press 
One of the most striking features of the coverage of this speech is the distribution of coverage 
among the newspapers studied. The speech received wide coverage in most of the pro-
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European leaning quality newspapers, with the Guardian, FT, and Independent each 
publishing five or more articles discussing Blair’s speech. Amongst the other quality 
newspapers, the Telegraph published two articles, and Times published three articles. 
However, among the mass-market newspapers, only the Mail offered any substantive 
coverage, with two articles, while the Sun published one, brief leading article. Significantly, 
the speech was unreported in the Express and in the generally pro-European Mirror. There is, 
therefore, a contrast between the relative importance placed on the speech by the Guardian, 
FT, and Independent, and in the mass-market newspapers. The speech was categorised as an 
important one by the government at the time: the 10 Downing Street website listed the speech 
as one of the ‘major’ speeches of 2006, and so it is surprising that the speech received only 
selective coverage in the press.  Although it is impossible within the scope of this study to 3
give a full explanation as to why this is the case, this does example proves illustrative in a 
number of ways. In the context of postfunctionalist theory, the fact that this speech was not 
reported in several major newspapers highlights the difficulties outlined in Chapter 2 in 
conceptualising the politicisation and contestation of European integration through the study 
of political parties alone (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Although parties are seen as setting the 
public agenda, and thus driving the politicisation and contestation process, examples such as 
this illustrate the weakness of that model: where media simply do not report acts of political 
discourse making by politicians, contestation in the mass arena cannot occur, or at least do not 
occur in a broad and cross-cutting way. Instead, this example shows the speech making an 
impact on certain sections of the media — in this case the broadsheets and the vociferously 
anti-EU Daily Mail — while other sections ignored it.  
Across the newspapers that covered the speech, a number of trends can be observed. In all 
cases, newspapers engaged in a substantial reframing of Blair’s narrative. In three of the pro-
European quality newspapers — the Times, Independent, and FT — the speech was framed as 
a valedictory admission of failure on the part of Blair. The elements of the speech that 
discussed the history of the UK’s involvement in European integration, and the discussion 
offered by Blair of Euroscepticism in the UK, are emphasised over the elements of the speech 
that discuss the future of Europe. In the Guardian, the reporting reframes the speech in light 
of Blair’s relationship with other European leaders, constructing him as being more ‘at home’ 
with right-wing that fellow centre-left politicians. Thus, the content of the speech is largely 
ignored and the narrative about Blair’s left-right positioning is privileged above the content of 
the speech. In two of the more Eurosceptic publications, the Mail and the Telegraph, the 
 Archived versions of the 10 Downing Street website from the New Labour period were made 3
available in the National Archives after the election of the coalition government in 2010 (see http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page8893.asp).
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speech is reframed around the issue of sovereignty, and the possibility of a revived 
Constitutional Treaty.  
The Times, Independent, and FT all framed their coverage in such a way to focus on the 
reflective aspects of Blair’s speech and placed less emphasis on the main message of the 
speech. For example, the Independent led on this a domestic angle, framing Blair’s speech as 
one ‘conceding that he will not achieve the sea change in British public attitudes to the EU’ 
that he had set out to achieve (2 February 2006). In addition, the Independent discussed 
Blair’s reference to Eurosceptic newspapers, and reframes this to suggest that Blair identified 
the press as the cause for his ‘lack of success changing public opinion’ (2 February 2006). 
Also in the Independent, Steve Richards asks ‘why has Tony Blair failed to convince the 
public of the benefits of Europe?’ (Richards, Independent, 2 February 2006), framing Europe 
as an issue of domestic party politics, and focussing on Blair’s personal frustration - quoting 
him that the ‘dilemma of a British prime minister over Europe is acute to the point of being 
ridiculous’. This article has a secondary frame that reflects Blair’s message that the EU 
presents an opportunity for the UK and for Blair personally, noting that Blair has ‘remained 
engaged’ with the EU and listed achievements including ‘defence, asylum, [and] international 
crime’.  
In his speech, Blair instead offers a developed and intellectually nuanced exploration of 
varieties of Euroscepticism, which is lost in the reporting. The focus of the reporting is on 
Blair’s legacy and domestic British debates about Europe. Similarly, the Times adopted a 
frame that analysed Blair’s speech in the context of his legacy and prime minister, claiming 
that ‘all he can do now is reflect on his record, and what might have been’ (2 February 2006). 
The reporting of the speech is constructed in the context of an ‘opportunity lost’. Much like 
the Independent, the Times offers a qualified endorsement for Blair’s achievements in the EU, 
listing them as ‘backing enlargement to the east; getting economic reform firmly established 
on the EU agenda; helping to shift the balance of the EU budget slowly (too slowly) away 
from farming; developing joint security and defence’ (2 February 2006). However, the 
framing focusses on the claim that ‘Blair has failed to resolve Britain’s relations with the EU’ 
and the associated impact on Blair’s record as prime minister. 
In the Times reporting on the day after the speech, the framing similarly focuses on the 
‘valedictory’ nature of the speech, and the idea that Blair had performed a ‘U-turn’ by being 
critical of the EU’s focus on institutional reform, and by adopting a ‘Brownite’ view of 
Europe that placed economics before politics (Times, 3 February 2006). This reporting does 
acknowledge the content of the speech in more detail, however. For instance, it characterises 
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the speech as ‘painting an optimistic future for Europe and Britain's part in it’ and quotes 
extensively from the text of the speech (Times, 3 February 2006). This preserves more of the 
original message and framing of the speech than the reporting in either the Guardian or 
Independent, for example. The FT followed a similar framing pattern, characterising Blair’s 
speech as ‘valedictory optimism’ and as having a ‘fin de regime feel’: Blair is described as ‘a 
prime minister whose days are numbered’ (3 February 2006). In common with the 
Independent and Times, the FT coverage is also framed in terms of the claimed failures of 
Blair’s European policy, which ‘has ducked its two biggest challenges’ (3 February 2006). 
The FT characterises the speech itself as ‘one of those failures’, noting that ‘Mr Blair has 
made a big speech on Europe every six months or so’, ‘then nothing much happens’(3 
February 2006). However, the FT is the most sympathetic towards Blair, in this instance, of 
the newspapers analysed. The FT’s analysis of the speech acknowledges Blair’s arguments in 
regard to the UK’s potential leadership role in the EU: ‘the prime minister was right to say the 
terms of intellectual debate in Europe have moved decisively in Britain's favour’ (3 February 
2006). 
In contrast, the framing of reporting in the Telegraph and the Mail concentrates on the 
Constitutional Treaty and the likelihood of its revival. The Telegraph’s main leader column on 
the speech is framed in terms of the Constitutional Treaty, arguing that Blair had signalled its 
possible revival (3 February 2006). As a secondary frame, this reporting also shares the 
emphasis on the valedictory nature of the speech. Blair is characterised as showing ‘candour’ 
and ’looking back on his eight years’ as prime minister. The Telegraph devotes far more space 
to emphasising the ‘remarkably different’ tone of Blair’s speech, and the ways in which Blair 
is, according to this construction, said to have ‘changed his mind’ on the EU. This ignores the 
elements of Blair’s speech that focus on a positive agenda for the EU, and places far more 
emphasis on the criticisms made by Blair of the emphasis of European reforms. In the Mail, 
this emphasis on the Constitutional Treaty is readily apparent, with the headline of Benedict 
Brogan’s article on the topic: ‘EU Constitution is not dead, says Blair’ (Brogan, Mail, 3 
February 2006). This article demonstrates much of the framing found in tan-leaning 
discourses discussed in the previous chapter. Brogan accuses Tony Blair of ‘trying to rewrite 
the discredited blueprint for a federal Europe’, framing the article in terms of sovereignty and 
Blair’s own credibility (Brogan, Mail, 3 February 2006). Blair is constructed as having 
‘admitted’ that the Constitutional Treaty ‘will have to be revived’ and as having ‘conceded the 
debate about the constitution is not over’ (Brogan, Mail, 3 February 2006). This suggests a 
mendaciousness on the part of Tony Blair that fits with the Mail’s overall discourse on the 
trustworthiness of Blair in regard to Europe (see Chapter 5). Notably, the Mail dedicates far 
more of its report to quoting Eurosceptic responses to the speech, quoting William Hague. 
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The article concludes by raising the EU budget, negotiated in 2005, claiming that it was 
‘victory’ for France ‘at the expense of the British rebate’, thus reframing Blair’s speech in 
terms of political conflict between EU member states (Brogan, Mail, 3 February 2006). In the 
case of both the Mail and the Telegraph, a re-framing of the speech has undertaken to 
concentrate on the claimed implications for national sovereignty. By emphasising Blair’s 
comments on the Constitutional Treaty, they are able to construct links to a tan-ish discourse 
that opposes the treaty.  
Three phenomena seem to be significant from the reporting of this speech. First, that the 
speech was only selectively reported in the press, suggesting that politicians who attempt to 
engage in the mass arena — even prime ministers — may find it difficult to have their 
discourses heard. Second, much of the reporting fit the speech within a narrative designed by 
the press to emphasise the more reflective elements of the speech over all else. While Blair 
did spend time reflecting on the past, this is not representative of the content of the speech 
overall. Finally, the expectation that Eurosceptic newspapers would seek to set reframe the 
speech in tan-ish terms was partially met. In both the Mail and Telegraph, the speech is 
framed by a discourse on sovereignty and the nation that does not reflect Blair’s framing and 
message. This result suggests that pro-European politicians may have difficulty in setting the 
agenda on their own terms, since the Eurosceptic media are likely to reframe their discourses 
in order to emphasise issues such as identity and sovereignty.  
6.3  Michael Howard’s speech in Bristol, 2004 
The third case study is that of a speech given by Michael Howard as leader of the 
Conservative Party on 7th June 2004, three days before that year’s European Parliament 
election (Howard 2004). This speech represents Howard’s most complete statement on 
Europe during his time as Conservative leader, a topic which he largely avoided at the 2005 
general election, as the previous chapter discussed. In this speech, Howard opposes further 
integration within the European Union, and draws upon nationalist discourses. In particular, 
Howard emphasises the nation state and seeks to use the idea of national identity and the 
national interest to mobilise opposition to the EU. However, Howard also calls for an 
alternative, ‘British’ vision for the future of the EU, centred around the sovereignty of 
Member States. 
Following William Hague’s strongly Eurosceptic policies as leader of the Conservative Party 
from 1997-2001, subsequent leaders, and Howard in particular, had adopted a less overtly 
!188
Eurosceptic line (Crowson 2006). This strategy was, in part, designed to counter claims that 
the Conservatives were ‘obsessed’ with Europe, or that the party was divided over European 
policy.  The speech, coming as it did during the European Parliament election, was made at a 
time of relatively high contestation of the EU, and so we would expect correspondingly high 
media interest in Howard’s message. Despite the relatively low priority assigned to the EU in 
Howard’s leadership, the speech offers a relatively straightforward Eurosceptical and tan 
construction of the EU. This speech therefore offers a case of a speech by a party leader 
attempting to politicise anti-EU sentiment at an election through deploying a tan discourse. 
The Conservatives at this time were an opposition party seeking to mobilise votes, and 
competing against the incumbent, pro-European, centre-left Labour Party. In the 
postfunctionalist model, the Conservatives can be interpreted as occupying a position closer 
to UKIP (which can be seen as a classic political entrepreneur), than to Labour.  
The framing of the speech demonstrates some of the same characteristics as the Eurosceptic 
tan-ish press discourses discussed in the previous chapter. The speech begins by offering a 
construction of the relationship between the UK and EU which asserts the primacy of the 
nation state as a form of governance, and which constructs the EU as an external entity 
engaged in a process of removing powers from the British state. Howard begins this by 
asserting that the ‘institution which can best provide that sense of ownership and solidarity is 
the nation state’, and that without ‘a strong and independent state’, ‘no modern democracy is 
possible’. Howard asserts that the key to this legitimacy of the nation state is its position as a 
focus for national identity. The nation ‘is what binds people together’, and what ‘gives people 
a sense of identity’: Howard argues that these are the main reasons why he is ‘so hostile to 
proposals which would transfer more power from Britain to the European Union’. In 
particular, Howard uses this speech to oppose the European Constitution, which he constructs 
as a threat to the status of the nation state, as it ‘would mean transferring substantial new 
powers from the nation state of Europe to the European Union’. The language of the national 
interest also plays a part in this speech. For instance, Howard accuses Labour of having 
‘totally failed to stand up for British interest’ and that Tony Blair had falsely claimed that 
‘he’ll stand up for Britain’s interests’. Fundamentally, Howard sees this as part of a wider plan 
to remove the nation state from the institutional architecture of Europe and would mean ‘more 
power for Europe, less power for Britain’. He argues that ‘Labour’s Minister for Europe went 
to Brussels and signed up to a blueprint for a European state’ and that the Constitution would 
mean the creation of ‘a nation called Europe’, since ‘countries have constitutions’. This 
‘country called Europe’ would have the attributes of a nation state: ‘the EU will have a 
President and a Foreign Minister to set policy’, and ‘new powers to make treaties with other 
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countries’. The nation is, therefore, one of the key frames adopted by Howard, and the speech 
seeks to construct the British nation as threatened by European integration. 
The second key frame in the speech is sovereignty. Howard constructs a vision of the 
implications of the ‘transfer’ of sovereignty to the EU for Britain. For instance, he asserts that 
‘Europe would be able to tell Britain how to run our police and courts’, and ‘how to deal with 
terrorists’, and that ‘it would give the EU and European Court the power to make new laws 
about how British businesses are run’. The consequences of this are argued to significant: for 
example, Howard argues that ‘they will lead to yet more burdens on business’ and that 
changes would be made that ‘British politicians would be powerless to stop’ In this 
construction, the pooling of competencies is a zero-sum game, and the EU is an external actor 
which can govern Britain from above. Rather than participating in a collective decision 
making process, the EU is constructed as a source of regulation and legislation over which 
Britain has not control. Howard argues, for instance, that measures would be ‘imposed upon 
us by the majority vote of other countries in Brussels’ rather than decided ‘here, in Britain’. In 
opposing this, he also invokes the concept of personal freedom - ‘we want to control our lives, 
here in Britain’ - and of democracy, constructing the negotiation process for the Constitution 
as being ‘railroaded into handing over yet more power to Brussels’.  
Despite this, Howard offers a message that constructs the possibility of a different approach to 
European integration. Howard asserts that ‘Britain should put forward an alternative vision for 
Europe’, in order for it to ‘counter the federalist vision’. This approach, Howard claims would 
‘safeguard jobs and prosperity’ and ‘create a more flexible Europe’. Again, this vision 
privileges the nation state: Howard argues that ‘taking back powers from Europe that would 
be better exercised at a national level here in Britain’ should be the primary objective of his 
vision. This, he argues, will ensure that national governments cannot ‘be more easily forced 
into doing things against their will’, and this will ‘succeed in building a successful and 
durable partnership among European nations’, echoing De Gaulle’s vision of a Europe des 
patries.  
The construction of Howard’s speech in the press 
Howard’s speech received coverage in all the newspapers studied, although the level of 
coverage varied significantly. The speech was the subject of only a short summary article in 
the Mirror, and in the Sun was reported in a single paragraph in the context of an article 
discussing the final days of campaigning in the European Parliament election, rather than 
separately as in the rest of the newspapers. Elsewhere, the other newspapers studied all ran 
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more than one article covering the speech, with five in the Independent, and four in the Times. 
This is a somewhat striking variation in coverage: while the Mirror devotes relatively little 
space to European issues, we would expect the Sun, with its strongly Eurosceptic editorial 
line, to devote more attention to the speech. As with Tony Blair’s 2006 speech, this 
demonstrates that even tan-leaning politicians can fail to make an impact even in newspapers 
(such as the Sun) that are of a similar position on the gal-tan and Euroscepticism axes. This 
supports the conclusion that the ability of politicians to influence the mass-mediated public 
debate is constrained by the role of the media as gatekeepers.  
The framing of the reporting of the speech is notable in two respects. Firstly, there is a 
remarkable consistency between the newspapers, with two frames being dominant in the 
reporting. These frames constructed Howard’s message as part of a conflict within the 
Conservative Party, and secondly, in the light of electoral competition with UKIP. Only the 
Mail presented a positive account of the speech that reflected Howard’s own message and 
framing. In an editorial, the Mail constructed a message that mirrored Howard’s, arguing that 
the proposed Constitutional Treaty would ‘hand over enormous powers to EU bureaucrats, 
including the right to set out policies on issues ranging from criminal justice to foreign policy’ 
(8 June 2004). The editorial frames the EU in similar terms to Howard, arguing that ‘the 
country is best served by a flexible, pragmatic approach’ and that the basis of the EU ought to 
be ‘that markets, not sovereignty, should be shared’, and Howard’s message is approvingly 
constructed as ‘the only realistic vision for Europe’. In the case of the Mail, it can be argued 
that Howard has succeeded in setting the agenda, although, as the previous chapter showed, 
this is an agenda to which the Mail is highly favourable.  
In the case of the other newspapers studied, there is evidence of a considerable reframing of 
Howard’s message, however. The quality newspapers - the Guardian, Independent, FT, Times, 
and Telegraph - all reported the speech framed by the internal conflict within the 
Conservative Party on the EU, constructing an account of Howard’s speech in the context of 
disagreements within the party, and the ‘divisive’ nature of the EU. This discourse emphasised 
the conflict within the Conservative Party, framing Howard as at the centre of a ‘battle’ over 
the EU within his party. For example, the Guardian’s leading article on the speech opened 
with the image that ‘the Conservative truce over Europe shattered’ (8 June 2004). The 
Independent constructed the Conservative Party campaign as ‘in disarray last night as its 
dormant divisions over Europe erupted in public again’, and characterised Howard’s speech as 
an ‘attempt to steady Tory nerves’ (8 June 2004). The FT also framed its main article on the 
speech with the construction of the Conservatives as a party divided, with the article leading 
on comments by Roger Helmer, then a Conservative MEP, that the Conservatives should 
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adopt withdrawal from the EU as party policy (FT, 8 June 2004). Similarly, the Times led with 
comments from pro-EU Conservative MPs, characterising Howard as under ‘pressure’, and 
his speech of having ‘provoked’ an ‘attack from within the party’ (8 June 2004). The 
Telegraph reported that ‘the Tory truce on Europe was under increasing strain’ and 
characterises Howard as struggling to ‘position himself at the centre between what he says are 
two extremes’ (8 June 2004). All the newspapers using this frame also constructed Howard as 
part of the history of Conservative Party divisions over the EU; indeed, all with the exception 
of the FT mentioned Margaret Thatcher as part of this. For example, the Guardian claimed 
that Howard ‘invoked the memory of Margaret Thatcher’ (8 June 2004), the Independent 
constructed Howard as ‘recalling how Margaret Thatcher fought Britain’s corner in Europe’ 
and of citing ‘Baroness Thatcher’s campaign to win a rebate’ (Grice, Independent, 8 June 
2004). The Times constructs Howard as having ‘invoked the spirit of Margaret Thatcher’ (8 
June 2004), and the Telegraph described Howard as having ‘invoked Margaret Thatcher's 
battle to secure the rebate on Britain's annual contribution to the EU’ (8 June 2004). 
The second major frame found within the reporting was that of electoral competition. This is 
perhaps to be expected given the timing of the speech, although the prevalence of this frame 
in combination with the ‘division’ frame is notable as together these two frames dominated 
the coverage of the speech. All the newspapers reported the speech in this context, and the 
electoral frame frequently appeared alongside the division frame to constitute the primary 
structuring narratives of the articles. In most of the newspapers, particular emphasis was given 
to the electoral fortunes of UKIP compared to the Conservatives, and the consequent 
implications for Howard’s position on the EU. For example, the Independent constructed 
Howard’s speech as ‘an attempt by Mr Howard to stem an apparent haemorrhage of Tory 
support to UKIP’ (8 June 2004), and the Conservative campaign as having been ‘derailed’ by 
‘the unexpectedly strong showing in the opinion polls by UKIP’ (Grice and Woolf, 
Independent, 8 June 2004). In the Express, the speech was characterised as an ‘eleventh hour 
appeal to Eurosceptic voters’, and the speech is positioned as an attempt to shore up support 
as ‘the UK Independence Party is set to snatch a quarter of Tory supporters in this week's 
European elections’ (Express, 8 June 2004). The Times noted that Howard ‘made no mention’ 
of UKIP in his speech, but characterises him as being under ‘pressure’ and for ‘failing to 
tackle the threat of the UK Independence Party’ (Times, 8 June 2004). Similarly, the 
Telegraph’s leader article on the speech argued that Howard had already begun ‘making 
excuses for what is likely to be a humiliating European election performance’ (8 June 2004).  
The Express constructs Howard as needing to ‘win back his grassroots supporters’, while also 
being ‘criticised’ by ‘senior Tory MPs’ (Walker, Express, 8 June 2004). In its leader article on 
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the speech, the Express constructs this division as being responsible for the Conservatives 
electoral performance. This discourse claims that Howard had ‘been pussyfooting instead of 
giving a clear lead’ due to the ‘differences in his party over the EU’, and that this meant that 
the Conservatives had ‘underestimated people’s hatred and suspicion of the EU’ (Express, 8 
June 2004). This is a rather different use of this frame than that in the other newspapers; the 
Express connects the idea of division in the Conservative Party to what it sees weakness and a 
failure on the part of Michael Howard to be sufficiently Eurosceptic. In the FT, Philip 
Stephens frames the speech as being in reaction to ‘the assumed advance of UKIP’, which had 
‘exposed the essential fraudulence of the Conservative prospectus’ (Stephens, FT, 8 June 
2004). Notably, this is one of the few articles to engage meaningfully with Howard’s own 
narrative, contesting his position on Europe by constructing it as meaning that it ‘shows he 
learnt nothing from the pitiful isolation of John Major’s government’; his argument for 
selective engagement in further integration is constructed as being damaging for the national 
interest, coming ‘at the cost of a permanent existence on the margins of influence’ (Stephens, 
FT, 8 June 2004). This is significant, as many of the reports of Howard’s speech contain 
relatively little reporting of Howard’s own narrative, instead focusing on the apparent 
divisions within the Conservative Party, and the electoral context of the speech, made in the 
face of favourable polling for UKIP.   
In the case of both major frames, they represent a major departure from the way that we can 
assume Howard intended his message to be received. The use of the frame of division within 
the Conservative Party by a broad cross-section of newspapers suggests that where other 
highly salient features of a speech, either in its content or context, are prioritised over the way 
in which the speech is framed, the message can be substantially re-interpreted by the media. 
Howard’s speech represents an attempt to mobilise support for his party during an election 
campaign where UKIP can be seen in the postfunctionalist model as an ‘entrepreneurial 
party’, mobilising support with nationalist discourses, and attracting some of the eurosceptic 
supporters previous won by the Conservatives (Ford and Goodwin 2014). While this speech 
might be interpreted as a ‘middle way’ between the positions of UKIP and Labour, the way 
that the speech was reported means that this message was largely lost in its transmission to the 
wider public. Howard clearly engages in tan-ish discourses centred on sovereignty and the 
primacy of the nation, however these are presented by the media in the context of divisions 
within the Conservative Party, and electoral competition from UKIP. Only in a few instances, 
particularly in the Mail, is the original framing of Howard’s speech reflected in the reporting. 
Indeed, the reporting appears to construct Howard’s speech almost exclusively in the context 
of pre-existing narratives, framing it as a symptom of division within the Conservative Party 
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and as a reaction to the success of UKIP. Thus, Howard’s message and framing is mediated in 
a way that fundamentally alters the original meaning of the speech and which, for the most 
part, primes the reader to think about the difficult electoral position of the Conservatives. This 
has important implications for understanding how contestation in the mass arena occurs. This 
case study provides evidence that where media actors hold the salience of other factors (in this 
case, internal party politics and electoral dynamics) to be greater than the salience of the 
content of party discourses on European integration, then the content of discourses will 
receive less exposure, and thus be transmitted less effectively into the mass arena. Despite 
engaging in a tan-ish discourse that was substantively similar to the discourses favoured by a 
number of Eurosceptic newspapers, only one of those newspapers - the Daily Mail - reported 
the speech in favourable terms that reflected Howard’s own framing and message. This 
suggests that even in the case of a tan-leaning party actor speaking to a tan-leaning media, the 
impact of acts of discourse can be constrained by the agency of the media.  
6.4  William Hague’s ‘foreign land’ speech, March 2001 
The fourth speech to be examined was made by William Hague, to the Conservative Party 
Conference in Harrogate, on 5 March 2001. Hague’s speech is notable for this thesis because 
it engaged directly with issues located on the tan pole of the gal-tan dimension, and set out 
Hague’s policy towards the EU and membership of the Euro. The speech was framed in terms 
of ‘the determination to fight for freedom and democracy’ (Hague 2001). While the speech 
discussed a number of topics that Hague associated with a second-term Labour government, 
the speech is particularly significant for its focus on Europe and British identity (Johnson 
2002, 170). Made in the run-up to the 2001 general election, the speech perhaps the clearest 
exposition of Hague’s position on the EU, and set the tone for the forthcoming Conservative 
Party general election campaign. Although the speech was not made during the election 
campaign itself, it was made at a time of relatively high contestation of European integration, 
as Labour promised to hold a referendum on British membership of the Euro should they win 
a second term in office.  
This speech has become known as Hague’s ‘foreign land’ speech, after the organising 
message of the speech, which promised ‘let me take you on a journey to a foreign 
land’ (Hague 2001). The ‘foreign land’ to which Hague referred was one ‘in which Brussels 
controlled the economy’ and in which ‘people were welfare dependent, in which bureaucracy 
had increased and competition was a dirty word’ (Johnson 2002, 169). In this speech, Hague 
constructs a discourse focussed on constructing his Labour opponents as a threat to the 
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fundamental character of the UK and to British identity. Hague frames the speech in his 
‘resolve to protect our national independence’ and to ‘speak the truth in an age of spin and 
political correctness’. This narrative combines a defence of the nation of the sort associated 
with tan discourses, along with a concern about individual sovereignty and the right of 
individuals to act with a maximum amount of freedom. For example, Hague promised that a 
future Conservative government would ‘go further than any government has ever gone before 
to hand back to individuals and families the ability to shape their own lives’. This forms part 
of a right-wing and tan-ish discourse that incorporates commentary on numerous issues 
including education, health, schools, and policing, as well as the EU and European 
integration. The speech therefore offers an example of a strongly-tan discourse aimed at 
politicising a proposed reform - British membership of the euro - and at a time of relatively 
high intensive political conflict on European integration generally. This offers an important 
test of the assumptions of the model.  
Hague’s framing of Europe in this speech is characterised by a strong emphasis on British 
national identity and the construction of the importance of Britishness. Indeed, the terms 
‘British’ or ‘Britishness’ are used in the speech 25 times. Hague establishes the historical 
continuity of his construction of Britishness by invoking the historical memory of prominent 
(Conservative) leaders, and the ‘values that have shaped our past’ and ‘must also guide our 
future’, including William Wilberforce, William Pitt, John Burke, Lord Shaftesbury, Winston 
Churchill, Margaret Thatcher, and John Major, situating what he calls ‘Tory values’ and ‘Tory 
history’ as the context for his claim to ‘fight for freedom and democracy’. In doing so, he 
constructs these values — national independence, freedom, democracy, and speaking the 
‘truth’ — as British, claiming that his would be ‘a Conservative Government that speaks with 
the voice of the British people’. This is built into a narrative of history that constructs the UK 
as the foremost defender of these values (‘no country has contributed as we have to the 
freedom of mankind’), and which attributes these claimed claimed achievements of the UK - 
free trade, law, freedom - as ‘our achievements as a sovereign and united country’.  
Associated with this discourse on Britishness is a framing of national sovereignty that closely 
associates it with national identity. Sovereignty is constructed as a necessary condition for 
‘Britishness’ and the upholding of ‘British values’. The speech constructs the EU, and the 
euro in particular, as a threat to Britishness and to the British nation. Hague builds a rhetorical 
construction of the EU that emphasises the claimed implications for sovereignty and 
democracy. Much of this is built around a discourse that commits Hague to opposing British 
membership of the euro and participation in further integration. Hague argues that the 
forthcoming general election would be ‘your last chance to vote for a Britain that still controls 
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its own destiny’: developments in European integration are constructed as being antithetical to 
this; ‘they will ratify the Nice Treaty’, ‘establish a European constitution and the start of an 
EU legal system’, and ‘they’ll agree to the European Army’.  For Hague, these developments 4
represent a mortal threat to parliamentary sovereignty, with the powers of the UK Parliament 
‘parcelled out in every direction outwards to Brussels’. Hague asserts that Tony Blair would 
‘give up the first and greatest of Parliament’s prerogatives…the right to control revenue’, and 
constructs a vision of the ‘Chancellor returning from Brussels carrying instructions to raise 
taxes still further’, which would mean ‘control over our own economy given away’. The EU 
is thus constructed as an emerging state, one which would replace the nation as the primary 
unit of governance. 
This dual framing is exemplified with the contrast that Hague draws between his own 
Conservative Party and the Labour Party. Labour is constructed as anti-British, ‘a government 
that holds Britishness cheap’, and as an enemy of British democracy:‘a Labour Government 
that scorns and despises the very Parliament to which they were elected’. In this, Hague 
accused Labour of ignoring the concerns of ‘the people it governs’:  
Talk about Europe and they call you extreme. Talk about tax and they call you greedy. 
Talk about crime and they call you reactionary. Talk about asylum and they call you 
racist. Talk about your nation and they call you Little Englanders (Hague 2001). 
This passage demonstrates a clear link in Hague’s speech between Europe and other issues 
associated with the gal-tan axis, such as crime and asylum. In reference to the gal-tan issues 
in the speech, Hague positions himself clearly on the tan pole. For instance, he complains 
about ‘liberal sociologists’ in reference to crime, and takes a stance which is strongly anti-
immigration, referring to ‘an international trade in asylum seekers’, and he promises 
‘immediate deportation’ for failed applicants for asylum.  
A particular focus for the eurosceptic elements of this speech is its articulation of Hague’s 
opposition to the Euro. Hague offers visions of the ‘Royal Mint melting down pound coins as 
the euro notes start to circulate’ and ‘our currency gone forever’ in the event of Euro 
membership (implying that the Euro would not be ‘our’ or British currency if it were adopted, 
but something external or foreign). As part of this discourse on the Euro, Hague makes a 
direct appeal to nationalist sentiment, appealing to ‘everyone who believes in our country’ to 
support the Conservative Party, because ‘this election is your last chance to keep the Pound’. 
This rhetoric on the Euro is situated in a discourse which juxtaposes sovereignty and 
democracy as two sides of the same coin. Membership of the Euro is argued by Hague to be 
 ‘They’ referring to Labour in this context. 4
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part of a wider programme of integration, meaning that ‘taxes and defence policy and even 
criminal justice’ would be ‘run from Brussels’, leading Hague to ask ‘what would be the point 
of holding elections here?’. At the same time, Hague constructs this agenda as being part of a 
wider anti-democratic tendency among the EU and its supporters in the UK. For instance, he 
asserts that after the next election, ‘Tony Blair would force this country into the euro’. Any 
referendum on membership, according to Hague, would be liable to be ‘rigged’ as Tony Blair 
would ‘set the terms of the referendum, ‘decide when to hold it’ and ‘draft the question’. As 
the previous chapter showed, this rhetoric later found expression in several newspapers during 
the 2001 general election campaign. 
Hague’s speech offers a clearly tan-oriented eurosceptic discourse, focused around the key 
frames of sovereignty and national identity, therefore. In the postfunctionalist framework, the 
speech can be seen as an attempt to set the agenda and push European integration, and the 
Euro in particular, into the mass arena. Hague’s discourses on the nation and Britishness seek 
to politicise these issues and draw connections with the EU, engaging contestation on the gal-
tan dimension. This fits the model particularly well since this speech was made at a time of 
electoral conflict, and in the context of mooted UK membership of the single currency. 
Attempting to gain an competitive and electoral advantage over the incumbent, pro-European 
Labour Party, Hague and the Conservatives therefore appear to be a clear example of a 
political entrepreneur in the postfunctionalist model.  
The construction of Hague’s speech in the press 
Of all the speeches analysed in the present chapter, Hague’s speech received the most 
coverage, being mentioned in 73 articles in the two weeks following its delivery (see figure 
6.1). This suggests a significant impact. While all newspapers dedicated at least three articles 
to reporting the speech, the Guardian, Telegraph, FT, and Times each covered it in greater 
detail. Three features are particularly notable in the content of the coverage of Hague’s 
speech. Firstly, much of the reporting and editorial discussion of the speech occurs on the 
terms set by Hague, focussing on the gal-tan axis and the concepts of the nation and 
Britishness in particular. Secondly, several of the newspapers placed an emphasis on the 
sections of Hague’s speech that dealt with immigration, rather than those which discussed 
European integration. Thirdly, the critical tone of much of the coverage is highly salient. 
Hague is accused of tapping into a strand of nationalism with xenophobic connotations by a 
number of newspapers that were generally sympathetic to his tan-ish message on Europe.  
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The speech had a polarising effect in the press. Only two newspapers gave a generally 
positive editorial response to the speech; the Mail and the Telegraph. Notably, the other 
generally Eurosceptic and tan-leaning newspapers exhibited a much more negative editorial 
reaction. Most notably, the Sun, despite being characterised by the generally tan-ish rhetoric 
analysed in the previous Chapter, reacted unfavourably to the speech, and ran an editorial on 
the day following the speech which declared that it would support Labour at the next general 
election. Similarly, the Express ran a leader column that condemned the speech. The 
remaining newspapers also reacted negatively to the speech: while this might be expected for 
particularly pro-European newspapers such the Guardian and Independent, it is notable that 
the Mirror, FT, and Times all ran editorial or leader articles that were highly critical of the 
speech.  
The two newspapers that offered a favourable reaction to Hague’s speech — the Mail and the 
Telegraph — are also the two newspapers that were found to be most consistently Eurosceptic 
in the discourses studied in Chapter 5. In both newspapers, Hague’s own framing of the EU is 
reproduced, with the reporting constructing tan narratives about the EU and focusing on the 
twin pillars of Hague’s narrative on the EU: Britishness and sovereignty. The Telegraph’s 
main article reporting on the speech echoed Hague’s central framing, appearing under the 
headline ‘Hague’s pledge to preserve Britishness’ (Jones, Telegraph, 5 March 2001). The 
article characterises Hague’s speech as ‘putting measures to curb asylum seekers and preserve 
Britain's sovereignty as an independent nation’ at the centre of the Conservative campaign. 
Although the article acknowledges claims that the speech would be labelled as ‘racist’, the 
framing of the Telegraph’s reporting constructs Hague as making ‘an appeal to national pride’ 
and as ‘being prepared to speak up for the “mainstream majority” of people’ (Jones, 
Telegraph, 5 March 2001). Hague’s framing of the EU is reproduced, with the article arguing 
that a Labour electoral victory ‘would mean so much power being handed to Brussels that 
Britain would lose its sovereignty, its independence and its power to control its own 
destiny’ (Jones, Telegraph, 5 March 2001). This was reflected in the Mail, which framed its 
main report on the speech with Hague’s claims on sovereignty, arguing that ‘that the next 
general election could be the last time British people freely choose their own government’ (5 
March 2001). This echoes Hague in constructing an image of the EU as a threat to 
Britishness, reproducing Hague’s claims and describing ‘Britain's sovereignty handed over to 
the eurocrats’ (Mail, 5 March 2001).  
Directly addressing the issue of Britishness in an editorial, the Telegraph constructed Hague’s 
speech as demonstrating his ‘patriotic credentials’, and reflects Hague’s characterising of 
Britishness as being rooted in institutions, arguing that ‘it is difficult to define Britishness… 
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wholly in terms of abstract precepts’ (5 March 2001). It also reflects Hague’s claim that 
Labour held the British people in poor regard, arguing that ‘ministers will find it hard to shake 
off Mr Hague’s central charge, namely that they feel embarrassed about the gut instincts of 
those they represent’ (Telegraph, 5 March 2001). Similarly, in an editorial on 12 March, the 
Telegraph argues that ‘William Hague was right to say that Britain under Labour is becoming 
a foreign land’, constructing a strongly nationalist and authoritarian vision of the UK. This 
connects a defence of national sovereignty, arguing that ‘Parliament's powers have been 
parcelled out in every direction’, with tan-ish concerns about ‘politically correct nostrums 
about women on the front line’ and ‘homosexual soldiers’ (Telegraph, 12 March 2001). The 
Mail’s editorial comment on the speech was more qualified, noting that Hague’s claims about 
the UK becoming a ‘foreign land’ were ‘exaggerated and deliberately so’ (5 March 2001). 
Nevertheless, it constructs Hague’s speech as highlighting ‘the threat to the pound and, with 
it, our very existence as an independent sovereign nation’. Hague is instead characterised as 
being on the side of ‘millions of decent, tolerant, and intelligent Britons’ (Mail, 5 March 
2001). Hague is thus constructed as speaking to a commonly-held set of national ‘values’, and 
as defending the national community - closely reflecting his own framing in the speech.  
However, these positive reactions were exceptional. While Hague’s framing of European 
integration on the gal-tan axis is preserved in the majority of reports, the reaction in the other 
seven newspapers studied was overwhelmingly negative and frequently sought to challenge 
Hague on his own terms. These articles focused on two narratives; one, which characterised 
Hague as appealing to xenophobic or racist undertones, and a second which characterised 
Hague as being disingenuous in order to win mobilise support. In the case of the first, many 
of the newspapers which reacted negatively to Hague’s speech directly challenged his ideas 
on the nation and Britishness. In the mass-market newspapers that reacted negatively to 
Hague’s speech, the Mirror exemplifies this framing, describing Hague’s speech as having 
‘abandoned the centre ground… for the Far-Right Eurosceptic foreigner-bashing lunatic 
fringe’ (5 March 2001). The Mirror constructs Hague as having ‘wrapped himself in the 
Union flag’ and ‘railed against Brussels, asylum seekers, the European Rapid Reaction force, 
anything he thinks isn’t quite English’ (5 March 2001). Using ‘English’ and ‘British’ 
interchangeably, Hague is mocked; he ‘pretends to speak for the people of Britain’, but this is 
instead shown to be concerning, ‘playing to the natural fears of the man in the street’ (Mirror, 
5 March 2001). Indeed the Mirror went as far as describing Hague’s speech as ‘Third Reich 
stuff’, and as ‘pandering to the basest instincts of voters - including racial hatred’ (5 March 
2001). In a leader column, the newspaper characterises Hague’s speech as having ‘conjured 
up’ a vision of Britain as ‘a land of racists and bigots, of hatred of foreigners’ (5 March 2001). 
Britishness is explicitly defended by the Mirror in this account of the speech, and the article 
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constructs Hague as being unrepresentative of Britishness: ‘the British people will never 
support such disgusting ideas’ (5 March 2001). Thus the image of Hague as xenophobic is 
combined with a challenge to his discourse on Britishness.  
Similarly, the Express noted that Hague had ‘placed national identity at the heart of the 
general election’, and noted that he used the word ‘British’ 25 times (Walker, Express, 5 
March 2001). In contrast to the Mirror, the Express reflects some of the framing of Hague’s 
speech, characterising Hague’s message as being that ‘a second-term Labour administration 
would see the end of Britain as an independent sovereign nation’ (Walker, Express, 5 March 
2001). However, this is qualified as ‘highly controversial’, while the reporting suggests that 
Hague had to ‘deny’ having played ‘a pre-election race card’ (Walker, Express, 5 March 
2001). John Kampfner notes that while Hague ‘denies any racist intent’, and sought to make 
‘an appeal to national pride’, the speech could be interpreted as ‘using coded language to play 
on people's fears that they might be swamped by an alien culture’ (Kampfner, Express, 5 
March 2001). This framing is repeated in the Sun, which in a leading article constructs Hague 
as ‘imprudent’, and having ‘risked being called an extremist by banging on about 
immigration’ (7 March 2001). In the Sun in particular, the elements of the speech discussing 
asylum are emphasised over the message on the EU and euro. For example Hague is shown to 
be engaging in a narrowly nationalist, anti-immigrant, discourse; his speech is shown to ‘flirt 
with extremism’, which is described as ‘clever and ‘coded’ (7 March 2001). This is 
constructed as having ‘left a nasty taste in the mouth’, since the Sun positions itself as having 
‘doubts about those [politicians] who are prepared to be portrayed as anti-foreign’ (7 March 
2001). The following day, the Sun published an editorial declaring that it would support the 
Labour Party at the next election. This editorial constructs the Harrogate speech as ‘a huge 
error’ and ‘a speech that has killed his election hopes’; the speech is characterised as ‘Hague’s 
asylum seekers speech’ that contained ‘a tone of desperation’ (8 March 2001). 
Notably, the Sun contains some dissenting voices to the overall editorial tone of the 
newspaper, which characterised Hague’s speech as ‘desperate’. For instance, political editor 
Trevor Kavanagh characterises Hague as being ‘probably right’ that ‘a silent majority is fed 
up with the way Tony Blair is carving up the United Kingdom’ (Kavanagh, Sun, 7 March 
2001). This echoes the nationalist framing that Hague adopted, in that it positions Labour as a 
threat to the nation. Kavanagh also asserts that ‘he is neither racist nor a Little Englander’; 
instead, Hague is characterised as hapless, and having failed to ‘think things through’ (7 
March 2001). Richard Littlejohn offered greater focus on the Eurosceptic elements of Hague’s 
speech, reflecting Hague’s framing with his claim that ‘Blair's ambitions in Europe are a 
deliberate affront to the vast majority of people in Britain’, and arguing that Blair would try to 
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‘railroad us into the euro’ (Littlejohn, Sun, 13 March 2001). However, Littlejohn frames 
Hague as ‘fighting a losing battle’ against his colleagues, and the speech as coming amid ‘an 
orgy of pathetic personal bickering and exhibitionism’ (Littlejohn, Sun, 13 March 2001).  
The framing of Hague as exploiting unsavoury nationalist sentiments was reflected in the 
quality newspapers that reported the speech unfavourably. These newspapers, in common 
with the mass-market newspapers discussed above, challenged Hague’s narrative directly. The 
quality newspapers also devoted more attention to the elements of the speech covering the 
EU. For instance, the Independent framed the speech as an attempt to ‘make asylum and 
Europe key issues at the forthcoming general election’, and as having ‘provoked allegation 
that he was a racist “Little Englander”’ (5 March 2001). Similarly, the FT characterised the 
speech as a ‘high-risk strategy of trying to spark controversy over asylum and Europe in order 
to win back voters who have deserted the Conservatives’ (FT, 5 March 2001). The 
Independent characterised Hague as having ‘wrapped himself in the flag’, and the speech is 
constructed as having ‘provoked allegations that he was a racist “Little Englander”’ (5 March 
2001). The use of the words ‘foreign land’ is argued to be ‘a careful and deliberate attempt to 
touch a nerve for voters worried about asylum-seekers’, and an attempt by Hague to ‘play the 
asylum card’, and construct a populist nationalist rhetoric (5 March 2001).  
The contestation of Hague’s narrative on Britishness was a key part of the reporting of the 
speech in the quality newspapers. The Times characterised Hague’s speech in an editorial as 
an attempt to ‘link the euro, asylum-seekers, constitutional reform and political correctness as 
a defensive war against alien threats to the nation’ (6 March 2001). Hague is described as 
‘narrowly nationalist’; this is juxtaposed with the attitudes of the British people, who are 
constructed as not being willing to ‘stampede to politicians’ who ‘seem to be playing the race 
card from the bottom of the deck’ (5 March 2001). Similarly, columnist Mary Sieghart offers 
a robust criticism of Hague, constructing him as ‘whipping up xenophobia against his better 
instincts’, repeating the framing found elsewhere that Hague was acting disingenuously in 
order to win support: he is characterised as knowing that ‘there is a seam of racism to be 
tapped in Britain’ (Sieghart, Times, 9 March 2001). Sieghart also contests Hague’s discourse 
of Britishness, arguing that ‘to accuse Labour of making Britain a foreign land is to deny the 
very principles of democracy’, that ‘parties with different views and ideologies can coexist in 
one country’. Instead, Britishness is constructed as inclusive and welcoming: ‘acceptance of 
other cultures is one of Britain's great national traits’ (Sieghart, Times, 9 March 2001). In a 
Guardian leader column, Jonathan Glancey directly challenges Hague’s construction of 
Britishness, asking ‘hasn’t Britain always been a bit foreign?’ (Glancey, Guardian, 6 March 
2001). Glancey constructs an inclusive account of national identity, arguing that ‘the British… 
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came from continental Europe’, and positions ‘Britain’s genius’ as being a capacity to ‘absorb 
and ultimately nurture in its rough and ready way, foreigners of every creed, culture and 
colour’ (Glancey, Guardian, 6 March 2001). Thus, Hague’s rhetoric on Britishness is 
contested with a construction of the UK as ‘a mixed race island governed largely from a 
capital founded by Italians’ (Glancey, Guardian, 6 March 2001). Similarly, in the Mail, which 
took a generally more supportive editorial line on the speech, columnist Keith Waterhouse 
asked ‘what’s so wrong with being foreign?’, deconstructing Hague’s claim of a continuous 
British identity by asserting that national identity is ever-changing ‘we make ourselves over 
more regularly than Manchester United changes its strip’ (Waterhouse, Mail, 8 March 2001). 
Elsewhere, the reporting also challenged Hague’s discourse on other dimensions. For 
example, the Guardian characterises Hague’s policy as an ‘exit from the European Union into 
a state of permanent commercial and diplomatic friction with our neighbours’, a policy that is 
juxtaposed with ‘a more liberal-minded or internationally responsible set of policies’ that the 
newspaper claims are necessary (Guardian, 5 March 2001). Elsewhere, Hague is framed as 
making ‘grim warnings about how Tony Blair’s enthusiasm for Europe would destroy 
Britain’, and of issuing a ‘chilling warning’ (Watt, Guardian, 5 March 2001). Francis Wheen 
mocked Hague’s ‘journey’ motif by describing the ‘nightmarish future’ as one where ‘the 
prison population is falling and Britain remains in Europe… so far so good’ (Wheen, 
Guardian, 7 March 2001). The FT also contested Hague’s discourse on nationalism and 
European integration. In an editorial, it characterised Hague as turning the upcoming election 
‘into a crusade against the European Union’, and juxtaposes the ‘emotive language’ used by 
Hague in his speech with the ‘days when they called themselves the party of Europe’ (5 
March 2001). Hague’s discourse is dismissed as ‘a crude attempt to make political capital 
from the recent influx of asylum-seekers’ (5 March 2001). Rather than a defence of the nation, 
the FT constructs Hague’s vision of the nation is being incompatible with the national interest, 
since ‘the UK’s prosperity and security rest on its active engagement in the Union’; although 
‘membership of the EU is sometimes uncomfortable’, the FT argues that Hague’s speech 
offers only a ‘vision of a little England safe from foreign interference’ (5 March 2001).  
This speech is notable in the way that it has been reported because it represents a deviation 
from the expectations we derive from the postfunctionalist framework. Whereas we expect 
Hague’s message, situated firmly at the tan-pole of the gal-tan dimension, to be reflected in 
the Eurosceptic newspapers and reported with enthusiasm, this was not the case. Several of 
the newspapers which were found in the previous chapter to engage in tan discursive 
constructions were strongly critical of the speech. This criticism was also found, as was 
expected, in the pro-European press. However, despite the somewhat surprising nature of the 
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coverage in several of the Eurosceptic newspapers, Hague was able to dictate the axis of 
contestation in this case. The reporting largely engages with Hague on the gal-tan dimension, 
discussing and contesting his construction of the nation. This is significant, because while 
Hague was challenged and much of the reporting was negative, these findings suggest that in 
some circumstances, politicians are able to set the agenda, at least in terms of dimension along 
which European reforms are contested, if not in terms of the character and content of the 
ensuing debate.  
6.5  Tony Blair’s speech in Edinburgh, 2001 
Two months after William Hague’s ‘foreign land’ speech, Tony Blair’s address in Edinburgh, 
entitled ‘Britain’s role in Europe and the world of today’, was one of Blair’s most important 
speeches on European integration (Blair 2001). This speech, given on 25th May 2001, can be 
understood as Blair’s reaction to the Conservative electoral focus on the euro and the EU, and 
was given during the 2001 general election campaign. This speech represents an important 
pro-European statement made during a period of high general contestation of the EU in the 
UK, as shown in the previous chapter. While the reaction to this speech was partially 
discussed previously, the discussion here, as in the rest of the present chapter, focusses on the 
ways in which press cover characterised Blair’s statements in relation to the content of those 
statements: i.e. how the press coverage of Blair’s speech framed and reframed his discourse 
on Europe.  
This speech is significant because it engages with the issue of European integration and the 
nation directly. As such, it situates itself on the gal-tan axis in a way that the other pro-
European speeches examined in the present chapter do not. The primary focus of this speech 
is to speak against ‘isolationism or marginalisation in Europe’, and to make the case that the 
UK should be ‘an active, engaged partner’ in the EU and in other international organisations. 
Blair is explicit in situating this case in a discourse that is about national identity, invoking 
ideas of patriotism, and arguing that failing to engage in the EU was ‘the denial of our true 
national interest’. This locates Blair’s speech very much in the same rhetorical field as that of 
Hague, discussed above, since the ideas of the nation, patriotism, and the national interest are 
deployed. However, this speech represents a case of the use of these ideas to support a pro-
European discourse. Indeed, Blair deploys the idea of Britishness to argue that the conception 
of national identity centred around parliamentary sovereignty is old fashioned: ‘to regard each 
pooling of sovereignty as a diminution of a national identity, is to retreat from modern 
reality’, rather he argues that this sovereignty-based approach is ‘for a nation, with such a 
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proud history as that of Britain’ demonstrates ‘a lack of self-confidence’, while denying ‘our 
true potential for leadership’.  
Britishness is, in common with Hague, defined by a set of shared values, although Blair 
rejects the conservative account of Britishness: ‘Britishness is not defined by clinging to the 
status quo’. Rather, it is defined ‘by reference to our common purpose and sense of mutual 
belonging, born of shared values’. These are, according to Blair, centred around three core 
‘sets’ of values. The first is ‘freedom under the law’, which Blair holds to include ‘the 
protection of human rights and personal autonomy’. He constructs a vision of a ‘pluralist 
democracy’ at the heart of this set of values, offering a contrast to Hague’s more traditional 
approach. The second set of values includes ‘tolerance’, along with ‘openness’, and ‘an 
outward looking approach to the world’, which includes a ‘spirit of internationalism’. Blair 
uses the imagery often offered by accounts of British ‘exceptionalism’ to defend this 
internationalist position; for instance he refers to the UK as ‘an island: a sea-faring country 
forever looking outward beyond our borders’. This reflects the narrative of the British as an 
‘island race’, exceptional when compared to their continental neighbours, on account of the 
outlook conferred upon the British people by virtue of geography and a sea-faring heritage 
(see for example, Baker, Gamble and Seawright 2000, 410; Price 2006, 609). For Blair, this 
re-framed Britishness is located in a rich history of engagement in Europe. He argues that the 
UK ‘has ancient European roots’, from St Augustine, to Caesar, and that to deny this 
European history is to be narrow-minded: ‘we are all products of that history, whether we like 
it or not’. Blair also talks about devolution and the strengthening of the union through a re-
imagining of Britishness around ‘our tradition of democratic self-government’, rather than 
parliamentary sovereignty ‘dominated by Westminster’. This offers a contrasting approach to 
that of Hague, and forms part of a wider rejection of traditional conceptions of Britishness 
centred around the concept of parliamentary sovereignty (Parekh 2000, 9). 
For Blair, the framing of Britishness and identity are central to the delivery of his message. He 
argues that British values are a platform for a redefinition of what it is to be ‘patriotic’ and 
British: ‘I believe a forward-looking modern patriotism can be built on them’. This provides 
the background to the primary message of the speech, which is to argue for a re-imagining of 
British engagement within the EU in the context of this re-framing of Britishness. At the core 
of this ‘modern patriotism’, Blair argues that there is a ‘patriotic case for international 
engagement and against isolation’. This message seems clearly calibrated to oppose the 
discourses of opponents of the European Union. Blair frames this as moving from a ‘domestic 
doctrine of community’ to ‘a doctrine of international community, based on enlightened self 
interest’, a process that is argued to require the regaining of ‘an inner-self confidence about 
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who are are’ and also about ‘what kind of country we want to be’. However, Blair is careful to 
qualify this by affirming that ‘we will remain nation states’, and that his vision is of ‘Europe 
becoming a super-power, but not a super state’. The nation thus remains privileged in his 
discourse on integration, echoing the pattern of Eurosceptic discourses. Nor is this 
commitment to the EU held to exclude other alliances: Blair argues that ‘we are stronger in 
Washington if we are seen to be leading in Europe’.  
Blair also engages in a discourse about the national interest, framing engagement in the EU as 
‘a unique opportunity for influence and leadership… on questions vital to our national 
interests’, and in doing so, re-frames what he calls ‘true patriotism’ as ‘standing up for the 
British national interest first’. Thus, for Blair, patriotism means not defending parliamentary 
sovereignty as an arbitrary goal, but ensuring that ‘we do not turn our back on Europe’. This 
creates an imperative to ensure Britain is not relegated ‘to the sidelines of… Europe’, since 
isolationism ‘is not standing up for Britain’. This is also given an economic justification; Blair 
constructs the EU, as ‘the key alliance… on which millions of British jobs depend and in 
which we do 60 percent of our trade’. At the core of Blair’s argument is a recurring theme of 
‘British jobs and influence’, and an imperative to ‘increase our leverage on the global 
problems that face us’. This convergence of the idea of a new patriotism and emphasis on the 
nation interest can be seen in the conclusion of the speech, where Blair argues:  
Far from standing up for Britain this Conservative Party would give up Britain’s 
interests to its own divisions. That is not patriotism. It is folly. I will fight for Britain. 
Fight for the British economy. Fight for Britain’s interests in Europe. Fight for Britain 
because it is right that Britain gets the best out of our membership of the EU (Blair 
2001). 
This speech therefore represents an instance of a politician attempting to directly contest the 
tan-ish discourses of an entrepreneurial political party — in this case, the Conservatives — 
through engaging in a discourse about national identity in relation to European integration. 
While this speech represents only one part of a wider ‘logic of history’ presented by New 
Labour (Daddow 2011), this speech is notable for its particular focus on the idea of the nation 
and the concept of patriotism, areas more readily associated with a tan discourse on Europe. 
Blair engages directly with the connection between European integration and national 
identity, contesting the ideas set out by Hague less than two months earlier.  
The construction of Blair’s speech in the press 
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The reporting of Blair’s speech is notable for its focus on the contestation of Blair’s key motif 
of patriotism, and by extension, the essence of national identity and the nation. In contrast 
with the reception to Hague’s speech, the reaction to Blair’s speech appears to divide along 
the lines of the general positions on European integration of the newspapers at the 2001 
election (see Chapter 5). Significantly, those newspapers which sought to contest Blair’s 
rhetoric on patriotism did so on the same terms, constructing a tan-ish discourse which sought 
to challenge Blair’s inclusive narrative on patriotism, and reframe it in their own, nationalist 
and authoritarian terms. Notably, the speech generated a positive reaction in only one of the 
more Eurosceptic newspapers — the Express — while the reaction in the other generally 
Eurosceptic newspapers was uniformly negative, even in those newspapers which endorsed 
the Labour Party at the general election. Overall, Blair’s framing around identity, Britishness, 
and the national interest is carried through, although his perspective on this is strongly 
contested in several of the newspapers. In the more pro-European press, Blair’s message is 
reflected in the Guardian, FT, and Mirror, while the Independent largely focussed on the 
domestic electoral implications of the speech, and its place in the election campaign.  
The framing in much of the Eurosceptic press reflected Blair’s emphasis on patriotism and 
identity, while strongly contesting it. For example, the Mail reformulated Blair’s discourse on 
sovereignty, co-operation, and patriotism. Blair’s narrative on patriotism was reframed as 
‘bowing to Brussels is patriotic, insists Blair’, and that Blair sought to ‘raise the election 
temperature’ by claiming that ‘only Labour's policy of handing more of Britain's powers to 
Brussels is truly patriotic’ (Eastham, Mail, 25 May 2001). The speech is characterised as 
‘provocative’ and his construction of patriotism ‘arrogant nonsense’ (Eastham, Mail, 25 May 
2001). In a subsequent article, the speech was re-framed as ‘the clearest signal yet’ that Blair 
would ‘take Britain into the single currency’; this is constructed as being against the wishes of 
the British people — the article notes that ‘73 per cent of voters are opposed to ditching the 
pound’ — and suggests an anti-democratic tendency, claiming that ‘Gordon Brown would not 
be able to stop it’ (Mail, 26 May 2001). Notably, when the article was framed in terms of euro 
membership, the elements of the speech on patriotism were largely left to speak for 
themselves. While the article extensively quotes Blair’s narrative on patriotism, it does not 
contest it in the same way as above; rather, the article situates these quotations in the context 
of the election, arguing that ‘Mr Blair was deliberately choosing to fight the Tories on their 
own battleground’ (Mail, 26 May 2001). However, a subsequent editorial connected the euro 
and Blair’s narrative on patriotism, framing it as a ‘fact-free speech on Europe and 
‘patriotism’’; it constructs the speech as a means for Blair to ‘enable him… to claim he has a 
mandate for scrapping the pound and hustling Britain into the emerging European 
superstate’ (28 May 2001). Thus, Blair’s narrative on patriotism is reframed as part of an elite 
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‘plot’, led by Blair, to subvert democracy and national sovereignty through a strategy that is 
described as ‘as opportunistic as his speech was dishonest’ (28 May 2001).  
These constructions and re-framings of Blair’s speech can be observed elsewhere. For 
example, the Sun reported on the day of the speech that it was expected to be ‘fiercely pro-
Europe’, and suggests its scepticism by closing its report with an extensive quotation from 
Conservative Shadow Foreign Secretary Francis Maude: ‘“[w]hat’s patriotic about axing the 
Pound, passing Parliament's powers to Brussels and damaging our democracy?”’ (25 May 
2001). Reporting after the speech, the Sun constructs the speech as a ‘desperate’ attempt to 
‘defuse the euro as an explosive issue’, and reframes Blair’s narrative on patriotism to suggest 
the opposite meaning: ‘he’ll have to explain how it is patriotic to surrender control of the best 
economy for 30 years to unelected Brussels bureaucrats’ (26 May 2001). In the Telegraph, the 
speech was reported as part of a larger, front-page article under the headline ‘Parties draw 
battle lines over Europe’ (25 May 2001). This article frames Blair’s speech as being about 
membership of the euro, and echoes the Conservative Party’s discourse by claiming that Blair 
‘gave his strongest indication yet that Labour wants to scrap the pound if it returns to power 
after June 7’ (25 May 2001). Notably, this article gives very little information about the 
speech, offering only a rather vague summary of Blair’s argument. Much like the Sun, the 
Telegraph provides extensive quotations from Francis Maude in this report; Blair’s speech is 
framed by a narrative that is centred on the Conservative agenda, and the claim (quoting 
Maude) that ‘a Tory victory would ensure that Britain was no longer taken down a “one-way 
street towards a European superstate”’ (Telegraph, 25 May 2001). In an editorial, the 
Telegraph also frames the speech as part of a ‘campaign to convert the British people to the 
merits of the euro’ (26 May 2001). This editorial challenges Blair’s narrative on patriotism, 
expressing a framing of patriotism centred on institutions and the symbols of nationhood:  
The monarchy, our greatest universities, our legal and parliamentary system: these are 
the institutions that might spring to mind when looking for a definition. But 
institutions are anathema to Mr Blair. (Telegraph, 26 May 2001) 
This construction of patriotism is striking, as it closely resembles the construction of British 
national identity espoused by the Conservative Party (see Lynch 2000). A second ‘electoral 
analysis’ article reinforces this editorial line, constructing Blair’s speech as ‘populist 
opportunism dressed as patriotism’ (26 May 2001). Here, Blair is constructed as a hypocrite 
and opportunist, and his 1983 election speeches and publicity material are used to substantiate 
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this claim.   Elsewhere in the same issue, Benedict Brogan offers a much more neutral report, 5
however. Brogan’s account strongly contrasts with the editorial pieces on the speech, being 
framed as an attack on William Hague’s European policy in which Blair’s characterisation of 
the Conservatives as ‘playing with fire’ on the EU and their policy as a ‘folly’ is reproduced 
(Brogan, Telegraph, 26 May 2001). Notably, this article also did not introduce quotations or 
other discourse from other politicians. The contrast between these articles demonstrates that 
even in newspapers with strongly Eurosceptic editorial lines, reporting can vary significantly 
in tone, with relatively neutral reports of speechmaking appearing alongside reports that 
radically re-frame speeches or contest strongly their narratives.  
A number of pro-European newspapers also reflected Blair’s framing, but in a way that 
supported his message. For example, the Mirror’s main report on the speech frames Blair  as 
having ‘declared Labour the party of true patriots’, while the Conservatives are characterised 
as ‘living in the past’ (26 May 2001). Reflecting Blair’s rhetoric, the EU is constructed as ‘a 
strategic alliance on its doorstep where Britain does 60 per cent of its trade and on which 
millions of jobs depend’. The article also contrasts Blair’s ‘growing confidence’ with Hague, 
who is characterised as having ‘hardened his right-wing stance over Europe’ (26 May 2001). 
Similarly, the Guardian echoes Blair, arguing that the speech represented an attempt to pick 
up the euro-gauntlet ‘flung down by the Conservative election team’ (25 May 2001). The 
Guardian contrasts Blairs ‘“patriotic case” for international partnership’ against what is 
described as ‘a wrecking Tory isolationism’, describing Blair’s policy as ‘full engagement 
with the EU’ (25 May 2001). Significantly, the main Guardian report on the speech quotes 
Blair extensively, reproducing the key elements of his speech (26 May 2001). Notably, this 
report did not give quotations from the Conservatives, focussing only on Blair’s message, and 
constructing a highly positive portrayal of the speech which claims that ‘Europe was not a 
problem’ but rather ‘it was an opportunity’ (26 May 2001). In an editorial, the Guardian 
continues this tone, reflecting Blair’s framing an arguments by portraying engagement in the 
EU as an opportunity, and constructing this as compatible with national identity: 
 
Patriotism and internationalism are not enemies. International engagement is Britain's 
only serious option, and Europe is inescapably the most immediate forum for that 
engagement. If undertaken, engagement must be sustained. (Guardian, 26 May 2001) 
Elsewhere, the framing of the speech varied, in contrast with the remarkable consistency of 
the Eurosceptic tan-leaning press. The most notable example is the Express, which, despite its 
 Blair campaigned in the Breconsfield by-election on a platform that included withdrawal from EEC 5
membership, which was Labour policy at this time. 
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relatively Eurosceptic orientation, did not contest Blair’s narrative on Britishness. The 
Express framed the speech as primarily about the euro, describing it ‘a long time coming’ and 
‘his most positive endorsement yet in favour of Britain joining the euro’ (26 May 2001). 
Blair’s framing of euro membership is echoed in this report, with the single currency being 
characterised as ‘economic common sense’ rather than a matter of sovereignty. The speech is 
also framed in terms of electoral competition; Blair is constructed as having decided to ‘fight 
back’ on the issue of the EU, in contrast to his previous ‘reticence’ (26 May 2001). Notably, 
this report does not discuss Blair’s rhetoric on patriotism, although a shorter report on the day 
of the speech did strongly reflect Blair’s framing, quoting from the text of the speech in such 
a way that suggests that it agrees with Blair; the article characterises Blair’s narrative as being 
that ‘“true, modern patriotism” means protecting Britain's interests’ (Express, 25 May 2001). 
Notably, this article did not present any of the opposing arguments from the Conservative 
Party, thus reinforcing the reproduction of Blair’s framing of patriotism. 
Similarly, the Times also framed its reporting of the the speech around the election. Here, the 
speech was constructed as an attempt by Blair to shift the debate away from the euro, ‘to 
separate the election from any euro referendum’ (Riddell, Times, 26 May 2001). Elsewhere in 
the same issue, the speech was described as a reaction to the Conservative campaign, with the 
aim ‘to blunt that offensive early by making “Europe” the campaign issue to which the euro 
should be seen as subsidiary’, and as ‘a tactical speech, designed to stop Mr Hague making 
the weather on Europe’ (26 May 2001). This article contests Blair’s narrative on the euro, 
constructing the decision to join as inherently political and as a matter of sovereignty, rather 
than economic as Blair argues:  
To present as pure economics a revolutionary transformation in Britain's position in 
the European Union, in its freedom to manage its economy and in the accountability 
of government to governed would be wrong. (Times, 26 May 2001) 
Meanwhile, the Independent reflected Blair’s framing of patriotism, reproducing extensive 
quotations from the speech covering Blair’s statements on ‘modern patriotism’ (Independent, 
25 May 2001; 26 May 2001), yet the primary frame was that of electoral competition between 
Labour and the Conservatives. In the Independent, the reporting constructs Blair’s speech as a 
signal that ‘he intends to convince the public of the merits of joining the single currency’, and 
characterised Blair as going ‘on the offensive on Europe’ (25 May 2001). Elsewhere, the 
speech is characterised as a ‘scathing attack’ on the Conservatives (26 May 2001). The 
Independent also emphasised the implications for the UK’s relationship with the United 
States, constructing Blair’s speech as calling for a ‘European super power’, and arguing that 
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the UK ‘could hold a strong place in the world only by co-operating with its historic allies’ in 
both Europe and North America (26 May 2001). 
The reporting of Blair’s speech offers insight into the operation of the politicisation 
mechanism. In this case, we see clear examples of where many of the expectations of 
postfunctionalism are met. In the Eurosceptic press, Blair’s speech was contested on the gal-
tan axis, where he had located his message. However, this was undertaken in a hostile way, 
which constructed Blair’s narrative on Britishness and the nation negatively, and 
fundamentally contested his constructions of those concepts. Here, we see constructions of 
European integration that strongly emphasise the claimed threat to the nation. Rather than re-
frame Blair’s narrative, the newspapers that opposed Blair’s message contested his narrative, 
representing it in their own nationalist terms. In the more pro-European press, in common 
with the findings of Chapter 5, we see a mixed picture. While some of the newspapers 
reflected Blair’s own framing and constructed a narrative of an inclusive, pluralistic national 
identity, comfortable with European integration, others chose to focus on the context of the 
speech in the election campaign. These findings suggest an inherent difficulty for pro-
European politicians; even when engaging with, and contesting Eurosceptic discourses on the 
gal-tan dimension, these discourses are likely to be repurposed by tan-leaning newspapers to 
support their own Eurosceptic narratives.  
  
Conclusions 
This chapter examined several aspects of the mediation of political speeches by newspapers, 
to test the postfunctionalist claim that political parties are able to politicise European 
integration in domestic political debates. It deployed a discourse analysis of five major 
speeches and the subsequent reporting of them in the nine national UK daily newspapers to 
develop a greater understanding of this mediation process. Chapter 2 argued that the claim 
that political parties can cue opposition to European integration through their framing of the 
EU in discourses rests on the assumption that the discourses of political parties are transmitted 
to the public by the media in a way that preserves their framing and narrative. This chapter 
has presented evidence to show that this is not the case: party framing and narratives are not 
simply transmitted in the press, but rather are subject to considerable modification. 
The notion that party framing is not reflected in the media is provided by evidence from the 
cases examined here. In three of the cases in particular, there was evidence of substantial 
reframing of party discourses by newspapers, in such a way that altered or removed entirely 
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the original narrative of the original speech. Section 6.1 showed that, in the case of Gordon 
Brown’s speech to the European Parliament, this reframing could take the form of altering the 
object of the discourse, moving it away from the substantive issue of European integration 
and instead focussing on claimed conflict between the government and Bank of England. The 
reporting in this case largely ignored the content of the speech to instead focus on the 
incidental context in which it was given. Similarly, section 6.3 gave an example of a speech 
— given by Michael Howard — that was reframed to be interpreted as a response to internal 
party conflict, not as an attempt to set a European policy. In the case of Tony Blair’s 2006 
speech, it was shown that newspapers sometimes chose to ignore party interventions into the 
debate entirely, while the coverage from the newspapers that did report them showed that pre-
existing narratives — i.e. Blair’s ‘failure’ on Europe and his final months in office — can 
displace the narrative of speeches in coverage, meaning that their original message fails to 
reach the public. Finally, section 6.4 presented an example of a speech that appears to be an 
attempt at cueing politicisation of European integration failed that to achieve a positive 
reception among even Eurosceptic newspapers, and was reframed as being in bad taste. This 
suggests that even in cases where we would expect the Eurosceptic media to reproduce 
identity frames and narratives relatively unaltered, other constraints outside of the model 
operate on the media. In this case, Hague’s speech was deemed to be ‘in bad taste’, meaning 
that he was unable to communicate his message successfully. This leads to the conclusion that 
readers of these newspapers did not receive the messages that parties intended, and casts 
doubt on the postfunctionalist politicisation model as conceived by Hooghe and Marks 
(2009).  
Only in section 6.5 did evidence of clear and consistent reproduction of the original framing 
emerge. In this case, the decision by Blair to engage in the debate on the gal-tan dimension 
seems to have ensured that the media framing remained largely focussed on identity. This case 
demonstrated the difficulty faced by pro-European politicians to influence debates. This 
example suggests that pro-European parties may have their message reported if they choose to 
contest European integration on the gal-tan axis. However, the postfunctionalist model 
concentrates on the potential for debates in the mass arena structured by the gal-tan 
dimension to politicise European integration. The extent to which parties can depoliticise 
European integration through engaging in debates structured by identity is unclear.  
A second expectation derived from the discussion in Chapter 2 and the data presented in 
Chapter 5 was that the discursive constructions of speeches would follow the political 
positions of newspapers. However, when we consider how newspapers reframe party 
discourses, and what relationship this has to the gal-tan positions of newspapers, the evidence 
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was less clear. The expectation that Eurosceptic, tan-leaning newspapers would reframe pro-
European party messages to emphasise connections to the nation and identity was not met in 
some of the cases examined. In several instances, these results show, the press do seek to 
reframe political speeches to reflect their own positions on the gal-tan axis. This phenomenon 
is particularly visible in the case of newspapers with predominately-tan discourses: here 
newspapers are observed reframing speeches that did not seek to contest European integration 
on the gal-tan axis in those terms. This is consistent with the behaviour of political 
entrepreneurs in the model. An example of this can be seen in the reporting of Tony Blair’s 
2006 speech. However, there more numerous examples of cases where this did not occur. In 
the case of Gordon Brown’s speech, for example, the main re-framing was to emphasise his 
domestic political difficulties. The only speech which was reported with identity as the 
dominant frame was Tony Blair’s 2001 speech in Edinburgh, which was already framed in 
these terms.  
These findings provide further support for the argument of this thesis that media organisations 
should be treated as key actors in the postfunctionalist model. Whereas postfunctionalism 
assumes that party contestation in the mass arena is a process that can operate without the 
influence of a substantive actor in-between parties and the public, these findings suggest 
otherwise. The mass media are a meaningful class of actors, able to reframe party discourses, 
selectively transmit and reconstruct key messages, and demonstrate considerable 
independence from parties. This calls into doubt the assumption that parties can set the agenda 
in European debates, and suggests a much more complex, interdependent relationship 
between actors in the mass arena, in which the role of mediation is important. However, the 
inconsistencies in the behaviour of newspapers suggests that the media cannot simply be 
substituted for parties in the postfunctionalist model. Newspapers do not always act as their 
positions on the new politics dimension suggest they should, and there is no clear pattern in 
the way that political speeches are represented. Further work is therefore needed to 
systematically determine the nature of the relationship between elite and media discourses, 
and how attempts by parties to cue public opinion are shaped and constrained by the agency 
of media actors.  
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Conclusions 
This thesis set out to explore a number of key questions regarding the processes that drive and 
constrain the course of European integration. Specifically, it developed an understanding of 
how debates in EU member states are structured, which actors are important, and how these 
debates affect the outcomes of policy making on the EU. It did this by focussing on the 
process by which European integration is politicised in EU member states, adopting the 
emerging postfunctionalist research agenda. In particular, it investigated the role of the public 
discourses of political parties and the media in the politicisation and contestation of the EU in 
member states, using the UK between 1997 and 2010 as a case-study. In order to shed light on 
the role of public discourses, it adopted a framework that emphasised the discursive 
construction of national identities. This led to a discussion of the role of the mass media in 
constructing national identity, and in acting as the primary source of citizen information on 
European integration. It was argued that the mass media are key to understanding national 
debates on the EU, in light of these two roles. Subsequently, the thesis presented a new model 
of politicisation, Media Augmented Postfunctionalism, that took these insights about the role 
of the media into account. Following from this, it set out to test a series of hypotheses about 
how the positions of the media on European integration are structured, how they discursively 
connect the EU and national identity, and how they interact strategically with the discourses 
of parties. The arguments made will now be summarised and the key implications of the 
conclusions reached will be discussed in more detail. This is followed by a short discussion of 
some of the limitations of this research, and finally by a series of suggestions as to how this 
research agenda could be furthered.  
Part I of the thesis reviewed the postfunctionalist model and set out the conceptual and 
methodological framework of the thesis. Chapter 1 began by discussing the postfunctionalist 
model, which provides the source of the theoretical understanding of European integration in 
this thesis. This discussion highlighted the roots of postfunctionalism in neo-functionalism 
and the multi-level governance approach. It argued that postfunctionalism centres its 
explanation of the politicisation of European integration on the agency of parties, which seek 
to entrepreneurially cue citizen attitudes towards European integration when it is electorally 
advantageous for them to do so. In light of this discussion, two weaknesses were identified in 
postfunctionalism. The first of these was in the account of identity that postfunctionalism 
provides. Identity is assumed to be given, without explanation as to how it is formed or 
contested. The second weakness was in the role of actors in cueing public opposition to the 
EU through constructing connections between static national identities and changing 
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supranational governance arrangements. It was argued that while Hooghe and Marks (2009) 
discuss in detail the role of parties in cueing opposition to the EU, they fail to properly 
explore the role of other actors, particularly intermediary actors, in this discursive process. 
Subsequently, Chapter 1 also examined the literature on identity formation in light of the 
unexplored nature of identity in postfunctionalism. The work of scholars including Benedict 
Anderson and Ruth Wodak was reviewed, and the chapter subsequently argued that recent 
approaches which emphasise the role of discourse in the construction of identity are 
compatible with the postfunctionalist theory. These accounts of identity formation emphasised 
the role of a diverse range of actors in constructing national identities. The significance of 
discourse for the postfunctionalist framework led to a discussion of the empirical claim made 
by postfunctionalists that discursive connections formed between static identities and 
evolving governance structures cue opposition to European integration among citizens, 
leading to a state of ‘constraining dissensus’. In particular, the role of the mass media emerged 
as being important: mass communication has enabled common discourses on identity to be 
shared across national communities in hitherto impossible ways. These discourses are not 
singular, but plural, and contested; different actors construct different discourses about the 
nation to serve divergent purposes. Ultimately, it was argued that if postfunctionalism is to 
contain a better account of identity formation, contestation, and politicisation, then the role of 
the media in constructing national identity ought to be taken into account.  
Accordingly, Chapter 2 proposed a new politicisation model — the Media Augmented 
Postfunctionalist model — that incorporated the mass media as an actor alongside political 
parties. It argued that the media play an important role in determining outcomes of national 
debates on the EU in two respects. The first of these was in the media’s construction of their 
own discourses on European integration, particularly in relation to national identity. In the 
MAP politicisation model, it was theorised that the media construct connections between 
identity and European integration in the same way that parties do in the Hooghe-Marks 
politicisation model. This serves to cue public opposition to European integration in a similar 
way to party discourses. Secondly, the role of the media as an intermediary actor in the mass 
arena is argued to be central to determining outcomes. A discussion of the political 
communications literature on media effects revealed considerable evidence to suggest that the 
media do have a substantive causal effect on citizen attitudes, and that this claim is broadly 
compatible with the claims made by identity theorists about the constructive nature of media 
discourses. The literature on media effects was discussed, with particular reference to the 
mechanisms that postfunctionalists identify: priming, cueing, and framing. It was shown that 
media framing effects are widely argued in the communications literature to have a 
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substantive effect on audiences; including on attitudes and voting behaviour. This was 
discussed in the context of party discourses, and it was argued that parties may face problems 
in successfully cueing public attitudes on Europe if the media do not effectively transmit their 
discourses to the public. If the media instil their own biases, narratives, and frames in their 
reporting — operating as independent actors in their own right — then we must have a clearer 
understanding of when and how the media construct discourses about European integration, 
how these discourses connect the issue with national identity, and how they represent the 
discourses of parties. This discussion led to a number of expectations or hypotheses to be 
addressed empirically in Part II of the thesis. These were, specifically: a) that newspaper 
positions on European integration would be structured in the same way as political parties, i.e. 
by the gal-tan dimension; b) that newspaper discourses would construct connections between 
national identity (i.e. the gal-tan dimension) and European integration; c) that newspapers 
would contest European integration through discourses on the nation and seek to cue citizen 
attitudes; and, d) that there would be evidence that newspapers were able to substantively alter 
debates through their reporting of party discourses. 
Subsequently, Chapter 3 discussed discourse theory and the relationship between discourse 
and social action. It introduced the work of Norman Fairclough and Critical Discourse 
Analysis. CDA provides a useful framework for unpacking the discourses of both parties and 
the media, providing the critical tools to anchor this research in an understanding of how 
discourses are produced (Fairclough 1995, 16). It set out the specific methods to be used in 
the subsequent empirical chapters, including describing the data to be examined and the 
procedures adopted for discursively analysing the qualitative sources. This chapter also 
discussed the UK, and it was argued that the UK presented an ideal case study for 
examination in this thesis in light of the highly contested nature of European integration in the 
UK, as the recent referendum on UK membership of the EU has demonstrated.  
Chapter 4 examined the structure of media positions on European integration in an attempt to 
determine if the relationship that postfunctionalists observe between opposition to European 
integration and the gal-tan dimension in parties can also be observed in newspapers. While it 
was argued that the political positions of newspapers are not as easily determined as those of 
parties, data on the attitudes of the readers of newspapers is widely available. The attitudes of 
the readers of nine UK daily newspapers was taken as a proxy for the positions of the 
newspapers, and data from the British Attitudes Survey allowed for an estimation of the 
position of these readers on their support for European integration, and on the economic left-
right and new politics dimensions. It was shown that the new politics dimension is much more 
closely associated with attitudes to European integration than the left-right economic 
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dimension. In common with parties, the average reader positions for the newspapers showed a 
correlation between positions towards the tan-pole of the dimension and opposition to 
European integration. These findings suggest that the structure of contestation among 
newspapers may be similar to that between parties, with the gal-tan position of newspapers 
(and their readers) being a better predictor of their position on European integration than the 
left-right economic dimension. This finding provides context to the rest of the study, and 
appears to confirm the first hypothesis. 
Chapter 5 subsequently examined the content of newspaper discourses in the UK. Indeed, one 
of the most significant findings of Chapter 5 was that the discursive constructions of 
European integration in newspapers appeared to follow the general pattern of the estimates of 
their positions derived in Chapter 4. It was shown that the gal-tan position of newspapers was 
related to the content of their discourses: tan-Eurosceptic newspapers consistently constructed 
the European Union in terms of a nationalist narrative. This appears to confirm that the 
pattern of contestation among newspapers is broadly similar to that of parties. Notable 
differences in the framing of European integration were found. Specifically, a group of 
newspapers, including the Daily Mail, Sun, Daily Telegraph, and Express, were found to 
consistently frame European integration in terms of the nation and national identity. Drawing 
connections between the EU and the nation, these newspapers constructed a narrative around 
the EU that portrayed it as a fundamental threat to the British nation, to national sovereignty, 
and to democracy. This distinctive ‘tan-Eurosceptic’ discourse demonstrated a remarkably 
consistent attempt to separate the UK and the EU, constructing the EU as the ‘other’ to the 
British nation and people, including at the most basic linguistic level. Concerns expressed 
about EU membership in these discourses seemed designed to construct connections between 
a sense of exclusive national identity and the perception that EU membership was a ‘threat’ to 
this identity. The EU was portrayed as encroaching on British sovereignty, and is dismissed as 
an elite and undemocratic project to ‘impose’ regulation from ‘Brussels’ on the British people.  
The zero-sum nature of this discourse meant that the nation was privileged above all other 
forms of governance, thus mobilising the tension between national identity and changing 
governance arrangements as postfunctionalism describes. In contrast, the pro-European 
discourse was not clearly associated with a distinctive gal discourse on the nation. While pro-
European discourses were associated with newspapers that had estimated positions towards 
the gal-pole of the gal-tan axis, there was no single, coherent pro-European discourse in the 
newspapers studied. While the tan / Eurosceptic discourse was consistent, clearly articulated, 
and formed of strong connections between opposition to European integration and a defence 
of the nation-state, no such coherent discourse could be found to oppose it. Although some 
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newspapers made a variety of arguments in favour of membership of the EU, these discourses 
were isolated and did not constitute a coherent whole. Similarly, while several of the pro-
European newspapers attempted to challenge the nationalist discourses of the Eurosceptic 
press, there was little evidence of a clearly articulated discourse that offered an alternative 
construction of the nation to that offered in tan discourses. This appears to confirm the 
findings, in this regard, of the only other significant recent study of UK newspaper discourses 
(Hawkins 2012). While pro-European newspapers were not as homogenous in their discourse 
on Europe as the tan-Eurosceptic newspapers, they did appear to actively contest the 
discourses of tan-Eurosceptic newspapers, seeking to rebut their claims about Europe. There 
is also some evidence of attempts to depoliticise European integration, particularly at the 2001 
general election. These findings appear to be particularly relevant in relation to the strong 
association between anti-European discourses and tan-ish discourses that privileged the nation 
above other forms of political organisation. In common with Hooghe and Marks’ (2005) study 
of party positions, this study finds that there is a clearer link between the tan-pole of the new 
politics dimension and opposition to European integration.  
Chapter 5 also confirms the picture of the press environment in the mass arena in the UK 
developed in Chapter 4. The structure of press positions in the UK is distributed towards the 
tan / Eurosceptic poles, especially in the mass-market press. This is made even more 
significant by the fact that the newspapers found here to be largely Eurosceptic in their 
discourses, and which sought to construct connections between identity and the EU, represent 
a significant majority of the UK press by readership and circulation. This suggests that other 
political actors, and in particular parties, face a strategic challenge in communicating their 
messages on European integration to the public, especially where these messages do not agree 
with the discourses on European integration produced by the newspapers representing the 
majority of readership. The implications of these findings are discussed in more detail below.  
Finally, Chapter 6 examined the ways in which party discourses are represented in the press. 
Chapter 6 presented a focussed analysis of five major speeches on European integration by 
UK party leaders and the subsequent press coverage of them. In contrast to the previous 
chapter, the empirical evidence on the relationship between the political positions of 
newspapers and their reporting of party leader’s speeches did not show a consistent pattern. 
While it was expected that Eurosceptic newspapers would reframe party narratives about the 
EU to a tan discourse focusing on the nation, or would emphasise this framing where it was 
used by parties, this did not occur consistently. While some of the reporting followed these 
expectations, there was not a clear pattern to the reframing that took place. The chapter did 
observe considerable evidence of reframing by all newspapers, however. This often took the 
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form of reframing party narratives to fit with pre-existing narratives in the press, and was 
found in the case with both Eurosceptic and pro-European speeches.  
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggested that attempts by political parties to cue 
opposition to European integration (or to seek to rally support) are hampered by the 
selectivity of press reporting. In several cases, newspapers ignored speeches entirely, or 
reported them only in scant detail. In almost all cases, major details and frames from the 
speeches were lost. To some extent, this is to be expected, since the press cannot report the 
whole content of speeches in the space available. However, even in the case of the major 
speeches studied here, readers of many of the newspapers would not have received an 
accurate report of the content or main messages of the speeches. This suggests an important 
role for the press as an intermediary actor. Attempts to cue public opinion directly are fraught 
with difficulty if parties cannot rely on accurate reporting of their messages. This is 
particularly the case for pro-European parties, where careful positioning to avoid contestation 
on the gal-tan axis may easily be undone by media reframing.  
However, these empirical findings suggest that the media cannot simply be substituted for 
parties in the postfunctionalist model. While the evidence in Chapter 5 suggests that there is a 
prime facie case that newspapers adopt positions and construct discourses on European 
integration in a similar way to parties, the empirical evidence from Chapter 6 reveals a more 
complicated picture. The press are actors in the mass arena in their own right, but they also 
play an important role as intermediaries for the discourses of other actors. The press do not 
follow a consistent pattern in their reporting and mediation of party discourses, however. 
While we expected that newspapers would reframe party messages on European integration to 
fit their own positions, this was not observed across all the reporting of the speeches 
examined. As Fairclough concludes, the relationship between professional political and media 
discourse is ‘an area of intersection and tension’ (1995, 197). What is clear from the evidence 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6 is that the claim of Part I of the thesis, that the transmission and 
reproduction of party discourses in the mass arena is best characterised as a complex mass-
mediated debate, appears to be the case in the UK contestation of European integration. The 
assumption of existing postfunctionalist theory that parties are the most significant actor in 
cueing public opinion on European integration must, therefore, be subject to revision and 
clarification. In the case of the UK, at least, parties face a significant challenge in ‘having 
their discourses heard’ by the public in the face of a polarised media that take distinctive 
positions on European integration, and which substantively reframe party discourses to fit 
their own pre-existing narratives.  
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Implications 
The findings of this thesis suggest a series of implications for postfunctionalist theory, and for 
our understanding of the factors that shape the course of European integration more generally. 
The overall conclusion is that the hypotheses have been largely confirmed. In seeking to build 
on the postfunctionalist model to develop a more holistic understanding of the constraints on 
European integration, this thesis has presented evidence to suggest that the media are 
significant actors in the politicisation of European integration in the domestic politics of 
European countries, and that their role in mass-mediated public debates can have a 
substantive effect on the outcomes of those debates. The MAP model, and the empirical 
evidence presented here to support it, demonstrates that debates in the press are well 
structured, and that the positions of newspapers are structured in a similar way to political 
parties. The evidence shows that press discourses can alter the substantive character of 
debates, reconstructing and mediating party messages and thus affecting the way in which the 
public debate about European integration is conducted and the information received by the 
public. The media are therefore the critical actor in the mass arena, acting as a gatekeeper to 
the public debate, and exercising considerable influence on the content and tone of debates. 
There is also clear evidence that the press act as political entrepreneurs in this arena, 
constructing connections between national identity and European integration that may serve to 
politicise European integration and cue citizen attitudes towards it.  
One implication of these findings regards the structure of the press. Where the structure of the 
mass media is different to that of parties, this may make a significant difference to the 
discourse on Europe. Parties face a strategic challenge where media positions are 
unfavourable to their own message on European integration, and where parties face a media 
hostile to their message, they are likely to struggle to cue citizen opinion on European 
integration. The MAP model conceptualises this as the key feature of the mass-mediated 
public debate - one in which the media and parties are engaged in a battle for ideas, frames, 
narratives. Parties can lose that battle if the media are structured in a way that is hostile to 
them. Similarly, in cases where entrepreneurial political parties find themselves faced with a 
relatively pro-European media, they may be unable to adequately influence the character of 
the mass-mediated public debate, thus failing to cue public opinion. This suggests a limit on 
the strategic ‘room for manoeuvre’ for parties in the mass arena. Thus, the overall structure of 
media positions on European integration may be central to determining the outcome of the 
politicisation process: what matters is where the media actors are relative to parties, since the 
media act as gatekeepers to the public and mediate party messages. Where the media in a 
member state are distributed differently to parties, this may result in outcomes that are not 
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predicted in Hooghe and Marks’ model, but for which the MAP model presented here is able 
to account. Extended across the EU, this is a significant finding, and may go some way to 
explaining the variable success of political parties in cueing citizen opposition to European 
integration in EU member states, especially in the light of relatively high levels of attachment 
to national identities (European Commission 2014). By extending the postfunctionalist model, 
this thesis allows for an understanding of how structural considerations are important, and 
provides a tool for conceptualising the contestation of European integration that takes this 
significant factor into account. 
In the case of the UK, this thesis has provided important evidence which builds on the 
existing literature to develop a picture of a newspaper sector that adopts distinctive discourses 
on European integration, and which appear to be active agents in the politicisation and 
contestation of European  integration in the mass arena. This provides further evidence to 
support claims that the UK media is characterised by a ‘vigorous partisan hostility’ to 
European integration (Daddow 2012, 1219). In developing a better understanding of press 
constructions of Europe during the New Labour period, it provides evidence that may help 
explain why New Labour found it so difficult to successfully ‘sell’ the project of Europe to the 
British people. The wider scholarship on the UK’s relationship with the EU is, of course, still 
to be redefined in the aftermath of the 2016 referendum. While this thesis does not address the 
referendum directly, it has provided useful contextual information to aid scholars in 
understanding how the EU is contested in British politics. In particular, the absence of a 
coherent pro-European narrative in the pro-European press echoes claims made that the 
‘Remain’ campaign failed to articulate a positive message during the referendum. In this 
study, it was found that much of the tan / nationalist / Eurosceptic discourse on European 
integration went unchallenged in the more moderate and pro-European sections of the press, 
and this seems to have contributed to an environment in which pro-European parties struggled 
to influence citizen attitudes towards the EU.  
The work done in this thesis to understand the mass-mediated debate in the New Labour era 
could usefully be extended to the referendum campaign and the contestation of the 
referendum in the media, therefore. While the MAP model deals largely with the process of 
contesting European reforms rather than the singular event of an in-out referendum, similar 
mechanisms appear to have been in operation during the referendum. Certainly, the decision 
to call the referendum could be seen as a result of the agency of entrepreneurial actors that led 
prime minister Cameron to feel compelled to hold a referendum. Subsequently, the mass-
mediated debate on the referendum was conducted in large part through the media, with all 
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the consequences for the campaign to remain in the EU implied by the discussion on the 
structure of the UK press set out above.  
In a wider sense, this thesis also holds implications for the growing body of literature that 
seeks to understand debates on European integration and the bases of citizen attitudes towards 
it. While a number of recent studies have highlighted the importance of the mass media in 
debates on European integration, this study differs in that it is able to situate the study of 
media effects in the context of a middle-range theory that is able to answer the question of 
how the media are able to affect policy making on the EU. With the MAP model, the 
postfunctionalist research agenda is able to offer an answer to that question, highlighting the 
consequences of the agency of the media in the mass arena, while providing a general 
framework for analysis that can be applied and adapted to all EU member states. This holds 
relevance both for studies that seek to understand the role of the press in contesting European 
integration, and for those that seek to understand the role of parties in contesting Europe. The 
growing salience of European integration and the gal-tan cleavage has reordered party 
systems in several European states (such as France), and threatens to do so in others (Börzel 
and Risse 2009). The MAP model allows for a framework to analyse the interactions between 
a parties and the media in the mass arena, and the constraining effects that the mass media can 
have on parties.  
Limitations 
A number of limitations to these conclusions must be noted. The first is that, as discussed 
above, the behaviour of newspapers in the mass arena when reporting the discourses of parties 
did not consistently conform to the expectations set out in the MAP model. We expected that 
party discourses would be reframed by newspapers in line with their own position. However, 
the evidence from Chapter 6 showed that this was not the case, and that while significant 
reframing did occur, it did not follow a clear pattern. This suggests a limit to the explanatory 
power of the model in this regard: while the model predicts that a mis-match between party 
and media positions on European integration will constrain the strategic possibilities for 
parties, it cannot currently predict how different media will react to party discourses.  
A number of limitations should also be noted in regards to the empirical evidence studied in 
this thesis. The most important of these is that this study only offers data from a single 
country, the UK. The applicability of the MAP model of domestic politicisation to other EU 
states requires further testing, and, as noted below, provides an important avenue for further 
research. The UK is certainly a case where opposition to European integration is widely held, 
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as the results of the 2016 referendum show, and offers an opportunity to study the 
mechanisms described by the model in a country with high contestation of the UK. However, 
the MAP model seeks to explain the politicisation process in all EU states, and so further data 
is required to understand how the politicisation process differs across member states, with 
different media and party systems, and where the relative influence of these actors may vary.  
In the UK case studied, there are also limitations in the data presented. The thesis studied data 
from only one section of the mass media: the London press. This was in part due to practical 
considerations, as well as to reflect the relatively prominent role played by the London press 
in UK political debates. However, it must be noted that there is likely some important 
variation in discourses on Europe in newspapers in other parts of the UK, particularly in light 
of distinctive Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish identities. The sample size of newspapers 
also provides only limited data to test the association between the gal-tan dimension and 
support for European integration. This was particularly noticeable in the case of exploring 
what association there is between pro-Europeanism and the gal pole of the gal-tan dimension. 
It was therefore not possible to determine if newspapers follow the pattern of parties, with a 
falling-away of support at the extreme gal-end of the dimension. An EU-wide study of 
newspaper positions might allow for this to be addressed. The sample also covered a 
relatively condensed period of time, choosing to cover two general election periods and five 
speeches in depth. While this allows for a highly detailed analysis of discourses on these 
occasions, it nevertheless limits the data in its temporal coverage.  
Perhaps most significantly, the study only examined the press, and did not analyse other forms 
of mass media. Although the press continues to play an important role in debates on European 
integration, the relative position of the press has declined as circulations have decreased and 
other forms of media have increased in popularity. Other more traditional forms of media, 
including magazines, radio, and television may provide important data not explored in this 
thesis. The rapid growth of internet news and social media is also potentially highly 
significant. While the world wide web was in its relative infancy at the start of the time period 
studied in this thesis, the growth of the internet as a source of citizen information means that it 
is now an important factor in the mass arena - one with quite different dynamics to the 
traditional print media (Gergen 2008; Coleman and Bulmer 2009; Welch 2013). As noted 
below, further work is required to understand the importance of these alternative forms of 
media for the model.  
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Future Research 
The results and implications discussed here present a number of possible avenues for future 
research that may seek to address the normative and empirical questions opened by this thesis. 
One important locus for further research is in extending this analysis to other European 
countries. While some work has been done to understand the extent to which public 
communication is ‘Europeanised’ in other EU member states (for example, Risse 2010), work 
is needed to understand if the patterns identified here are to be found elsewhere in the EU. 
While the UK appears — especially in light of the 2016 referendum on EU membership — to 
be an especially powerful example of a country where public attitudes towards European 
integration act as a constraint on policy makers, developments in the politics of the EU 
demonstrate a deeper crisis of European integration than when Hooghe and Marks first 
proposed their theory in 2009. The slowing speed of European integration, the rise of 
Eurosceptic parties in many EU States (including, notably, Alternative für Deutschland in 
Germany, Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, and Front National in France), the difficulties faced by 
the EU in responding to the continuing crisis of the Eurozone, and the challenge of the UK’s 
vote to leave the Union all suggest that domestic politics are increasingly important to the 
development of European integration. 
Part of this work entails developing a deeper understanding of the agency of media 
organisations in debates in other EU Member States. This includes developing the estimates 
of positions developed here to understand if the correlation between gal-tan position and 
support for European integration detected here is found in the media of other European 
countries. There is good reason to think that it may, in light of the association between these 
dimensions found in the positions of parties and the attitudes of individual citizens across the 
continent. Analysis of the specific content of news discourses would undoubtedly reveal 
significant variation between member states — the domestic nature of the contestation of 
European integration means that concerns about the EU are inevitably linked to domestic 
political issues — however a wider study might seek to discover the common features 
between the debates in member states to develop a more structured picture of discourses on 
European integration across the EU.  
Another avenue for research is in studying politicisation in the context of different modes of 
contestation of European integration. This thesis has largely concentrated on domestic 
elections, reflecting the domestic focus of postfunctionalism’s model of politicisation. 
Referendums offer an alternative to this, and the UK’s 2016 referendum on EU membership 
appears to be an obvious and interesting example. The postfunctionalist politicisation model is 
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particularly well-suited to studying events such as referendums, since these represent a very 
clear case of decisions on European policy being made in the arena of mass politics: rather 
than simply an example of policy makers having to ‘look over their shoulder’ when making 
policy on Europe, referendums involve politicians devolving this decision-making directly to 
citizens. As noted above, the recent UK referendum is a case where postfunctionalism may be 
able to offer a much-needed explanatory framework for understanding the causes of the result.  
Wider questions arise from this thesis about the nature of the media’s role as an intermediary 
actor in the arena of mass politics. While the communications studies literature contains a 
growing body of work on the effects of media discourses on the attitudes of citizens, the 
conduct of political debates, and on the wider discursive environment, the project of 
integrating this knowledge into political science is incomplete. Understanding how and when 
the media are significant actors which might constrain or influence the actions of parties and 
other actors is another area where more work needs to be done. This thesis has presented 
evidence that the media can be important in determining which messages citizens receive 
from parties. However, further evidence is required to expand this analysis beyond 
newspapers, especially in light of the declining circulation of print newspapers and the 
increasing importance of the internet for news consumption. The dynamics of news 
production also face changes as social media becomes more widely used and becomes an 
important site of discourse production. Although some studies have begun to address this (for 
example, de Wilde et al 2013), the influence of the internet and social media discourses on 
European integration remains relatively unexplored. Online media have the potential to 
involve citizens more actively in the construction of discourses on European integration, and 
in the processes of politicisation and contestation. Therefore, understanding decision making 
in these new media is an important step in building a more comprehensive picture of the 
influence of discourses on European integration in the mass arena.  
Questions also remain about precisely when and why media actors choose to reframe party 
messages and thus play a role in shaping the content and character of debates. A wider study 
of media reframing of party discourses on European integration might be able to identify 
trends in this behaviour where the current study could not. Understanding the conditions in 
which media actors choose to substantively reframe party discourses, and the ways in which 
they represent party attempts at intervention in public debates, in more detail, would allow for 
greater specificity in the MAP model. Ultimately, this thesis has presented theory of European 
integration that takes into account the highly complex nature of mass-mediated public debates 
that connect citizens with parties, the media, and other actors. Only by understanding the 
dynamics of these debates can we fully understand the the current state of the contestation of 
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the EU across its member states and the implications that these debates have for the future of 
Europe.  
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